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INTRODUCTION FOR THE GOODWIN SEMINAR
ARTICLES: TRADE WINDS IN CARIBBEAN LAW-
EVOLUTION OF LEGAL NORMS AND QUEST FOR
INDEPENDENT JUSTICE
JANE E. CROSS
During the fall semester of 2004, Nova Southeastern University
Shepard Broad Law Center (NSU Law Center) devoted its Goodwin Seminar
series to an examination of emerging legal trends and institutions in the
Commonwealth Caribbean. Accordingly, the seminar series invited a num-
ber of speakers to explore the ongoing legal reform and change within the
region. Along these lines, the Goodwin Seminar speakers provided insights
into the long-term efforts to address contemporary national, regional, and
international concerns by advancing Caribbean law and legal institutions.
These innovations have culminated with such historic regional undertakings
as the inauguration of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) scheduled for
April 2005 and the establishment of the Caribbean Single Market and Econ-
omy (CSME).
The speakers for the Goodwin Seminar were selected in order to pro-
vide a full variety of perspectives on the current legal developments in the
Caribbean. As the list below indicates, the featured speakers included indi-
viduals from the legal academy, government, judiciary, and the legal profes-
sion. NSU Law Center was honored to host the following distinguished
speakers:
* The Honorable Dr. Kenny Anthony, Prime Minister of St. Lucia;
* Dr. Rose-Marie Belle Antoine, Director of the Master of Law Pro-
gram at the University of the West Indies and a Senior Lecturer in Law;
* C. Dennis Morrison, Q.C., Partner, DunnCox Law Firm, Kingston,
Jamaica;
e The Honorable Mia Amor Mottley, Q.C., M.P., Deputy Prime Minis-
ter, Attorney General and Minister of Home Affairs, Barbados; and
* Sir David A. C. Simmons, K.A., A.C.H., Chief Justice of the Su-
preme Court of Barbados.
Nova Law Review has graciously consented to publish the papers of
four of these speakers - Dr. Antoine, Mr. Morrison, Minister Mottley, and
* Jane E. Cross is an Associate Professor of Law at Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova
Southeastern University. Professor Cross was the Faculty Chair of the Goodwin Seminar in
the fall of 2004.
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Chief Justice Simmons. This issue of the Nova Law Review includes the
papers of Dr. Antoine and Chief Justice Simmons.' The remaining two pa-
pers by Mr. Morrison and Minister Mottley will be published in a forthcom-
ing issue of Nova Law Review. For that reason, these two papers are not
referenced below. This introduction does, however, reference points from
the unpublished keynote address by Prime Minister Anthony.
As underscored by each of the Goodwin speakers, the Commonwealth
Caribbean community is undergoing a post-colonial renaissance as shown by
its emerging legal institutions and identity. Caribbean institutions and the
actors within those institutions have continually explored the bounds and
parameters delineating the character of Commonwealth Caribbean jurispru-
dence. By themselves, such efforts would prove highly significant. These
legal initiatives, however, are now taking shaping in an increasingly collabo-
rative environment in the Caribbean. Most importantly, these endeavors
seek to benefit all of region's parts, by strengthening the whole. At the core
of this effort is the establishment of the CSME. The establishment of the
CSME will be reinforced by the coincidental establishment of the CCJ. Thus
taking all of these trends together, the consolidation of regional self aware-
ness with this remarkable culmination of the legal philosophy and organiza-
tion will categorically transform law and the legal systems in the Caribbean.
The first featured Goodwin Visiting Professor is Dr. Rose-Marie Belle-
Antoine who is Director of the Master of Law Program at the University of
the West Indies and a Senior Lecturer in Law. In addition to these positions,
she works as an attorney-at-law and has worked as international legal con-
sultant on projects that have included international organizations such as the
ILO, the World Bank, UNICEF and the Inter-Development Bank.
Dr. Antoine received her LL.B. with honors from the University of the
West Indies, Barbados and her Legal Education Certificate from the Norman
Manley Law School in Jamaica. She continued her studies in England, earn-
ing her LL.M. with distinctions at Cambridge University and her Doctorate
in Law from Oxford University. To add to those distinctions, Dr. Antoine is
the recipient of a Certificate in International Human Rights Teaching from
the Centre for International Human Rights Teaching in France, and a Di-
ploma in International Human Rights Law from the International Institute of
Human Rights at the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France.
1. The author would like to offer profound gratitude to the Krista Kovalcin, Katherine
Miller, Christopher Sprague, and Nicole Velasco for all of their efforts on behalf of these
authors.
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In 1999, she completed her doctoral thesis on Legal Issues in Offshore
Finance.2 Since then, she has written a number of books on this subject,
including Legal Aspects of Offshore Finance Law,3 Trusts and Related Tax
Issues in Offshore Financial Law,4 and Confidentiality in Offshore Financial
Law.5 Dr. Antoine has also authored numerous chapters and articles for a
variety of publications, including the Caribbean Law Bulletin, the Caribbean
Law Review, the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, and the International and
Comparative Law Quarterly. Her most recent book is Commonwealth Car-
ibbean Law and Legal Systems, second edition, scheduled for publication in
August 2005.6 Finally, in addition to being the Leo Goodwin Senior Chair in
Law, Dr. Antoine has received numerous awards and honors, and has repre-
sented Barbados and the Caribbean as an official delegate at regional and
international conferences.
In her paper, entitled, Waiting to Exhale: Commonwealth Caribbean
Law and Legal Systems, Dr. Antoine provides a brief overview of Caribbean
legal system from a historical perspective. 7 In this section, she explores the
psychological legacy of slave societies and its influence of the adoption of
British jurisprudence without fully adapting these norms and institutions to
the diverse demands of Caribbean society.8 In the remainder of her paper she
delves into four momentous legal themes in the region. These are: (1) the
replacement of the English Judicial Committee of the Privy Council with the
Caribbean Court of Justice;9 (2) the controversial issue of the constitutional-
ity of the death penalty in the Caribbean; 10 (3) the innovative legal regime of
the offshore financial sector;" and (4) the legal transformation need for po-
litical and economic regional integration. 2 Throughout her article, she dis-
2. Dr. Rose-Marie Belle Antoine, Legal Issues in Offshore Finance (1999) (unpublished
thesis) (on file with author).
3. ROSE-MARIE BELLE ANTOINE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF OFFSHORE FINANCE LAW:
CONFIDENTIALITY IN OFFSHORE FINANCE LAW & OFFSHORE TRUSTS AND RELATED TAX ISSUES
IN OFFSHORE FINANCIAL LAW (2005).
4. ROSE-MARIE BELLE ANTOINE, TRUSTS AND RELATED TAX ISSUES IN OFFSHORE
FINANCE LAW (2005).
5. ROSE-MARIE BELLE ANTOINE, CONFIDENTIALITY IN OFFSHORE FINANCIAL LAW
(2002).
6. ROSE-MARIE BELLE ANTOINE, COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN LAW AND LEGAL
SYSTEMS (Cavendish Pub. Ltd. 2000) (1999).
7. Rose-Marie B. Antoine, Waiting to Exhale: Commonwealth Caribbean Law and
Legal Systems, 29 NOVA L. REV. 139 (2005).
8. Id. at 141-42.
9. Id. at 144-50.
10. Id. at 150-54.
11. Id. at 154-61.
12. Antoine, supra note 7, at 162-64.
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cusses the factors supporting the impetus for legal evolution within the Car-
ibbean and also highlights the internal and external forces that both seek to
support and inhibit such change. 3 Overall, Dr. Antoine's article provides
judicious insight into the critical contemporary challenges facing Caribbean
Law and Legal Systems. 4
The second featured Goodwin Visiting Professor is Sir David A.C. Sim-
mons, who became the twelfth Chief Justice of Barbados on January 1, 2002.
Justice Simmons is a graduate of the Faculty of Law at the London School of
Economics where he received his L.L.B. (with honors) in 1963 and was the
first Barbadian to receive his L.L.M. awarded in 1965 from the University of
London. He is also a barrister of Lincoln's Inn. Sir David Simmons has
lectured law in London and at the Faculty of Law of the University of the
West Indies (UWI). In June 2003, he became an Honorary Fellow of the
UWI. In December 2003, he was the first Caribbean person ever awarded an
honorary L.L.D. by the University of London.
Sir David Simmons has had an impressive career as an attorney, Mem-
ber of Parliament, and Attorney General in Barbados. He was appointed
Queen's Counsel in Barbados in February 1984, served in the Parliament of
Barbados from February 1976 to August 2001, and served twice as Attorney
General of Barbados from 1985 to 1986 and from 1994 to 2001. On several
occasions during the latter period as Attorney General, Sir David Simmons
acted as Prime Minister of Barbados. Due to his distinction in public service
and politics, in January 2001 he was awarded the Barbados Centennial Hon-
our (B.C.H.), and on November 30, 2001, he received Barbados' highest
national honor when he was named a Knight of St. Andrew (K.A.).
As Attorney General, Simmons has chaired numerous committees, ini-
tiatives and conferences, including the Caribbean Financial Action Task
Force (1997/98), the Regional Committee for the Establishment of a Project
for Maritime Cooperation Against the Traffic in Illicit Narcotic Drugs in the
Caribbean (1999-2002), the Preparatory Committee to Establish the Carib-
bean Court of Justice (1999-2001), the Regional Judicial and Legal Services
Commission (2003-2004), EU/Caribbean Conference (1996), and the Joint
U.S./Caribbean Sub-Committee(1 997). He has also represented Barbados at
regional and international forums and is the author of numerous papers and
publications.
In the Caribbean Court of Justice: A Unique Institution of Caribbean
Creativity, Sir David Simmons describes the historical background leading to
13. Id.
14. Id. at 140.
[Vol. 29:2:131
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the planned inauguration of the CCJ.' 5 In this paper, he also explores a series
of arguments supporting and opposing the establishment of the CCJ,' 6 and
justifies the designation of the CCJ as a court sui generis.'7 Justice Simmons
then explains (1) the impetus the CCJ will create to upgrade regional and
local justice systems,"8 and (2) the process of severing links with the JCPC.' 9
He then briefly outlines some final steps to the anticipated inauguration of
the CCJ in 2005.20 He ends by concluding that the creation of the CCJ "will
complete our independence and finally remove the self-doubt and lack of
self-confidence which have been deeply ingrained in the psyche of our for-
mer colonial peoples.'
The themes elaborated by Dr. Antoine and Justice Simmons were rein-
forced by the insightful remarks of Prime Minister Kenny Anthony during
his keynote address during the Goodwin Seminar series. Elected Prime Min-
ister of St. Lucia in 1997, Dr. Anthony is an educator, former General Coun-
sel to CARICOM, and leader of the St. Lucia Labour Party. In this keynote
address, Prime Minister Anthony noted that although much of the opposition
to the establishment of the CCJ comes from the notion that it will be a "hang-
ing court," this has never been the primary goal or purpose of the CCJ.2 2 He
explained that while the series of death penalty cases beginning with Pratt v.
Attorney General23 have intensified both support for and opposition to the
CCJ, the efforts to establish the CCJ pre-date this seminal decision. 24 In ad-
dition, Prime Minister Anthony noted other compelling reasons for the estab-
lishment of the CCJ, such as creating affordable access to justice,25 trans-
forming Caribbean jurisprudence,26 and fostering a Caribbean legal culture. 7
He also explained that the establishment of the CCJ will be critical to ensur-
ing the success of the CSME.28 He stated that without the CCJ, "[c]ompeting
15. Honorable Sir David Simmons, The Caribbean Court of Justice: A Unique Institution
of Caribbean Creativity, 29 NOVA L. REV. 169 (2005).
16. Id. at 177-84.
17. Id. at 186-93.
18. Id. at 195.
19. Id. at 196.
20. Simmons, supra note 15, at 196-97.
21. Id. at 198.
22. Kenny D. Anthony, Establishment of the Caribbean Court of Justice: The Political
and Legal Imperatives, Address at the Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law
Center Goodwin Seminar 4-5 (Oct. 7, 2004).
23. (1993) 43 W.I.R. 340.
24. Anthony, supra note 22, at 3-9.
25. Id. at 13-14.
26. Id. at 14-15.
27. Id. at 15-16.
28. Id.
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judicial interpretations [of the CSME] could cause confusion, uncertainty
and delay., 29 He ended by noting that ultimately while the CCJ has been
designed to be insulated from political interference, the support or opposition
to the CCJ rests with one's belief or disbelief in the personal integrity of the
appointed justices.30
It is notable that all of the speakers in this Goodwin Seminar series ex-
pressed strong optimism in the impending establishment of the CCJ. Follow-
ing the submission of the papers by Dr. Antoine, Chief Justice Simmons, and
Prime Minister Anthony, however, the establishment of the CCJ suffered a
major setback due to a decision by the JCPC delivered on February 3, 2005
in Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights (1998) Ltd. v. Marshall-
Burnett.31 In this decision, the JCPC struck down three acts passed by Ja-
maican Parliament in 2004.32 These acts were: (1) the Caribbean Court of
Justice (Constitutional Amendment) Act 2004, Act 20 of 2004; 33 (2) the Car-
ibbean Court of Justice Act 2004, Act 21 of 2004;14 and (3) the Judicature
(Appellate Jurisdiction) (Amendment) Act 2004, Act 19 of 2004.3' Respec-
tively, these acts were passed (1) to replace the Privy Council with the CCJ
as the final court of appeal from decisions by the Jamaican Court of Ap-
peal,36 (2) to implement in Jamaica the CARICOM Agreement Establishing
the Caribbean Court of Justice as amended by the Protocol to that Agreement
Relating to the Juridical Personality and Legal Capacity of the Court,37 and
(3) to substitute the Deputy of Public Prosecutions' right of appeal to the
Privy Council in criminal cases with the right of appeal to the CCJ. 38
The Privy Council held that the first two acts described above effec-
tively amended entrenched provisions of the Jamaican Constitution.39 As
such, the acts could not take effect by a mere majority of the parliament, but
required a two-thirds vote as required by the Jamaican Constitution.40 In
addition, the passage of amendment to an entrenched provision requires a
six-month lapse between the bill's introduction into and passage by Parlia-
29. Anthony, supra note 22, at 20.
30. ld. at 23.
31. [2005] U.K.P.C. 3, available at http://www.privy-council.org.uk/files/other/indepen
dent%20jamaica.jud.rtf.
32. Id. 24.
33. Id. 5.
34. Id. 6.
35. Id. 8.
36. Marshall-Burnett, [2005] U.K.P.C. 3, 5.
37. Id 6.
38. Id. 8.
39. Id. 21.
40. Id. 10.
[Vol. 29:2:131
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ment.'" Finally, amendment of an entrenched provision requires approval by
the majority of the Jamaican electorate.42 Although the third act did not
amend an entrenched provision and could be affected by a majority vote in
the Parliament, that constitutional amendment was voided as well.43 The
reason for its voiding was that this legislation was inextricably linked to the
first two acts and, therefore, could not accomplish its intended effect if sev-
ered from the two voided acts." As such, the Privy Council held that all
three acts were void due to unconstitutionality.4 5
With the delivery of this inopportune judgment by the Privy Council,
the Caribbean Court of Justice has a more difficult future. More notably, the
implications of this opinion once again shine a glaring light on the jarring
effect of some Privy Council pronouncements. In essence, this case encapsu-
lates the jurisprudential tension at the heart of the efforts to establish the Car-
ibbean Court of Justice. As noted by Dr. Antoine in her paper, there remains
a question of the impartiality of the Privy Council.46 This issue of impartial-
ity takes center stage in this most recent case even though the Privy Council
expressly stated that "it must be understood that the Board [of the Privy
Council], sitting as the final court of appeal of Jamaica, has no interest of its
own in the outcome of this appeal. The Board exists in this capacity to serve
the interests of the people of Jamaica."47
Accordingly, despite the inexorably long historical march to the estab-
lishment of the CCJ, as outlined by Dr. Antoine and Justice Simmons, the
Commonwealth Caribbean must continue its struggle at the doorstep of full
regional judicial autonomy.48 Correspondingly, judicial colonialism, though
slated for death by the agreement to establish the CCJ, cannot yet be dealt its
death knell because its execution has been temporarily stayed due to the in-
tervention of the Privy Council. It is doubtful that this irony will be over-
looked by proponents of the CCJ.
In the aftermath of the JCPC pronouncement, the process to establish
the CCJ may falter somewhat, but will unquestionably continue. Edwin W.
Carrington, the Secretary General of CARICOM, has stated that "[tlhere is as
yet no indication that the Privy Council's ruling on Jamaica's legislation
introducing the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) would delay the establish-
41. Marshall-Burnett, [2005] U.K.P.C. 3, 10.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 22, 24.
46. Antoine, supra note 7, at 149.
47. Marshall-Burnett, [2005] U.K.P.C. 3, 4.
48. See Antoine, supra note 7; Simmons, supra note 15.
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ment of the Court by CARICOM Governments."49 In addition, P.J. Patter-
son, Prime Minister of Jamaica, issued in part the following statement in
reaction to the JCPC decision: "[t]he Jamaican Government remains com-
mitted to the establishment of the CCJ as our final appellate court. It intends
to take the necessary steps, arising from this decision to honour our commit-
ments to the Jamaican people and our partners in the region."5
As this process to establish the CCJ continues to evolve and face new
challenges, there will be a recurring need for academic forums to explore and
discuss these salient topics both within and without the Caribbean region.
Thus, although this Goodwin Seminar series at NSU Law Center undertook
to contribute to the discussion of the evolving legal norms and institutions in
the Caribbean, clearly the dialogue will expand to explore new possibilities,
processes, and understandings.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR THE FALL 2004 GOODWIN SERIES
As always, the success of any undertaking like the Goodwin Seminar
involves the collaboration and cooperation of a number of dedicated indi-
viduals. First, I would like to thank Dean Joseph Harbaugh and Associate
Dean Bill Adams for entrusting me with this important responsibility. Next,
I would like to give my profound thanks to Linda Lahey, Michelle Hurley,
and Deborah Brown who were all invaluable in organizing and coordinating
the seminar events. I would also express my deep appreciation to Paula
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extend my thanks to the entire law faculty for supporting this series in innu-
merable ways. I would especially like to thank Kathy Cerminara, Linda Har-
49. Press Release 32/2005, Caribbean Community Secretariate, CARICOM States Move
to Establish CCJ on Schedule (Feb. 4, 2005) available at http://www.caricom.org/pres
32_05.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
50. Press Release, Jamaica Information Service, Statement by Prime Minister of Jamaica
the Most Honourable P. J. Patterson, ON, PC, QC, MP on the Privy Council Decision in the
Litigation Concerning the Caribbean Court of Justice (Feb. 3, 2005) available at http://www.
caricom.org/newsflash-ccjruling-ja.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
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effort including, but not limited to, Alvin Abraham, Nerina Smart, Sophia
Lopez, and Lawrence Eberst. I also extend my appreciation to all of the
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In addition, I thank the various members of administrative staff who
graciously assisted me in making arrangements for the speakers in the Good-
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included Cecelia La Corbiniere (Prime Minister Anthony); June Christian
(Justice David Simmons); Hazel Mederick (Minister Mottley); and Deborah
Cadogan (Minister Mottley)
Last, but not least, I extend my thanks to those members of the Carib-
bean-American Community who supported this series. Among them are the
Consul Generals from Barbados, Ed Bushnell, as well as the Deputy Consul
General Joyce Boume, from St. Lucia, Kent Hippolyte and from Jamaica,
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE ANATOMY AND CONTEXT OF COMMONWEALTH
CARIBBEAN LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEMS
This is an exciting and appropriate time to be discussing Common-
wealth Caribbean legal systems. We stand at the very crossroads of a Carib-
bean revolution in legal development. At this juncture, we have several im-
portant choices to make, and our future will be determined by the wisdom of
those choices as we attempt to define our place in the world. I suggest that
we have never had a more opportune time to create an independent legal
philosophy, whilst at the same time, steaming ahead to forge a unified Carib-
bean identity. Caribbean legal systems can be said to be at the boiling point.
Perhaps there has been no other time in our history when every Caribbean
man and woman is aware of, and has a stake in, the directions in which our
laws and legal policies are going. Whether we are speaking about the reten-
tion of the death penalty, or the abolition of appeals to the English Privy
Council, or the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME), or changes
in our official financial system brought about by blacklisting attempts of the
world community, the latter which impacts directly on employment opportu-
nities, we all relate intimately with and participate directly in these develop-
ments.
And at this crossroad-whilst we stand, waiting to exhale-the relation-
ships which we have with the rest of the international community, through
our practices and our legal system, are very much swinging in the balance. It
is appropriate, therefore, that I should be addressing my remarks to an exter-
nal audience, in a country and state with which the Caribbean has had very
many links, and with which there are many similarities, not just in hurricane
impacts, but in our very legal history, in some of the judicial patterns which
we may in the future emulate and, unfortunately, some of the problems
which we face.
While this is a huge topic, I will contain my discussion to four main ar-
eas: 1) the turning away from the Privy Council to an indigenous final Ca-
ribbean Court of Appeal and jurisprudence; 2) Constitutional Reform arising
from the death penalty and other social problems, such as gender; 3) the im-
pact of the offshore financial sector and its contribution to our legal devel-
opment; and 4) initiatives toward political and economic unity which neces-
sitate law reform and possible harmonization of laws in the region.
What we find is that there are common denominators in all four of these
main areas. They are issues of political sovereignty, economic problems,
and even questions of economic survival. These underline the vulnerable
status and place of small developing countries in the world. It should also be
[Vol.29:2:141
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noted that some of our main discussion areas are closely intertwined. I sug-
gest that an important thread running through our analyses is the extent to
which small, poor, developing nations such as ours have the freedom and the
flexibility to fully define the legal systems therein. This may, at first blush,
seem to be an alarmist, rather extreme position, but upon closer examination,
we shall see that there are important truths and realities to be ascertained.
When we speak of difficulties in defining and shaping the legal systems
in the region, we are not, of course, speaking of the kind of legal displace-
ment that can occur when one country invades or intervenes into another
smaller, weaker country. That brings its own dynamics and is certainly
something which occurred very early in our legal history, although the exis-
tence of the legal and political systems of the original peoples is hardly even
acknowledged.' Here, legal displacement may be far more subtle and may
even be welcomed with open arms; in some cases, it is self-perpetuating.
First, however, a brief description of Commonwealth Caribbean legal sys-
tems and legal infrastructure is outlined.
II. DESCRIPTION OF COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS
The Commonwealth Caribbean region is made up of a number of small
democratic states, over fourteen of them having formed themselves into a
loose political community, called the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).2
Only a few countries in the region are still dependent territories of the United
Kingdom, among them Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Is-
lands, and Montserrat. These are associated members of CARICOM, with
the exception of Montserrat, which is a full member.3 There are current ini-
tiatives toward formal economic integration and more formal political ties,
but the principle of autonomous self-government for each one of these states
is likely to be retained. The governmental system, the Westminster Parlia-
ment system, including its traditions of political and legal conventions, fol-
1. Nor did the legal systems of early European conquerors like the Spanish, French,
Portuguese, or Dutch endure except in isolated cases, such as in St. Lucia and Guyana.
2. See Caribbean Community Secretariat, The History of CARICOM, at http://www.cari
com.org/archives/caricom-history.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2004) [hereinafter History of
CARICOM]. Originally, CARICOM was made up of only English speaking states which are
part of the Commonwealth, but more recently, non-English speaking states, such as Suriname
and Haiti, have become members. Id.
3. Caribbean Community Secretariat, Caricom Members & Associate Members, at
http://www.caricom.org/members.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2004).
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lows closely the model set out by England, the former coloniser of the
Commonwealth Caribbean.
The region can boast of enviably high levels of literacy and often qual-
ity education, particularly at the primary and secondary school levels, also
inherited from the British.' Although the Caribbean has a relatively small
population, there have been three Nobel Prize winners. Incredibly, two come
from the same country, the tiny nation of St. Lucia (150,000 people), for
Economics and Literature, and recently a third, for literature, from Trinidad
and Tobago.
Commonwealth Caribbean legal systems, like United States' legal sys-
tems, were born out of our English colonial heritage, ensuring that the shape
and flavour of our law is largely the common law legal tradition. I say
largely because the history of conquest in the region was a very colourful
one, with many of our countries changing hands between the French, Span-
ish, and English. This means that not only English law was received but, at
least initially, so was the civil law. Only Guyana and St. Lucia have retained
aspects of the civil law. In the case of St. Lucia, the country (called the
Helen of Troy of the West) changed hands between the English and French
fourteen times, resulting in a hybrid legal tradition. This may be described as
a unique mixture of the English common law, French civil law, and indige-
nous law, facilitated by a bond with all things French and the development of
a French Kweyol language.6
The experiences of slavery, also a feature of United States historical de-
velopment, have perhaps had a more direct impact on our legal systems than
those of the United States. This is because the ancestors of African slaves
form a larger percentage of our population than in the United States. Thus,
they are not the minority but the majority, a consequence which arguably has
very positive consequences, but which, understandably, make the negative
experiences of slavery more enduring.
4. See History of CARICOM, supra note 2. While there are now two non-English
speaking CARICOM members, this paper confines itself to a discussion of the legal systems
of the Commonwealth Caribbean.
5. Ironically, a recent trend is that some British parents have been sending their children
to the Caribbean to obtain their grounding in education because of concerns that the education
system at that level in the United Kingdom is inadequate. See Gareth Rubin, Passport to
Better Learning, THE INDEPENDENT, July 1, 2004, at http://education.independent.co.uk/
schools/story.jsp?story=536879.
6. For further reading on the hybrid legal system of Saint Lucia, see Kenny D. Anthony,
The Viability of the Civilist Tradition in St. Lucia: A Tenative Appraisal, in ESSAYS ON THE
CIVIL CODES OF QUtBEC AND ST. LUCIA 33 (Raymond A. Landry & Ernest Caparros eds.,
Univ. of Ottawa Press 1984).
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Thus, the psychological impact and longevity of brutal slave societies
has led to what can be described as feelings of insecurity and dependency in
our societies today. Perhaps this is the reason why today, we still send our
final appeals to the Privy Council located in England and why so many Car-
ibbean people doubt that we can adjudicate final appeals for ourselves in a
just manner. Interestingly, this belief that we could not be trusted to do
things right for ourselves was one of the reasons why, upon independence,
we ended up with written constitutions which secured rights and created ob-
ligations, instead of continuing with the pure Westminster model of unwrit-
ten constitutions. Independence was attained for most states during the
1960s and 1970s, making the countries in question exceedingly young na-
tions.
Our ex-slave societies may also be described as apathetic, as a result of
the enduring alienation that Caribbean peoples, the governed, feel with those
who govern. There is a sense of disconnect, a feeling that we do not and
cannot control our own destiny and that our voices are not heard. I would
suggest that although this may be changing in relation to models of govern-
ment, it is being substituted for the growing feelings of helplessness that so
called Third World countries feel in relation to international economics and
politics. In those paradigms, small developing countries have little voice and
little control over their destinies. We see this, for example, in the negative
way in which free trade law constructs have impacted upon our banana in-
dustries, our sugar industries, and even our international financial services
sector.
These human traits in our societies perhaps best explains the failure to
"strike out ... and mould" the common law to "suit [our] needs" and devel-
opment.' We remain today, largely "mimic men ' in terms of our legal de-
velopment, an unhappy stance which is much lamented but which is chang-
ing too slowly. Few proactive initiatives, from either our judges or our prac-
titioners, are taken to rectify this situation. Unlike the United States, which
took the English common law and created vibrant, sometimes radically new
legal concepts, interpretations, and precedents, Commonwealth Caribbean
courts and jurists still rely heavily, almost totally, on English precedent.
More recently, we have sometimes substituted English law with European
Law and U.S. law, particularly in relation to human rights issues.
7. Persaud v. Plantation Versailles, [1971] 17 W.I.R. 107, 118 (Guy. C.A.). Persuad is
a well-known case in the Caribbean.
8. V.S. NAIPAUL, THE MIMIC MEN (1967). The term "mimic men," as used to describe
West-Indians, was made famous by Sir V.S. Naipul, who is also the Nobel Prize Winner for
literature from Trinidad and Tobago.
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It appears that we are successful legal civilisations if we judge ourselves
by how admirably we have retained and maintained the English justice that
we inherited or, more accurately, was thrust upon us. However, we are fail-
ures by our inability to put our own stamp, our own face, on our justice.
Ultimately, law is meant to reflect society and to engineer society. Yet, our
law still looks very alien and foreign to many.
III. THE ABOLITION OF FINAL APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL AND THE
INSTITUTION OF A CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
I will touch only briefly on this topic, as I am aware that other speakers
in the Goodwin Seminar will speak exclusively on it. Suffice it to say that
after decades of talking, we are at the doorstep of a new era in adjudication
as it appears that the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) will now become a
reality in March 2005.' However, not all of the countries of the region have
joined the momentum toward sovereign and independent justice by putting
an end to final appeals to the Privy Council. Some, like The Commonwealth
of The Bahamas, have refused flatly, at least at this juncture, to participate in
the appellate jurisdiction of the CCJ.'0 Others, like Jamaica, while their gov-
ernments have supported the idea,"' have been plagued with much opposition
to the cutting of ties with the apparent fountain of justice that is England. It
should be noted, however, that all of the independent Commonwealth Carib-
bean countries will participate in the original jurisdiction of the CCJ, 2 dis-
cussed further below.
This topic has perhaps been the one which has engendered the most
emotive responses from Caribbean peoples, particularly attorneys. 3 At the
top of the list are fears that the CCJ will not dispense impartial justice, that it
will be too costly, that the region will not be able to choose judges based on
merit, that those judges will not be competent enough to make right deci-
9. Press Release, Caribbean Community Secretariat, Postponement of Inauguration of
the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) (Oct. 11, 2004), at http://www.caricom.org/pressre-
leases/presl57_04.htm.
10. Response by the Hon. Fred Mitchell, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to FNM's Spokes-
man on Caribbean Single Market and Economy (Aug. 26, 2003) at http://www.bahamasun-
censored.com/csme response.html.
11. HUGH RAWLiNS, THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: THE HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF
THE DEBATE 5 (2000), http://www.caricom.org/archives/ccj rawlins.pdf.
12. Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, Feb. 14, 2000, art. II, http://
www.caricom.org/archives/agreement-ccj.pdf [hereinafter CCJ Agreement].
13. Caribbean Court of Justice, About the Caribbean Court of Justice, at http://www.
caribbeancourtofjustice.org/abtccj.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2004) [hereinafter About the
Caribbean Court of Justice].
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sions, and that the larger countries in the region will dominate the court. 4
We can observe the preponderance of the reasons that seem connected to my
earlier points about insecurity and dependency which plague us as a people
in our moves toward development.
While the driving forces behind the CCJ deny that it is a direct response
to unpopular Privy Council judgments which prevented the implementation
of the death penalty,15 there is little doubt that the Privy Council's high-
handed approach to constitutional interpretation with regard to the death
penalty, and its failure to appreciate the principles by which Caribbean peo-
ples wish to live, have acted as catalysts to the institution of the CCJ. This is
but another example of the way in which international forces have plunged
us along a path which some maintain that we are not yet ready for.
Yet the CCJ represents so much to Caribbean peoples. Its advocates ar-
gue, correctly, that independence should not have a price tag. 6 We also have
the positive example of an integrated court in the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States (OECS) Court of Appeal, and a Guyana final court of ap-
peal since that country abolished appeals to the Privy Council many years
ago.' 7 These existing courts should serve as assurances to Caribbean peoples
since they have operated efficiently, and largely without stains of bias or
incompetence. Further, an independent Legal Commission has been estab-
lished to ensure impartiality in judicial selection for the CCJ.'8
A. Cost of Justice
The question of cost is not limited to the funding of the CCJ. A grave
defect in our legal system is the relatively poor access to justice. Justice is
expensive at every level, mainly because of the absence of contingency fees
as found in the United States and the glaring absence of adequate legal aid
for many matters. This is compounded, of course, by the relatively high lev-
14. Id.
15. This began with the landmark decision of Pratt v. A-G, [1993] 43 W.I.R. 340 (P.C.),
which held that undue delay on death row constituted cruel and inhuman punishment which
violated Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions. Id. at 359-60.
16. See, e.g., Dorcas White, Jettison the Judicial Committee? You T'ink It Easy? (1975)
(unpublished paper, on file with the Reserve Collection, Faculty of Law Library, University of
the West Indies). However, it should be noted that the CCJ will be funded by external mon-
ies, at least initially, which is another instance of our dependence on external factors.
17. See RAwLiNs, supra note 11, at 5. Information about the OECS Court of Appeal can
be found at the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court website, http://www.ecsupremecourts.
org.lc/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
18. About the Caribbean Court of Justice, supra note 13.
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els of poverty in the region, where litigation is perhaps viewed as a luxury.' 9
It is particularly costly where appeals have to be brought to the Privy Coun-
cil, not the least because the rules of the court dictate that British counsel
must be retained.
B. Indigenous Jurisprudence and the Declaratory Theory
My own view is that the CCJ has been too long in coming. Its existence
is imperative for the embodiment of independence and sovereignty which
every society must display and live by. It is also the most viable tool for the
encouragement and development of an indigenous Caribbean jurisprudence.
Yet, it is the latter which is the most problematic. The crux of the issue is
not simply a court located in the region, but a jurisprudence located in the
region. I have argued elsewhere that, unless Caribbean jurists mend their
ways, in particular, their restrictive approach to precedent and their over-
reliance on English law, what we are in danger of seeing is only a change in
the complexion of our judges and not of our law.2 °
This thinking comes from an approach that views the reception of the
common law in the most restricted way, holding onto a belief that it is only
the House of Lords of England that can legitimately declare the correct prin-
ciples of the common law. Such a view, which is often expressed by our
judges,2" results in a very limited opportunity for change and for an evolving
jurisprudence. It is in direct contrast to the United State's approach to recep-
tion and the evolution of the common law. Caribbean judgments are rarely
seen as authoritative. Indeed, they are seldom cited.
C. Turn Toward United States Law?
There is another possibility for the direction of CARICOM jurispru-
dence and legal infrastructure. While we may turn away from an incestuous
English jurisprudence, we may seek to find solutions, not so much out of our
own creativity and experience, but in the increasingly accessible United
States and North American models. This is by no means far-fetched. Cur-
19. A recent view expressed by the Chief Magistrate of St. Vincent and its Magistrate for
the Family Court is that legal aid should be available even for family court and divorce mat-
ters, as many couples stay together simply because they cannot afford a divorce. First OECS
Law Fair, September 17, 2004, Kingstown, St. Vincent. Legal aid, where granted, such as in
murder cases, has largely been viewed as inadequate.
20. ROSE-MARIE BELLE ANTOINE, COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN LAW AND LEGAL
SYsTEMs 249 (reprint 2000) (1999).
21. See, e.g., Jamaica Carpet Mills, Ltd. v. First Valley Bank, [1986] 45 W.I.R. 278 (Jam.
C.A.).
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rently, our constitutional law is heavily informed by United States constitu-
tional law, largely because of the absence of a written United Kingdom con-
stitution upon which to lean.
The convergence toward North American models of legal systems is
also seen in the recent adoption of case-management, court practices, and
rules borrowed from Canada and which aims to make court adjudication
more efficient. Further, we have already seen a high degree of Americaniza-
tion of the region, aided, no doubt, by our geographical closeness and the
dominance of American television and pop culture. That same television is a
medium for transmitting models of justice, such as televised trials, racially
constructed juries, new rules of evidence, and changing the locations of ju-
ries to avoid bias. These may challenge long-held assumptions about the
correct (English) way of doing things. Perhaps the day is not too far away
when we will be electing judges! There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that
the Caribbean layperson has been seduced into believing that the American
way is the more relevant and accurate face of justice.
Some options which may be borrowed from the American legal system
seem more attractive than others. Contingency fees, for example, may be
suitable in societies such as ours where many citizens find the cost of justice
to be prohibitive, and where, as noted earlier, legal aid is scarce. It may also
have the effect of speeding up the process by encouraging legal counsel to be
more time-efficient. In addition, it has been argued that multicultural socie-
ties such as ours should be reflected in the composition of our juries, a posi-
tion which has been resisted under the traditional English jury system, but
adopted in the United States.
Similarly, access to court trials on television, a medium which is
wholeheartedly embraced in the region, may encourage more inclusion in the
adjudication system, in societies whose peoples have traditionally felt that
formal channels of justice were closed to them or alienated from them. This
is not to suggest, however, that the American model of justice is a panacea
for all of the evils of the law and legal systems of the Commonwealth Carib-
bean. Its relevance and suitability to the region should be carefully scruti-
nised. Television trials, for example, have great potential to distort truth or
sensationalise litigation.
Further, while the doctrine of judicial precedent should fit appropriately
into the changing values of a society, the English model of precedent offers
more certainty than its U.S. counterpart. Change is necessary in a legal sys-
tem but it is to be approached rationally and cautiously. Ironically, the Pratt
and Morgan controversy arose out of the unusual step to deviate from certain
2005]
20
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss2/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
routes of punishment as laid down by well-established precedent.22 More
recently, some Privy Council judges have found it appropriate to speak out
against such radical change in favour of a return to a more conservative ap-
proach to precedent.23
D. Our Unrecognised Contribution to the Privy Council's Jurisprudence
A point which is seldom made is one that is positive for Caribbean ju-
risprudence, and this is that Caribbean legal practitioners and Caribbean
judges are often those who create the defining precedents in our jurispru-
dence, although they seldom get the credit. Statistics show that a large per-
centage of Caribbean Court of Appeal decisions are actually approved by the
Privy Council and the reasoning therein merely adopted.24 Yet it is the Privy
Council judgments that we cite approvingly and the justices of that court
which get the credit for these outstanding jurisprudential creations. This is
particularly the case with constitutional jurisprudence. Arguably, England
has a relatively undeveloped constitutional jurisprudence because of the ab-
sence of a written constitution. Consequently, English judicial personnel
may be less au fait with constitutional matters than in other areas. Indeed,
English jurisprudence has often been at loggerheads with European human
rights jurisprudence and the trend is only now changing with the incorpora-
tion of the European Convention on Human Rights into English law. 25 The
fear that our judicial personnel is incapable of forming intellectually ade-
quate arguments is, therefore, grossly inaccurate.
E. Political Interference
There is a growing cynicism in our region, which I believe is also re-
flected in the United States and elsewhere in the world, that politicians can-
not be trusted and that they are able to overreach well beyond the boundaries
22. See Pratt v. A-G, [1993] 43 W.I.R. 340 (P.C.).
23. See, e.g., Lewis v. A-G of Jamaica, [2000] 57 W.I.R. 275, 308 (P.C.) (Lord Hoff-
mann, dissenting). Interestingly, Lord Hoffmann relies on the practice of the United States
Supreme Court of overruling precedent reluctantly. Id.
24. The Hon. Mr. Justice M.A. de la Bastide, The Case of a Caribbean Court of Appeal,
5 CARIB. L. REv. 401, 403 (1995). Michael de la Bastide is the former Chief Justice of Trini-
dad and Tobago, and is now the President Elect of the forthcoming CCJ. See Caribbean Net
News, Chief of New Caribbean Court Sworn In (Aug. 19, 2004), at http://www.caribbean
netnews.com/2004/08/19/ccj.htm.
25. E.g., Les P. Camegie, Privacy and the Press: The Impact of Incorporating the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights in the United Kingdom, 9 DuKE J. CoMP. & INT'L L. 311
(1998).
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of what is acceptable and interfere with the judicial process. Little mention
is made of the potential for the reverse, where it is the judges who intervene
in the political process. It is perhaps an area with which American jurists are
more familiar. However, that is a topic beyond the scope of this paper.
In the case of the Commonwealth Caribbean, the fears of political inter-
vention are even less well-founded, as politicians do not even have a stake in
the appointment of the judiciary,26 except in rare instances such as at the
Chief Justice level in the OECS. The processes are implemented and super-
vised by independent legal commissions,2 7 and judges enjoy enviable secu-
rity of tenure. 8 Yet, there is an entrenched and, I believe, largely irrational
belief that judges "dance to the bidding" of politicians. Such fears endanger
the integrity of the judicial process if we accept the adage that "justice must
not only be done but it must be seen to be done."
Nonetheless, fears that judges are contaminated by the political process
are rooted largely in the immaturity of our democracies, which are offshoots
of the insecurities discussed earlier. As the democracies and legal systems of
the region mature, it is to be expected that the people will have more faith in
them. This is yet another argument for the existence of the CCJ: to enable a
demonstration of growth in both democracy and the legal infrastructure.
F. Does the Privy Council Dispense Impartial Justice?
The question whether the Privy Council can truly be impartial is often
raised. Some Caribbean peoples appear fearful about the potential bias of
our Caribbean judges but believe unquestionably in Privy Council judges.
Nevertheless, we should inquire whether, at least in issues which impinge on
sensitive areas, such as international trade, neo-colonialism and even inde-
pendence, British judges (like all judges) are coloured by their own ideolo-
gies. For example, it was the British Privy Council which had to determine
whether Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, could legitimately seize its independence
from the United Kingdom.29 Closer to home is the Mitchell case, in which
the question for the courts was whether the Grenadian revolution had created
a state that had political and legal legitimacy.3°
26. See CCJ Agreement, supra note 12, art. V(3).
27. Id.
28. Id. art. IX.
29. See Alison Grabell, New Northern Neighbor? An Independent Quebec, the United
States, and the NAFTA, 2 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 265, 276 n.68 (1995) (citing In Re: Resolu-
tion to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, 755 (Can.)).
30. Mitchell v R, [1985] L.R.C. (Const.) 127.
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The United States invasion of Grenada never reached the courts, but had
it done so, how would the Privy Council have judged it? Reportedly, the
Queen of England frowned upon the United States initiative, particularly
upon the fact that Grenada was still part of the Empire, which meant that she
was the Head of State. The view was that the United States should have
sought permission from the United Kingdom first.
These are legal decisions which directly involve or impact political is-
sues. It is not to be expected that judges who decide such issues be devoid of
ideological influences. Indeed, it may be a valid expectation that judges who
decide such questions should be grounded in an ideological position. Hence,
it is even more important for such ideological positions to emanate from
within the society upon which the decisions impact, and not from some ex-
ternal societal reality. It is where there are ideological disconnects that legal
decisions which are violently opposed by the majority in society occur, as
appeared to be the case in the Pratt and Morgan decision.3'
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE DEATH PENALTY
The issue of constitutional reform and, in particular, the jurisprudential
wrangling over the constitutionality of the death penalty and its execution, is
a controversial one in the region. An underlying theme here is the extent to
which international norms and pressures have been weighing in on the con-
stitutional development of the Commonwealth Caribbean.
Here, I am concerned not with the substantive issue of the death penalty
and its constitutionality, but with its impact on Caribbean legal systems and
Caribbean justice. The issue came into focus with the landmark ruling of the
Privy Council in Pratt and Morgan, which found that the delay that prisoners
experienced in having their sentences of death executed was sufficient to
constitute cruel and inhuman punishment and thereby violated the constitu-
tion.32 This was despite the constitutionality of the death penalty itself and
irrespective of the fact that the delay was caused substantially by the appeal
processes which the convicted were pursuing. Thereafter, in a line of cases,
the Privy Council went further and held that it was unconstitutional to con-
strue the death penalty as a mandatory penalty.33
These judgments were hugely unpopular in the region, by governments
and peoples alike who, by and large, supported the death penalty. Many
31. See Pratt v. A-G, [1993] 43 W.I.R. 340, 340 (P.C.).
32. Id. at 359-60.
33. See, e.g., Reyes v. R, [2002] 60 W.I.R. 42, 66 (P.C.); R v. Hughes, [2002] 60 W.I.R.
156, 225 (P.C.); Roodal v. Trinidad and Tobago, [2003] 64 W.I.R. 270 (P.C.); cf Boyce v R.,
[2004] 64 W.I.R. 37, 39 (P.C.).
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believed that the Privy Council was attempting to force its own belief that the
death penalty should be outlawed (which is the position in the United King-
dom) onto Commonwealth Caribbean legal systems. Notwithstanding cries
of judicial imperialism made by the general public, it is clear from prece-
dents from the European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations
Human Rights Committee that the position on undue delay was one
grounded in international law. 34 Yet, the judgments displayed a serious dis-
regard for the intent and spirit of the constitutions in question and the will of
the Caribbean peoples.
Another telling point is that the judgments also betrayed the dollars and
cents implications of Caribbean justice which held such cases to ransom.
The slowness of the judicial process is due mainly to a lack of resources
which can expedite appeals and, in some cases, the paucity of adequate legal
representation. This underscores my earlier point about the impact of prob-
lems, that are really about development, on the legal system.
Thereafter, Barbados attempted to amend its constitution to make it
more difficult to find the death penalty unconstitutional in any form. Some
countries, such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, also initiated moves to
remove themselves from the Optional Protocol to the United Nations Con-
vention on Human Rights and the relevant protocol under the Inter-American
System.35 This was to avoid the judicial jurisdiction of these bodies and
eliminate the possibility of them finding that the death penalty or its process
is often unconstitutional.
A. Static Construction Through Saving Law Clauses Versus Purposive
Construction
Despite the controversy over Pratt and Morgan and its progeny, these
decisions are not really anomalies. We have witnessed many liberal consti-
tutional interpretations by the Privy Council. These cement their oft-quoted
sentiments that constitutions are to be given purposive and generous interpre-
tations. They are, therefore, living instruments. Often, these decisions have
followed the European Court on Human Rights, so that we can legitimately
claim that our focus, at least in constitutional jurisprudence, is international.
34. E.g., Daniel J. Sharfstein, European Courts, American Rights: Extradition and
Prison Conditions, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 719, 721, 742 n.77 (2002); William A. Schabas, Mens
Rea and the Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1015, 1016
(2003).
35. Sharfstein, supra note 34, at 742 n.77 (citing Natalia Schiffrin, Jamaica Withdraws
the Right of International Petition Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 563 (1998)).
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These purposive constructions are far cries and a welcome relief from
earlier constitutional jurisprudence, which interpreted our constitutions as
static through the use of saving law or existing law clauses. These are provi-
sions inserted into some of the independence constitutions in order to pre-
serve the English law which existed before independence.3 6 The narrow in-
terpretation of these clauses was that they did not create new rights or law
but merely preserved existing law.3 7 The very existence of such clauses and
their interpretation is perhaps evidence of the fear of self-determination in-
herent in Commonwealth Caribbean legal systems. This was why in Colly-
more v. Attorney General,8 a case which emerged just after Trinidad and
Tobago's independence, the court looked at the right to associate and, in
examining whether it embodied within it a right to strike, determined that
there could be no right to strike since there had been no such right under the
common law.39 In this respect, the critique of the decision relates to the
method employed and not necessarily to the result obtained.
B. Internationalism and the Evolution of Constitutional Jurisprudence
As noted earlier, the seemingly radical decisions on the death penalty
were in line with human rights jurisprudence from international courts and
bodies. Increasingly, Commonwealth Caribbean courts, whether local courts
or the Privy Council sitting as a Caribbean court, are being influenced by
normative standards laid down by notions of international consensus of what
are human rights and democratic ideals. Commonwealth Caribbean legal
systems conform to the common law approach to international law that inter-
national law does not supersede domestic law unless incorporated. However,
the courts are more and more adopting, unilaterally, of treaty obligations and
values, without benefit of the legislative process.
One lesson we have learned, therefore, is that constitutional jurispru-
dence and reform can be influenced, not so much by the social ethos-the
ground norms of the society, but by external sources and pressures. Once
again, Caribbean societies are being shaped by an internationalist, and even
metropolitan, point of view of what is right and appropriate for Caribbean
peoples. It can happen, of course, because we are not yet completely in con-
trol of our own political and economic destinies, and far less of our legal
destinies.
36. See Joanna Harrington, The Challenge to the Mandatory Death Penalty in the Com-
monwealth Caribbean, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 126, 128 (2004).
37. Id.
38. [1967] 12 W.I.R. 5 (C.A. Trin. & Tobago).
39. Id. at 15.
[Vol.29:2:141
25
: Nova Law Review 29, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2005
WAITING TO EXHALE
This is not necessarily a bad thing, as the Commonwealth Caribbean re-
gion, as elsewhere, subscribes to the view that there should be basic stan-
dards of decency which all nations should share. Yet, locating the threshold
for these standards can sometimes produce jurisprudential tensions. This is
particularly the case where the constitution is silent or unclear on a particular
matter.
Apart from the death penalty, some Commonwealth Caribbean courts
have also rejected corporal punishment, grounding their reasoning in the
universal norms shared by civilised nations.4 ° In Hobbs v. The Queen,41 for
example, the Court of Appeal of Barbados looked to international norms and
the evolving standards of civilisation in making its decision that the cat o'
nine tails was unlawful.42 The court said:
Punishments which are incompatible with the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society . . Are repugnant ... What
might not have been regarded as inhuman or degrading decades ago may be
revolting to the new sensitivities which emerge as civilisation advances.43
Similarly, notions of gender equality, absent or weak in domestic legis-
lation and even in constitutions, have benefited from the courts' awareness of
international ideals and their willingness to adopt them. This was the case,
for example, in a case on sexual harassment from Trinidad and Tobago.'
The Industrial Court looked toward ILO Conventions and international stan-
dards of appropriate conduct at the workplace to come to its decision that a
co-worker who had sexually harassed another should have been dismissed, as
his actions went against good industrial relations practice.45
C. Trend Towards Legislative Supremacy
Yet more recently, courts, particularly the Privy Council, appear to be
re-directing their decisions away from perhaps more abstract ideas of inter-
national law and practice to more concrete expressions of legislative will.
They are thus turning away from the internationalist trend, preferring instead
to give effect to the intent of the legislature, even where that intent seemingly
40. E.g., Hobbs v. R, [1991] C.L.B. 45 (Barb. C.A.).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Bank Employees Union v. Republic Bank, Ltd. (Unreported) No. 17 of 1995, decided
March 25, 1996, (Industrial Court) Trinidad and Tobago.
45. See id.
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violates accepted international values about human rights. This allows do-
mestic law to once again trump over international law, and allows constitu-
tional jurisprudence to be more predictable, albeit more conservative. This is
not an undesirable approach as it allows constitutional change to be what it is
supposed to be: the rational, reflective expressions of the ideals of the peo-
ples in any particular society as laid down by their representative legislature.
In contrast, ignoring the legislative will creates the danger of making law the
unpredictable "plaything" of judges influenced by norms which do not al-
ways represent that society.
On the question of corporal punishment, for example, in Pinder v. R46
the Privy Council upheld a judgment of the Court of Appeal of The Bahamas
in finding that a law which reintroduced corporal punishment into The Ba-
hamas was constitutional.47 This was despite the fact that the courts clearly
viewed corporal punishment as inhuman and degrading punishment,48 when
assessed from the perspective of civilised societies as recognised in the inter-
national sphere. Whilst agreeing that constitutions should be interpreted
purposively, the Privy Council stated:
If the Court indulges itself by straining the language of the constitution to ac-
cord with its own subjective moral values then, as Holmes J. said almost a cen-
tury ago in his first opinion for the Supreme Court of the United States (Otis v.
Parker, [187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903)]):
"a constitution, instead of embodying only relatively fundamental rules of
right, as generally understood by all English-speaking communities, would be-
come the partisan of a particular set of ethical or economical opinions."
A constitution is an exercise in balancing the rights of the individual against
the democratic rights of the majority. On the one hand, the fundamental rights
and freedoms of the individual must be entrenched against future legislative ac-
tion if they are to be properly protected; on the other hand, the powers of the
legislature must not be unduly circumscribed if the democratic process is to be
allowed its proper scope. The balance is drawn by the Constitution. The judi-
cial task is to interpret the Constitution in order to determine where the balance
is drawn; not to substitute the judges' views where it should be drawn. 49
More important perhaps, is the Privy Council's apparent reversal of its
position on the mandatory nature of the death penalty in Boyce v. The
46. [2002] U.K.P.C. 46.
47. Id. 18.
48. Id. 4.
49. Id. 14-15.
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Queen.50 The court found that a law decreeing the mandatory death penalty
for murder in Barbados was an "existing law," and remained constitutional
whether or not it was inhuman or degrading punishment.5 ' The law was also
constitutional despite the fact that it was inconsistent to various human rights
treaties to which Barbados was a party. 2 Surprisingly, the Privy Council in
Boyce also expressly stated that its earlier decision in the case of Roodal v.
State,53 which had declared the mandatory death penalty unconstitutional,54
had been wrongly decided and should not be followed.5
D. Law Enforcement Versus Civil Liberties
But the need for constitutional reform and reflection also conjures up
the pressing modem needs of law enforcement and the consequent balancing
of individual rights. This is another reference to the United States, whether
we are speaking about crime prevention or terrorism. How much of our civil
liberties must hang in the balance? Is the death penalty itself a desirable
objective in evolved, modem, civilisations? As in the United States, in an
increasingly dangerous world "John Q. Public ' 56 is often enthusiastic about
law enforcement, even harsh methods such as the death penalty.
V. CONTRIBUTION OF THE OFFSHORE FINANCIAL SECTOR TO LEGAL
DEVELOPMENT
It is perhaps to the controversial offshore financial sector that we must
turn in order to see our most dramatic legal development. The offshore sec-
tor, a hugely important one to the economies of CARICOM, also makes a
significant contribution to our legal system. It does this by introducing many
new legal concepts and by clarifying and correcting several gaps in the legal
framework, not just of our domestic legal system, but internationally.
There is an irony here. Caribbean legal systems have long been criti-
cized as lacking an indigenous jurisprudence and as too eager to copy from
the United Kingdom. However, the remarkably successful legislative and
50. [2004] 64 W.I.R. 37, 39 (P.C.).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. [2003] 64 W.I.R. 270 (P.C.).
54. Id. at 317.
55. Boyce, [2004] 64 W.I.R. at 58.
56. "John Q. Public" is a name commonly used to describe an average member of the
public. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1218(2002).
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judicial creations in the area of offshore law57 have either gone relatively
unnoticed, are not placed in context, or have been severely attacked by pow-
erful onshore nations fearful of the huge financial losses resulting from their
citizens investing offshore, and because of the success of offshore jurisdic-
tions at filtering moneys from onshore to offshore. Indeed, many of these
innovative legal concepts are in danger because of the concerted efforts by
onshore nations and international organizations manned by these nations to
discredit and dismantle the offshore industry. This means that these impor-
tant jurisprudential contributions and their impact on the legal system have
not been adequately acknowledged.
A. The Context of Offshore Legal Infrastructure
It is suggested here that offshore law, apart from being indigenous, may
be seen as a subset of the entire legal system. It is, in a sense, an alternative
legal system and one that has been created entirely for foreign investors. 8
This is a legal infrastructure created purely for commercial reasons. And
herein lies the dilemma: it is the very success of the offshore sector in at-
tracting business and income from foreign, wealthier shores that has made it
a magnet for confrontation.
I have consistently argued that much of the challenges and attacks made
by some developed countries and international organizations, such as the
United States, France, and the Organisation for Economic Co-ordination and
Development (OECD), on the offshore sector about alleged money launder-
ing, secrecy, unfair tax competition, and so on, has less to do with legal prin-
ciple and more to do with dollars and cents.59 Undoubtedly, some financial
impropriety exists within the offshore sector. However, financial impropri-
ety exists in all financial sectors. There is sufficient proof that most impro-
priety (money laundering, financial transactions that benefit terrorism, etc.)
occurs most frequently in the large, metropolitan financial centres of the
world, such as New York, London, and Russia, and in the domestic financial
sector.6" Yet, we have seen a barrage of financial regulations and attacks
requiring offshore financial centres, particularly in small developing coun-
57. We may define offshore law as a body of law concerned with investment, financial
arrangements, and entities, created by non-residents of a particular jurisdiction primarily for
non-residents but structured within that jurisdiction.
58. ROSE-MARIE BELLE ANTOINE, CONFIDENTIALITY IN OFFSHORE FINANCIAL LAW 3
(2002).
59. Id.at 41.
60. See, e.g., Annan Boodram, The Many Faces of Money Laundering, THE CARIBBEAN
VOICE, at http://www.caribvoice.org/Business/moneylaund.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
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tries, to do much more in the way of self-regulation than these large centres
even contemplate.
The unfair tax competition charge emanating from the OECD is well-
known.6' Offshore financial centres were condemned for offering tax incen-
tives to non-residents,62 a phenomenon still practised in many "onshore"
countries. My explanation is that these large-scale attacks have really had to
do with politics and not legal wrongs. Often, there have been objections to
legal rules that are well established and which onshore countries themselves
follow. One small example is the traditional rule on the non-enforcement of
foreign fiscal law.63 Another is the Westminster rule on the legitimacy of tax
avoidance, as opposed to tax evasion, 4' now severely undermined by onshore
tax authorities determined to do something about thinning revenue coffers,
largely as a result of offshore opportunities. It is also curious that onshore
countries have often promoted confidentiality in financial affairs in litigation
with other onshore countries and in their own self-interest, but have frowned
upon it when utilised by developing offshore jurisdictions.65 Similarly, uni-
lateral extraterritorial jurisdiction to reach assets appears to be asserted
mainly over offshore jurisdictions, while onshore nations are given the bene-
fit of comity (the respect which one nation gives to the laws of another).
There is, therefore, a constant pressure for offshore centres to change
their modus operandi. The required change is really to destroy the legal mu-
tations that have occurred in offshore law and which permit more flexibility
in commerce. These mutations, of course, permit some businesses to save on
taxes because of more generous tax r6gimes, which give incentives to non-
resident business. The result is that today there have been many changes in
the onshore tax rdgime, and the offshore tax function has weakened.
Nevertheless, flexibility and creativity continue to be the hallmarks of
offshore legal r6gimes, often going much further than onshore laws in ac-
commodating the perceived needs of international business. This is a proac-
tive approach that relies on market demands and does not view law as merely
responses to problems after they have arisen. Instead, it is an approach
which seeks to create new business opportunities.
We have seen an evolution of current legal principles or radically new
ones. Many of these creations speak to true commercial concerns. However,
61. See ANTOINE, supra note 58, at 313.
62. ORGANISATION FOR EcONOMIc CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, HARMFuL TAX
COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISsUE 20-21 (1998).
63. Gov't of India v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491 (H.L.).
64. The Comm'rs of Inland Revenue v. Duke of Westminster, [1936] A.C. 1, 2 (H.L.).
65. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1143 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
Butsee United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (1 th Cir. 1982).
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the fact that their raison d'tre is business and commercial enterprise is no
indictment. It is a rationale for lawmaking which is found in several other
areas of law. Offshore law is thus no less legitimate because it embodies
such a rationale. Indeed, trust law was created to assist wealthy persons from
saving their property during war and, later, for tax revenues owed to a needy
state. This was the experience of the landed poor in the United Kingdom.
Similarly, the creation of the limited liability company in company law was
first thought to be unethical and unconscionable, but has now become a sta-
ple. Indeed, it may be credited as having elevated company law, since the
limited liability company may be viewed as a bastion of capitalism and free
enterprise. It has helped to make company law more viable and more rele-
vant.
In the same vein, offshore laws seek to uphold principles and needs of
commerce and international business. Thus, they are not out of sync with
other areas of commercial law and should be similarly judged. Fortunately,
it is being recognised by judges, jurists, and lawmakers elsewhere that off-
shore law, such as offshore trust law, can elevate more traditional areas of
law found onshore.
B. Transplanting Offshore Law: If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them
The fruits of the legal evolution, or revolution, created by offshore law
are slowly but steadily emerging. Indeed, many of the offshore legal innova-
tions are now being embraced onshore, particularly in trust law. These
modifications of traditional onshore law are entering the mainstream because
of the existence of offshore legal precepts. The offshore legal solution and
its developmental approach has proven so effective and so attractive, that
today, even states in the United States have sought to emulate offshore juris-
dictions, introducing trust, banking, and tax laws which borrow heavily from
offshore legal paradigms. These U.S. developments include asset protection,
and trust and tax planning features in six main states: Alaska, Delaware,
Montana, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Colorado.66 Offshore-type features
now also exist to a lesser extent in several other states including: Idaho, Illi-
nois, Maine, Maryland, Arizona, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota,
Virginia, and Wisconsin.67 This latter group, for example, instituted "dy-
66. Jesse Dukeminier and James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L.
REv. 1303 (2003).
67. Id. at 1314-15. "Dynasty trust" is a term typically defined as "a trust set up primar-
ily to perpetuate the trust estate for as long a period as possible," commonly by way "of a
chain of life interests." Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547, 547-
48 (1964).
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nasty trusts" by abolishing the rule against perpetuities and allowing estate
taxes to be deferred indefinitely.68 Familiar offshore asset protection features
against creditors, challenging forced heirship regimes, and so on, are evi-
dent.69 Self-settled, protective trusts are now allowed in some of these states
solely for non-resident trusts, despite long standing rules in United States
courts that such trusts are against U.S. public policy. This, of course, creates
a dichotomy under U.S. law. While the rest of the United States adheres to
the rule that it is against U.S. policy, it is allowed for non-residents. It begs
the question whether it can remain a rule of U.S. public policy.
While these new offshore-onshore states create competition for offshore
jurisdictions, they should be welcomed because they demonstrate the credi-
bility, legitimacy, and intelligence of the offshore law approach. Surely,
offshore law cannot be effectively challenged if onshore states are now rede-
fining their own legal systems so as to incorporate so-called offshore type
laws, which were previously frowned upon. It is evident that these onshore
jurisdictions have recognised the success of offshore legal innovations and,
in the name of profitability, have decided to join them instead of challenging
the legal precepts upon which they are based.
C. Some Specific Examples of Offshore Law
Perhaps the most adventurous area of offshore law is the law on trusts.
Offshore trusts are more closely aligned to business and companies than their
onshore counterparts. Offshore law allows for a host of things that a tradi-
tional trust either cannot do, or cannot do effectively. One example is that
offshore trust law allows persons from civil law jurisdictions to take advan-
tage of a structure that was traditionally reserved for persons in common law
countries.7" Apart from simply benefiting from the trust's three-tiered struc-
ture, settlors from civil law jurisdictions may avoid forced heirship or man-
datory succession r6gimes.71
The trust under offshore law has now become a more viable commercial
entity. For example, it permits the abolition or liberalisation of perpetuity
68. See, e.g., Banking Code of Colorado, Title 11, COLO. REV. STAT §§ 11-37.5-103(16),
-402 (2003) (providing that non-residents transacting with banks in Colorado incur no state
taxes with respect to income from bank deposits, certificates of deposit, purchases of gold,
silver, platinum, and other precious metals, foreign currency exchange for U.S. dollars, and
other forms of personal, tangible property). See also Qualified Dispositions in Trusts Act,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570-76 (1996).
69. See Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 18-9.2-1-7 (2003);
Alaska Uniform Custodial Trust Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.60.010-.990 (Michie 2002).
70. See ANTOINE, supra note 58, at 179.
71. Id.
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and accumulation periods, thereby enabling the creation of dynasty trusts. It
further allows the creation of purpose trusts, thus abolishing the traditional
common law rule that a trust must have identifiable beneficiaries. This rule
has often been criticised as being without real justification in a modem
commercial environment, and there have been proposals in both Canada and
the United Kingdom to change the rule so that it conforms with offshore
law.72
These examples of new legal ideas, emanating from the offshore sector
and being transplanted to onshore jurisdictions, are evidence of legal devel-
opment and new directions in Commonwealth Caribbean legal systems. The
challenges faced by offshore financial centres in the region also represent
tensions evident in these legal systems at the current time.
D. Conflict of Laws Under Offshore Law
There have also been dramatic legal accommodations in offshore legal
regimes in the area of private international law. The offshore sector has
sought to clarify and even create conflict of laws rules. This is particularly
the case in relation to trusts, where, traditionally, few such rules existed.
These new rules serve a dual purpose. First, appropriate rules of private in-
ternational law must be clearly identified, so as to avoid confusion in the law.
Second, in order for innovative trust law principles to survive, it is impera-
tive that the offshore trust falls under the offshore law regime and not under
that of the onshore law. Simply put, the law must be configured so that off-
shore entities are created and adjudicated by offshore laws which are suppor-
tive of the aims of offshore financial regimes.
This, in turn, means that other jurisdictions are able to consider these
legislative solutions to gaps in the law as credible legal solutions for onshore
trusts also. This is particularly the case as the offshore sector has sought to
be in line with the Convention on The Law Applicable to Trusts and on their
Recognition as far as possible.73
For example, offshore jurisdictions promote the settlors' choice of law
as the proper law of the trust and encourage the insertion of exclusive juris-
diction or forum selection clauses. These are in keeping with the modem
position as gleaned from the Hague Convention on the Recognition of
72. See, e.g., David Hayton, Developing the Obligation Characteristic of the Trust, 117
Q. REv. 96 (2001); LAW REFORM COMM'N OF B. C., REPORT ON NON-CHARITABLE PURPOSE
TRUSTS (1992).
73. Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition, July 1, 1985,
U.K.T.S. 14 (1992), 23 I.L.M. 1388 [hereinafter The Hague Convention on the Recognition of
Trusts].
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Trusts.74 It also gives priority to the autonomy of the settlor and the owner of
property. Conveniently, it allows the settlor to choose the more user-friendly
offshore trust law as the proper law. As this is an emerging issue, few courts
have advised on it, but the evidence suggests that it is an appropriate ap-
proach.75
Similarly, courts, even those outside of the region, are beginning to pay
respect to offshore law practice. They have begun to accept that the courts of
offshore jurisdiction have exclusive jurisdiction over the trust, and that the
offshore trust law chosen by the settlor is the proper law. For example, in
Green v. Jernigan,76 a Canadian company made such a choice of law with
respect to an offshore trust set up in Nevis, and chose Nevis as the exclusive
forum for purposes of jurisdiction.77 The court found that there must be a
"strong cause" to displace such exclusive jurisdiction clauses.78 Such deci-
sions are helpful for the viability of offshore legal rdgimes, which often
hinge on jurisdiction and proper law issues.
E. Recognition and Capacity Under Offshore Trust Law
Issues on the recognition of the trust in civil law countries, and the ca-
pacity of settlors from civil law countries where there is no trust law to estab-
lish trusts are also resolved. Settlors are granted the capacity to create trusts,
and legislative mechanisms exist which seek to ensure the recognition of
trusts established in this manner. It is perhaps in this area that offshore trusts
have made the most impact. The legislative approach of stating clearly that
the offshore trust is to be recognized and to be governed by offshore law is
now an accepted one validated under the Hague Convention on the Recogni-
tion of Trusts.79
Thus, offshore trusts are to be recognized under offshore law, whether
or not the settlor originates from a civil law jurisdiction. This is traditionally
a difficult issue under onshore law. Often, trusts were not recognized or
were transformed into some other similar entity, such as the foundation or a
type of contract, to enable dealings with civil law settlors. This was the de-
fect that the Hague Convention on the Recognition of Trusts sought to cure.80
74. See id.
75. See, e.g., Trib., 23 sept. 1997, Casani v. Mattei, reprinted in 1 I.T.E.L.R. 925
(1998/99) (Italy).
76. [2003] reprinted in 6 I.T.E.L.R. 330 (Sup. Ct. B.C.).
77. Id. at 336-37.
78. Id. at 339.
79. See Casani, 1 I.T.E.L.R. at 943, 945; see also Re an Isle of Man Trust, (1998/99) 1
I.T.E.L.R. 103 (Swed. Tax Panel).
80. See The Hague Convention on the Recognition of Trusts, supra note 73.
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In Casani, the trust was recognized in Italy although it sought to defeat
forced heirship rights, or mandatory rights of succession granted to heirs,
typically found in civil law countries.81 The decision thereby answered a
question which had long been asked in relation to the survivability of anti-
forced heirship provisions, such as are found in offshore trusts, when ad-
dressed by civil law courts. The Italian court found that such a trust did not
violate public policy, and was not, and could not be invalid on that ground,
as the trust was essentially a recognizable entity.82 Other means could have
been found to satisfy disappointed heirs.8 3
These legislative changes and their interpretation make significant con-
tributions to trust jurisprudence. What we are witnessing, therefore, is a vir-
tual revolution in the financial legal infrastructure. In this revolution, Carib-
bean legal sub-systems are being both challenged and emulated around the
world. Undoubtedly, these are important advances in our legal development.
Yet, once again, as with the CCJ, the future direction of the offshore legal
paradigm seems heavily dependent on the extent to which we can conduct
ourselves in the international sphere, and the degree to which we can uphold
notions of sovereignty and independence in our law and legal systems.
VI. IMPACT OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC UNITY ON LAW REFORM
The attempts toward political and economic unity in the region are fu-
elled by the need for economic survival in what is perceived as an increas-
ingly hostile world. There is a growing realisation that small states such as
ours cannot make it on their own. The advent of the CSME, which will bring
economic unity, and other such initiatives clearly necessitates changes in the
respective laws of the countries in the region. Perhaps the most obvious
would be in the labour laws.
Already, Caribbean governments have begun the process of the "Free
Movement of Skilled Workers" throughout the region,84 and changes to do-
mestic law are slowly being made. There is, however, considerable opposi-
tion to this, particularly from the countries which are currently more eco-
81. Casani, 1 I.T.E.L.R. at 946--47.
82. Id. at 948.
83. See id. at 947.
84. E.g., Press Release, Caribbean Community Secretariat, Education Focus at COHSOD
Meeting (Mar. 28, 2003), at http://www.caricom.org/pressreleases/pres49_03.htm; Press
Release, Caribbean Community Secretariat, CARICOM Council for Human and Social De-
velopment (COHSOD) to Focus on Labour (Oct. 7, 2003), at http://www.caricom.org/press-
releases/pres 130_03.htm.
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nomically successful. Trinidad and Tobago, for example, is an oil-rich
economy and will naturally attract many workers.
As yet, however, the other necessary reforms such as the harmonisation
of labour laws, particularly with respect to workers' rights, have been slow in
coming. As a result of the Harmonisation of CARICOM Labour Laws Pro-
ject, an in-depth report85 paving the way forward for harmonisation was pro-
duced. However, the political connotations of labour law reform and the
customary unilateral approach of the region's governments have not pro-
duced uniform results. These are small states jealous of their political auton-
omy. Nonetheless, the Report is used as a blue print for labour law reform
and has acted as a catalyst in several areas of labour law. Notwithstanding,
the levels of protection for workers, the obligations of employers, and the
conditions of business are variable throughout the region. Other areas rele-
vant to the free movement of workers and which have yet to even be dis-
cussed, are the portability of benefit schemes from one country to another,
and the availability of benefits for transplanted workers.
A. Discrimination in Employment and HIV
There are two sub-topics in this area that I believe need to be urgently
addressed. One is the appalling lack of legal protection for discrimination in
employment issues in many of the CARICOM states and the almost non-
existent legal framework for HIV/AIDS sufferers.86 The latter is particularly
remarkable considering that the region has been documented as having one
of the highest levels of HIV/AIDS in the world. The deficiencies in ordinary
legislation are not cured by our constitutions which seek to protect rights, as
those rights apply only to citizens viz-a-viz the State, and private employers
are thereby excluded from the requisite obligations. Further, our constitu-
tions have been construed quite narrowly where issues of discrimination
have arisen. This is particularly the case in relation to issues of gender, a
term absent from the various constitutions. On the one hand, the protections
have often only been mentioned in the preambles of the constitutions and
85. See generally Website of the Caribbean Community Secretariat, at http://www.cari-
com.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
86. Countries which have appropriate laws against discrimination are Guyana and St.
Lucia. Trinidad and Tobago drafted such laws but they were not brought into force, the main
reasons being the controversy over whether sexual orientation should be included and the non-
existence of enforcement mechanisms and institutions. Only the Bahamas has laws protecting
against discrimination because of HIV/AIDS, and the protections are sparse.
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have therefore been construed as unjusticiable s7 On the other, some courts
have inserted high thresholds for finding discrimination, such as malice,
making it exceedingly difficult to ground an offence.88
In addition to restrictive constitutional interpretation, litigation has been
sparse. This is in part due to the lack of awareness of the rights of the citi-
zenry. More likely, however, it is due to cultural attitudes which do not per-
ceive certain types of conduct as discriminatory, unlawful, or even inappro-
priate. Such attitudes spill over into the interpretation of the law. One ex-
ample relates to sexual harassment. In a case which was brought under a
summary dismissal heading, a male employee who was dismissed for fon-
dling and ogling female employees at the workplace challenged the dis-
missal, and a female magistrate viewed it as merely "ungentlemanly con-
duct" insufficient to warrant dismissal.89 Currently, a non-governmental
group attempting to introduce sexual harassment legislation in Barbados9" is
facing much opposition from a male-based lobbying group.
The gaps and inconsistencies between the laws of various Common-
wealth Caribbean countries, in particular, labour laws, make it difficult to
envisage a smooth integration process either economically or politically. It
also makes nonsense of projected goals of investment on a regional basis as
opposed to an individual country basis as ascertaining the varying laws and
obligations is a nightmare for any investor.
Recently, more conscious Caribbean firms have rushed to implement
reasonable standards against discrimination in employment as a response to
international trade requirements for business. This however, is an externally
driven, fragmented, and rushed "stop-gap" approach to the problem. Such
individualistic approaches are probably unsuited to the real needs and sensi-
tivities of the workplaces in question, as they are uninformed by coherent
planning. In some cases, for example, enterprises have merely adopted the
codes of ethics of companies based overseas. That such laws and policies
are necessary is indisputable, but they should be part of national and regional
initiatives which reflect well-researched and relevant legal policy.
87. See, e.g., Girard and the St. Lucia Teachers' Union v. A.G. (Unreported Judgment),
No. 371 of 1985, decided Dec. 17, 1986 (St. Lucia). See also Civil Appeals Nos. 12 & 13 of
1986 (Jan. 25, 1988), Court of Appeal, St. Lucia.
88. Smith v. L.J. Williams, Ltd., [1980] 32 W.I.R. 395 (Trin. & Tobago, High Ct.).
89. Jones v. Bico, (Barb.Magis. Ct.) Feb. 16, 1995, affdby the C.A. in [1996] 53 W.I.R.
49.
90. See S.J. GOOLSARRAN, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS AND LABOUR RELATIONS
IN THE CARIBBEAN PUBLIC SERVICE 7 (Int'l Labour Org. 2003), http://unpanl.un.org/intra-
doc/groups/public/documents/CARICAD/UNPAN010846.pdf.
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B. Economic and Political Sovereignty
The region's economic and political sovereignty is clearly not un-
touched, even directly, by the dictates of larger states. Recently, for exam-
ple, the United States responded to CARICOM's refusal to vote to excuse the
United States from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court by
withholding aid.9' Washington was also not amused by the region's lack of
enthusiasm over the Iraq War, although the region was hardly alone in this
stance. The position taken by some leaders that Haiti's democratically
elected leader should not have been summarily disposed was similarly disap-
proved of. The threat that international aid will be withheld if we do not toe
the line is ever present.
These political realities may have implications for the kinds of laws
which we put into place. For example, politics has had practical impact in
the urgency with which the region has had to implement laws against terror-
ism, which is perhaps not a pressing need in these lands of sun and sea, albeit
laudable. Such initiatives also have hefty economical implications. Millions
of badly needed monies have been spent to make our ports safer for Ameri-
can tourists92 and to upgrade our financial reporting systems to ensure that
terrorists do not exploit them. While these are not undesirable objectives in
themselves, they do demonstrate the extent to which legal changes in policy
may be dictated from outside of the region, and the often low priority given
to pressing issues of law reform in favour of external priorities. Often, these
are not choices, but imperatives.
Incidentally, it is not only foreign governments which have the ability to
influence regional governments. The powerful multinational cruise industry
has succeeded in preventing the region from implementing laws to install a
paltry five U.S. dollars head tax on passengers, a tax needed to upkeep the
ports and protect the reefs and other aspects of the environment. They have
done this by threatening to take their business elsewhere if the tax is imple-
mented. It is possible that "John and Jane Public, USA" would happily pay
the tax if they were aware of the problem and the significant and sorely
needed revenue it could create for struggling CARICOM economies.
91. See Press Release, Amnesty International, International Criminal Court: CARICOM
Should Reject U.S. Impunity Agreements (May 7, 2003), at http://web.amnesty.org/library/
Index/ENGIOR510012003?open&of=ENG-385; Kenneth Roth, Letter to Colin Powell on
US. Bully Tactics Against International Criminal Court, FREE REPUBLIC, July 1, 2003, at
http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/938720/posts.
92. See B VI Ports Authority Improves Service and Security, CARIBBEAN NET NEWS, Nov.
1, 2004, at http://www.caribbeannetnews.com/2004/1 1/0 1/service.htm.
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C. The CCJ's Original Jurisdiction for Trade Disputes
Economic unification and regional integration also make it imperative
that there be a clear and credible means of adjudicating the inevitable dis-
putes that emerge with trade r6gimes and inter-governmental policies. Hith-
erto, this has been lacking in CARICOM, despite the Revised Treaty of Cha-
guaramus, which attempted to define trade rdgimes for the region.93 The
CCJ, with its original jurisdiction to interpret the treaty and related trade is-
sues,9 4 will fill this glaring gap in Caribbean jurisprudence. All of the inde-
pendent Commonwealth Caribbean countries will participate in this original
jurisdiction.9 5
Increasingly, matters related to both trade and competition are emerg-
ing. They too, have impacted significantly on the minds of the man and
woman on the Caribbean street. The most recent, and perhaps the most vola-
tile example, is the fishing impasse between Trinidad and Tobago and Bar-
bados. In that scenario, Barbados fisher-folk illegally entered Tobagonian
waters on a consistent basis, following migratory flying fish which had left
Barbadian waters for more favourable Tobagonian waters. The issue ex-
panded when Barbados, rather belatedly, claimed that the waters themselves
were in dispute. Consequently, a maritime boundary matter is currently in
issue.
D. Funding Justice
Finally, we should note that issues of law reform and legal develop-
ment, whether we are speaking about jurisprudence or justice generally, can-
not come to fruition without adequate physical infrastructure. Our courts
need to be adequately funded and supported. This is as true for criminal tri-
als as it is for civil trials, and for juvenile justice. For example, often juve-
niles spend nights in jail with hardened adult criminals because of a lack of
facilities to house them. The Pratt and Morgan doctrine on undue delay,96
discussed earlier, is significantly fuelled by the lack of resources. It high-
lighted the need to make the administration of justice more efficient and
93. See Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community Includ-
ing the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, July 5, 2001, http://www.caricom.org/ar-
chives/revisedtreaty.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Revised Treaty].
94. CCJ Agreement, supra note 12, art. XIII; Revised Treaty, supra note 93, art. 211.
95. CCJ Agreement, supra note 12, art. II.
96. Pratt v. A-G, [1993] 43 W.I.R. 340, 359-60.
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speedy, thereby ensuring that prisoners do not spend long periods on Death
Row.97 In other words, hang them quickly or not at all.
Funding is just as important for finding the legal principles which in-
form the court. This necessitates, for example, adequate and efficient law
reporting. All of these things are lacking in the region because of our fragile
and needy economies, economies which are further vulnerable to the forces
of nature and to international market forces. If Commonwealth Caribbean
law and legal systems are to realise their true potential-if they are to "ex-
hale"--these difficulties must be overcome.
97. Id. at 359.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For more than thirty years, a debate has engaged the attention of law-
yers across the Commonwealth Caribbean. It concerned the appropriateness
of the independent states of that sub-region continuing to seek final appellate
justice, not from a Caribbean Court of last resort, but from the Judicial Com-
mittee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in England.
In the last decade of the twentieth century, observers of the contempo-
rary scene in the sub-region will have noted that the phenomena of globaliza-
tion, trade liberalization, and the emergence of new trading blocs, have all
combined to pressurize the democracies of the sub-region to re-think, re-
structure, and reposition their economic perspectives and arrangements.
Change is inescapable if these democracies are to survive and be competitive
and relevant in the new global environment.
From colonial times, the JCPC has been the final court of appeal for
Commonwealth Caribbean States,1 and its jurisdiction has continued not-
withstanding those states' attainment of political independence during the
period 1962 to 1980.2 In the twentieth century the jurisdiction of the JCPC,
as the final court of appeal for the countries of the Commonwealth, has nar-
rowed to the point where it is now the court of last resort only for the major-
ity of Commonwealth Caribbean States and five others, including Mauritius
and Brunei.3
However, a change in the relationship with the JCPC is imminent.
Similarly, a change in the economic and trading arrangements among Com-
monwealth Caribbean States is also imminent. The Treaty of Chaguaramas
of 1973, which created a limited Common Market regime in the sub-region,
has been substantially revised to provide for the free movement of capital,
1. Rhea P. Hamilton, Alumni Research Guide: A Guide to Researching the Caribbean
Court of Justice, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 531, 532 (2002) (citing HUGH RAWLINS, THE
CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: THE HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE DEBATE 9 (2000), avail-
able at http://www.caricom.org/archives/ccjrawlins.pdf; Roget V. Bryan, Toward the Devel-
opment of a Caribbean Jurisprudence: The Case for Establishing a Caribbean Court of Ap-
peal, 7 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 181, 183-84 (1998)).
2. RAWLINS, supra note 1, at 5; Hamilton, supra note 1, at 531 (citing Bryan, supra note
1, at 183 n.8).
3. Bryan, supra note 1, at 185 (citing Honorable Mr. Justice M.A. de la Bastide, The
Case for a Caribbean Court of Appeal, 5 CARIB. L. REv. 401, 402 (1995)).
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goods, and services, and ultimately, the free movement of people across the
borders of national states.4
A new legal architecture is being designed, and central to the new
Commonwealth Caribbean of the twenty-first century will be the Caribbean
Court of Justice (CCJ).
Sometime in the first quarter of 2005, the CCJ will be inaugurated in
Port-of-Spain, Trinidad.' Inauguration of the Court will finally demonstrate
the self-confidence of the people of the Member States of Caribbean Com-
munity (CARICOM)6 that we are mature enough to manage and operate our
highest judicial institution. In his recent book, The Caribbean Court of Jus-
tice: Closing the Circle of Independence, Duke Pollard7 captures the mean-
ing, relevance, and importance of the appellate jurisdiction of the CCJ in the
following words:
The establishment of the Caribbean Court of Justice in its appellate
jurisdiction will not only sever the last remaining vestige of a co-
lonial condition, but will signal the birth of autonomous judicial
decision-making in Member States of the Caribbean Community
and close the circle of independence which commenced as early as
1962. In a real sense, too, the establishment of the Court will mark
the culmination of initiatives to create our own regional institu-
tions to facilitate and promote the development of an indigenous
jurisprudence reflective of the moral, political, social and eco-
nomic imperatives of our Region and which commenced with the
establishment of the Council of Legal Education in 1970.8
The CCJ is a unique adjudicatory body-sui generis--in the world. For
in addition to it being a final appellate court for the States of the Common-
4. See Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community Includ-
ing the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, July 5, 2001, http://www.caricom.
org/archives/revisedtreaty.pdf [hereinafter Revised Treaty].
5. Press Release, CARICOM, Postponement of Inauguration of the Caribbean Court of
Justice (CCJ) (Oct. 11, 2004), at http://www.caricom.org/pressreleases/presl57_04.htm
[hereinafter CCJ Press Release]. The inauguration, previously set for November 6, 2004, has
been deferred to a date in March, 2005. Id.
6. The states are: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, the Bahamas, Dominica,
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and
the Grenadines, and Suriname. Their membership is at different levels. For example, contrast
Montserrat (a British overseas territory) to the Bahamas, which is not yet prepared to be fully
integrated in the regional integration process.
7. Mr. Pollard is the Director of the Legislative Drafting Facility at the CARICOM
Secretariat in Georgetown, Guyana.
8. DUKE E. POLLARD, THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: CLOSING THE CIRCLE OF
INDEPENDENCE 204 (2004) (emphasis added).
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wealth Caribbean, the CCJ will have a central role to play in the adjudication
of disputes arising under the CARICOM Single Market and Economy
(CSME) due to come into effect also in 2005.'
In this paper, the historical development of the CCJ will be sketched to
explain the context in which this new institution has evolved. It is a new
Caribbean venture, and no innovation or change is easily explained in the
absence of a sense of history and an appreciation of the factors or forces that
influenced the new direction.
The reasons for and against the establishment of the Court are discussed
next in order that readers may better understand the regional debate and the
lofty motives which inspired the creation of the Court. The paper then seeks
to justify the assertion that the CCJ is indeed a Court sui generis by high-
lighting some of the distinctive features of the Court, including its constitu-
tion and jurisdiction under the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, modalities of
appointment of its judges and staff, and the creative solution devised to fi-
nance its operations. I then suggest that the decision to establish the CCJ is
having a positive effect on national justice systems and briefly indicate how
regional States may de-link from the JCPC. In the final section of the paper,
I endeavour to provide a glimpse into the next steps to be taken prior to inau-
guration and the actual adjudication of cases.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE ORIGINS OF THE IDEA
It must be made very clear at the outset that the CCJ is not the product
of some sudden or knee-jerk reaction to recent decisions of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC), our highest appellate court. Re-
searchers have unearthed information which suggests that the idea of a final
indigenous court for the Commonwealth Caribbean had its origins as long
ago as 1901 in an editorial in the Daily Gleaner newspaper of Jamaica."0
Hugh Rawlins suggests that the idea was first mooted at a high level during a
meeting of colonial governors in Barbados in 1947."
In 1962, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago gained their political inde-
pendence from Britain. 2 Other countries in the region became independent
in the 1960s, 3 and those of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
9. See Revised Treaty, supra note 4.
10. POLLARD, supra note 8, at 199.
11. RAWLINs, supra note 1, at 5.
12. Robert B. Lubic, The Present Status of International Commercial Arbitration in the
English Speaking Caribbean, 63 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 117, 121 (1994).
13. Id. at 121 n. 12. Barbados and Guyana both became independent in 1966. Id.
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(OECS) became independent during the decades of the seventies and eight-
ies.'4
Political independence implied autonomy for Commonwealth Carib-
bean states in legislative and executive affairs. No longer would the legisla-
tive arm of government reside in Westminster; no longer would executive
actions and policy-making be dictated from Whitehall. Upon independence,
Commonwealth Caribbean countries assumed responsibility for the legisla-
tive and executive arms of government. However, final decision-making in
judicial matters has continued to reside in Downing Street at the premises of
the JCPC.15 Appeals from the Courts of Appeal of the several Common-
wealth Caribbean countries still go to the JCPC, and, as indicated above, this
circumstance has spawned the debate as to the appropriateness of those coun-
tries continuing appeals to the JCPC as independent nations.
Since 1970, when the Faculty of Law was established at the University
of the West Indies (UWI), there have been principled calls for the repatria-
tion of the final appellate court to the Commonwealth Caribbean. It is one of
the paradoxes of the legal history of the Commonwealth Caribbean, for rea-
sons which will appear later, that it was Jamaica which first sounded the bell
for the establishment of a regional court of last resort.1 6 Two years later, in
1972, the Organisation of Commonwealth Caribbean Bar Associations
(OCCBA) made a similar proposal. 7 Having been closely associated since
1994 with the movement to establish an indigenous final appellate court, it is
my opinion that the movement for such a court gained momentum after the
inauguration of the Faculty of Law of the UWI. The Faculty inspired, pro-
moted, and published a wealth of learning in support of a final court of ap-
peal for the region. Many learned and carefully researched papers were writ-
ten by the academic staff of the Faculty.18
14. Id. at 118 n.3, 121 n.12.
15. Hamilton, supra note 1, at 531 (citing RAWLINS, supra note 1, at 5; Bryan, supra note
1, at 183).
16. RAwLrNs, supra note 1, at 5; Hamilton, supra, note 1, at 532 (citing Duke Pollard,
The Caribbean Court of Justice: What It Is, What It Does, at http://www.caricom.
org/archives/ccj-q&a.htm (Apr. 17, 2000)). The proposal that a regional court of last resort be
established to replace the JCPC was made by the Jamaican delegation to the Heads of Gov-
emnment Meeting in 1970. Id.
17. Neil Dennis, Note, Using One's Head to Sustain One's Heart: A New Focus for the
Establishment of the Caribbean Court of Justice, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1778, 1807 n.140
(citing RAwLINs, supra note 1, at 56). Aubrey Fraser, a former Justice of Appeal of the Su-
preme Court of Trinidad and Tobago, produced a report for OCCBA, known as the "Fraser
Report," in which he advocated the establishment of a Caribbean Court of Appeal to replace
the JCPC. See id. at 1807 n.140.
18. See, e.g., Dr. Francis Alexis, The Case Against West Indian Appeals to the Privy
Council (1975) Bulletin of East Caribbean Affairs; Hugh Rawlins, The Privy Council or a
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In the years after 1970, Commonwealth Caribbean countries began to
review the Westminster-type constitutions imported from Britain upon inde-
pendence. There was a need to examine and analyse the continuing rele-
vance of these constitutions to the requirements of contemporary Caribbean
societies. Various commissions were set up to review the independence con-
stitutions in some territories. In Trinidad and Tobago, the Commission on
Constitutional Reform, presided over by the great Trinidadian jurist, Sir
Hugh Wooding, reported in 1974 and recommended discontinuance of ap-
peals to the JCPC. 9 In fact, every Constitution Commission appointed in
any Commonwealth Caribbean country since 1974 has recommended sever-
ance of ties with the JCPC.20
It was not, however, until 1988 that any firm decision was taken to es-
tablish a final appellate court in the region, although in 1987 the Trinidad
and Tobago delegation to the Eighth Meeting of Heads of Government in St.
Lucia proposed the establishment of a Caribbean Court of Appeal to replace
the JCPC.21 Between 1970 and 1988 there was much talk, much writing, but
no concrete action to transform the idea into a reality.
It all changed in 1988. The Heads of Government of the region met in
Antigua and Barbuda.22 They made the decision to establish a court to re-
place the JCPC.23 The very next year, at their meeting in Grenada, the Heads
made another equally significant and far-reaching decision. 24 They estab-
lished the West Indian Commission (the Ramphal Commission) under the
Caribbean Final Court of Appeal?, 6 CARIB. L. REv. 235 (1996); Jeff Cumberbatch, Appeals
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council - A Re-examination of the Issues (1994);
SIMEON C.R. MCINTOSH, CARIBBEAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM (2002).
19. RAwUNS, supra note 1, at 13, 20n.10, 21 n.21.
20. Most recently, The Report of the Constitution Review Commission of Barbados 1998,
which was chaired by former Attorney General of Barbados, Sir Henry Forde, K.A., Q.C.
THE COMMUNICATIONS UNIT, CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY SECRETARIAT, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM) 1998, at http://www.cari
com.org/archives/sgreport/rep98over.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
21. Press Release, CARICOM, Communiqud of the Eighth Meeting of the Conference of
Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community held at Castries, Saint Lucia from June
29-July 3, 1987, at http://www.caricom.org/archives/communiques-hgc/8hgc-1987-comm
unique.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2004).
22. Press Release, CARICOM, Communiqud Issued at the Conclusion of the Ninth Meet-
ing of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community held at Deep
Bay, Antigua and Barbuda from July 4-8, 1988, at http://www.caricom.org/archives/commu-
niques-hgc/9hgc- 1988-communique.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).
23. Id.
24. Press Release, CARICOM, Communiqud Issued at the Conclusion of the Tenth Meet-
ing of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community held at Grand
Anse, Grenada from July 3-7, 1989, at http://www.caricom.org/archives/communiques-
hgc/10hgc-1989-communique.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).
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chairmanship of Sir Shridath Ramphal, a former Secretary-General of the
Commonwealth, to consider and report on the way to deepen and widen the
process of regional integration.25 The time had come to revisit the Treaty of
Chaguaramas (1973).
This Treaty had, as its principal objective, the economic integration of
the thirteen States of the Commonwealth Caribbean by the establishment of a
common market regime commencing the process of regional economic inte-
gration. But, in 1989, there was the realization that a common market was
too limited an economic mechanism for deeper and wider integration. More
had to be done to deepen and widen the regional integration process.
The Ramphal Commission set out to consult the views of Common-
wealth Caribbean nationals all over the world.26 They discussed the future
structures for the region in London, North America, and across the Carib-
bean.27 After the widest possible consultation, the Commission handed in its
report, Time for Action, in May 1992.28 The report made a very strong case
for an indigenous final court and, most importantly, located the need for such
a court in the process of regional integration itself
29
The Report concluded: "[T]he case for the CARICOM Supreme Court,
with both a general appellate jurisdiction and an original regional one, is now
overwhelming-indeed it is fundamental to the process of integration it-
self.
30
The Heads of Government took action to implement the recommenda-
tions of the Ramphal Commission.31 A two-pronged strategy was devised.
In order to establish a single market and economy, the Treaty of Cha-
guaramas had to be revised.32 A Task Force33 was therefore established to
prepare the several protocols necessary to amend and revise the 1973 Treaty.
So far as a final court was concerned, the Legal Affairs Committee of
25. Id.
26. TIME FOR ACTION: REPORT OF THE WEST INDIAN COMMISSION 11 (2d ed., The Press
1993) (1992) [hereinafter TIME FOR ACTION].
27. Id.
28. Id. at xxix.
29. See id. at 497-50 1.
30. Id. at 498.
31. Press Release, CARICOM, Communiqu6 of the Special Meeting of the Conference of
Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community held at Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and To-
bago from October 28 to 31, 1992, at http://www.caricom.org/archives/communiquds-
hgc/sphgc-octl 992-communique.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).
32. Id.
33. The Task Force was chaired by Ambassador Nigel Barrow, Barbados' Ambassador to
CARICOM.
2005]
47
: Nova Law Review 29, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2005
NOVA LA W REVIEW
CARICOM (LAC)3 4 was instructed to draft the various instruments neces-
sary to underpin the establishment of the Court and, at the same time, to re-
fine the Protocols before commending them to the Heads for signature.35
During my tenure as Attorney General of Barbados (1994-2001), I was
directly involved in the finalisation of every Protocol and every instrument
relating to the CCJ. It was a huge task.36 The LAC began its work in earnest
at a meeting in Barbados in December 1994. There was in existence an
Inter-Governmental Agreement signed by Heads of Government in July 1990
which provided a rudimentary basis for action upon the decision of 1988.
In July 1999, the Heads appointed a Preparatory Committee (Prep.
Comm.) to supervise the work leading to the inauguration of the Court 7 and
later, they approved the creation of a full-time Coordinating Unit at the
CARICOM Secretariat in Georgetown, dedicated to driving the necessary
day-to-day work to facilitate the establishment of the Court. 38 I had the hon-
our to chair the Prep. Comm. until my retirement from political office in Au-
gust 2001. The drafting of eight instruments specific to the establishment of
the Court was completed by the time of my retirement, and I had the satisfac-
tion of commending the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Jus-
tice39 to Heads of Government for signature on February 14, 2001 at a cere-
mony in Barbados. We were on the way to inauguration of the CCJ. The
34. The Committee comprises the Attorneys-General or Ministers who are responsible
for legal affairs in CARICOM States.
35. See Press Release, CARICOM, Communiqud Issued at the Conclusion of the Second
Meeting of the Legal Affairs Committee held at Nassau, The Bahamas from September 7-10,
1998 (Sept. 9, 1998), at http://www.caricom.org/pressreleases/pres73_98.htm.
36. Nine Protocols were developed by the Task Force, and were then examined and
amended where necessary by the Legal Affairs Committee of CARICOM - prior to being sent
for signature by the Heads of Government and State. The Protocols have since been reformu-
lated and incorporated in the several chapters and articles of the "Revised Treaty of Cha-
guaramas establishing the Caribbean Community including the CARICOM Single Market and
Economy," signed by Heads of Government and State of the Caribbean Community on July 5,
2001. Revised Treaty, supra note 4.
37. Press Release, CARICOM, Communiqud Issued at the Conclusion of the Twentieth
Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community held at
Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago from July 4-7, 1999, at http://www.caricom.org/archives/
communiqus-hgc/20hgc-1999communique.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2005). The Prep.
Comm. comprises the Attorneys-General of Barbados (Chair), Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago. Id.
38. Press Release, CARICOM, Communiqud Issued at the Meeting of Members of the
Caricom Ministerial Sub-Committee for Resource Mobilisation for Crime and Security and a
United Kingdom Senior Level Time on Security Cooperation held at Kingston, Jamaica on
March 3, 2004 (Mar. 5, 2004), at http://www.caricom.org/pressreleases/pres28_04.htm.
39. Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, Feb. 14, 2001, http://www.
caricom.org/ccjagrmnt.htm [hereinafter CCJ Agreement].
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CCJ was a few years away from realization. After thirty-one years of debate
and discussion, an important milestone in Caribbean legal history had been
reached. The completion of our independence was at hand.
III. THE COMPETING ARGUMENTS
During the many years of debate and discussion, some of them acrimo-
nious, the competing arguments in support of and against the Court had crys-
tallized. The Prep. Comm., as a deliberate strategy, determined to discuss
the establishment of the Court with the regional public. We were conscious
that the region had experimented with a political Federation of the West In-
dies for four years (from 1958-1962), and that experiment had failed. Failure
was attributed to many reasons but it is generally agreed that a lack of under-
standing of the Federal idea among the mass of Caribbean people was one of
the main reasons. The Prep. Comm. was determined that the CCJ should not
founder because the people of the region did not support the Court or did not
understand the reasons for its creation. Thus, members of the Prep. Comm.
and the Coordinating Unit went across the region promoting and explaining
the Court. It was during these interactive consultations with the people of
the region that we were able to discuss the competing arguments for and
against the Court and understand the legitimate concerns of the people.
A. Arguments in Favour
1. Access to Justice
The foremost reason for an indigenous final court is a conviction that
such a court will increase access to justice. Especially in civil appeals, the
sheer distance of the JCPC in London from the Caribbean has denied access
to litigants. In addition, the costs associated with taking appeals beyond lo-
cal Courts of Appeal are an inhibiting factor. It is true that, comparatively
recently, there has been an increase in civil appeals to the JCPC, but these
appeals have largely been pursued by litigants who can afford the costs.
During my years in private practice in Barbados (from 1970-1994) few civil
appeals went from Barbados to the JCPC. I appeared in the first civil appeal
from Barbados in thirty years in Elias v George Sahely & Co.4 °
On the other hand, access to justice in criminal appeals is relatively
easy. There is a regular flow of appeals to the JCPC. The vast majority are
appeals against convictions for murder or appeals raising constitutional
40. [1983] A.C. 646, 648 (P.C.).
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points arising out of the imposition of the death penalty. Even though these
criminal or constitutional appeals do not cost the appellants personally, there
are substantial costs to be borne by the governments which fund these ap-
peals since the appellants are invariably poor and make applications in forma
pauperis.
To the extent that the CCJ will be an itinerant court taking justice to the
people of the region, it will immeasurably increase access to justice. I pause
here to mention that we are not short on experience of itinerant courts. Dur-
ing the federal experiment there was a Federal Supreme Court." It was
headquartered in Trinidad,42 but it moved around the region. In contempo-
rary times, the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court has its Seat in St. Lucia but
travels to all of the States of the OECS dispensing justice.43
2. Development of a Caribbean Jurisprudence
There are two fundamental functions of a final appellate court: first, the
correction of errors of lower courts, and, second, development of the com-
mon law. A rational reason for the establishment of the CCJ is rooted in a
desire to promote the development of a Caribbean jurisprudence giving its
own flavour to the common law. Over time, countries which severed rela-
tionships with the JCPC have contributed in quite unique ways to the growth
and development of the common law. One thinks immediately of the High
Court of Australia, the Supreme Court of Canada, the Supreme Court of In-
dia, and the Constitutional Court of South Africa.
It has been persuasively argued that retention of the JCPC has restricted
the development of a Caribbean jurisprudence. In the words of the Ramphal
Commission, "it must be to a local not an external, court that we must look
for the sensitive and courageous development of our law"' in the post-
independence phase of our development.
In 2002, the Honorable Michael de la Bastide, former Chief Justice of
Trinidad and Tobago (and recently appointed first President of the CCJ)45
41. See Sheldon A. McDonald, The Caribbean Court of Justice: Enhancing the Law of
International Organizations, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 930, 1010 (2004).
42. See id.
43. See id. at 960 n.96, 1010.
44. TIME FOR ACTION, supra note 26, at 499.
45. The Honorable Michael de la Bastide was appointed by the Heads of Government at
their meeting in Grenada in July, 2004. Press Release, CARICOM, Communiqud Issued at
the Conclusion of the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the
Caribbean Community held at St. Georges, Grenada from July 4-7, 2004 (July 8, 2004), at
http://www.caricom.org/archives/communiques-hgc/25hgc-2004-communique.htm [hereinaf-
ter Twenty-fifth Communique].
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speaking extra-judicially, emphasised that: "It is very important that the
judges who rfiake the decisions which create our jurisprudence have a close
and very intimate connection with our societies." '46
Even more pointedly, Lord Hoffman, one of the serving Privy Council
judges, seemed to lament the remoteness of the JCPC from the Caribbean
societies for which they are the final appellate court when he addressed the
Law Association of Trinidad and Tobago on October 10, 2003. His Lordship
said:
It is an extraordinary fact that for nearly nine years I have been a
member of the final court of appeal for the independent Republic
of Trinidad and Tobago, a confident democracy with its own cul-
ture and national values, and this is the first time that I have set
foot upon the islands. No one unaware of the historic links be-
tween the islands and the United Kingdom would believe it possi-
ble.47
Lord Cooke of Thorndon, a New Zealander who sat in the JCPC for
many years, wrote in similar vein in The Commonwealth Lawyer (April
2003) in support of New Zealand's withdrawal from the JCPC, that: "Since
1987 I have been and remain converted to the view that the development of
our legal system requires replacing the Privy Council. . . .Judges in the
United Kingdom, however eminent and enlightened, can have only a superfi-
cial acquaintance with New Zealand conditions and problems. "
4 8
3. The Single Market and Economy
A third reason for the CCJ, as the Ramphal Commission observed, lies
in the process of regional integration itself. The contemporary world order
(or disorder) is generating more and more regional arrangements for eco-
nomic cooperation and integration. Inevitably, disputes will arise between
states in any regional economic grouping. Those disputes require resolution
46. Honorable Michael de la Bastide, Address at a Convocation on the CCJ, Kingston,
Jam., (Apr. 9, 2002); Government of Jamaica, Ministry of Commerce, Science and Technol-
ogy, News Stories, St. Lucian Prime Minister and Trinidad and Tobago's Chief Justice for
CARICOM Single Market and Economy/Caribbean Court of Justice Convocation, at
http://www.mct.gov.jm/csme-forum.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2005).
47. The Right Honorable Lord Leonard Hoffmannn, Speech at the Annual Dinner of the
Law Association of Trinidad and Tobago, at 5 (Oct. 10, 2003).
48. LORD COOKE OF THORNDON, NEW ZEALAND CENTRE FOR PUBLIC LAW, FINAL APPEAL
COURTS: SOME COMPARISONS 17-18 (2001), at http://www.law.vuw.ac.nz/vuw/fca/law/files/-
occasionalpaper7.pdf.
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by an independent and impartial tribunal applying appropriate rules of inter-
national law or international trade law.
Under the Treaty of Chaguaramas there was no satisfactory dispute
resolution mechanism. 49 The Heads of Government in Conference were the
ultimate arbiters. The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas of 2001, enacting a
specific protocol for dispute settlement,5 ° provides for judicial resolution of
the disputes which will eventuate upon the coming into force of the Single
Market and Economy in 2005. It would be difficult to conceive of a role for
the JCPC once the Single Market and Economy becomes a reality in the
Commonwealth Caribbean. I shall discuss the adjudicatory function of the
CCJ in relation to its original jurisdiction under the Revised Treaty of Cha-
guaramas later. But for the moment, it is submitted that in the light of the
decision to establish a Single Market and Economy, the CCJ is a necessary
regional institution responding to the realities of regional integration and the
prevailing global economic environment.
4. Sovereignty and Independence
Duke Pollard disagrees with my view that notions of sovereignty are
sound reasons justifying the establishment of the CCJ.5" It is freely admitted
that such notions may appear to be hoisted on a flag of emotionalism. But,
having regard to our colonial past, considerations of sovereignty and inde-
pendence (independence that is both legal and psychological) are, in my
opinion, central to the self-respect, self-confidence, and self-definition of
Commonwealth Caribbean people. I reiterate my view that if Common-
wealth Caribbean countries can legitimately claim political independence, it
must surely be the case that they are not truly and fully independent while
their highest court sits outside the region, in London, and is staffed by judges
from outside the region. Our statute laws are no longer made for us in the
United Kingdom; our Cabinets, exercising executive authority, no longer
receive dictates of policy from the United Kingdom. Why should our law
continue to be interpreted and fashioned in Downing Street? The third arm
of government, the judicial, requires repatriation. Continuation of appeals to
the JCPC is an affront to sovereignty and inconsistent with independence.
One of our most distinguished jurists, the Right Honorable Telford
Georges, who himself sat as a judge in the JCPC, wrote in 1998:
49. See Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1033,
http://www.jis.gov.jm/special-sections/CARICOMNew/CARICOMTreaty.pdf.
50. See Revised Treaty, supra note 4, art. 211.
51. See POLLARD, supra note 8, at 238.
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It appears to me that an independent country should assume re-
sponsibility for providing a court of its own choosing for the final
determination of legal disputes arising for decision in the country.
It is a compromise of sovereignty to leave that decision to a court
which is part of the former colonial hierarchy, a court in the ap-
pointment of whose members we have absolutely no say. 52
And Lord Cooke makes a similar point:
It is inconsistent with that nationhood to submit our legal issues to
the adjudication of those, whoever they may be, who happen at
any one time and in any particular case to comprise a majority of
Judges of another country, appointed and sitting far off in that
country and primarily versed in the laws of that country.9
53
B. Arguments Against
1. Quality of Judges
The arguments against the CCJ are essentially three. Some of the op-
ponents of the CCJ speak of the quality of the judges of the JCPC almost in
terms of infallibility. It is undeniable that the JCPC has been a regional court
of the highest quality, comprising as it does, a majority of House of Lords
judges. It is also undoubted that in the area of constitutional law, the JCPC
has been a great protector of the fundamental rights and freedoms of Carib-
bean people. Lords Diplock and Wilberforce were extremely influential in
shaping our constitutional law and jurisprudence.
For example, Lord Wilberforce advised in Minister of Home Affairs v.
Fisher " that the interpretation of a Constitution should be large, liberal, and
purposive eschewing as far as possible "the austerity of tabulated legalism."55
Hinds v. R.56 established that the doctrine of the separation of powers is im-
plicit in the Westminster model Constitutions of the Commonwealth Carib-
bean. In Maharaj v. Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago,57 Lord Dip-
52. Right Honorable Telford Georges, Address to a Symposium on Caribbean Rights,
Barbados, (Nov. 28, 1998); Attorney General, Honorable Godfrey Smith, The Caribbean
Court of Justice: An Overview of the Challenges & Prospects, Aug. 28, 2001, at http://www.
belize.gov.bz/features/Caribbean court/challenges&prospects.html.
53. THORNDON, supra note 48, at 20.
54. [1980] A.C. 319 (P.C.).
55. Id. at 328. This celebrated phrase was coined by the late Professor Stanley de Smith,
a British Constitutional lawyer.
56. (1975) 24 W.I.R. 326, 328 (P.C.).
57. (1978)30 W.I.R. 310, 310-11 (P.C.).
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lock created a public law remedy of damages for breach of fundamental
rights caused by judicial error. Thomas v. Attorney General of Trinidad and
Tobago 58 held that public servants were not dismissible at pleasure under the
Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago. More recently, Lord Bridge ruled that
where the Cabinet of Barbados was exercising a statutory power (the award
of a contract), its decision was judicially reviewable.59
However, to suggest that a kind of infallibility inheres in the judgments
of the JCPC is a wide proposition not supported by recent evidence. In fact,
our highest court has shown itself to be exceptionally fallible especially in
developing the jurisprudence on the death penalty. One merely has to exam-
ine the long list of decisions in the death penalty cases between November
1993 and March 2004 to discover how often the JCPC judges have reversed
themselves by the slenderest majorities (for example, three to two, or five to
four) on the same point!6" The judicial gymnastics of the JCPC in the death
penalty cases prompted one of the very judges of the JCPC to warn his breth-
ren in 2000 that "the rule of law itself will be damaged and there will be no
stability in the administration of justice in the Caribbean,"'" if JCPC judges
continue to give decisions on the basis of"a doctrinal disposition to come out
differently.... 62 I go so far as to say that it is disconcerting that our highest
court should be a source of instability in the administration of justice in the
Commonwealth Caribbean. One of the functions of a final appellate court is
to bring certainty to the law. But, it might be explicable on the ground that
no Caribbean judge was ever invited to sit on the panels of judges when the
JCPC was fashioning the death penalty jurisprudence in the period between
November 1993 to December 2003.63
58. [19821 A.C. 113, 126-7 (P.C.).
59. C.O. Williams Constr. Ltd v. Blackman, (1994) 45 W.I.R. 94, 100 (P.C.).
60. See, e.g., Guerra v. State, (1994) 45 W.I.R. 400 (P.C.); Reckley v. Minister of Pub.
Safety and Immigr., (1995) 47 W.I.R. 9 (P.C.); Henfield v. A-G, (1996) 49 W.I.R. 1 (P.C.);
Fisher v. Minister of Pub. Safety and Immigr., (1997) 52 W.I.R. 1 (P.C.); Fisher v. Minister of
Pub. Safety and Immigr., (1998) 53 W.I.R. 27 (P.C.); Thomas v. Baptiste (1999) 54 W.I.R.
387 (Trin. & Tobago C.A.); Lewis v. Attorney Gen., (2000) 57 W.I.R. 275 (P.C.); Roodall v.
State, (2003) 64 W.I.R. 270 (P.C.).
61. Lewis, 57 W.I.R. at 309 (Lord Hoffmann, dissenting).
62. Id.
63. A change of attitude came in December 2003. The JCPC was hearing an appeal from
Barbados. Boyce v. R, (2004) 64 W.I.R. 37 (P.C.). During argument it appeared to the Bench
of five judges that it might be necessary to overrule the decision they had given a few months
before in the Trinidadian case, Roodall. Boyce, 64 W.I.R. at 42; see also Roodall, 64 W.I.R.
at 287. An enlarged panel was convened in March 2004 to hear re-argument in Boyce, along
with two other appeals from Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago viz. Watson v. The Queen,
(2004) 64 W.I.R. 241 (P.C.), and Matthew v. State, (2004) 64 W.I.R. 412 (P.C.) on whether
the mandatory sentence of death was constitutional in Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and
[Vol.29:2:171
54
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss2/1
THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
However that may be, fairness and objectivity demand that the great
contribution which the JCPC has made to the development of the common
law in the Commonwealth Caribbean must be acknowledged.
2. Lack of Judicial Talent
It has been suggested by detractors of the CCJ that there is a lack of ju-
dicial talent in the Caribbean. I take issue with the suggestion. The Carib-
bean has long been an exporter of judicial talent to other countries of the
Commonwealth and to international courts or tribunals.64 More to the point,
in July 2004, three Caribbean judges were appointed to the JCPC by the
Prime Minister of Britain. They are Honorable Michael de la Bastide, Sir
Dennis Byron, and Dame Joan Sawyer.65 Those appointments clearly imply
that it is recognised that there are persons in the Commonwealth Caribbean
who possess the qualities to sit as equals with the judges of the JCPC. The
argument of a lack of judicial talent fails in the face of these recent appoint-
ments. It is also an empty argument which ignores the contributions made
by the University of the West Indies (U.W.I.) and the Council of Legal Edu-
cation (CLE) to the graduation of our own, home-grown lawyers since 1973.
A regionally trained lawyer, Justice Adrian Saunders, is today Acting Chief
Jamaica. See also Boyce, 64 W.I.R. at 37. When the panel was constituted, the Rt. Honorable
Edward Zacca, a former President of the Court of Appeal of Jamaica, was added. See Boyce,
64 W.I.R. at 40; Watson, 64 W.I.R. at 214; Matthew, 64 W.I.R. at 412. Overruling Roodall,
the JCPC, by a majority of five to four, held that the mandatory death sentence was constitu-
tional in Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, but not in Jamaica. Boyce, 64 W.I.R. at 60;
Watson, 6 W.I.R. at 262; Matthew, 64 W.I.R. at 425.
64. Sir Hugh Wooding (Trinidad and Tobago), Sir William Douglas (Barbados), Rt.
Honorable Telford Georges (Trinidad and Tobago), and Sir Vincent Floissac (St. Lucia) all sat
as judges in the JCPC. Privy Council, Privy Council Members, available at http://www.privy-
coucil.org.uk/output/Page76.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2005). Sir Dennis Byron (Chief Justice
of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court) is currently presiding over the Rwandan tribunal
regarding alleged genocide. Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanada, Sir
Charles Michael Dennis Byron Appointed as Permanent Judge of the ICTR (Apr. 20, 2004), at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2004/384.htm. The Honorable Patrick Robinson
of Jamaica is presiding over the Milosevic hearing. The Telegraph (UK), Milosevic accused
of presiding over era of 'medieval savagery,' at http://www.balkanpeace.org/hed/archive/
feb02/hed4683.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
65. Dame Joan Sawyer is President of the Court of Appeal of The Bahamas. The Gov-
eminent of the Bahamas, Supreme Court Justices, available at http://www.bahamas.gov.bs/Ba
hamasWeb/aboutthegovemment.nsf/Subjects/Members+of+the+Judicial+System (last visited
Feb. 2, 2005).
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Justice of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court.66 Many graduates of the
U.W.I. and C.L.E. hold high offices as Attorneys-General, Directors of Pub-
lic Prosecutions, Solicitors-General, inter dios.
3. A Hanging Court?
Before concluding the discussion on the pros and cons of the CCJ, it is
necessary to address a distorted argument and perception that has gained
currency. It is the unworthy suggestion that the CCJ is being established as
"a hanging court." The argument has its genesis in the line of cases follow-
ing the landmark decision in Pratt v. Attorney General.67 Broadly, the effect
of those cases has been to prevent the use of the death penalty in the region.
Caribbean people and their governments became frustrated and angry that
the reasoning of the judges of the JCPC in case after case went beyond ac-
ceptable judicial activism and was clearly judicial legislation in an issue of
social policy. The parliaments of the region were not abolishing the death
penalty; the judges of the JCPC were. "It is impermissible for [judges] to
develop the law in a direction which is contrary to the expressed will of Par-
liament." 68 "[C]ourts [should be] slow to develop the common law by enter-
ing ... a field regulated by legislation.,
69
The spate of death penalty decisions came between 1993 and 2000, pre-
cisely at the time when serious work was going on in the region to make the
CCJ a reality. There was therefore a coincidence, even a collision, of events
that gave rise to the distorted argument. At the same time, as the proponents
of the Court were promoting it throughout the region, dissatisfaction was
being expressed with the decisions of the JCPC. It is not hard to see how the
debate got derailed. The JCPC judges were accused of using Eurocentric
attitudes and values to seek to abolish the death penalty in the region con-
trary to the wishes of the people of the region and usurping the powers of
national parliaments as the only constitutional authorities to repeal statute
laws. Abolition of the death penalty in the region must be the function of the
parliaments in the region. As Chief Justice de la Bastide remarked in 2002:
66. Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, Honorable Justices of the Eastern Caribbean
Supreme Court, Honorable Adrian Saunders, Biography, http://www.ecsupremecourts.org.lc/
index.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2005).
67. (1993) 43 W.I.R. 340 (P.C.).
68. Re McKerr, [2004] 2 All E.R. 409, 425 (H.L.) (quoting R. v. Chief Constable of the
Royal Ulster Constabulary, [1997] 4 All E.R. 833, 838 (H.L.)).
69. McKerr, [2004] 2 All E.R. at 419.
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"We are firmly of the view that if the death penalty is no longer to be manda-
tory in Trinidad and Tobago, this change must be effected by Parliament."7
That view of the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago has been en-
dorsed in the recent decisions of Boyce and Matthew by the majority in the
JCPC.71
I am bound to say that the suggestion that the Court is being established
for the collateral purpose of accelerating hangings in the region distorts real-
ity and flies in the face of history. I have demonstrated above that the idea
for such a Court (raised in both 1901 and 1947) predated Pratt, which took
place in November 1993, and so did the decision of Heads of Government in
1989 to replace the JCPC with an indigenous Court. The raison d'etre of the
CCJ is not to accelerate hangings. Gossip to the contrary is all the more
frivolous when it is remembered that no judges were appointed to the CCJ
when the gossip was at its height. In truth, the gossip is an attack on the in-
tegrity and impartiality of the body charged with responsibility for appoint-
ing the judges and it implies that the judges, will be appointed on the basis of
their personal views on the death penalty. Nothing could be further from the
truth.
On balance, the arguments in favour of the CCJ far outweighed those
against it and convinced the Heads to pursue their determination to establish
the CCJ. They recognised that the Court is indispensable for the good gov-
erance of the region and has a critical role to play in the efficient admini-
stration of justice in Member States of CARICOM.
Our current judicial hosts, the JCPC, will not be sad to see us leave.
Over the years the Commonwealth jurisdiction of the CCJ has steadily con-
tracted. Canada, Australia, the states of East and West Africa, India, Paki-
stan, Singapore, inter alia, have all de-linked from the JCPC.72 Most re-
cently, in October 2003, New Zealand enacted legislation to sever its rela-
tionship with the JCPC.73
A feature of the termination of these relationships has been the resis-
tance of the private bars to the rupture. The Government of New Zealand
met stem opposition in its efforts to end the relationship with the JCPC.74
We faced it in the Caribbean. The Bars of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago
and, to a lesser extent, the OECS, have resisted the establishment of the CCJ.
70. Roodall v. State (Criminal Appeal No.64 of 1999) p. 21 (C.A. Trinidad & Tobago).
71. See generally Boyce, [2004] U.K.P.C at 32; Matthew, [2004] U.K.P.C. at 33.
72. TOM BINGHAM, THE BUSINESS OF JUDGING: SELECTED ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 387
(2002).
73. See New Zealand Gets Own Justice System After 160 Years, PAC. NEWS AGENCY
SERVICE, July 1, 2004, 2004 WL 56683169.
74. BINGHAM, supra note 72, at 388.
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The strident, almost virulent, opposition to the CCJ in Jamaica is, as I indi-
cated above, paradoxical when it is remembered that as long ago as 1970, it
was Jamaica which proposed to the regional Heads of Government that the
region replace the JCPC with its own indigenous court of last resort.75
However that may be, the concerns of the Bars were taken into account
by the Prep. Comm. and helped to improve the text of the CCJ Agreement.
In common with sections of the general Caribbean public, those concerns
were focused on securing the independence of the Court in regard to the ap-
pointment of judges and the financing of the Court.
IV. THE UNIQUENESS OF THE CCJ
We shall now examine some of the distinctive features of this Court
confident in the assertion that it is a court sui generis. The CCJ has two ju-
risdictions. It is a municipal court which will hear appeals in civil and crimi-
nal cases in the same way as the JCPC now hears appeals from Common-
wealth Caribbean States. At the same time, regional governments accepted
the recommendations of the Ramphal Commission: that the CCJ should
have original jurisdiction, that is to say, jurisdiction to hear and determine
disputes arising under the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas governing ar-
rangements for the CSME. To that extent, the CCJ is also an international
court.
A. Compulsory and Exclusive Original Jurisdiction
The Ramphal Commission envisaged a central role for the CCJ in a
deeper and wider regional integration process, and Article 211 of the Revised
Treaty of Chaguaramas gives the Court compulsory and exclusive jurisdic-
tion in the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation and applica-
tion of that Treaty.76 No other courts in the region have competence to hear
and determine disputes involving the interpretation and application of the
Revised Treaty.77 Indeed, if an issue as to the interpretation and application
of the Revised Treaty arises before a national court, that court must stay the
proceedings and refer the issue to the CCJ for its determination.78
In the context of its role as a judicial institution in a regional integration
movement, the CCJ will apply rules of international law, but it may also em-
75. RAWLINS, supra note 1, at 5.
76. Revised Treaty, supra note 4, art. 211.
77. See id.
78. CCJ Agreement, supra note 39, art. XIV.
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ploy other principles of law or equity where necessary.79 In this regard, the
jurisdiction of the CCJ differs from that of other regional courts such as the
European Court of Justice, which must apply Community Law (the norms
peculiar to the European Union).80 The CCJ is not a supra-national institu-
tion. The States of the Caribbean which have signed the Revised Treaty and
submit to the original jurisdiction of the Court are all sovereign, independent
states. They have not ceded any of the attributes of sovereignty to any supra-
national entity as, for example, is the case with the European Union.
So far as original jurisdiction is concerned, Article XII of the CCJ
Agreement, as well as Article 211 of the Revised Treaty, provides that the
CCJ will
have compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine
disputes concerning the application and interpretation of the Re-
vised Treaty including:
(a) disputes between Member States parties to the Agree-
ment;
(b) disputes between Member States parties to the Agree-
ment and the Community;
(c) referrals from national courts of the Member States par-
ties to the Agreement;
(d) applications by persons in accordance with Article 222,
concerning the interpretation and application of this Treaty. 8I
The circumstances in which such persons, or nationals, may have stand-
ing before the Court are where:
(a) the Court has determined in any particular case that the
Treaty intended that a right conferred by or under the Treaty on a
Contracting Party shall enure to the benefit of such persons di-
rectly; and
(b) the persons concerned have established that such persons
have been prejudiced in the enjoyment of the benefit mentioned
under (a)... ; and
(c) the Contracting Party entitled to espouse the claim in
proceedings before the Court has:
79. Revised Treaty, supra note 4, art. 217.
80. E.g., Jiirgen Schwarze, Judicial Review in EC Law-Some Reflections on the Origins
and the Actual Legal Situation, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 17, 28 (2002).
81. Id. art. 211. Article XII of the CCJ Agreement is very similar to Article 211 of the
Revised Treaty, and its subsection (d) refers to applications by nationals who, with special
leave, are given locus standi to appear in three specific cases under Article XXIV of CCJ the
Agreement. CCJ Agreement, supra note 39, art. XII.
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(i) omitted or declined to espouse the claim, or
(ii) expressly agreed that the persons concerned may es-
pouse the claim instead of the Contracting Party so entitled; and
(d) the Court has found that the interests of justice requires
that the persons be allowed to espouse the claim.
82
B. Non Liquet
Closer examination of the original jurisdiction of the Court highlights in
a stark way some of the other distinctive characteristics of the Court apart
from its dual jurisdictions. First is the principle of non liquet. Article XVII,
subsection two of the CCJ Agreement prohibits the Court from refusing to
determine a matter on the grounds of "silence or obscurity of the law." 3
Whereas in civil law systems, a court might decline to give a decision if there
were particular difficulties in reaching a decision and leave the issue for fu-
ture determination, both the CCJ Agreement and the Revised Treaty require
decisiveness of the CCJ. 84 Although the non liquet provision has been criti-
cised by H.R. Lim A. Po,85 it is justified on grounds of certainty and predict-
ability in the interpretation and application of the Revised Treaty. It would
not be appropriate for national courts to seek to resolve disputes arising un-
der the Revised Treaty. Clearly it would be preferable to have a separate
court, independent of individual states, adjudicate issues under the Revised
Treaty. Such an arrangement would better promote certainty, predictability,
and impartiality, hence the role of the CCJ.
C. Stare Decisis
A third unique feature of the original jurisdiction is seen in the incorpo-
ration of the doctrine of stare decisis in that jurisdiction. 86 It is true that, tra-
ditionally, this doctrine has had no application in international law or civil
law jurisdictions and is absent from the Articles of the European Court of
Justice.87 The doctrine of binding precedent is a common law phenomenon
82. Id. art. XXIV.
83. Id. art. XVII(2).
84. CCJ Agreement, supra note 39, art. XVII; Revised Treaty, supra note 4, art. 217.
85. H.R. Lim A. Po, Bridging the Divide, An Address to a Symposium on the CCJ in
Suriname (October 31, 2003).
86. CCJ Agreement, supra note 39, art. XXII. "Judgments of the Court shall be legally
binding precedents for parties before the Court unless such judgments have been revised in
accordance with Article XX." Id.
87. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3.
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facilitating certainty in the law as far as practicable. And, although the fram-
ers of the CCJ Agreement and the Revised Treaty were conscious of the
membership of Haiti and Suriname (two civil law jurisdictions) in the Carib-
bean Community, and although it was appreciated that courts in civil law
jurisdictions may depart from previous decisions, the drafters nevertheless
were persuaded to write the doctrine into the documentation.
The justification for the decision to include Article XXII lies in a recog-
nition of a movement in the European Court of Justice and other courts to
promote greater certainty in the law by an adherence to previous decisions.
Inconsistency in judicial decisions promotes uncertainty and injustice.
D. Locus Standi for Private Entities
A fourth distinctive feature of the original jurisdiction can be seen in
Article XII. This Article introduces an important exception to the general
principle that in traditional international law only States and States' entities
are subjects of international law and competent to espouse claims in an inter-
national form.88
The Legal Affairs Committee in 1998 accepted a recommendation to
include in the CCJ Agreement a procedure to provide an opportunity for non-
States parties to appear before the CCJ in special circumstances. There is no
automatic right for a private entity to move the Court, but access may be
accorded either through the State of the national or via Article 214 of the
Revised Treaty.89
The Revised Treaty is intended to be a rules-based mechanism widening
and deepening the integration of the Caribbean region. But, at its centre, it is
intended to benefit the people of the region. It is right, therefore, that the
regime for the settlement of disputes should provide a mechanism by which
the people of the region, natural and corporate, should be able to invoke the
Court's jurisdiction in appropriate cases.
E. Constitution of the Court
Turning to the constitution of the Court, the Agreement makes provi-
sion for the Court to be staffed by nine judges and a President.90 The Judges,
other than the President, will be appointed or removed by a majority vote of
all of the members of the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission
88. See CCJ Agreement, supra note 39, art. XII; Statute of the International Court of
Justice, 1945 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. art. 34(1).
89. Revised Treaty, supra note 4, art. 214.
90. CCJ Agreement, supra note 39, art. IV(1).
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(RJLSC). 9' In the case of the President, however, he or she is appointed by a
vote of three-fourths of the Heads of Government on the recommendation of
the RJLSC.92 This formula owed much of its final form to the comments of
the Jamaica Bar Council and the concerns of the regional public. They were
all determined that, as far as practicable, judicial appointments should be
insulated from the possibility of political influence. Some of the detractors
of the Court preferred that all of the judges should be appointed by the
RJLSC, but the Prep. Comm. was not persuaded and saw no compelling rea-
son to deny the Heads of Government the privilege of a final say in the ap-
pointment of the President. Those detractors ignored the glaring facts that
the judges of the JCPC, our highest court, are appointed upon the recom-
mendation of the British Prime Minister, and that Chief Justices of the region
are appointed by the Head of State acting on the recommendation of a Prime
Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition.
F. The Judges
Any Caribbean or Commonwealth judge with five or more years of ser-
vice or judges from civil law jurisdictions are eligible for appointment as
judges of the CCJ.93 In addition, a practitioner or teacher of law with fifteen
years of experience in any part of the Caribbean, the Commonwealth, or a
civil law jurisdiction, may be eligible for appointment.9 4
The Agreement has deliberately cast a wide net for the judges of the
Court in order to capture the best available talent in common law and civil
law jurisdictions and to invest the Court with the kind of diversity that a final
Court deserves. Specific provision is made in the Agreement for at least
three judges of the Court to have expertise in international law and/or inter-
national trade law.95 It is my opinion that extending eligibility for judicial
appointment to academic lawyers is a highly progressive and desirable inno-
vation.
Again, the provisions for appointment of the judges are so crafted as to
highlight the uniqueness of the Court. As Duke Pollard observes: "The CCJ
is the only international institution of its kind in the world where judges will
not be appointed, directly or indirectly, by the political directorate of the
91. Id. art. V(3)(1)(a).
92. See id. art. IV(2), VI(1).
93. Id. art. IV(10)(a).
94. Id. art. IV(10)(b).
95. CCJ Agreement, supra note 39, art. IV(1).
[Vol.29:2:171
62
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss2/1
THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
States participating in the regime. Cases in point are the International Court
of Justice (ICJ), the European Court of Justice (ECJ). '96
In early 2004, when advertisements ran worldwide for judges of the
Court, the RJLSC received ninety applications from all over the world. At
their meeting in Grenada during July 4-7, 2004, the Heads of Government
unanimously accepted the recommendation of the RJLSC that the Honorable
Michael de la Bastide, T.C., Q.C., a former Chief Justice of Trinidad and
Tobago, be appointed as the first President of the CCJ.97 The RJLSC met on
the 27th and 28th of September, 2004 and selected a further five judges for
appointment.
In my opinion, the Agreement establishing the CCJ makes adequate
provision for ensuring the judges' security of tenure. For example, the
President can serve for a period of seven years (non-renewable) or until the
age of seventy-two.98 The other judges must retire at age seventy-two, and
there is no power to extend a judge's term of office.99 This is an important
provision aimed at reducing the possibility of a judge submitting to improper
influence. Similarly, the office of a judge cannot be abolished while there is
a substantive holder of it.' The salaries and allowances payable to the
judges, as well as their other terms and conditions of service, cannot be al-
tered to their disadvantage during their tenure of office.'0 ' And removal from
office is not an easy process. A judge may only be removed from office if he
or she is unable to perform the functions of office by reason of ill-health or
mis-behaviour. 12 I will not set out in this paper the detailed procedure for
removal of a judge from office. Suffice it to say that there is an elaborate
procedure which makes ample provision for securing a fair hearing and in-
volves the appointment of a special tribunal to hear and determine a proposal
for removal.'03
So far as the emoluments and perquisites of judicial office are con-
cerned, salaries and allowances are free of tax, and judges will be entitled to
96. POLLARD, supra note 8, at 38.
97. See Twenty-fifth Communiqu6, supra note 45. The Honorable Michael de la Bastide
was sworn in as President on August 18, 2004 at a ceremony in Port-of-Spain. Caribbean Net
News, Chief of New Caribbean Court Sworn In (Aug. 19, 2004), at http://www.caribbean
netnews.com/2004/08/19/ccj.htm.
98. CCJ Agreement, supra note 39, art. IX(2).
99. See id. art. IX(3).
100. Id. art. IX(l).
101. Id. art. XXVIII(3).
102. Id. art. IX(4).
103. See generally CCJ Agreement, supra note 39, art. IX(4), (6) (outlining the reasons
and procedure for removing a judge from office).
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housing allowances, cars, drivers, and other benefits."°  Superannuation
benefits are as follows:
(a) less than 5 years' service - a gratuity of 20 per cent of
the Judge's pensionable emoluments at the time of retirement for
every year of service;
(b) 5 to 10 years' service - a monthly pension equivalent to
two-thirds of the Judge's monthly pensionable emoluments at the
time of retirement.
(c) more than 10 years' service - a monthly pension equiva-
lent to the Judge's monthly pensionable emoluments at the time of
retirement. 105
G. Mode of Appointment of Judges and Staff" The RJLSC
More and more throughout the Commonwealth, it is accepted that ap-
pointments to judicial office should be made by an independent, impartial,
autonomous body. In the constitutions of the Commonwealth Caribbean
States, a Judicial and Legal Service Commission is a common feature of such
a body. In the case of the CCJ, a deliberate attempt was made to ensure that
the appointments of judges were made by such a body. Thus, the Agreement
has adopted the constitutional mechanism of appointment (and removal) of
the judges of the CCJ by the RJLSC.' °6
The RJLSC is an independent body comprised of persons nominated or
chosen by institutions or persons with no political affiliation. °7 It consists of
the President of the Court as Chairman and ten other persons drawn from the
Caribbean region and includes: the Chairman of a Judicial and Legal Ser-
vices Commission of a Contracting Party, the Chairman of a Public Service
Commission of a Contracting Party, two persons from civil society appointed
by the Secretary-General of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), two
persons nominated by OCCBA and the Bar Association of the OECS, two
distinguished regional jurists, and two nominees of the Bar Associations of
Contracting Parties. 108 The independence of the Commission is reinforced by
a Protocol conferring various privileges and immunities on it, and its inde-
pendence is specifically incorporated in the Agreement: "In the exercise of
their functions under this Agreement, the members of the Commission shall
104. Id. at App. II.
105. Id.
106. Id. art. V(3), IX(5)(2).
107. See id. art. V(I).
108. CCJ Agreement, supra note 39, art. V(1).
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neither seek nor receive instructions from any body or person external to the
Commission."' 9
The RJLSC assumed office on August 20, 2003. Among its responsi-
bilities is the appointment of the Judges, officials, and staff of the Court."0
The President took up office on August 18, 2004, but prior to his appoint-
ment, the Commission met every month after August 20, 2003 to prepare and
put into place a wide range of necessary administrative and infrastructural
arrangements. These included, inter alia, the establishment of budgets for
library materials and technological support systems, preparation of a code of
judicial conduct, identification of human resource requirements, and adver-
tising for judges and staff of the Court. The Commission has worked hard
and well.
H. Headquarters
The Seat of the Court will be in Trinidad and Tobago, but, as mentioned
earlier, the Court will be itinerant. 11' The Government of Trinidad and To-
bago is providing a building in Port-of-Spain to house the Court, and the
offices of the RJLSC are also presently located in Port-of-Spain.
V. FINANCING THE COURT: AN EXAMPLE OF UNIQUE CREATIVITY
Now to the very important matter of financing the Court. As indicated
earlier, the people of the region were concerned that the financing of the op-
erations of the Court should be put on a secure and sustainable basis. This
concern was born of the experiences of many of our regional institutions
which have, from time to time, suffered from fiscal disequilibrium owing to
the delinquency of some governments in paying their contributions in a
timely manner. Caribbean peoples were determined that the CCJ should not
be subjected to fiscal uncertainty or embarrassment. To meet these concerns,
the Prep. Comm. designed a mechanism to secure the efficiency, effective-
ness, financial independence, and viability of the Court, 1 12 and the Heads of
Government courageously accepted the arrangement proposed. It called for
109. Id. art. V(12).
110. Id. art. V(3)(1).
111. Id. art. 111(3).
112. On the evening before a meeting of the Legal Affairs Committee of CARICOM in
Jamaica (June 18, 2000), Duke Pollard discussed with me the creation of a trust fund to pro-
vide financial independence for the Court. We agreed it was an idea worth canvassing with
the Prep. Comm. Upon sharing the idea with the Prep. Comm., it agreed to develop the broad
idea in more concrete terms.
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their willingness to enter into substantial borrowing to invest the Court with
sustainable financing and enhance its independence. A truly unique mecha-
nism was designed to secure the financing of the Court.
VI. THE TRUST FUND
The mechanism ultimately agreed upon by regional governments was
the creation of a trust fund." 3 Broadly, the arrangement is as follows: It was
estimated that 100 million U.S. dollars would be required to sustain the op-
erations of the Court in perpetuity. Heads of Government agreed that the
Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) should raise this amount on their be-
half on the international capital markets." 4 Each Government undertook to
borrow a part of the sum raised and to be liable to repay the CDB the part
borrowed of the 100 million U.S. dollars according to an established formula
in CARICOM on the basis of a long term loan. In the meantime, the sum
raised will be transferred to trustees who will use it to constitute the corpus
of the Trust Fund and the trustees will then invest the corpus in securities to
yield income." 5 This income will thereafter be used to finance the recurrent
and capital expenditure of the Court and the Commission. The trustees are
expected to administer the Trust Fund, keeping in mind considerations of
economy, efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and the need to safeguard the inde-
pendence and sustainability of the Court.
The trustees are a group of highly respected, prominent, Caribbean per-
sons with a wealth of expertise and experience in a variety of disciplines.
None has any known or obvious connection with the political directorates of
the region. The trust fund arrangement has been well received in the region
and applauded outside of the region. I believe that this novel creation has
substantially buttressed the independence of the CCJ.
Both the mechanism for the appointment of the judges, and the mecha-
nism for financing the Court, have indeed been testaments to the creativity of
Caribbean people and offer excellent paradigms for securing judicial inde-
pendence. New norms for ensuring judicial independence have been estab-
lished by small countries.
113. See generally Press Release, CARICOM, Caribbean Court of Justice Trust Fund
Agreement Enters into Force - Court Arrangements Advance (Feb. 11, 2004), at http://www.
caricom.org/pressreleases/pres 17 04.htm.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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VII. THE INFLUENCE OF THE CCJ ON NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The influence of the CCJ is being felt throughout the region. National
justice systems are going through a process of modernisation to improve the
delivery of justice as a contributor to national development generally. Many
of the economies of the region are service-oriented and it is vital that national
justice systems be modernised to assist in the facilitation of the delivery of
services.
Justice and development are inextricably linked. Since the middle of
the 1990s, international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank,
have accepted that thesis. In fact, those three institutions came together with
the regional judiciary and the Attorney Generals in December 1999 in Ja-
maica to examine that link more closely. Broadly, it is acknowledged that
the justice sector contributes as much as twenty-five per cent to the gross
domestic product of Caribbean countries.
However, the justice sector of the Caribbean region has traditionally
been under-provisioned. Justice infra-structure has lagged behind other sec-
tors of the economies of the countries of the region. That inferior status of
the justice sector prompted many opponents of the CCJ to call for a deferral
in the establishment of the Court until local courts and the justice sector as a
whole were brought up to respectable standards, according to the notional
standards of the opponents. Quite simply, it was argued that the money be-
ing spent to set up the CCJ would be better spent improving the national jus-
tice sectors across the region while hanging on to the coat tails of the judges
of the JCPC interminably. It was not an argument that commended the Prep.
Comm. to abandon establishment of the CCJ, but it was a catalyst to spur
action at the national level to improve the national justice systems.
Since 1999, therefore, all of the Commonwealth Caribbean countries
have devised strategies and programmes for the modernisation of their jus-
tice systems with assistance from external sources. The OECS has made
spectacular progress; Barbados is currently implementing a Justice Im-
provement Project with a loan of 12.5 million U.S. dollars from the Inter-
American Development Bank.1t 6 Jamaica is undergoing modernization, as
well as Trinidad and Tobago. Rules of Civil Procedure are being harmo-
nized across all countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean,1t 7 and the pace
of judicial education and training has been markedly accelerated.
116. Inter-American Development Bank, Administration of Jusitce Program, available at
http://www.iabd.org/exr/doc98/apr/ba1332e.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
117. See, e.g., GILBERT KODILINYE & VANESSA KODILINYE, COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN
CIVIL PROCEDURE (1999).
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It is unquestionable that the movement to establish the CCJ has inspired
these several reforms. It is equally undoubted that the international financial
institutions have seen the improvements in the justice sector as essential at-
tributes for attracting investment necessary for sustainable economic devel-
opment and are demonstrating a willingness to assist in tangible ways.
VIII. DE-LINKING FROM THE JCPC
In the Commonwealth, some countries have gone the route of creating a
Supreme Court to replace the JCPC."' Canada, Ghana, and Singapore are
three examples. New Zealand also proposed a similar court when it decided
to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the JCPC in October 2003.119 Australia,
of course, created the High Court of Australia as its final court in 1986. For
Commonwealth Caribbean States, the CCJ will be similar to the Supreme
Courts mentioned or the High Court of Australia. 2 There is no difficulty in
conceptualization. But there are practical difficulties in seeking to de-link
the appellate jurisdiction from the JCPC because of Constitutional differ-
ences among the Member States. Some states, for example, Jamaica and
Barbados, require a simple majority vote of Parliament to sever. In the ma-
jority of States of the OECS, it is thought that they require a referendum in
addition to a qualified majority vote in Parliament. Let me hasten to add,
however, that no special majorities or referenda are required in any of the
states to join the original jurisdiction of the Court. That explains why all of
the Member States of the Community have had no difficulty in acceding to
the original jurisdiction of the CCJ. A challenge may lie ahead for some
states in joining the Court in its appellate jurisdiction upon inauguration.
IX. THE NEXT STEPS TO INAUGURATION
How soon can it be expected that the CCJ will begin hearing cases?
The RJLSC has made substantial progress towards the establishment of nec-
essary administrative and procedural infrastructure. To the extent that the
CCJ is a regional court, efforts must be made to recruit staff on a regional
basis. It is necessary therefore to advertise posts regionally and these proce-
118. James F. Smith, Comparing Federal Judicial Review of Administrative Court Deci-
sions in the United States and Canada, 73 TEMPLE L. REV. 503, 545-54 (2000).
119. See John Turner, Review: Civil Procedure, 2004 NEW ZEALAND L. REv. 345, 359.
As of January 1, 2004, the New Zealand Supreme Court replaced the JCPC as the appellate
court for New Zealand cases. Id.
120. Michael Kirby AC CMG, Rules of Appellate Advocacy: An Australian Perspective, 1
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 227,228 (1999).
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dures consume time. However, it is anticipated that by the end of 2004, ap-
plicants for senior and executive posts of the Court will have been inter-
viewed and selected. Response to the various advertisements has been mas-
sive, attesting to the interest in the Court and esteem in which it is held.
Judges sufficient to start the Court and fulfill Treaty obligations, such as
the making of the Rules of Court,12' have been selected and it is confidently
asserted that the first six judges of the Court will assume office early in
2005.122 Even after selection in September 2004, time has to be allowed for
the selected judges to give reasonable notice to end their current employ-
ment.123
There are other considerations which militate against inauguration be-
fore March 2005. The headquarters of the Court are not yet ready, 124 but the
Government of Trinidad and Tobago forecasts completion of necessary
works within six months.125 This time frame ought also to be sufficient to
allow some regional governments to take legislative action to transform the
Agreement establishing the Court into local law and to proclaim dates after
which cases will cease going to the JCPC.' 26
Inauguration, however, does not imply that there will be an immediate
end of appeals to the JCPC. Governments will have to proclaim the dates
after which appeals will cease going to the JCPC. All appeals pending be-
fore those "cut-off dates" will be adjudicated by the JCPC since the appel-
lants will have had accrued rights to hearings before the JCPC. Their legiti-
mate expectations cannot be denied. There will also be enough time for all of
the preconditions to the disbursement of the funds from the CDB to the trus-
tees of the Trust Fund to be satisfied.
121. Under the aegis of the Preparatory Committee and the Legal Affairs Committee,
Draft Rules of Court in both jurisdictions have been prepared. When the judges assume of-
fice, they will be required to consider the drafts and determine whether to adopt them as
drafted or to amend them. See generally Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ): Draft Rules of
Court, available at http://www.caricom.org/ccj-index.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
122. CCJ Press Release, supra note 5. At its meeting of September 27-28, 2004, the
RJLSC selected five persons for appointment as judges of the Court. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago recently determined to change the location
of the headquarters of the Court from Richmond Street, Port-of-Spain to 134 Henry Street,
Port-of-Spain.
126. CCJ Press Release, supra note 5. At the time of writing, Guyana, Trinidad and To-
bago, and Grenada have not passed relevant legislation to invest the CCJ with jurisdiction in
local law. Id.
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X. CONCLUSION
Realistically, it is anticipated that inauguration of the CCJ is likely in
March 2005. Upon its inauguration, the CCJ will be a final appellate court
for the Commonwealth Caribbean and a court essential to the regional inte-
gration movement of which the entire Caribbean can be proud. Its estab-
lishment will enable the region to make its own contribution to the develop-
ment of the common law and provide the stimulus for the development of
Caribbean jurisprudence. As the Trinidad and Tobago delegation to the
Eighth Meeting of Heads observed in 1987: "[In] the field of law, Caribbean
jurists have long ago attained the maturity, competence and distinction to
man a Caribbean Court of Appeal with honour.
127
Its establishment will complete our independence and finally remove
the self-doubt and lack of self-confidence which have been deeply ingrained
in the psyche of our former colonial peoples.
In its creation, the decision-makers of the region have demonstrated to
the world the creativity and ingenuity that inhere in the people of the region.
New norms have been developed for the appointment of the judiciary; new
norms have been established for bolstering judicial independence; new
norms have been created for the financing of courts, expanding judicial
autonomy and independence; new norms have been created in international
law. This unique judicial paradigm stands ready to take its place among the
final appellate courts of the Commonwealth and alongside other regional
courts such as the Court of Justice of the Andean Community, the Court of
Justice of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA),
and the Central American Court of Justice (CACJ). The CCJ is essential for
the structured and efficient functioning of the CSME.
Winds of change are blowing in the Caribbean in the dispensation of
justice and in the integration of the economies of the region. The independ-
ence of Commonwealth Caribbean States is not yet complete. We are seek-
ing to complete that independence by repatriation of the judicial arm of gov-
ernment at its highest level from the United Kingdom. In that search for
independence in judicial matters, the people of the Caribbean have evolved
several exciting new norms to promote and safeguard the independence, in-
tegrity, and credibility of the Court. The journey in the evolution of
region-specific legal norms and the quest for independent justice in the
Commonwealth Caribbean has begun. History will determine whether it
succeeds.
127. POLLARD, supra note 8, at 2.
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ANTHONY CHASE*
Reasons for business clients disliking or being suspicious of attorneys
are legion. First, some clients (including business clients) are disserved by
the lawyer they have retained. "Unfortunately," observes Richard Abel,
"most people view lawyers through their personal experience of the law,
which is usually unhappy (always for the losing party in litigation, often for
the winner too), and firmly believe lawyers produce injustice (clients want to
win, not lose to vindicate an ideal)."1 Just as the victims of crime may look
upon the criminal defense attorney as the enemy (as much perhaps as the
alleged perpetrator himself), and adversaries in a divorce or child custody
proceeding may regard the lawyer for the other side with as much disdain, if
not more, than they hold for their soon-to-be former spouse, business clients
may see a competitor's lawyer as more of a problem than their opponent
who, while temporarily on the other side of a dispute, remains nevertheless
engaged in the same or similar trade.
"While business might find lawyers useful," remarks David Sugarman,
in an historical commentary on the British legal profession, "they also found
them expensive, technical, and time-consuming."2 As it was, these factors
often "turned litigation into a game of chess, which put a premium on tactics
and the wearing down of one's opponents [and u]sually only those with suf-
ficient resources could take on a dedicated and well-financed adversary."3
Such observations immediately bring to mind the New Yorker magazine car-
toon where a lawyer clasps his hands together and asks the client, sitting
across the desk from him, just how much justice he can afford.4 Business
clients gain no more pleasure than any anyone else from being compelled to
pay expensive, sometimes exorbitant, legal fees.
Even where business clients become convinced they are getting their
money's worth, they may still feel a sense of helplessness as a result of what
*Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida.
1. Richard L. Abel, Lawyers and Legal Services, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL
STUDEs 814 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003).
2. David Sugarman, Simple Images and Complex Realities: English Lawyers and Their
Relationship to Business and Politics, 1750-1950, in 2 LAW IN HISTORY: HISTORIES OF LAW
AND SOCIETY 145,168 (David Sugarman ed., 1996).
3. Id. at 169.
4. J.B. Handelsman, Cartoon, in THE NEW YORKER BOOK OF LAWYER CARTOONS 73
(1993).
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they perceive to be a dependent relationship with their attorney. "Not only
does the law factory serve the corporate system," wrote C. Wright Mills in
his book, White Collar, "but the lawyers of the factory infiltrate the system.
At the top, they sit on the Boards of Directors of banks and railroads, manu-
facturing concerns, and leading educational institutions. 5  Whatever the
commercial client's business strategy may be, it is the attorney who tells the
client what the law does and does not permit-it is the lawyer who seems to
call the shots. Describing the emergence of trade on a world scale, Kenneth
Pomeranz and Steven Topik record the following:
In most Southeast Asian ports, traders were organized into ethnic commu-
nities, each of which had a headman who was supposed to keep order. So
if, say, a Gujarati and a Dutch merchant fell out, their respective headmen
would first meet to settle the dispute. This had its own perils for the mer-
chants-they often lost the chance to speak for themselves, and might find
their own case sacrificed to the broader interests of their communities, or
the political ambitions of their headman.
6
While C. Wright Mills acknowledges the Wall Street law firm's interest
in national politics "is usually only a means of realizing its clients' economic
interests,"7 one still wonders how many corporate clients must nevertheless
have felt that their subservience to their respective headmen was not all that
different from the Dutch merchants who first penetrated the Southeast Asian
market.
The commercial client's anxiety over the power of attomeys and ex-
penses added on to the normal costs of doing business incurred when lawyers
become involved is of ancient vintage. As we shall see, it was already pre-
sent and given voice in the ancient world-specifically, the world of Greek
maritime traders. This essay briefly examines the attitudes and commentary
upon lawyers and the law's delay, characteristic of classical Greece and me-
dieval Spain, before turning to a brief assessment of similar complaints ex-
pressed in the New World, that of colonial America. The latter represents an
instructive example of law and lawyers in a commercial setting where the
familiar adage that the more things change, the more they stay same, turns
out not to apply. In The Ancient Economy, M.I. Finley states that whatever
the precise definition of the term class society,
5. C. WRIGHT MILLS, WHITE COLLAR 126 (1951).
6. KENNETH POMERANZ & STEVEN TOPIK, THE WORLD THAT TRADE CREATED: SOCIETY,
CULTURE, AND THE WORLD ECONOMY, 1400 - THE PRESENT 31 (1999).
7. MILLS, supra note 5, at 126.
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[Flor the ancient historian there is an obvious difficulty: the slave and the
free wage labourer would then be members of the same class, on a me-
chanical interpretation, as would the richest senator and the non-working
owner of a small pottery. That does not seem a very sensible way to ana-
lyse ancient society. 8
While G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, in his landmark book, The Class Struggle
in the Ancient Greek World, clearly disagrees with Finley on the applicability
of this category to the analysis of ancient society,9 both historians readily
agree that if the world of the Greek maritime traders was a full-blown com-
mercial society, it was not a capitalist one.1" On the contrary, the emergence
of capitalism in Western Europe was still two thousand years away.
"Litigants who faced Athenian juries did so with minimal professional
help," observes Steven Johnstone, and "[t]here were no legal experts, no
lawyers, in Athens."'" But if ancient Athens was without a legal profession,
it was not without litigation. Not only was Athenian law procedurally com-
plex 12 but "even without specialized personnel, Athenian litigation gave rise
to insular traditions of legal practice." 3 For Johnstone, these "practices of
litigation mark the autonomy of courts."' 4 The autonomy of Greek courts,
the insular traditions of legal practice, and the procedural complexity of
Greek law all contributed to growing problems of delay in Greek justice. An
important exception to one side, according to Edward Cohen, "[t]he Athe-
nian courts otherwise were subject to long delays."'5 Cohen cites one case
which "came to trial some seven years after initiation of the prosecution" and
adds that "[w]hile the statutory time limitation ... appears normally to have
been five years" another case did not come to court until "fourteen years
after the relevant agreement had been made. ' 6
What was that single exception to the typical delay litigants suffered in
Athenian courts? It was the separate system of maritime law and adjudica-
tion. "Thus Athenian commercial maritime law," says Cohen, "was in ac-
cord with various modem systems that in practice offer procedural time-
8. M.I. FINLEY, THE ANCIENT ECONOMY 49 (updated ed., 1999) (1973).
9. G.E.M. DE STE. CROIX, THE CLASS STRUGGLE IN THE ANCIENT GREEK WORLD FROM
THE ARCHAIC AGE TO THE ARAB CONQUESTS 58 (1981).
10. Compare generally FINLEY, supra note 8 with DE STE. CROIX, supra note 9.
11. STEVEN JOHNSTONE, DISPUTES AND DEMOCRACY: THE CONSEQUENCES OF LITIGATION
IN ANCIENT ATHENS 18 (1999).
12. See id. at 130.
13. Id. at44.
14. Id.
15. EDWARD E. COHEN, ANCIENT ATHENIAN MARITIME COURTS 10 (1973).
16. Id.
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preference for certain commercial actions."' 7 It is this commercial fast-track
which Cohen takes as the primary subject of his research and he argues that
"[t]he peculiar procedural characteristics of empiric cases developed in a
legal system that had attained considerable sophistication in its commercial
maritime regulations."' 8 Cohen discusses the remarkable supranationality of
Greek maritime courts, their openness to traders of all nationalities, and con-
cludes that "[w]ith commerce so vital to Athens, with the state interest in
trade accordingly high, the autonomy of commercial procedure at Athens is
understandable."' 9 At least it is understandable that in a commercial society,
commerce may be valued sufficiently that a relatively autonomous system of
commercial litigation might be created for the purpose of avoiding many of
those typical complaints business clients routinely lodge against lawyers and
the legal system.
Cohen points out that it was not only the maritime courts of Athens, in
the fourth century B.C., which were open to traders from all throughout the
maritime world.2" At both Syracuse and Rhodes, "nationals of foreign states
could also litigate freely in the local commercial courts"'" and it was at Rho-
des that both substance and procedure adopted by the Greek maritime courts
began to be codified.22 "The Rhodian Code," according to A. Pearce Higgins
and C. John Colombos, "which dates from the third or second century B.C.,
was evidently of great authority in the Mediterranean for its principles were
accepted by both Greeks and Romans and its memory lasted for a thousand
years. '23 The Rhodian Code helped to shape maritime law up through the
French Laws of Oleron and the British Black Book of the Admiralty.24 "All
of these attempts at codification," asserts Stanley Jados, "are best exempli-
fied by the codification, publication, and general acceptance in the fifteenth
century of the Consulate of the Sea. Azuni referred to the Consulate, as a
document 'whose authority is above all others.' 2 5
17. Id. at 10 (footnote omitted).
18. Id. at 63.
19. Id. at 69.
20. COHEN, supra note 15, at 70.
21. Id. at 69.
22. See generally A. PEARCE HIGGINS & C. JOHN COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
THE SEA 24 (1943) (stating the Romans adopted the Sea Laws of the Rhodians).
23. Id.
24. See id. at 24-28.
25. STANLEY S. JADOs, Preface to the CONSULATE OF THE SEA AND RELATED DOCUMENTs,
at xiii (1975).
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Edgar Gold, who also refers to the Consulate as the "law of Barce-
lona, ' ' records that the first version of this codification was written in the
Catalan language about 1300 and became "immensely popular' 27 because it
managed to appear "at the right time-the time of the expansion of truly in-
ternational trade and commerce., 28 In the main English language monograph
on the Consulate of the Sea (or Consulado del Mar), Robert Sydney Smith's
The Spanish Guild Merchant, the author observes:
Innumerable records furnish evidence that a fundamental motive of the
Spanish Consulado was to secure the expeditious, economical, and equita-
ble adjudication of disputes concerning maritime and mercantile contracts.
An early privilege (1325) granted to the councilors of Majorca reveals
their determination to circumvent the legalism and obstructions encoun-
tered in the ordinary courts through the institution of the Consulado (cita-
tion omitted). The sea consulate of Barcelona was established "in order to
do away with the expenses of lawsuits and the strife of judicial proceed-
ings among merchants and navigators" (citation omitted).
29
Here Smith tills the very same soil as the historians discussed above in
mapping various pitfalls that await the business litigant in conventional
courts and routine legal process. Just as Sugarman's British commercial
interests often found recourse to lawyers expensive, technical, and time-
consuming, and just as Cohen's ordinary Athenian courts were subject to
long delays, the Consulado del Mar provided maritime traders with an attrac-
tive alternative to the legalism and obstruction encountered in medieval Bar-
celona's regular courts.3" Smith continues:
Pointing to the procedure of the consular court in Perpignan as a model for
the sea-consuls of Montpellier, the king declared that the trammels of or-
dinary justices had reduced many merchants to poverty (citation omitted).
Pleading for consular privileges, the merchants of Burgos represented that
in ordinary courts mercantile cases were "never terminated," because law-
yers found ways to prolong litigation, no matter how unjust the claim. 3 1
26. EDGAR GOLD, MARITIME TRANSPORT: THE EvOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL MARINE
POLICY AND SHIPPING LAW 27 (1981).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. ROBERT SYDNEY SMITH, THE SPANISH GUILD MERCHANT: A HISTORY OF THE
CONSULADO, 1250-1700, at 6 (Octagon Books 1972) (1940).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 6-7.
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Thus, Spanish mercantile traders seeking enforcement or interpretation
of maritime contracts, were presented with the same kind of commercial fast-
track or procedural time-preference, as Cohen put it, as were early Greek
traders.32 And just as the Athenian maritime courts had pioneered a very
forward-looking supranational jurisdiction, treating litigants equally regard-
less of nationality, the Consulado del Mar provided a direct response to those
medieval merchants, described by Smith, who railed against the "inability of
foreign traders to secure fair treatment at moderate cost in the ordinary courts
of [Marseilles]."33 So it can be said that when confronted with a contradic-
tion between the "inherent nature of commerce, 34 the equally inherent na-
ture of law, and the almost inescapable expense and technical complexity
encountered in seemingly endless legal process, a range of societies suffi-
ciently sympathetic to the business client's woes (and the stake of society as
a whole, after all, in an expeditious as well as efficient public support for
commerce) simply created an alternative social process to that of traditional
litigation for the handling of mercantile disputes.
It was just these elements of flexibility and attention to the existing
practices of maritime traders which declined when Spain's role as a domi-
nant force in international trade and commerce itself began to decline.35
Eventually, as John Lynch argues, the Spanish government in 1690
appointed a junta to advise on the promotion of American trade, and sub-
sequently asked [Manuel de] Lira to comment on its report, which simply
recommended rigid prohibition of trade with foreigners. Lira reacted
sharply against the growing xenophobia .... He argued that it was pre-
cisely the ban on trade with foreigners that induced the English, the Dutch
and the French to establish settlements in the Indies.... In addition to re-
viving and expanding American trade, which in turn would stimulate
Spanish manufactures and merchant marine, Lira believed that his propos-
als would convert England and the United Provinces into firm allies, for
they would have a stake in a vital sector of the Spanish economy ....36
Sadly for Spain, as Lynch points out, Manuel de Lira was pessimistic
about the chance of his proposals being adopted and "in fact they were not.
Many of them would have simply legalised existing practice, and the gov-
ernment could not bring itself to do this., 37 Thus the very things that had
32. COHEN, supra note 15, at 10.
33. SMITH, supra note 29, at 6 (citation omitted).
34. COHEN, supra note 15, at 63.
35. See generally 2 JOHN LYNCH, SPAN UNDER THE HABSBURGS: SPAN AND AMERICA
1598-1700 (1969).
36. Id. at 279.
37. Id.
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removed the law's delay and the trammels of conventional litigation from the
commercial arena-that had lifted these legal burdens from the merchant's
shoulders-lost favor, and precisely in that part of the world where the Con-
sulado del Mar had been born and proved so effective. It was the existing
practice of merchants, not lawyers and government bureaucrats, on which the
international system of commerce had seemed to thrive. And it was the "es-
tablishment of an exceptional commercial jurisdiction, '3 8 in ancient Greece
as well as medieval Spain, which had given rise to such successful (and un-
obtrusive or counterproductive) commercial regulation. But the wheel of
power and prestige in the world of global trade was simply making another
turn-this time in the direction of the New World.
If maritime traders in the sixteenth century complained of the plethora
of suits among merchants trading with America, and government policy two
centuries later failed to recognize the link between an open system, comercio
libre, and American trade and development, the colonists who had settled in
the sometimes bitter environment across the Atlantic were themselves ini-
tially hostile to the kind of entrepreneurial values which animated economic
traders and helped relationships of commercial exchange to multiply rap-
idly.
39
The story about how the early resistance of New England's European
settler communities gradually gave way, by the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury, to an emerging agrarian capitalist society is by now not only familiar
but the most widely accepted description of just what happened within the
New World economy during this period. Equally credited by historians is
the once-controversial narrative of how lawyers and courts reshaped early
American common law and institutions to serve the dominant interests of
commercial enterprise: "Real values pushed aside by exchange values, de-
clining employment of equitable remedies, and the rise of caveat emptor,
judges subordinating common law to the market-these were the hallmarks
of an entrepreneurial revolution which took the nineteenth-century legal sys-
tem by storm."40
On the event of this transformation, however, the most conventional
sort of diatribe was directed at attorneys by the merchant class and Republi-
can pamphleteers. Charles Warren, in A History of the American Bar, re-
cords that "the most powerful attacks on the 'dangerous' and 'pernicious'
'order' of lawyers and their 'malpractices, delays and extravagant fees' were
the letters of Benjamin Austin, an able pamphleteer and Anti-Federalist poli-
38. SMITH, supra note 29, at 7.
39. Id. at 73-76.
40. Id. at 111.
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tician of Boston, who wrote, in 1786, under the name of 'Honestus,' and
whose letters had a widespread influence."'" While less familiar and harder
to find, Austin's essays and broadsides, published in The Independent
Chronicle under the name "Old-South," pack such a punch and contain such
a fine vitriolic wit that they remain worth reading.42 In his discussion of the
judiciary, for example, Austin asks, "is there a man in the United States who
wishes to extend this department of our government? Where is the man who
candidly thinks that the bench and the bar, (though respectable as men) have
not already their full preponderancy of weight in the community? ' 43 After a
stinging attack on Theophilus Parsons, Esq., for not appearing in court
promptly at ten o'clock in the morning on a day when an argument by him
had been scheduled, Austin extended his frustration to the whole of the pro-
fession, "[a] particular body of men, [who] of late have placed themselves in
an attitude which appears calculated to stop the wheels of government. They
assume an arrogance of deportment to which no free government ought to
submit."
One way of looking at the American case is simply to argue that, as in
antiquity and medieval Spain (up to a point), experience eventually taught
the professions of law and commerce, as well as those who managed the
judicial and legislative apparatus, that the substance and procedure of law
needed to be streamlined if business was to be carried on efficiently and
profitably. But such an argument would actually miss the point-
overlooking the most important aspect of New World law and economy.
While an independent body of maritime law was preserved and developed in
early America, it was not simply the legal universe of merchants and traders
that was redesigned to serve specific economic goals. The entire legal and
political system, in fact, was refashioned in order to serve not just business-
men but capitalism itself as a mode of production.
Even after the 'great transformation' of American law in the years prior
to the Civil War, such a revolutionary project would not and could not elimi-
nate all the concerns and frustrations of the merchant class in any particular
division or sector of the economy. That was not its purpose. As Ellen Meik-
sins Wood puts it:
41. CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 219 (1990).
42. BENJAMIN AUSTIN, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLICANISM, IN OPPOSITION TO
FALLACIOUS FEDERALISM; AS PUBLISHED OCCASIONALLY IN THE INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE,
UNDER THE SIGNATURE OF OLD-SOUTH (1803).
43. Id.at 251.
44. Id. at 297.
[Vol. 29:2:201
78
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss2/1
NOTES ON LA WYERS AND COMMERCE
The economic imperatives of capitalism are always in need of support by
extra-economic powers of regulation and coercion, to create and sustain
the conditions of accumulation and maintain the system of capitalist prop-
erty. The transfer of certain 'political' powers to capital can never elimi-
nate the need to retain others in a formally separate political 'sphere'....
To stabilize its constitutive social relations-between capital and labour or
capital and other capitals--capitalism is especially reliant on legally de-
fined and politically authorized regularities. Business transactions at
every level require consistency and reliable enforcement, in contractual
relations, monetary standards, exchanges of property.
45
Consequently, contemporary conflicts between the economic interests
of different professions (law, medicine) or industries (health care, insurance)
or social groups (consumer advocates, tort reform) may at times produce
both animosity and sharp opposition. These conflicts may be mitigated, re-
solved, heightened, or exploited by politicians and the mass media. A corpo-
ration, downsizing, may decide to bring its legal representation in house in
order to save money on legal expenses. Government may impose labor or
ecological regulations on private industry which cut into profits or encourage
relocation abroad. IRS lawyers may try to prove in court that a company has
not paid its fair share of taxes, and so on. But none of that means that law-
yers---or the legal system-are fundamentally hostile to business. On the
contrary, within capitalism alone do businessmen and women find them-
selves operating in a legal environment where the entire system has been
designed to serve the main aims of capital. In what alternative economy
would the fortunes of business share a brighter prospect?
45. ELLEN MEIKSINS WOOD, THE ORIGIN OF CAPITALISM: A LONGER VIEW 178-79 (Verso
2002) (1999).
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Theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theo-
ries have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in
time and space, specifically social and political time and space.
The world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation or
social class, of dominance or subordination, of rising or declining
power, of a sense of immobility or of present crisis, ofpast experi-
ence, and of hopes and expectations for the future .... There is,
accordingly, no such thing as theory in itself divorced from a
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standpoint in time and space. When any theory so represents it-
self it is the more important to examine it as ideology, and to lay
bare its concealed perspective.1
[H]ave we a right to assume the survival of something that was
originally there, alongside of what was later derived from it? Un-
doubtedly. There is nothing strange in such a phenomenon,
whether in the mental field or elsewhere. In the animal kingdom
we hold to the view that the most highly developed species we have
proceeded from the lowest; and yet we find all the simple forms
still in existence today.
2
Nothing we do can be defended absolutely and finally. But only
by reference to something else that is not questioned.3
I. INTRODUCTION
International law has undergone profound and radical transformations.
The history of international law is replete with paradigm shifts as momentous
as those in the history of science, philosophy, or the arts. The first great
paradigm was forged out of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, that point in
history commonly given for the genesis of modern international law. Out of
the Treaty, certain metaphors for the state and inter-state relations became
well-entrenched and pervasive. They concerned the equality of sovereign
and independent nations and rules of action designed to prevent conflicts and
wars. The next great shift involved the move away from natural law to posi-
tivism, which gained strength in the late eighteenth century, and culminated
in the efforts of the great codifiers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, those who were determined to set down the rules of international
law in a coherent and systematic manner. However, this quasi-scientific
approach was deemed a failure. Alejandro Alvarez, in the 1920s, recognized
that a new international law was needed to deal with the issues of globaliza-
tion, to better describe the intertwined nature of law and politics. This reali-
zation resulted in a move away from positivism toward postmodernity, from
1. Richard K. Ashley & R.B.J. Walker, Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline:
Crises and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies, 34 INT'L STUD. Q. 367, 369
(1990) (quoting Robert W. Cox, Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond Interna-
tional Relations Theory, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 207 (Robert 0. Keohane ed., 1986)).
2. Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nine-
teenth-Century International Law, 40 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 77 (1999) (quoting SIGMUND FREUD,
CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTNTS 15 (James Strachey ed. & trans. 1961) (1930)).
3. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, CULTURE AND VALUE 16e (Peter Winch trans., G.H. Von
Wright ed., 1980) [hereinafter WITTGENSTEIN I].
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the strict notions of a rules-based system, to a new conception of interna-
tional law, as an ideology, a social system, a great conversation in which all
nations, and ultimately all individuals, groups, corporate entities, and NGOs,
potentially can participate and realize a new international society.4
The important point for purposes of this paper is that at each of these
historical "moments," at each major paradigm shift, the prior understandings
and conceptual assumptions were not eradicated or wholly replaced. While
modified and transmuted by the new innovations, each prior understanding
remained intact as part of the structure upon which the succeeding layer was
constructed. Contemporary international law, as this paper seeks to show, is
an amalgam of its history. International law exists in a very special and in-
teresting conceptual space. It is simultaneously postmodern and antiquated,
aspirational and antiquarian, forward-looking and backward-referencing.
International legal arguments routinely rely on old precedents encapsulating
bright-line legal rules, such as in The Lotus Case,5 where territoriality
trumped nationality. At the same time, they also look forward to customary
and so-called "soft" law, relying on emerging trends in support of a so-called
"graduated normativity," where there can be various degrees of more binding
and less binding norms. As exemplified in The Nuclear Weapons Case,6 the
court recognized that a trend existed, that the international community is
moving toward a prohibition of nuclear weapons, but that a bright-line rule
representing an all-out ban under any conditions had not yet been realized.7
These considerations, the simultaneous referencing of past legal principles,
and the importance of emerging trends as having a degree of normative force
complicates matters, makes the discerning of bias more difficult as historical
distance arguably can never really be achieved.
The present study has as its goal to identify, catalogue, and explore the
biases and blind spots, prejudices, and unintended consequences which re-
side in and around present-day international law, in this its most recent phase
of its history. Philip Allott has described the new international law as a so-
4. This historical process of change has been well-documented and extensively ana-
lyzed. See ANTHONY CARTY, THE DECAY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? A REAPPRAISAL OF THE
LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (1986); Leo Gross, The Peace of
Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20 (1948); David Kennedy, International Law and
the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 99 (1997); David Ken-
nedy, Primitive Legal Scholarship, 27 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1 (1986); see also LORI FISLER
DAMROSCH, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS xxvii-xxxvi (4th ed. 2001).
5. S.S. Lotus (France v, Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20, reprinted in 2 WORLD
COURT REPORTS 20 (Manley 0. Hudson ed., 1935).
6. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8,
1996).
7. Id.
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cial phenomenon, as a "self-constituting" phenomenon, a process whereby
the international society is coming to know itself and is actualized.8 For Al-
lott, international law is a social-psychological phenomenon, and law and
society exist out of (as well as in) the minds of its constituents. 9 My basic
thesis is that because of the inherent subjectivity of any system designed to
regulate and mediate relations between people-and peoples-it is of the
utmost importance to subject the new international law to a searching scru-
tiny, to ask hard questions about its tendencies to emphasize certain interests,
exalt particular groups, and order society in predetermined or preconceived
ways. The outcomes and distributional consequences of the various deci-
sions, models, and discourses-ways of framing, conceptualizing, and talk-
ing about international law-must be examined.
The biases of the past are easier to perceive than the biases of the pre-
sent and the future. One example, the use of the term "civilized nations"
(which is still in existence in Article 38)1" and the language employed by the
jurists of the nineteenth century reveal their prejudices, prejudgments, and
biased attitudes. 1 But the prejudices of the contemporary discourses are not
so easy to discern. Under normal conditions, we are too close in time and
perspective during our everyday legal activities to be able to perceive the
new international law's biases and unintended consequences. It takes a lot of
thought and consideration-a lot of patient self-criticism and self-
appraisal-to be able to take a step (or more) back, to reevaluate the process
and enterprise of international law making in this new era.
The problem is further complicated by the fact that bias is not a mono-
lithic entity. It does not merely exist-as stereotypically conceived-in
law's views of cultures, ethnicities, and political structures. Although culture
does play a part in the discussion which follows, this is only one lens through
which to view bias in international law. There are many metaphors which
international law has employed, many built-in, structural biases which exist
so deeply entrenched in the system of international law as to be part and par-
cel of its function, exhibited in so-called background rules and their assump-
tions. Bias is also found in the major procedural doctrines of international
law, in the conceptions of sovereignty, jurisdiction, state responsibility, na-
tionality, statehood, self-determination, and standing. These structural, sys-
8. See Philip Allott, The Concept of International Law, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
3.1, 3.4, at 69 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).
9. Id. 4, at 70.
10. See 1947 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 38, reprinted in 2 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT JUSTICE app. 1, at 789 (Leo Gross ed., 1976).
11. See infra Part 11.
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temic modes, dictating the procedural apparatus of international law, consti-
tute the main subject of this study. Outside the direct scope of this paper, but
equally important, are the more well-recognized and well-documented biases
in the context of international law's substantive regimes: for example, hu-
man rights, the environment, or in rules surrounding a particular nation's
labor practices, trade, or immigration policies. 2
Before moving to the specific examples of bias, there must be an explo-
ration of what we mean by the term itself and whether bias itself can be em-
ployed in an effective, meaningful, and cogent way. To put it succinctly, is
there a bias in talking about bias? The genesis of my thinking about these
issues derives from my reading of Roland Barthes' essay, The Eiffel Tower. 3
Perhaps, in some trivial sense, all discourse (all thinking for that matter) is
biased in favor of one group, party, person, or identity, usually but not neces-
sarily in favor of the speaker, the client, or the special interest being repre-
sented. Like Barthes' inhabitant of Paris ascending the Eiffel Tower, we as
international lawyers and academics exist within the structural constraints
and presuppositions of the international legal regime. Once the sightseer
attains the summit and looks down from the tower's apex, there is a trans-
formation of the city landscape. The city of Paris is seen in a particular way,
an idiosyncratic viewing, mediated by the viewer's position within the tower,
its height, location, and most importantly, by the experience of the viewer as
a person "inside" the tower's structure.
In much the same way, the international lawyer is conditioned to see the
"territory" of international law in preconditioned, predetermined, and idio-
syncratic ways. As Barthes comments, the viewer upon looking out over the
city landscape expects to see certain landmarks, anticipates seeing the his-
torical Paris, populated with various indicators and remembrances of the
city's past. 4 When for some reason the landmarks are not present, invisible,
obscured, or otherwise not apparent, the mind of the viewer necessarily "fills
in" the gaps created by the lacunae of his experience. 5 This is a natural
process, an automatic and usually unnoticed and subconscious process,
whereby our experience is made whole by the insertion of our fantasies. Our
fantasy of the perceived Paris is made to match the reality of the expected
12. See, e.g., David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the
Problem? 3 EuR. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 245 (2001) [hereinafter Kennedy I].
13. Roland Barthes, The Eiffel Tower, in A BARTHES READER 236 (Susan Sontag ed.,
1982).
14. Id. at 237.
15. Id. at 238.
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Paris, the preexisting Paris residing like a specter of normalcy beneath the
curtain of our conscious minds. 6
Through the thought-experiment of Barthes, we can see the manifesta-
tion of non-trivial bias. This bias is (usually) unseen and unappreciated by
the speaker and this is where the difficulties arise. More than that, it is at this
point that international legal discourse can become dangerous and counter-
productive. Actors within the international community, within the matrix of
international law, can confront their prejudices, which exist for them outside
the tower, but are prevented from confronting such prejudices, which exist
instead as a priori constructs part and parcel of the tower's structure. The
perception of "outside" bias is sometimes achieved, as mentioned above,
when there is temporal distance between the usage of the rule and its forma-
tion. When enough time has passed and society has changed, it becomes
easier to recognize the biases inherent in, for example, the international legal
rules supporting colonialism, slavery, or the slave trade. The orthodoxies of
preceding generations can become the heresies of their successors. 7 Bias
can also be discerned more readily when there is a plurality of voices clamor-
ing for attention. There is perhaps a better chance to uncover biases and
blind spots when a variety of alternative narratives are competing to tell the
story of international law, as opposed to a narrow range of "official" stories
which are received without questioning and perceived as authoritative doc-
trine. In this sense, the chances for achieving a more unbiased, just, and fair
conception of international law has arguably been increased in modem times
by the more recent, latest incarnation of international law. As it moves from
a monolithic, top-down, rules-based model to a more circular, bottom-up,
sociological conception, international law becomes more porous, transparent,
and amenable to change, as more voices are raised and more perspectives
explored and integrated into the web of inter-connecting relationships. 8
This modem structural change in the mode in which international law
operates raises another point, which must be mentioned at the outset. Inter-
national law, because of its relative lack of top-down vertical structure, be-
cause of the lesser emphasis it places on black and white, on-off, well-settled
clear rules, is much more dependent for its legitimizing upon its own rhetoric
16. Id.
17. Of course this process also occurs in the domestic and not just the international realm.
Take, for example, all the instances in which the United States Supreme Court has decided to
reverse prior cases and suspend the doctrine of stare decisis. For example, consider the recent
case in the context of state sodomy laws, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), rev' d,
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
18. It could also be argued, conversely, that a plurality of voices instead creates cacoph-
ony and confusion.
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than domestic law or other general fields of law. In other words, what ju-
rists, commentators, academics, and international actors say about the doc-
trines of international law and how we speak about them is more important,
is more constitutive of international law than what we say about, for exam-
ple, a particular nation's contract law or property law. This brings us to talk-
ing "as if"-if we talk as if there is an emerging world state, as if there is a
particular international legal rule, this is much more important to the forma-
tion of the reality of the world state and the rule than if we talk about the
existence of adverse possession in domestic property law, for instance. The
strong vertical hierarchy of most domestic legal systems is able to do the
work of legitimating and authorizing reinforcement which international law
arguably lacks.
International law makes up for the deficiency of verticality by its
heightened reliance on a conversational, circular, or horizontal structure, a
wait-and-see attitude which is largely foreign to the domestic realm. Pre-
cisely because of this inherent importance of international legal discourse,
we need to pay special attention, be especially vigilant, concerning what we
are saying and how we are talking when we talk about international law,
international relations, and international legal theory. The discourse of inter-
national law is a moral force in and of itself. It propagates stereotypes and
creates power relationships. It sneaks up on us because it is so essential to
the process of creating law.
International law is not made in a vacuum. By this I mean we must re-
member the practical, pragmatic, real-world nature of international law.
International law, like domestic law, is made out of a feedback mechanism.
International law is, as Allott has written, the world community becoming
conscious of itself, waking up and looking around, putting out small fires and
big ones, and generally trying to coordinate and harmonize the multifarious
relationships which arise in our current stage of globalization.' 9 This is im-
portant to keep in mind because the nature of the legal rules of course must
be seen in connection with the real-world state of affairs and the circum-
stances, against the backdrop of these circumstances, which force adjudica-
tors and parties to treaties to create these rules in the first place. Many au-
thors recently have noted the relevance of international relations to interna-
tional law and are working to bridge the gap between the two fields.20 This
practical aspect of international law, this close connection between "the
world" and international law-international law as a series of real-time, real-
19. See Phillip Allott, State Responsibility and the Unmaking of International Law, 29
HARV. INT'L L.J, 1, 13-14 (1988).
20. See, e.g. Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6
EUR. J. Nt'L L. 503, 503 (1995).
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world responses to actual situations-is also, however, another place where
bias is especially likely to creep in.
This point, regarding the danger of what I call "real-world" bias, is
manifest by the all-too-easy way facts may seem to be objective, settled, and
are all too often taken for granted as true. Despite the seeming concreteness
of the reported facts, the so-called "facts" in any particular case are always a
social construction, always someone's social construction, and most often the
social construction of the most powerful players in the world arena. This is
not to make the very obvious claim that the facts are often in dispute, which
they often are and very well may be. Rather, the point is that the range of
possible explanations for events-the facts themselves as conceived by all
the players to a dispute-may be imposed by the power elite and this imposi-
tion often goes unnoticed and unchallenged. Events happen in the world.
Unfortunately (or fortunately), events are not perceived as actually happen-
ing or as have happened until we have the language, conceptual tools, and
will to explain through discourse what has happened, why it has happened,
and what remedies, if any, exist to try to ameliorate the harm caused.
Bias also seeps in and surrounds international law by its very attempt to
be a postmodem institution and activity. This point is elucidated by Nathan-
iel Berman in his article, Modernism, Nationalism, and the Rhetoric of Re-
construction, concerning the relationship between international law and mod-
em art.2 In this article, Berman draws a parallel between four aspects, as he
sees them, of modernism and then maps these aspects onto the contemporary
conception of international law.22 For Berman, modernism, as seen through
the lens of modem art, embraces the following characteristics: "1) the cri-
tique of representation; 2) an openness to so-called 'primitive' sources cul-
tural energy; 3) innovative experimentation ... and 4) the juxtaposition, in a
single work, of elements considered [heretofore] irreconcilable ....
These four characteristics also inform our understanding of the new interna-
tional law-after the world wars-when international law fashioned itself as
a way of appeasing nationalistic energies and harmonizing competing and
discordant voices within the world. The new international law has the fol-
lowing four characteristics, reminiscent of modem art: "1) the critique
of... [sovereignty] as the object which defines international law; . . . 2) an
openness to [heretofore] repressed ... forces of nationalism; 3) the unprece-
dented invention of a wide variety of techniques, understood as specifically
21. Nathaniel Berman, Modernism, Nationalism, and the Rhetoric of Reconstruction, 4
YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 351, 352 (1992).
22. Id. at 354.
23. Id.
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'legal'; and 4) the juxtaposition, in international legal discourse, doctrines,
and institutions, of elements incompatible under traditional legal criteria.' 24
This insight of Berman highlights one further way in which the new in-
ternational law (and for that matter modernism itself) reinforces traditional
(and even non-traditional) biases under the guise of a more reactive, cali-
brated, and sensitive international legal structure. For example, the notion
under the new conception of international law of "primitivism" (viewed in
the new vocabulary as "nationalism")25 is especially pregnant with meaning.
This notion sets up an implicit dichotomy between the "modern" and the
"primitive" and at the same time tries to contain, mediate, and deconstruct
the "primitive" to provide an outlet for nationalistic feelings and aggressions.
To a large extent bias is built into modernity itself, which has to define itself
to a large extent against the rubric of the primitive, the primordial, and the
irrational.
As a final consideration in this preliminary and introductory exploration
of the concept of bias in international law, the practical importance of this
enterprise must be emphasized. As Charles Taylor has noted, groups, like
individuals, manufacture their identities-their self-worth and self-
conceptions-based largely on others' recognition or absence of recogni-
tion.26 The importance of uncovering bias is fundamental to allowing groups
to fully develop and evolve because their development and actualization is
not dependent merely on their own actions and their own perceptions alone.27
Rather, as the traditional jurisprudence of international law teaches, it is de-
pendent on the perceptions of the international community as a whole and on
the way other states, governments, and courts view individual states. A peo-
ple's, government's, or social minority's search for "recognition" may be
described as a mirror, created and maintained by the international commu-
nity, upon which the group can view their own identity and their own reality.
With this insight, it becomes apparent that a people's conception of itself is
especially susceptible to bias: as Taylor says, a colonized people's "own
self-deprecation... becomes one of the most potent instruments of their own
oppression.
2 8
Bias, prejudice, and blind spots have unintended consequences and in-
flict costs on both the development of international law and human life and
well-being. They impact the plight of the injured and the oppressed; they
24. Id. at 362.
24. Id. at 363.
26. See Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING
T1E POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994).
27. Id. at 25-26.
28. Id. at 26.
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form hidden impediments, which obscure pain, injustice, and oppression. In
some cases, they may even directly be the cause of pain, injustice, and op-
pression.29 It is the aim of this paper to uncover the more insidious structural
and procedural biases of international law, those which exist just beneath the
surface, as well as those which are firmly embedded deep within the subter-
ranean consciousness of the discipline's conception of itself.
The paper proceeds first with a discussion of three major procedural or
structural discourses of contemporary international law: those revolving
around sovereignty, jurisdiction, and state responsibility. Within the sover-
eignty discussion, I further distinguish between three categories of bias: 1)
biases emanating from the concepts which remain as remnants of nineteenth
century and pre-nineteenth century discourses; 2) biases surrounding the
major metaphors of international law, specifically examined are those illu-
minated by feminism's critique of the state and state power; and 3) biases
surrounding the major substantive areas of international law, focusing spe-
cifically on the environment and the Kyoto Protocol. Lastly, Part III con-
tains a discussion of "fairness" discourse, an attempt to define and reign in
the concept of bias, and to thereby deal with and resolve the paradox of uni-
versalism and the conundrum this paradox has created for international law
and society.
II. BIAS AND THE MAJOR CONTEMPORARY PROCEDURAL/STRUCTURAL
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DISCOURSES UNDERLYING PRESENT-DAY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Sovereignty
The first topic of international legal discourse to be considered is per-
haps the most basic and fundamental one serving to ground and delimit the
state, the actor traditionally considered at the center of international legal
relations. It is not difficult to see many of the actual and potential biases
surrounding the conception of "sovereignty," that aspect of statehood, which
has served as both sword and shield, as the basis for justifying the actions of
states and immunizing them from sanctions. "Sovereignty" often has func-
tioned to retard or freeze the evolution of international law by protecting
states from paying out claims and even from the disapprobation of the inter-
national community, despite an emerging international legal rule or trend
which otherwise would have condemned their behavior. As will be dis-
cussed, it is a concept which has its genesis in mid-sixteenth and early seven-
29. See Kennedy I, supra note 12, at 249.
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teenth century Europe and has undergone its own peculiar evolution, but still
is relied on as an implicit backstop and failsafe, utilized as an important -
albeit eroding-cloak of protection.
Stephane Beaulac has explored the origins of the term "sovereignty"
from its introduction in the sixteenth century in Jean Bodin's Six Livres de la
Republique.3 ° Beaulac undertakes to examine the history of the term, point-
ing out that it was originally employed by Bodin and his contemporaries for
purposes of domestic governance.31 Beaulac's analysis is premised on the
important insight (echoing Wittgenstein) that language is not merely a
"thing," but an activity which communicates "tremendous social power
within the shared consciousness of humanity. 32 Beaulac relies upon Philip
Allott to help explain the importance of understanding the pivotal words
which have shaped international law and society.33 In Allott's words,
As persons and as societies, we are what we were able to be, and
we will be what we are now able to be. So it is with the history of
words. We are what we have said; we will be what we are now
able to say. Words contain social history, distilled and crystallized
and embodied and preserved, but available also as a social force,
a cause of new social effects. 34
Bodin in Six Livres defines "sovereignty" as follows: 'Majesty or Sov-
ereignty is the most high, absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens and
subjects in a Commonwealth.' 35  Beaulac points out that the French text
identifies two characteristics of sovereignty as it being "absolute" and "per-
petual. 36 But the "absolute" or "unlimited" nature of Bodin's "sovereignty"
was tempered by the caveat that the prince still is subject to "the laws of
30. See Stephane Beaulac, The Social Power of Bodin's 'Sovereignty' and International
Law, 4 MELB. J. INT'L L. 1 (2003). Beaulac acknowledges that although Bodin did not invent
the term, Bodin is considered "the 'father' of 'sovereignty' because he provided the first sys-
tematic discussion of the nature of this... powerful word." Id. at 6-7.
31. Id. at 4.
32. Id. at 2.
33. Id.
34. Beaulac, supra note 30, at 2 (quoting PHILIP ALLOTr, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A
NEW WORLD 9 (Oxford University Press 1990) (emphasis added).
35. Beaulac, supra note 30, at 11 (quoting JEAN BODIN, Six L1VRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE).
Only 19 copies are recorded of the original French edition of Six LIvRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE,
published in 1576. Id. at 9 n.48. The version quoted is JEAN BODIN, THE Six BOOKS OF A
COMMONWEALE (Richard Knolles trans., 1606) (translation of LES SIX LIVRES DE LA
REPUBLIQUE) [hereinafter Six BOOKS I]. The version used by this Law Review is the English
translation, Six BooKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH (M.J. Tooley trans., Basil Blackwell Oxford)
[hereinafter Six BOOKS II].
36. Id. (quoting JEAN BODIN, Six LIVRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE 124).
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God, of nature, and of nations." 17 Bodin more specifically outlines three
limits on supreme power: "i) to honor contracts; ii) to respect private prop-
erty; and iii) to consent to taxation., 38 Furthermore, Bodin wrote that there
existed other certain "fundamental laws" which the prince must accept, con-
cerning essentially "rules of succession of the throne ...and . . . the in-
alienability of the public domain. ' 39 Bodin envisioned the power of the
Prince resting upon a pyramidal structure, and the power of sovereignty as
that of the "highest unified power, distinguished from that of the subordinate
decentralised power." 40
As Beaulac explains, Bodin's use of the term "sovereignty" arose out of
the specific social and historical context of France and the French monarchy
in the late sixteenth century. 41 It was a term designed to support and main-
tain the monarchy and especially "to place the ruler at the apex of a pyramid
of authority." ' It was only subsequently, in Vatte1 3 and later in Wheaton,'
that the "internal" sovereignty of which Bodin wrote was distinguished from
"external sovereignty," i.e., "the independence of one political society, in
respect to all other political societies."" As Beaulac points out, the trans-
formation of the term "sovereignty," from internal to external, shows its mal-
leability, its rhetorical force, and power as a term that is continually and con-
tinuously changing. 6
This transmutation of "sovereignty" from its internal to its external us-
age allowed states, rulers, and governments to project their power outward as
well as inward. It allowed for the propagation and instantiation of idiosyn-
cratic attitudes and prejudices, even in contravention of trends supported by
the majority of states within the international community. The biased nature
of external sovereignty was especially apparent in the context of slavery and
the slave trade. An early example of sovereignty's role in preserving and
37. Id. at 13 (quoting SIx BOOKS I at 90; Six BOOKS lI AT 28).
38. Id. at 14 (citing Six LrVRES 152-57, 855-913; Six BOOKS I 106-110, 649-686; Six
BOOKS I1 at 29-33, 185-90).
39. Id. at 14-15 (citing Six LIvREs 973-1013, 857-863; Six BOOKS I at 721-754, 651-54;
Six BOOKS II at 25-31, 8).
40. Beaulac, supra note 30, at 19 (emphasis in original).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 22.
43. See EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE:
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS/FROM THE FRENCH OF
MONSIEUR DE VATTEL (1797).
44. See HENRY WHEATON, HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF NATIONS IN EUROPE AND AMERICA:
FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON (1845).
45. Beaulac, supra note 30, at 27 (quoting HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (Richard Henry Dana ed., 1866)).
46. Id.
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justifying such trade occurred in The Antelope, a decision by the United
States Supreme Court in 1825. 47 In that case, the Spanish and Portuguese
consuls filed claims concerning "certain Africans as the property of subjects
of their nation," after the ship transporting them was brought back to the
United States under the command of an American captain, John Smith.48
Smith also brought a claim for possession of the Africans as slaves captured
jure belli. 49
The Court in adjudicating the various claims went to great pains to em-
phasize that although public sentiment was against the slave trade, the matter
was "unsettled," and the Court must not yield to such feelings.5° The Court,
after reviewing prior cases, concluded that the following rule was to be ap-
plied: "that the legality of the capture of a vessel engaged in the slave trade,
depends on the law of the country to which the vessel belongs. If that law
gives its sanction to the trade, restitution will be decreed." "' This rule was
premised on several propositions emanating directly out of the external sov-
ereignty of states: e.g., "No principle of general law is more universally ac-
knowledged, than the perfect equality of nations .. . . Each legislates for
itself, but its legislation can operate on itself alone. 52 Consent becomes re-
quired before a nation can be seen to have relinquished a "right" to engage in
the slave trade, a trade "in which [historically] all have participated., 53 Ap-
plying these principles, the Supreme Court entered into a calculation based
upon testimony and documentary evidence as to the precise number of Afri-
cans taken from Spanish ships.5 4 Since the number belonging to any Portu-
guese ships could not be determined, the Court ultimately held that the Afri-
cans be divided between Spain and the United States "to be disposed of ac-
cording to law."55
The other paradigmatic use of "sovereignty" in the nineteenth century,
was as a tool for state actors to justify expansion of their empires, as a means
for legitimating the process of colonization. Antony Anghie has written ex-
tensively on this subject.5 6 He explains the myriad effects that positivism
47. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
48. Id. at 67-68.
49. Id. at 68.
50. Id. at 114.
51. Id. at 118.
52. The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 122.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 126-28.
55. Id. at 132-33.
56. See Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nine-
teenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1 (1999).
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and notions of sovereignty had in supporting the colonial encounter. 57
Anghie's main thesis goes further, however, in that he asserts that "the prob-
lem of order among states, is a problem that has been peculiar ...to the
specificities of European history... the extension and universalization of the
European experience, which.., has the effect of suppressing and subordinat-
ing other histories of international law and the people to whom it has ap-
plied."58 For Anghie, his interest lies "not only in the important point that
positivism legitimized conquest and dispossession, but also in the reverse
relationship-in identifying how notions of positivism and sovereignty were
themselves shaped by the encounter."59
The reverberations of nineteenth and pre-nineteenth century thought-
with its sharp distinction between "civilized" and "uncivilized" states-still
are heard today, as will be discussed.60 Anghie sums up his argument as
follows: "that central elements of nineteenth-century international law are
reproduced in current approaches to international law and relations."'', This
insight is based upon the fact that the "naturalist notion of a mythic state of
nature [was] replaced by a positivist notion of a mythic age when European
states constituted a self-evident family of nations. '"62 Sovereignty became a
tool for dividing the European from the non-European world: "since the
non-European world was not 'sovereign,' virtually no legal restrictions were
imposed on the actions of European states with respect to non-European peo-
ples. 63
"Sovereignty," as a concept, certainly has evolved since the days of The
Antelope and its use in furthering the colonial encounter; but still is utilized
to justify state power, as a means of immunizing states from international
sanction, and as a shield from international disapprobation. Before World
War II, for example, there was unbounded optimism that the external sover-
57. See id.
58. Id. at 7.
59. Id. at 6.
60. Id. at 23. Anghie cites Wheaton for standing behind the proposition that what counts
as law is the custom "which is practiced only among 'civilized countries."' Anghie, supra
note 56, at 23. Wheaton wrote:
Is there a uniform law of nations? There certainly is not the same one for all the na-
tions and states of the world. The public law, with slight exceptions, has always
been, and still is, limited to the civilized and Christian people of Europe or to those
of European origin.
Id. (quoting HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (Richard Henry Dana
ed., 1866)).
61. Anghie, supra note 56, at 8.
62. Id. at 68.
63. Id. at 69.
[Vol. 29:2:211
93
: Nova Law Review 29, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2005
CRITIQUE, CULTURE AND COMMITMENT
eignty of individual nations could be mediated by the League of Nations.'
Geoffrey Butler opined in an article published in the British Year Book of
International Law (1920-21), that sovereignty can be checked by the League,
but in a way that preserves fundamental rights.65 His own summarization of
his point is as follows:
in so far as the League of Nations supplies a mechanism for the preserva-
tion of these rights and values, the conception of sovereignty, with its nec-
essary implication of moral authority, can for the first time be applied to
external affairs in a more adequate sense than as a mere assertion of the
unchecked power either of the states or of some central federation.
6 6
For Butler, the League represented a way to ensure peace, so that "sub-
conscious" activities of states, e.g., mining, engineering, locomotion engi-
neering, and preventative medicine, could be conducted without the interrup-
tion of war.67
Unfortunately, the League failed in its mission to keep the peace and the
tragedy of World War II resulted. During and after the Second War, interna-
tional legal scholars and jurists were beginning to reconceive the notion of
sovereignty just as they began to reconceive the nature of the state itself.
This conceptual transformation is evident in Hans Kelsen's 1942 work, Law
and Peace in International Relations.68 Kelsen questioned the Austinian
assumption that a state is sovereign because "no order can be conceived to
exist above the state or the legal order of the state such that it can obligate
the state or the individuals representing it."'69 For Kelsen, sovereignty (like
the state itself) does not exist "in the world of physical reality," but rather as
a mental construct.7° "The state is sovereign if we conceive it to be sover-
eign, if we conceive the order of the state to be the highest. It is not sover-
eign if we proceed from a different assumption." 71 Kelsen speaks of the
"dogma of sovereignty" which functions to support the state, just as "[t]he
concept of the state is a typical product of political theology.
72
64. See Geoffrey Butler, Sovereignty and the League of Nations, BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 35
(1920-21).
65. Id. at 41.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 42-44.
68. HANS KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, THE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES 1940-41 (2d prtg. 1948).
69. Id. at 79.
70. Id. at 78.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 74, 78.
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The principles espoused in 1942 by Kelsen in a theoretical sense were
later articulated and expanded upon in a practical setting by Judge Alejandro
Alvarez in the The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania) in 1949. 7" Alva-
rez, in the late 1920s, had previously written about the importance of the
"new" international law embracing a new psychology and ideology, where
the artificial division between law and politics was not so clearly defined.1
4
Alvarez continued this thinking and applied it in practical terms to decide a
case between Britain and Albania arising out of an incident that occurred in
the Corfu Strait on October 22, 1946. 75 On that date, two British destroyers
struck mines in Albanian waters, causing damage to the ships and loss of
life.76 In Corfu Channel, Alvarez had this to say regarding the evolving con-
cept of sovereignty:
[b]y sovereignty, we understand the whole body of rights and at-
tributes which a State possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of
all other States, and also in its relations with other States.... Some
jurists have proposed to abolish the notion of the sovereignty of
States, considering it obsolete. That is an error. This notion has
its foundation in national sentiment and in the psychology of the
peoples, in fact it is very deeply rooted .... This notion has
evolved, and we must now adopt a conception of it which will be
in harmony with the new conditions of social life. We can no
longer regard sovereignty as an absolute and individual right of
every State, as used to be done under the old law founded on the
individualist r~gime, according to which States were only bound
by the rules which they had accepted [i.e., as in The Antelope, dis-
cussed supra]. Today, owing to social interdependence and to the
predominance of the general interest, the States are bound by many
rules which have not been ordered by their will. The sovereignty
of States has now become an institution, an international social
function of a psychological character, which has to be exercised in
accordance with the new international law.77
Alvarez, in his individual opinion, then proceeded to discuss state re-
sponsibility, concluding inter alia that there is a place under international
law for-what he termed-the concept of a "misuse" or "abuse" of right.7 8
73. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
74. Alejandro Alvarez, The New International Law, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIOUS
SOCIETY 35-51 (1929).
75. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 12-13.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 43.
78. Id. at 43-46.
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For Alvarez, states could be held liable even if their actions were undertaken
within their sovereign rights.79
It is clear from the above-discussed sources that sovereignty has under-
gone a radical change from the days of The Antelope, Wheaton, Vattel, and
Bodin. At this point, I will begin consideration of some examples of modem
discourses of sovereignty, to determine the biases within these discourses,
and to map out how the above-discussed "proto-sovereignties" which existed
at various points in international law's historical past are still with us, perme-
ating the conceptual space of international law and its language-games. Be-
fore making this transition, it is worth considering the four propositions re-
garding discourses on sovereignty noted in Reading Dissidence/Writing the
Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies.8°
These propositions may be rendered in condensed form as follows:
1. Discourses of sovereignty cannot relate to their object, sover-
eignty, as other than a problem or question. [This statement ema-
nates from the realization that] sovereignty enters discourse ... as
a reflection on a lack, on a loss, on something that might have been
but is no longer.
2. The problem of sovereignty is profoundly paradoxical. [The
paradox is derived from the dual nature of sovereignty, as referring
to something that is] a fundamental principle, a supporting struc-
ture, a base [but at the same time dependent on activity that pro-
ceeds without foundations], hence a foundation beyond doubt.
3. It follows that texts or discourses that would produce a sem-
blance of a resolution to the problem of sovereignty must engage
in a kind of duplicity.
4. [And, finally, that all] 'resolutions' to the problem of sover-
eignty proffered by texts or discourses can only be unstable and
tentative. 8
1
It is important to bear in mind the ultimate tentativeness of any dis-
course involving sovereignty.82 As the authors of Reading Dissidence con-
clude, "[t]he word [sovereignty] can but connote a boundless region of am-
79. Id. at 44.
80. See Richard K. Ashley & R. B. J. Walker, Reading Dissidence/Writing the Disci-
pline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies, 34 INT'L STUD. Q. 367
(1990).
81. Id. at 381-83.
82. Id. at 383.
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biguous activity that a vagabond desire.., would mark off, fill, and claim as
a territory of its own., 83 In sovereignty's ambiguity, I submit, lies its ambi-
tion, as well as its effectiveness as a strategic tool for those who use it to
preserve the status quo and their power.
The following discussion revolves around three groupings of bias sur-
rounding the notion of sovereignty in international law. I focus on a repre-
sentative sample of bias from each group. The groups may be labeled as
follows: 1) remnants of bias in the still extant concepts of nineteenth and
pre-nineteenth century international law; 2) bias existing in the prevailing
metaphors of contemporary international law; and 3) bias in the use of sov-
ereignty in the major substantive areas of international law.
I have chosen the following topics to focus on within each group:
within the "concepts" category, the civilized/uncivilized distinction; within
the "metaphors" category, feminism, and new conceptions of state sover-
eignty; and within the "substance" category, the environment, specifically,
the Kyoto Protocol.
1. Remnants of Bias in the Still Extant Concepts of Nineteenth Century
and Pre-Nineteenth Century International Law: The "Civilized/Uncivilized"
Distinction
An important remnant of nineteenth century sovereignty discourse di-
rectly shaping and influencing contemporary international law discourse is
the "civilized/uncivilized" dichotomy.84 One of the most glaring examples
may be found in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
("ICJ"), used universally today as the main mode of determining appropriate
sources of international law.85 Article 38, subsection 1(c), provides as fol-
lows: "[t]he Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with interna-
tional law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: ... (c) the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations., 86 This use of "civilized"
in the most foundational document of modem international law is a clear
indication that some nations-i.e., those deemed "uncivilized"-will be ex-
cluded from the discourse of international law.8"
More than that, the civilized/uncivilized dichotomy, as Anghie has writ-
ten, represented a technology of control, an ordering for non-European
83. Id.
84. Anghie, supra note 56, at 23.
85. See id. at 75 n.267.
86. 1947 I.C.J. Acts & Does. 38, reprinted in 2 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT JUSTICE app. 1, at 789 (Leo Gross ed., 1976).
87. See id.; see also Anghie, supra note 56, at 75.
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states.88 It presented "non-European societies with the fundamental contra-
diction of having to comply with authoritative European standards in order to
win recognition and assert themselves., 89 Sovereignty for the non-European
nations was "a profoundly ambiguous development, as it involved alienation
rather than empowerment, and presupposed the submission to alien standards
rather than the affirmation of authentic identity." 90 Anghie makes the point
that this dichotomy and its racial overtones became "something of an embar-
rassment" for the new international law which tried in large part to expunge
this language from the discourse. 9
While the language may have been largely expunged-with the explicit
exception of Article 38-the concept still remains with us in insidious and
thinly-veiled ways. An example is the new liberalism, epitomized in the
work of Anne Marie Slaughter.92 Slaughter utilizes international relations
theory and applies it to fashion a new international law based on the distinc-
tion between liberal and non-liberal states.93 In her article, International Law
in a World of Liberal States, she outlines her project, "consistent with an
overall commitment to a new generation of interdisciplinary scholarship ...
to re-imagine international law based on an acceptance [of the distinction
between liberal and non-liberal states] and an extrapolation of its potential
implications. 94 At the outset, it should be mentioned, Slaughter openly ac-
knowledges the potential "distastefulness" of this enterprise with the follow-
ing caveat:
[t]he very idea of a division between liberal and non-liberal States
may prove distasteful to many. It is likely to recall nineteenth cen-
tury distinctions between 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' States, re-
wrapped in the rhetoric of Western political values and institu-
tions. Such distinctions summon images of an exclusive club cre-
ated by the powerful to justify their dominion over the weak.
Whether a liberal/non-liberal distinction is used or abused for simi-
lar purposes depends on the normative system developed to govern
88. Anghie, supra note 56, at 72 n.257.
89. Id. at 73.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 74-75.
92. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 503 (1995).
93. Id. at 505.
94. Id.
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a world of liberal and non-liberal States. Exclusionary norms are
unlikely to be effective in regulating that world.95
For Slaughter, the division between states based on "liberality" is a tool
that can be "used or abused" and such use or abuse depends, as she asserts,
on the "normative system" governing such a system.96 In a further attempt to
distance herself from the ethical implications of her project she self-
consciously labels it a "self-professed 'thought-experiment,"' as opposed to a
call to action, a proposal for the future, or some other more ambitious real-
world enterprise. 97
Slaughter's caveat is ineffective to insulate the project from the "dis-
tasteful" bias of the nineteenth century for at least two reasons. First, there is
the implicit assumption that the "normative system," developed to govern a
world of liberal and non-liberal states, will shy away from "[e]xclusionary
norms," allegedly because such norms would be "unlikely to be effective in
regulating that world. 98 However, this assumption is unwarranted. The
"exclusionary norms" of the nineteenth century were quite "effective" in
creating a normative order for the "civilized" world, and providing a legal
context which supported slavery, the slave trade, and colonialism. There is
no reason to suppose categorically that exclusionary policies would not be
"effective" to order contemporary society just because the term used to de-
scribe preferred states has been changed from "civilized" to "liberal." Such
policies and norms are very often effective and may be used to create alli-
ances and trading practices, which may have widespread economic advan-
tages causing deleterious consequences to so-called "non-liberal" states.
A second reason to call into question Slaughter's distinction concerns
the other implicit assumption contained in her caveat: that the "normative
order" can be divorced from the distinctions, language-games, and analytic
framework used to build that order, as if the normative order is somehow
separate and distinct from the conceptual distinctions that it itself uses to
carve up reality.99 The normative order is created out of, and directly re-
flects, the language we use to represent the state of affairs of contemporary
international reality. Slaughter attempts to wash her hands clean of any rac-
ist connotations or disadvantageous consequences flowing to non-liberal
states by supposing that some "normative order" will be able to swoop down
95. Id. at 506 (emphasis added).
96. Id.
97. Slaughter, supra note 92, at 514.
98. Id. at 506.
99. Id. at 510.
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(deus ex machina) to prevent abuses."° Such an assumption is ill-conceived,
unrealistic, and simplistic. It presupposes a faith in a reified order, which
exists somehow outside the "liberal/non-liberal" construct created to do the
governing in some hypothetical world. Such an un-tethered normative order
is a fantasy.
Under Slaughter's model, the very notion of sovereignty is radically re-
defined."0  The State is a "disaggregated entity."'0 2 This redefinition, the
"new sovereignty," operates however for the purpose of facilitating the ac-
quisition and retention of power for the so-called "liberal" states. 3 In the
newly conceived world of liberal states:
- 'the State' is composed of multiple centres of political authority- legis-
lative, administrative, executive, and judicial;
- each of these institutions operates in a dual regulatory and representative
capacity ... defined in terms of a specific set of functions it performs ...
- the proliferation of transnational economic and social transactions cre-
ates links between each of these institutions and individuals and groups in
transnational society.
- [I]nteractions among counterpart or coordinate institutions from differ-
ent States ... are shaped by ... an awareness of a common or comple-
mentary function transcending a particular national identity .... 104
Under the new system, a .'negarchy' is created; "a liberal political or-
der between anarchy and hierarchy in which power is checked horizontally
rather than vertically.""1 5 As Slaughter observes, "the norm of sovereignty
would have to be constructed so as to constitute andprotect the political in-
stitutions of liberal States in carrying out their individual functions and in
checking and balancing one another." ' 6
It should be mentioned at this juncture that it is not my contention that
Slaughter's entire project should be dismissed outright because of the poten-
tial bias inherent in her redefinition and re-conception of the international
100. See id. at 538.
101. Seeid. at 534.
102. Slaughter, supra note 92, at 505.
103. Id. at 534.
104. Id. at 534-35.
105. Id. at 535 (quoting Daniel H. Deudney, The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty,
Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union, Circa 1787-1861, 49
INT'L. ORG. 191, 208 (1995)).
106. Id. (emphasis added).
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legal order. To the extent that she points out the disaggregated nature of
power and the many-layered intricacies of power relationships between and
among international actors and political institutions, I agree that her project
adds an important level of realistic sophistication to our model of interna-
tional community. 10 7 My argument instead is that a harder look needs to be
taken concerning Slaughter's assumptions, specifically, for example, the
primary empirical and neo-Kantian assertion that liberal states do not make
war with each other, or that the world (as a whole) would be better off with
the imposition of such a stark distinction between states based on some char-
acterization of their liberal nature.0 8 This more searching inquiry actually
has been undertaken by Jos6 Alvarez in a critique of Slaughter's liberal the-
ory, in which he argues that she relies upon questionable assumptions about
how "'liberal"' or "'democratic' states behave. 109
Alvarez first points out that Slaughter's liberal theory is prescriptive and
not merely descriptive; it is not merely a "'thought-experiment' as she ini-
tially envisioned and characterized it."0 According to Alvarez, "[t]he liberal
theory of international relations, or 'transgovernmental[ism],' is . . . pre-
sented as a 'blueprint for the international architecture of the 21st century,
offering nothing less than 'answers to the most important challenges facing
advanced industrial countries."' 1 Slaughter's liberal theory, for Alvarez, is
"millenist, triumphalist, upbeat," and he underscores the exceedingly positive
reception it has received among policy-makers, at least in the United
States."12
In contrast to this good reception, Alvarez notes that there have been
several critiques of liberal theory, but most have failed to grapple with the
assumptions the theory makes about how states actually behave.' For ex-
ample,
Harold Koh has criticized liberal theory for being "essentialist"
and for failing to recognize that nations are not permanently liberal
or non-liberal. Susan Marks has criticized Slaughter's liberal the-
ory as part and parcel of... "liberal millenarism". . . [and its] un-
critical and superficial view of democracy, noting that liberal mil-
107. See Slaughter, supra note 92.
108. See id.
109. Josd E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal
Theory, 12 EUR. J. INT'LL. 183 (2001).
110. Id. at 187, 193 (quoting Slaughter, supra note 92, at 505).
111. Id. at 188 (quoting Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN
AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 197).
112. Id. at 189-90.
113. Id. at 192.
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lenarists too readily assume that periodic elections ensure a genu-
ine political choice or a real free market of ideas. Harsher cri-
tiques have emerged from . . . 'critical' legal scholars, 'new
streamers' or scholars of the "sub-altem" or the "post-colonial"
For these critics, liberal theory does more than "shift attention
away from the scale, character and sources of deprivation, oppres-
sion and conflict in the contemporary world:" it is the oppressive
voice of neo-liberal hegemony."14
Alvarez's critique, however, is more limited and pointed." 5 He asks a
central question behind Slaughter's liberal theory: whether liberal states
behave better than non-liberal states?" 6 An inquiry into this question is cru-
cial because it was just such an unquestioned assumption about the allegedly
self-evident moral superiority of so-called civilized states in the nineteenth
century that created and supported the regimes of slavery and colonialism,
which we now abhor.' 17 He concludes, in answer to the question-Do Lib-
eral States Behave Better?-as follows: "we do not know for sure but...
there is plenty of reason to be sceptical [sic].""' 8
Alvarez makes clear that his inquiry "[does] not take issue with many of
Slaughter's premises," e.g., the ethical attractiveness of democracy, its im-
portance in fostering civil and political rights as well as economic develop-
ment, and its benefits in quelling violence especially in the context of ethnic
conflict.' 9 Alvarez instead investigates the "little that we know about com-
pliance, [and] whether liberal theory accurately describes the international
law-making practices of liberal states, whether in the context of traditional
treaties, transnational networks, or 'transjudicial communication.'""20 He also
explores inter alia whether "liberal theory and its prescriptions will further
peace among nations.' 12 ' His conclusions, as he describes them, are "a great
deal more equivocal than those reached by Slaughter," and at the same time
"less damning than those reached by her harshest critics."'
' 22
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to recount each of Alvarez's
arguments, I would like to mention a couple representative arguments made
in support of his critique. Alvarez points out that the paradigm of a liberal
114. Alvarez, supra note 109, at 192 (citations omitted).
115. See id.
116. Id. at 193.
117. See id. at 240.
118. Id. at 194.
119. Alvarez, supra note 109, at 193.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 193.
122. Id. at 193-94.
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state, the United States itself, "has plainly not taken the route followed by
European states with respect to direct or vertical enforcement of human
rights conventions. 1 2 3 Enforcement of international human rights in United
States courts has been made "notoriously difficult" given the reservations
and limitations placed upon human rights agreements by the United States. 24
Alvarez makes the further point that contrary to the predictions of the liberal
theorists:
the leading examples of US treaty obligations permitting "vertical"
enforcement by US domestic courts have not been treaties with
other liberal nations but bilateral investment treaties (BITs), mostly
with non-liberal nations ... [the list includes:] Bangladesh, Cam-
eroon, Egypt, Grenada, Morocco, Senegal, Turkey and Zaire ...
[and later] Haiti, Panama, the Congo and Poland. 125
The example of BITs (and also FCN treaties, i.e. treaties of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation) appear to undermine Slaughter's presupposi-
tions about compliance and liberal and non-liberal states' treaty-making
practices. 126
Alvarez next addresses liberal theorists' assumptions regarding the gen-
eral law-abiding nature of liberal regimes, and challenges Slaughter's pre-
scriptive claim regarding "transnational networks," namely that "liberal
states are . . . more likely to establish, maintain, and adhere to these net-
works, and all the 'soft' informal obligations that result from them."'2 7 Alva-
rez suggests that perhaps Slaughter's descriptive reliance on such networks
as a basis for a prescriptive argument is circular since:
[i]t may be true that the kinds of transgovernmental contacts that
Slaughter describes prevail among Western industrialized states..
• . [I]f one defines the relevant governmental contacts to be those
that one finds among the West's quasi-autonomous governmental
institutions, it stands to reason that we would find more such con-
tacts in the West.
12 8
Later in the paper, Alvarez attacks Slaughter's description of how interna-
tional law norms are nationalized under the classic sources of international
123. Id. at 194.
124. Alvarez, supra note 109, at 194.
125. Id at 196-97 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 210.
127. Id. at211.
128. Id.
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law, arguing that "[t]he suggested dichotomy-traditional international law
is coercive and top-down while regulatory networks are soft and bottom-
up--does not accurately describe either approach to norm-making or the
complex interplay between the two.
129
Alvarez also calls into question Slaughter's assumptions regarding the
purported connection between liberal theory and peace.130 In support of her
assumption, "Slaughter says nothing about the many debates about which
wars or how many casualties ought to 'count,' [or] about arguments that the
thesis of a liberal peace may only be viable for the relatively short post-1945
period."'' Alvarez is especially critical of the liberal theorists' failure to
provide a convincing rationale for liberal peace. 132 Slaughter's explanation
of attitudes shared by liberal states "point in all directions at once" and do
not provide a basis, according to Alvarez, for prescriptive claims.' 33 As Ido
Oren has written, cited by Alvarez, liberal peace is "not about democracies
per se as much as it is about countries that are perceived to be 'of our
kind."",13 4 If Oren is correct, it leaves room for the possibility that "liberal
states may have a tendency, perhaps a greater tendency than non-liberal
states, to wage war on those that they perceive to be non-liberal.' 35
The Slaughter-Alvarez conversation is a healthy one for the future of in-
ternational law. The kind of critique proposed by Alvarez challenges the
somnambulistic tendency of any adherent acting, judging, or speaking within
a conceptual structure to fall back into the patterns of the past. There is the
real danger, which discourse itself engenders, of allowing our thinking to be
shaped by the processes, distinctions, and underlying prejudices of prior dis-
courses. The answer is to be ever-vigilant against the subconscious urges
that drive us toward rationalization and justification of the current sphere.
The theories of mainstream international law, as quoted at the beginning of
this paper, are always "for someone and for some purpose. All theories have
a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifi-
cally social and political time and space.' 36
129. Alvarez, supra note 109, at 213.
130. Id. at 234-38.
131. Id. at 234-35.
132. Id. at 235.
133. Id. at 236.
134. Alvarez, supra note 109, at 236 (quoting Ido Oren, The Subjectivity of the "Democ-
ratic " Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions of imperial Germany, 20 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
(1995), http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/oren.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2005)).
135. Id. at 238.
136. Ashley & Walker, supra note 1, at 369 (quoting Robert W. Cox, Social Forces, States
and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS
204,207 (Robert 0. Keohane ed., 1986)).
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2. Bias Existing in the Prevailing Metaphors of Contemporary International
Law: Feminism and New Conceptions of State Sovereignty
The next modem discourse of sovereignty to be considered is an espe-
cially good example of the perspective nature of theory, of how preconceived
notions of "the State" can have far-reaching consequences in terms of state
practice and norm creation. Feminist writers have attacked biased notions of
the state, specifically ways in which bias arises from and shapes background
conceptions held by international lawyers, jurists, scholars, and other interna-
tional actors.'37 Karen Knop has noted "[i]ntemational law does not yield
easily to feminist legal methods. ' 38 I would submit that this is a very po-
lite-a perhaps consciously toned down-understatement of the true state of
affairs. A more accurate description of international law is a discipline
which has on occasion "looked the other way," one in which until recently
the subjugation of women and other minority groups have either been ig-
nored, permitted, justified, or condoned in times of war and in times of
peace.
Knop begins her analysis by noting the ambivalent notion of sover-
eignty under international law. 139 She eloquently describes the nature of sov-
ereignty as "at once brute fact of power and central metaphor of normativity,
obstacle to the paradisiacal future worlds and means of their realization, bar-
rier to transparent global relations between individuals and groups and essen-
tial sanctuary for them."'' 40 These ambivalent, ambiguous, and contradictory
natures of sovereignty are at once its power and its poison. Knop's first self-
described project is to "increase women's participation in the process of in-
ternational lawmaking.' ' 41 Her second project, interconnected with the first,
is to examine "[t]he implications of feminist theory for alternative concep-
tions of sovereignty.' 42 I will focus on this second question, specifically
Knop's discussion of how the "metaphor of the sovereign State as a bounded,
unified self returns us to the problematic equation of State sovereignty with
individual autonomy.' 14
3
137. See Karen Knop, Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in International
Law, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 293 (1993).
138. Id. at 294.
139. Id. at 295.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 296.
142. Knop, supra note 137, at 296.
143. Id. at 297.
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Before discussing the prevailing metaphor of the state as a "bounded,
unified self,"'" Knop makes an interesting and effective move in identifying
those aspects of sovereignty which can be viewed as at the "center" and
those at the "periphery" of international law.'45 Inasmuch as the center-
periphery distinction itself is merely a metaphor for the locus of entrenched
power relations, the distinction functions mainly as a mode of instantiating
and reproducing the structural bias of the system.46 Knop turns the center-
periphery distinction on its head, however, with her insight into a further
dimension to the international civil society, beyond "statism," i.e., the notion
that states are the central and most important players in the international
arena. 47 For Knop, "international civil society is a creature both liberated
and enslaved by its marginality. Its existence at the edges of the system of
States frees this mix of non-governmental organizations, unofficial groups of
experts, and other initiatives from the narrow confines of self-interest."'148
Knop accepts the center-periphery distinction, but at the same time uses it to
catapult herself to a new understanding of power in the international com-
munity.'49
Knop's discussion continues by citing other feminist thinkers who also
seek to get beyond the center-periphery dichotomy. 5 Anne Marie Goetz,
for example, "'struggles to eliminate the elements of centre, unity, and total-
ity that organize structures into hierarchical oppositions [and] allows for the
fact that women experience simultaneously many oppressions and must en-
gage in a multitude of struggles that conflict and supplement each other."""'
Knop calls this trend that operates outside the mainstream statist system,
"dancing in the normative margins."' 52 She notes, however, that gender con-
scious groups have to "contend with the fact that these margins are defined
by the mainstream fora.' 53 More than this, it also may have a dark side:
"the dark side of unregulated international civil society is its tendency to
replicate the imbalance of political and economic power that characterizes
144. Id.
145. Id. at 296.
146. See id
147. See Knop, supra note 137, at 296-97.
148. Id. at 316 (emphasis added).
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 316 (citing Anne Marie Goetz, Feminism and the Claim to Know: Contradic-
tions in Feminist Approaches to Women in Development, in GENDER AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 133, 149-53 (Rebecca Grant & Kathleen Newland eds., 1991)).
152. Knop, supra note 137, at 316.
153. Id.
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the system of States, an imbalance apparent in relations between First World
and Third World NGOs [for example]. 154
With respect to the metaphor of the state as a "bounded, unified self,"
Knop points out the limitations of making such an analogy between the state
and an individual being: "the analogy cannot take into account that States
are not like individuals in the significant respect that they are not unified
beings, they are not irreducible units of analysis., 155 Knop identifies the bias
that flows from the individualistic conception of the state when she observes
that "the analogy renders problematic any consideration of the status of indi-
viduals and groups in international law, other than as part of a monolithic
State."' 56 She further argues that some feminist approaches to international
law are colored by two resulting viewpoints emanating from such analogy:
"the territory of the State as the physical body of the individual and the terri-
tory of the State as the individual's private property." 157 Her salient point is
that these metaphors arising out of the bias of statism prevent our progress
toward a greater appreciation of the rights of women and people within
states. 
158
Knop concludes with an examination of two "normative approaches" to
sovereignty: "limited sovereignty" and "overlapping sovereignty."'' 59 The
concept of limited sovereignty takes into consideration the question "why the
State should have a monopoly on representation in international fora when it
may not [be able to] decide the issue at hand domestically," because, for ex-
ample, "ethnic minorities are claiming greater autonomy within the State."'1
60
In contrast, the concept of "[o]verlapping sovereignty is at odds with this
monocular view of sovereignty," instead embracing "the recognition of over-
lapping legal orders.' 16 ' The paradigm here is the European Community
which coexists with its constituent states, and contains mediating institutions
which at the same time allow for the retention of an intact, albeit more po-
rous state sovereignty.
162
Knop's work should be applauded for utilizing the center-periphery dis-
tinction to highlight ways women can be empowered by "the [relatively]
154. Id. at 317 (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 320.
156. Id.
157. Knop, supra note 137, at 322.
158. Id. at 321-22.
159. Id. at 341.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 342. The term "overlapping sovereignty" is Neil MacCormick's. Knop, supra
note 137, at 342 n.207 (citing Neil MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 MOD. L.
REv. 1 (1993)).
162. Id. at 342.
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fluid and un-constricted nature of emerging international civil society', 163
and, even more importantly, for her ability to see the detrimental as well as
the beneficial aspects of working at the margins. Knop also deserves credit
for examining the various conceptions of state power as being determined by
pre-existing metaphors. She takes the existing literature concerning new
ways to conceptualize international law-for example, the policy-oriented
perspective of McDougal and Lasswell, the transition toward a new world
order system of Richard Falk, the functionalism of Julius Stone, and Douglas
Johnston-and suggests ways feminist thinkers can harness these ideas to
better represent women's and group's interests. 164
3. Bias in the Use of Sovereignty in the Major Substantive Areas of Inter-
national Law: A Study of the Discourses Surrounding the Kyoto Protocol
and the Environment
I will focus in this section on the Kyoto Protocol because it has become
the situs of an acrimonious debate over national sovereignty and the per-
ceived dangers of a new enviro-imperialism, balanced against the necessity
for a new international framework to deal with global and transnational prob-
lems. Couched within the arguments proffered on both sides of the debate
are the remnants of nineteenth century conceptions of sovereignty, as well as
new metaphors created to deal with the monumental problems of our new
society. 6' The Protocol derives from the 1992 Framework Convention on
Climate Change, which was designed to set up a regime to address the prob-
lem of global warming by the eventual lowering of green house gas emis-
sions. 1 66 "[I]n 1997 more than 160 nations met in Kyoto, Japan to negotiate
binding limitations on greenhouse gases for the developed nations, pursuant
to the objectives of the Framework Convention."' 167 The Kyoto Protocol was
produced as a result of the 1997 meeting, "in which the developed nations
agreed to limit their greenhouse gas emissions, relative to the levels emitted
in 1990. , ,168 "The United States agreed to reduce emissions from 1990 levels
by 7 percent during the period 2008 to 2012. " 169 However, the United States
subsequently failed to ratify the Protocol.170
162. Id. at 316.
164. Id. at 335, 339-40.
164. See Shalini Prakash, Enforcement of International Environmental Law: The Kyoto
Protocol, at http://www.devalt.org/newsletter/nov03/of 7.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Prakash, supra note 164.
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The core critique of the Protocol made by the staunch pro-traditional
state sovereignty voices, tracks a familiar narrative concerning the inviolabil-
ity of state power, and especially relies on rhetoric concerning the necessity
that the state be permitted to withdraw its consent to treaty conditions.' 7' In
addition, supporters of the traditional sovereignty decry the Protocol's au-
thority to set energy emissions. 172 This is the rhetoric of one such position
encapsulated in the following quotation:
[t]he Protocol does not limit emissions in the developing countries.
China will rapidly surpass America's emissions early in the next
century. Greenhouse gas emissions will not be slowed by the Pro-
tocol; they will simply be shifted from the northern hemisphere to
the southern hemisphere.
So will America's jobs, industry, and wealth. The first-step Proto-
col is designed to start a series of five-year "budget periods" for
which the Conference of the Parties is empowered to adjust the
emissions limits on developed countries. By limiting America's
emissions, the UN effectively limits our energy use. By embracing
this Protocol, America is willingly giving up its authority to set its
own energy policy. The Gore/Clinton Administration has em-
braced the Protocol and has the audacity to claim that it is not a
surrender of national sovereignty. 173
Later in the article, the author creates an alarming picture of the dangers
of the Protocol, characterizing it as invading "every facet of American
life." 17
4
The consequences of the Kyoto Protocol include another giant
step toward global governance. The international bureaucracy be-
ing constructed by the UN is reaching its tentacles into every
facet of American life-hiding behind the scary scenario of
planetary impoverishment. Society is being transformed incre-
mentally to conform to the vision of Al Gore's 1992 declaration
171. See Ray Evans, The Kyoto Protocol: Fast Road to Global Governance, Address to
the Samuel Griffith Society Sydney Conference (Nov. 10-12, 2000), (transcript available at
http://www.lavoisier.com.auf/papers/articles/EvansKyoto.html).
172. Id.
173. Henry Lamb, Kyoto: The Consequences, http://www.citizenreviewonline.org/
news/stories/398c5.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2005).
174. Id.
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that societies must be restructured around the central organizing
principle of protecting the environment.
75
The above-voiced American position has also been echoed by other na-
tional voices, including those in other developed countries."' Here is an
example from an Australian perspective:
[w]hy should the Kyoto Protocol, of itself, presage a new imperial-
ism? What distinguishes the Kyoto Protocol from every other in-
ternational treaty which Australia has ratified? The difference be-
tween Kyoto and every other international treaty is this: If Kyoto
is brought into effect, the economic dislocation which must follow
its implementation will be unprecedented in modem times. It will
be equivalent to the famines of the early nineteenth century in its
disruptive power, (except that the famines were followed by good
seasons). There are some treaties which Australia has ratified
which have caused economic loss to Australians and to people in
other countries. The Basel Convention is the best known example.
But the extent of the economic loss due to Basel is minuscule, at
least in Australia, and understood by very few people. The Kyoto
Protocol is a different thing indeed, compared with Basel.
177
In contrast to these voices, the other side of the narrative stresses the
benefits to both the environment and to developing countries. 178 As stated in
a recent World Bank article entitled Supporting Poor Communities Under
the Kyoto Protocol:
[t]he [Community Development Carbon Fund] will provide finan-
cial support to small-scale greenhouse gas reduction projects in the
least developed countries and poor communities in developing
countries. Poorer communities will get the advantage of develop-
ment dollars coming their way, and participants in the fund will
receive carbon emission reduction credits for reductions in carbon
emissions.' 79
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. Evans, supra note 171.
178. See Press Release, The World Bank Group, Supporting Poor Communities Under the
Kyoto Protocol (July 15, 2003) (available at http://Inwebl 8.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/
43ByDocName/NewsandMediaPressReleasesArchive).
179. Id.
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The pro-Kyoto Protocol side of the debate also minimizes the impact on
the infringement to traditional notions of national sovereignty."' For exam-
ple, in the 1998 hearings before the United States House of Representatives
International Relations Committee, there was much discussion of the effects
of the Protocol on sovereignty and especially its economic effect given the
mandated reduced emissions.1 81 During the hearings, experts addressed sev-
eral key concerns, namely that the Protocol would not be applied to DOD
(Department of Defense) emissions and fears that the Protocol would create a
"super U.N. Secretariat."'' 8  With respect to the first concern, it was reported
that "the President determined recently that to ensure defense readiness, he
will propose that military operations and training be completely held harm-
less from any national emissions limits that might be adopted." ' 3 With re-
spect to the second concern, Mr. Eizenstat, United States Under Secretary of
State for Economics, Business and Agriculture Affairs, attempted to allay
fears of a world dominating U.N. such as those reflected in the above. 84 He
had this to say:
[a] second misconception is that somehow the protocol will create
a super U.N. Secretariat, threatening U.S. sovereignty. That is also
fallacious. The review process and the protocol simply codifies al-
ready existing practices under the 1992 Rio Convention.
The review process is not by some centralized U.N. Secretariat; it
is intergovernmental. The review teams are chosen by the govern-
ment officials and then they can only come into a country with the
invitation of that government. They cannot come onto any private
property unless the property owner himself or herself permits it.
There will be no black helicopters swooping down on farms.
Also, this intergovernmental team recently visited in April the
U.S. Capitol, met with congressional staff and Members of the
Congress, and the Capitol still stands. So the notion that somehow
people are going to be intruding on our sovereignty is simply and
totally untrue.
180. See The Kyoto Protocol: Problems with U.S. Sovereignty and the Lack of Developing
Country Participation: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 105th Cong.
(1998), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlre/hfa49425.000/hfa49425_0
.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) [hereinafter The Kyoto Protocol].
181. Id. at 5.
182. Id. at 31, 46-47.
183. Id at 31.
184. Id.
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Finally, there are some who suggest the protocol is going to result
in a huge government transfer of foreign aid to Russia. That is also
not true. U.S. private sector firms may on their own choose to pur-
chase international emissions credits from Russia or any other
country that wants to sell them. It will be purely a private decision.
The U.S. Government is not transferring taxpayers' money to any-
one. Indeed, this will be one of the crucial ways that the private
sector can achieve cost-effective reductions. It will be their deci-
sion.' 85
The various positions of the two sides, as reflected in the above quota-
tions, make clear that each has internalized a traditional and monolithic con-
ception of sovereignty. 8 6 No one, it seems (except perhaps law professors
and other academics) came out and said that there is no such thing anymore
as an impermeable membrane called sovereignty surrounding national terri-
tories that must never be relinquished, even in matters of global environ-
mental concern. The territorial conception of sovereignty is apparent in Mr.
Eizenstat's response, when he states that there is no intrusion of national
sovereignty because "[t]here will be no black helicopters swooping down on
farms.' ' 187 This overly-simplistic (and perhaps jocular) expression of this
pro-Kyoto position shows that the porous and post-modern notions of sover-
eignty have not trickled down at least to discourse occurring on the domestic
level.
On the international plane, however, there was a different conception of
sovereignty being discussed and employed in operative ways.' The new
sovereignty became apparent in the interaction between states and environ-
mental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs). 89 As reported in a law
review article on the subject, at the sixth Framework Convention Conference
of the Parties at The Hague in November 2000, "representatives of NGOs
outnumbered representatives of States."' 90  It should be mentioned that
NGOs are frequently excluded from "closed-door" sessions at formal treaty
negotiation sessions and are further disadvantaged because "the institutional
setting favors a more moderate approach than is often advocated by EN-
185. The Kyoto Protocol, supra note 180, at 31 (emphasis added).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See Michele Betsill, Environmental NGOs Meet the Sovereign State: The Kyoto Pro-
tocol Negotiations on Global Climate Change, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 49
(2002).
189. See id.
190. Id. at 50.
20051
112
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss2/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
GOs."' 9 ' But this institutional bias is counteracted when NGOs are able to
exert their force through public opinion and in other less formal ways. Betsill
underscores the important role of NGOs:
[i]n the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, ENGOs played important
roles behind the scenes and influenced the negotiations in ways
that cannot readily be observed in the treaty text. By focusing only
on the effects of NGO activity on the outcome of international ne-
gotiations, one runs the risk of missing the ways that NGOs shape
the process of the negotiations. ENGOs influenced the Kyoto Pro-
tocol negotiations by catalyzing and framing debates on emissions
trading and sinks, and by increasing pressure on States to reach
agreement. Thus, ENGO activities have had indirect effects on the
final agreement. 192
Betsill further reports that "[d]uring the Kyoto Protocol negotiations,
some ENGOs organized demonstrations and protest activities to draw public
and media attention to the negotiations and the issue of climate change."' 93
In the context of the new international law, according to Betsill, "the
notion of sovereignty is being redefined in the post-Cold War era, suggesting
that there could be greater opportunity for ENGOs to shape international
climate change negotiations."' 94 The President of the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, Jessica Mathews, contends "that power is shifting to
new actors. 'National governments are not simply losing autonomy in a
globalizing economy. They are sharing powers-including political, social,
and security roles at the core of sovereignty-with businesses, with interna-
tional organizations, and with a multitude of citizens groups .... "1 95 Betsill
also cites Professor Karen Litfin, who points out "that the development of
international environmental regimes challenges the authority of States.
'[O]nce States have acceded to nonbinding principles or other weak agree-
ments, they usually find it difficult not to agree to increasingly more robust
191. Id. at 51.
192. Id. at 56-57.
193. Betsill, supra note 188, at 55.
For example, during COP I in Berlin, three Greenpeace activists suspended them-
selves from a smoke stack near Cologne, Germany, in an effort to highlight the role
of coal-burning power stations as carbon dioxide emitters. At COP 3, Japanese
ENGOs covered bushes outside the conference hall with messages, such as "Are U
going to save us, Al?," and Greenpeace erected a dinosaur made out of used oil
cans and spare car parts.
Id.
194. Id. at 52.
195. Id. (quoting Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 50).
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commitments."' 196 Betsill concludes "ENGOs can influence negotiations by
holding States accountable to their prior commitments to protect the envi-
ronment, thereby limiting the ability of States to make autonomous deci-
sions.' 97
Taking a step back for a moment, beyond the scope of the Kyoto Proto-
col and outside of the specific problems concerning the Protocol's imple-
mentation, there is a further consideration which must be addressed which
has exerted its own independent force in recent years in an increasing way
against efforts to support environmental protection, in general terms. Rich-
ard Falk has identified the very process of economic globalization as exerting
a "downward pull on the efforts to address various environmental challenges
through effective regulatory efforts."' 98 He argues that "given the time hori-
zons of policy makers, economic globalization and environmental protection
stress fundamentally inconsistent policy objectives that could be rendered
compatible only by the imposition of effective regulatory authority based on
an underlying political equilibrium between the competing econornistic and
environmentalist constituencies. '199
This is an important insight because it suggests another bias, which ex-
ists simultaneously overlaid onto the puzzle of state-centric sovereignty. As
Falk explains, the old paradigm, which explained the downside of the state-
centered system, is no longer explanatorily adequate.200 The old paradigm
was characterized by the "essentially inward-looking nature of political au-
thority in the world," and held that the state as a self-interested party could
not therefore protect the global commons. 20 1 "This was attributed to a gener-
alized reluctance of states to cooperate externally, and, more specifically, to
the related inability to solve the free-rider problem ... 202 But the new
paradigm, defined and shaped by globalization, presents an even greater dif-
ficulty.20 3 Under the new paradigm, "all governments are increasingly sub-
ject to the discipline of global capital in relation to organizing their activities
and setting their priorities with respect to public expenditures and goals.,,
204
196. Id. at 52 (quoting Karen T. Litfin, Sovereignty in Work Ecopolitics, 41 MERSHON
INT'L STUD. REV. 167, 181 (1997)).
197. Betsill, supra note 188, at 52.
198. Richard Falk, Environmental Protection in an Era of Globalization, 6 Y.B. INT'L
ENvTL. L. 3, 3 (1995).
199. ld.
200. Id. at 4.
201. Id. at 5.
202. Id.
203. Falk, supra note 198, at 5.
204. Id.
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Globalization, for Falk, is a tremendous force that exists and functions
to a large extent on its own accord or-to use another metaphor-like a run-
away train.20 5
[T]he increasingly globalized character of trade, finance, and in-
vestment, as reinforced by media, computerization, and advertiz-
ing [sic], have created strong regulatory imperatives that appear
for various reasons to go beyond the capacity and will of states to
manage, either directly on their own, or indirectly through the es-
tablishment of international regimes.206
Thus conceived, Falk views globalization as a "world-order crisis of a
structural and ideological character that has not existed in prior historical
periods. '20 1 Under this view, the traditional individuated state is sapped of
its power, not by any concerted conscious effort at global governance or re-
gime change (like the Kyoto Protocol), but instead because of a basic, sys-
temic, and structural condition that is changing the landscape of the world-
both literally and figuratively.2 8
Falk is careful in his conclusion to temper his remarks about the dangers
and pressures created by globalization by the caveat that "globalization by its
nature is not weighted against environmentalism. '2 9 Rather, "[i]t is global-
ization as shaped by neo-liberalism in a world of very diverse sovereign
states .... ,210 There are pressures that work to counteract environmental
regulation, for example, "the unevenness of material conditions around the
world, which makes it difficult for some actors to feel responsible for envi-
ronmental decay of a global scope and others to feel unfairly expected to
bear disproportionate costs in relation to environmental cleanups. 21  In
Falk's view, the neo-liberal willingness to promote economic growth makes
environmentalist concerns "less pressing. 21 2 An ensuing crisis in public
goods has resulted, one which "places a premium on reduced government
expenditures of public goods of all varieties . . . definitely including envi-
ronmental protection.,
21 3
205. See id.
206. Id. at 4.
207. Id. at 4-5.
208. See Falk, supra note 198, at 5.
209. Id. at 24.
210. Id.
211. Id. at6.
212. Id.
213. Falk, supra note 198, at 6.
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Globalization may be viewed as another bias, which may force state ac-
tors into positions of reduced responsibility. It is a new and awe-inspiring
characteristic of international life not encompassed by any of the old meta-
phors of the sovereign state or even by the "society or system of states. ''1 4
Instead, globalization is a metaphor itself for the problems, which exist be-
yond the comprehension of one state. These are problems-like global envi-
ronmental degradation, terrorism, and fluctuations in trade and the world
economy-for which it does not make sense anymore for one state or even a
minority of individuated powerful states to lay claim to and to attempt to
solve alone.2 5
B. Jurisdiction
The next major procedural/structural international legal discourse to be
discussed revolves around the changing concept of jurisdiction. Like sover-
eignty, notions of jurisdiction have developed in many ways, influencing
how state actors, corporate entities, and individuals conceive of the limita-
tions placed upon the exercise of state power. The evolving concept of juris-
diction over time is intimately linked with the changing conceptions of sov-
ereignty, discussed above in Part A. Jurisdiction, like sovereignty, has be-
come divested from the strictly territorial, the strictly physical-self of the
state; it has been expanded to meet the needs of an increasingly interdepend-
ent and globalized world. To the extent jurisdictional discourse, like the
discourse surrounding sovereignty, holds onto, perpetuates, and engenders
antiquated and biased modes of viewing the world, it must be reinterpreted
and reformulated to better meet the needs of our evolving international soci-
ety. To place contemporary jurisdictional discourse in perspective, I begin
with a look at the way jurisdiction was conceived of by United States courts
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
In The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,216 decided in 1812, the United
States Supreme Court was called upon to decide the following issue:
"whether an American citizen can assert, in an American court, a title to [a
public] armed national vessel" found within United States waters.217 The
214. Id. at 4.
215. See id. at 4-7. For Falk, this realization leads to his conclusion that globalization
should serve as the basis, as he says, for "the negotiation of an unprecedented global social
contract, an undertaking of immense complexity, and one that will arouse the ideological fury
of those who believe in neo-liberal approaches." Id. at 7.
216. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
217. Id. at 135.
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Court answered in the negative.2 18 The decision necessarily hinged on the
Court's understanding of the nature of jurisdiction, territorial sovereignty,
and consent.219 Its jurisdictional discourse was framed as follows:
[t]he jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which is possessed
by the nation as an independent sovereign power.
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not im-
posed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an
external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the
extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to
the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a na-
tion within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of
the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source.
This consent may be either express or implied. In the latter case, it
is less determinate, exposed more to the uncertainties of construc-
tion; but, if understood, not less obligatory.22 °
As this passage shows, jurisdiction was intimately connected with the state's
territory, not to be infringed except by consent.22 1
Because of the mutual exclusivity of sovereign power, the general rule
described in The Schooner Exchange was that "[the] full and absolute territo-
rial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of every sovereign, and being inca-
pable of conferring extra-territorial power, would not seem to contemplate
foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects. 222 This shows
the Court's reluctance to presume any type of extra-territorial application of
jurisdiction.2 2 3  A state could, however, exercise jurisdiction over foreign
persons or entities within its borders. Such exercise would be suspended
however, provided a specific license was given for the activity under consid-
eration or if certain exceptions applied.22 4
218. Id at 147.
219. Id. at 136.
220. Id. at 136 (emphasis added).
221. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 136.
222. Id. at 137.
223. See id.
224. For example, the exemption of the person of a foreign sovereign from arrest or deten-
tion, the immunity of foreign ministers, and waiver of jurisdiction over troops of a foreign
prince allowed to pass through a territory.
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In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,225 decided in 1909, the
Supreme Court again wrestled with whether jurisdiction should apply, but
this time in the context of activities occurring outside the territory of the
United States, and, as the Court further explicitly noted, "within that of other
states.'226 The plaintiff brought an action to recover threefold damages under
the Sherman Act alleging that its operations had been unfairly interfered with
by the defendant-corporation. 227 The plaintiff claimed inter alia that "in July
[1904], Costa Rican soldiers and officials, instigated by the defendant, seized
a part of the plantation and a cargo of supplies and have held them ever
since, and stopped the construction and operation of the [plaintiffs] planta-
tion and railway.' 228
Justice Holmes, writing for the Court in American Banana Co., took
great pains to base his jurisdictional narrative on the precept that "' [a]ll legis-
lation is prima facie territorial.' ' 229 Holmes begins his analysis by express-
ing surprise that any other conception of jurisdiction could be conceived:
"[i]t is obvious that, however stated, the plaintiffs case depends on several
rather startling propositions. In the first place the acts causing the damage
were done ... outside the jurisdiction of the United States .... It is surpris-
ing to hear it argued that they were governed by [an] act of Congress."23 ' For
the court, "not only were the acts of the defendant in Panama or Costa Rica
not within the Sherman Act, but they were not torts by the law of the place
and therefore were not torts at all, however contrary to the ethical and eco-
nomic postulates of that statute. '231 Although the Court acknowledges that
an American defendant-corporation is bound by the laws of the United
States, it found dispositive the fact that the acts of other states-namely Pa-
nama and Costa Rica-were involved: "a seizure by a state is not a thing
that can be complained of elsewhere in the courts [of a foreign nation]." 32
It is fascinating to juxtapose the "proto-jurisdictional" discourse within
The Schooner Exchange and American Banana Co. with the more modern
and sophisticated conceptions of jurisdiction exemplified in the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law and recent cases. 33 The modern dis-
courses regarding jurisdiction have developed beyond looking strictly at the
225. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
226. Id. at 355.
227. Id. at 353-54.
228. Id. at 354-55.
229. Id. at 357 (quoting Exparte Blain, 12 Ch. D. 522, 528 (1879)).
230. Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 355 (emphasis added).
231. Id. at 357.
232. Id. at 357-58.
233. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987).
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territorial locus of the parties' actions and instead encompass a broad range
of further principles, which focus on the nationalities of parties and national
interest, and which coexist and overlap with the territorial principle.234 These
other discourses can be found embedded within section 402 of the Restate-
ment. 235 That section provides in full as follows:
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with re-
spect to
(1)(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within
its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its
territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have sub-
stantial effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals out-
side as well as within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals
that is directed against the security of the state or against a limited
class of other state interests.236
Within section 402 is the still thriving "territorial principle" reflected in
three parts of section 402(1).237 Section 402(2) embodies the so-called "na-
tionality principle" and section 402(3), the "protective principle. 238
Section 403 of the Restatement, referenced explicitly in section 402,
provides the limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe, even
where the section 402 rules would be otherwise applicable.239 The extreme
flexibility of section 403 is especially apparent in its reliance on the tort con-
cept of reasonableness. 4 Under section 403(1), "a state may not exercise
jurisdiction ... with respect to a person or activity having connections with
another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable., 241 Sec-
tion 403(2) gives further guidance to the legislator, adjudicator, or party by
234. See id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See DAMROSCH ET AL., International Law: Cases and Materials 1090-91 (4th ed.
2001).
238. Id.
239. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1987).
240. Id.
241. Id. § 403(l).
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enumerating various factors to be applied in determining unreasonableness,
including:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state,
i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory,
or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the ter-
ritory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic ac-
tivity, between the regulating state and the person principally re-
sponsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and
those whom the regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of
such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected
or hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political,
legal, or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the tradi-
tions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regu-
lating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.242
Section 403(3) imposes a hortatory duty of good-faith and deference
upon two states where a conflict in jurisdiction exists: "a state should defer
to the other state if that state's interest is clearly greater., 243
The jurisdictional principles set forth within these Restatement sections,
as applied by modem United States courts, have resulted in inconsistent and
diverging results.2" In some instances, the net has been cast very wide,
242. Id. § 403(2).
243. Id. § 403(3).
244. See Note, Constructing the State Extraterritorially: Jurisdictional Discourse, the
National Interest, and Transnational Norms, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1273, 1293 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter State Extraterritorially].
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namely in those cases involving drug trafficking,245 trade and business inter-
ests, and alleged Sherman Act violations.246 However, in other types of
cases, namely those involving employment discrimination under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 47 the environment,2 48 and consti-
tutional guarantees such as the Fourth Amendment, courts have refused to
extend jurisdiction extraterritorially,249 Is there a clear line of demarcation
between these two sets of cases, an underlying rationale that helps to explain
their divergences that preserves some underlying consistent jurisdictional
discourse which is both coherent and appropriately tailored to modem social,
political, and cultural conditions? Or, are the courts instead laboring under
biased notions of jurisdiction rooted in outmoded and inappropriate concep-
tions of sovereignty, territory, and national interest?
Take for instance, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,25 ° where
in 1945 the Second Circuit considered whether the Sherman Act applied to
activities of a foreign corporation allegedly to constrain trade in aluminum
ingots, which had taken place outside the United States.251 In that case, the
court was careful to formulate the main issue such that it concerned the con-
sequences which could be found to flow to the United States.2  This crucial
move is apparent in the following passage:
[d]id either the agreement of 1931 or that of 1936 violate § 1 of the
Act? The answer does not depend upon whether we shall recog-
nize as a source of liability a liability imposed by another state.
On the contrary we are concerned only with whether Congress
chose to attach liability to the conduct outside the United States of
persons not in allegiance to it. That being so, the only question
open is whether Congress intended to impose the liability, and
whether our own Constitution permitted it to do so: as a court of
the United States, we cannot look beyond our own law. Neverthe-
less, it is quite true that we are not to read general words, such as
those in this Act, without regard to the limitations customarily ob-
served by nations upon the exercise of their powers; limitations
245. See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11 th Cir. 1997).
246. See Cont'l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
247. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2004); Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014,
1016 (5th Cir. 1988).
248. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
249. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
250. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
251. Seeid.at421.
252. See id. at 443.
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which generally correspond to those fixed by the "Conflict of
Laws." We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all
whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences
within the United States.
253
This emphasis on "consequences within the United States" '254 is wholly
absent from the subsequently overruled American Banana Co. case, which
took a less sophisticated, more bright-line, on-off approach to jurisdiction.255
For the Aluminum Co. of America court, the consequences must be deter-
mined and will be determined by the court.256
The Second Circuit in Aluminum Co. of America candidly admitted that
it was going slightly beyond the precedent in a sense by reading the Sherman
Act so broadly. 7 Judge Learned Hand, writing for the court, remarked as
follows:
[i]t is true that in [prior] cases the persons held liable had sent
agents into the United States to perform part of the agreement; but
an agent is merely an animate means of executing his principal's
purposes, and, for the purposes of this case, he does not differ from
an inanimate means; besides, only human agents can import and
sell ingot.258
This transition from "animate" to "inanimate" means, while made almost as
an aside, represents a major transition. 9  It shows the willingness of the
court to begin to apply and formulate a more common-sense "reasonable-
ness" test, undeterred by technicalities.
Before looking at cases on the other side of the ledger, i.e. to those
cases where jurisdiction was not granted, consider the language (and its ori-
gins) pervading United States v. Noriega,260 decided by the Eleventh Circuit
in 1997.261 Manuel Noriega appealed his convictions in the Southern District
of Florida for drug trafficking.262 Noriega's principal arguments were that
the indictments against him should have been dismissed by the district court
253. Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
254. Id.
255. See Am. Banana Co v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
256. See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 421-22.
257. See id. at 443-44.
258. Id. at 444.
259. Id.
260. 117 F.3d 1206 (llth Cir. 1997).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1209.
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due to "his status as a head of state and the manner in which the United
States brought him to justice." 263 In addressing the "head-of-state" argument
the court relied explicitly on The Schooner Exchange:
[t]he Supreme Court long ago held that "[t]he jurisdiction of courts
is a branch of that which is possessed by the nation as an inde-
pendent sovereign power. The jurisdiction of the nation within its
own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is suscepti-
ble of no limitation not imposed by itself." (citations omitted).
The Court, however, ruled that nations, including the United
States, had agreed implicitly to accept certain limitations on their
individual territorial jurisdiction based on the "common interest
impelling [sovereign nations] to mutual intercourse, and an inter-
change of good offices with each other . . ." (citations omitted).
Chief among the exceptions to jurisdiction was "the exemption of
the person of the sovereign from arrest or detention within a for-
eign territory" (citations omitted).2 6
The Eleventh Circuit proceeded to discuss how The Schooner Exchange
doctrine subsequently led to the development of the modem notions of for-
eign sovereign immunity and its eventual codification in the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act, passed in 1977.265 Since the Act did not address "head
of state" immunity in the criminal context, the court held that the only way
immunity could attach was through reference to "the principles and proce-
dures outlined in The Schooner Exchange and its progeny. 266 Moreover, the
court found itself obligated to "look to the Executive Branch for direction on
the propriety of Noriega's immunity claim." '267
By providing that the Judicial Branch "must look to the Executive
Branch ' 268 for guidance, the court has in effect self-consciously circum-
scribed and de-emphasized its role in deciding the case in deference to the
recognition bestowed or withheld by the political branch.2 69 The Executive
Branch, generally, follows one of three paths with respect to such recogni-
tion: "(1) explicitly suggests immunity; (2) expressly declines to suggest
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1211 (quoting The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116,
136-37 (1812)) (alterations in original).
265. Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1211-12; See Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2000).
266. Noriega, 117 F.3dat 1212.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See id.
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immunity; or (3) offers no guidance. 2 70 "Some courts have held that absent
a formal suggestion of immunity, a putative head of state should receive no
immunity. 271 In Noriega, the court ultimately denied the defendant's im-
munity claim, noting that the Executive Branch had "not merely refrained
from taking a position... [but pursued] Noriega's capture and [his] prosecu-
tion ... [thus manifesting] its clear sentiment that Noriega should be denied
head-of-state immunity., 272 Moreover, the court further pointed out that
"Noriega never served as the constitutional leader of Panama [and] that Pa-
nama has not sought immunity for Noriega.,
273
Although Aluminum Co. of America was a civil action274 and Noriega
involved criminal drug-trafficking,2 75 both cases illustrate the various tech-
niques courts have used to justify and articulate their exercise of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction over foreign defendants. 276 In Boureslan v. Aramco,277 how-
ever, the court rejected the exercise of jurisdiction in an (arguably) more
compelling case for jurisdiction, involving a United States plaintiff and de-
fendant.278 In that case, the Fifth Circuit framed the issue as follows: "Does
Title VII regulate the employment practices of businesses which, although
incorporated in the United States, employ citizens of the United States in
foreign countries?" '279  The plaintiffs employer had its principal place of
business in Saudi Arabia.8 ° Plaintiff, a naturalized American citizen of
Lebanese descent, alleged he was discriminated against on the basis of his
race, religion, and national origin while working in the defendant's offices in
Saudi Arabia. 281 The court rejected plaintiffs main argument that extraterri-
torial application of Title VII was mandated by drawing a 'negative infer-
ence"' from the statute's "alien exemption provision. ' '282 The court similarly
rejected the EEOC's reliance on the legislative history of Title VII, suggest-
ing extraterritorial application, holding that it fell "far short of the clear ex-
270. Id.
271. Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1212 (citing In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40,45 (2d Cir. 1988)).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
275. See Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1206.
276. See Aluminum Co. ofAm., 148 F.2d at 416.
277. 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988).
278. Id. at 1015.
279. Id. at 1015-16.
280. Id. at 1016.
281. Id. at 1015.
282. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1018 (quoting Bryant v. Int'l Sch. Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp.
472, 482 (D. N.J. 1980)).
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pression of congressional intent required to overcome the presumption
against extraterritorial application. 283
What lurks beneath the surface of the court's reasoning in Boureslan is
its worry about the sovereign rights of other nations, as evidenced by its ob-
servation that "[t]he religious and social customs practiced in many countries
are wholly at odds with those of this country., 284 Although not addressed
directly by the majority, this subconscious preoccupation is apparent. The
subtext of the opinion is that by applying Title VII abroad, other nations'
sovereign rights could be infringed in violation of the territorial principle
enshrined in The Schooner Exchange and American Banana Co. 285 As made
clear in the dissent, one of the arguments against extraterritorial application
was that "because labor relations are a peculiarly domestic matter, it would
be an affront to the sovereignty of other nations to apply Title VII extraterri-
torially. '286 Both the defendant and amicus curiae argued that application of
Title VII abroad would be "unreasonable" under section 403 of the Restate-
ment.287
The dissent conducted an exhaustive analysis of the reasonableness of
applying Title VII to United States citizens abroad under the factors set out
in section 403.288 It found dispositive that the statute was expressly ex-
empted from application to aliens as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1. 289
"Since Title VII expressly exempts from coverage aliens employed abroad
by U.S. corporations, the logical negative inference is that Title VII was in-
tended to cover U.S. citizens employed abroad. Indeed, the alien exemption
provision would be meaningless if Title VII did not apply extraterritori-
ally., 290 For the dissent, it was not unreasonable to apply the statute abroad
because there would be no conflict with other nations' local laws:
[t]he argument that extraterritorial application of Title VII is un-
reasonable because it would offend the sovereignty of other na-
tions is not persuasive. The fact that another nation may exercise
jurisdiction over employment relations on the basis of territory
does not render the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction on the basis of na-
tionality unreasonable. The likelihood that concurrent jurisdiction
283. Id. at 1019.
284. Id. at 1020.
285. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 213 U.S. 347 (1909); The Schooner Ex-
change v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
286. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1026 (King, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 1025; See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403 (1987).
288. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1021-1035 (King, J., dissenting).
289. Id. at 1032.
290. Id.
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would produce international discord is minimized by the fact that
the United States seeks to regulate only the conduct of its own na-
tionals and by the fact that Title VII may be reconciled with for-
eign law in the event of a conflict.291
The fact that there might be "concurrent jurisdiction" does not auto-
matically result in a determination of unreasonableness: "[i]nternational
discord does not arise from the existence of concurrent jurisdiction alone as
much as it arises from an attempt to regulate the conduct of foreign nation-
als. 292
In addition to labor law cases, a similar result, denying application of
United States laws extraterritorially, has been found in the context of the
environment and environmental impact assessment.293 In Natural Resources
Defense Council Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRDC"), the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether the Na-
tional Environmental Protection Act ("NEPA") applied to the sale for export
of a nuclear reactor and related nuclear materials to the Philippines. 94 As the
court noted, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission "decided in
the case before us to license a nuclear export without evaluating health,
safety and environmental impacts within the recipient nation.29 5 In deciding
that NEPA did not apply, the court hinged its decision on the anticipated
infringement of the foreign nation's sovereign regulatory framework by im-
posing NEPA's requirements on exports:
[w]e do honor to the sovereignty of national governments, our own
included, when we respect foreign public policy by not automati-
cally displacing theirs with ours. This calls for a thorough under-
standing of our interests as defined by Congress-we can then rea-
sonably balance the scope of our own regulation alongside the
rightful regulatory jurisdiction of the Philippines. 296
The court's opinion in NRDC is laden with concerns about "imperial-
ism" and "coercion. ' ' For example, the court acknowledged that some
amount of "regulatory coercion [is a possibility] across national borders ...
291. Id. at 1031.
292. Id. at 1029.
293. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d
1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
294. Id. at 1346, 1348.
295. Id. at 1347.
296. Id. at 1357.
297. See id. at 1345.
2005]
126
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss2/1
NOVA LA W REVIEW
for the United States when we hold the cards. But when a foreign develop-
ment program-the public provision of electricity-is at stake, we should not
assign an insignificant place to the foreign political interest., 298 Although the
court held "[t]his is not a case of the United States imperiously imposing its
will on the Philippines, ' '29 9 it nevertheless found that "conditioning export
licenses on the satisfaction of standards fashioned in the United States may
unnecessarily displace domestic regulation by the government of the Philip-
pines. , 3
00
In other instances, United States courts have been able to decide cases
without reaching (or by sidestepping) the issue of extraterritoriality in the
context of NEPA. 30 ' For example, as noted in NRDC itself, the court in Si-
erra Club v. Adams did not decide the extraterritoriality issue because the
government "never questioned the applicability of NEPA to the construction
of this highway in Panama. 30 2 The District of Columbia Circuit in NRDC
further distinguished Adams by pointing out that in that case the United
States had "two-thirds of the ongoing financial responsibility and control
over the South American highway construction. Moreover, the [Environ-
mental Impact Statement] (EIS) requirement had been originally triggered by
health effects on United States livestock herds."3 3
A subsequent case in 1993 also concerned the extraterritorial applica-
tion of NEPA.3°  In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey,3 °5 the
plaintiff brought an action against the National Science Foundation to enjoin
it from permitting incineration of food waste in Antarctica.30 6 Again, sover-
eignty (or more specifically, the lack of sovereign power) was pivotal for the
court in deciding the extraterritoriality question:
the presumption against the extraterritorial application of statutes
... does not apply where the conduct regulated by the statute oc-
curs primarily, if not exclusively, in the United States, and the al-
leged extraterritorial effect of the statute will be felt in Antarc-
tica-a continent without a sovereign, and an area over which the
United States has a great measure of legislative control.307
298. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 647 F.2d at 1357.
299. Id. at 1356.
300. Id.
301. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
302. See id. at 392.
303. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 647 F.2d at 1368.
304. 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
305. Id. at 528.
306. Id. at 529.
307. Id.
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The Massey court emphasized that both parties had acknowledged that Ant-
arctica is unique in that it "is the only continent on earth which has never
been, and is not now, subject to the sovereign rule of any nation. 308
Efforts by plaintiffs after Massey, to extend the decision's scope to re-
gions with sovereignty, have been wholly unsuccessful.30 9 For example, in
NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin,3 1° the plaintiffs argued that NEPA should
be applied to the U.S. Secretary of Defense concerning the environmental
impact of American military installations in Japan.3 1' In finding NEPA not
applicable, the court was careful to distinguish Massey, holding that the prior
case involved the "unique status of Antarctica ... not a foreign country. 312
Subsequent courts have agreed that NEPA is not applicable extraterritorially
when foreign sovereign rights are found to be implicated.
3 13
Commentators on these jurisdictional discourses running through the
American cases have noted that the language of "national interest" or "com-
mon good" serves to reflect and reinforce the "dominant, hierarchical struc-
tures and naturalizes the position of those in power who decide what is best
for the 'we.' 314 As the authors of the leading critical article on this subject,
point out:
[o]n the domestic level, appeals to "shared values" have been used
to justify the subordinated position of, among others, blacks and
women. Similarly, in discussions of extraterritoriality, appeals to
"shared" beliefs have justified an expansive conception of jurisdic-
tion in such fields as antitrust and securities, but a more constricted
308. Id. Consistent with the holding in Massey, courts have held similarly in cases involv-
ing NEPA's application on the high seas. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Sci.
Found., No. C02-5065JL, 2002 WL 31548073 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2002); Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Navy, No. CV-01-07781CAS(RZX), 2002 WL 32095131 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 17, 2002).
309. See, e.g., NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993).
310. Id. at 466.
311. Id. at467.
312. Id.
313. See, e.g., Mayaguezanos por la Salud y el Ambiente v. United States, 38 F. Supp. 2d
168, 179 (D.P.R. 1999) (holding that NEPA did not require United States' consent for retrans-
fer of irrecoverable nuclear waste); see also Born Free USA v. Norton, 278 F. Supp. 2d 5, 8
(D.D.C. 2003) (holding that preliminary injunction not warranted when animal welfare or-
ganizations interested in welfare of elephants brought action against the U.S. Department of
the Interior and the Fish and Wildlife Service, challenging its decision to issue permits to two
zoos for the importation of eleven African elephants, because the Fish and Wildlife Service
had no discretion with respect to Swaziland's determination to remove the elephants from
their indigenous habitat).
314. State Extraterritorially, supra note 244, at 1293.
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version in areas such as the constitutional rights of aliens and anti-
discrimination laws. Thus, the securities fraud activities of a for-
eign defendant against a foreign company in Canada have been
prescribed, although the discriminatory practices of Aramco
against American workers in Saudi Arabia have gone un-
checked.315
These authors make the important point that "the language of jurisdic-
tional argument matters, because language both communicates social mean-
ing and, by circumscribing the ways in which communication takes place,
creates meaning. '31 6
One solution to the divergences and inconsistencies of the judicial ap-
plication of jurisdiction in these American cases is to apply an alternative
discourse, one embracing a new conception of the state and sovereign
power.317 For Malley, Manas and Nix:
jurisdictional arguments couched in the univocal language of terri-
tory, citizenship, or national interest obscure the complexity of the
substantive issues at stake and fail to provide meaningful guidance
to decision-makers. As one commentator has argued, debates
about extraterritoriality "protect the discourse from having to as-
sert its own normative theory." Although perceived and presented
as a 'preliminary' matter, determination of justiciability actually
regiments the outcome of the inquiry.3 1 8
While these commentators admit that:
[flraming the issue differently might not have led the courts in any
of these cases to reach different jurisdictional result ... [the point
is that] [t]he courts' rhetoric corresponded to a particular geogra-
phy of the jurisdictional world, one in which self-proclaimed na-
tional interests were given precedence over transnational groups'
normative claims.319
While I am in general agreement with Malley, Manas, and Nix about
their approach and project of imagining alternative discourses, it should be
noted that alternative discourses also are susceptible to bias, mislabeling, and
315. Id. at 1293-94 (citing Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988)).
316. Id. at 1290.
317. See id. at 1304-05.
318. Id. at 1303-04 (quoting DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES 126
(1987)).
319. State Extraterritorially, supra note 244, at 1300.
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misunderstanding, because what counts as "interests" and what counts as
components of the diffuse and disaggregated power of the state may vary
among cultures, societies, and even among individuals. In particular cases,
the interests at stake necessarily will be largely defined by the parties them-
selves and other interests will be left out of the discussion-just by the very
nature of the litigation process. Moreover, although these authors admit that
perhaps jurisdictional results would not change given application by the
judges of alternative conceptual paradigms, discourses, and conceptualiza-
tions of the state power, it is certainly true that in reality the jurisdictional
results in these and some future cases will indeed change if different dis-
courses and assumptions are used. Assuming arguendo that such changes in
discourse will lead to changes in outcomes in specific cases, the next ques-
tion is: is this a good or bad thing?
The answer to this question necessarily brings us to the paradox of uni-
versalism. On one hand, there is the attractiveness of exporting liberal val-
ues and of the beneficial effects which greater rights and regulation may
have on people's lives around the world, either by applying NEPA's envi-
ronmental standards in the Philippines, American anti-discrimination labor
laws in Saudi Arabia, or the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment in Mex-
ico.32 On the other hand, there is the equally serious counter-tension strain-
ing at the other end of our normative tug of war: the dangers of cultural,
ideological, and value imperialism. Malley, Manas, and Nix attempt to ad-
dress this objection in their discussion of the critique they term
"[i]mperialism in [d]isguise. '  Their answers, however, do not resolve the
conundrum of universalism.322 First, they counter-argue that "recognition of
alternative solidarities does not imply disregard for national ties. 323 Their
second counter-argument is that:
normative orders do not coincide strictly with national entities;
rather, they cut through national boundaries. Within the frame-
work suggested here, then, norms are imposed neither by nor on
nations, but by certain transnational groups on others. Hence, all
jurisdictional resolutions encroach upon the normative order of
some transnational group. This is as true of assertions of jurisdic-
tion as it is of denials of jurisdiction.324
320. See, e.g, Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988); Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
321. State Extraterritorially, supra note 244, at 1301.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
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With respect to the first argument, there are situations where using an
alternative discourse does not necessarily mean disregarding national ties.325
Take for instance, the Cuna and Choco Indians' interest in Sierra Club v.
Coleman.326 But, of course, the use of an alternative discourse in other cases
may mean that one set of laws is being privileged over another, namely in
those situations of concurrent jurisdiction where a conflict exists. 327 In such
cases, section 403 mandates application of a "reasonableness" test, to bal-
ance certain factors, and to ensure that the outcome is fair to all parties.328
But the problem with this is that the actor doing the balancing is in most
cases a judge who is operating under his own underlying assumptions, with
his own biases, cultural presuppositions, values, and indoctrinated societal
goals. These goals and values may be at odds with the laws and practices of
people in another nation.
With respect to the second response, that "normative orders do not co-
incide strictly with national entities," while this is true in some cases, it does
not assist us in answering the paradox of universalism.129 As the authors
correctly observe, "[w]ithin the framework suggested here, then, norms are
imposed neither by nor on nations, but by certain transnational groups on
others. 33° While I agree, the conundrum in which we find ourselves in with
respect to the purported dangers of imperialism on the one hand and univer-
sal values on the other is not resolved by renegotiating and re-labeling the
group doing the imposing as a "transnational group" as opposed to a "nation"
within the context of specific cases. 31 The salient and important point made
by the authors is that over-reliance on notions of sovereignty and self-
determination can "take on an ironic, even hollow quality" in specific cases
in light of the fact that our cultural values (and those of many other nations)
appear to dictate a different outcome.332 I agree. However, while this may
be true, my point is that the "hollowness" which rings in our ears may not be
the same ring heard in other persons' ears, especially those on the other side
325. See Sierra Club v. Coleman, 421 F. Supp. 63 (D.D.C. 1976).
326. Id. at 63. This example is used by the authors in their article. State Extraterritori-
ally, supra note 244, at 1284.
327. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
328. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1987).
329. State Extraterritorially, supra note 244, at 1301.
330. Id.
331. See id. at 1275.
332. Id. at 1303. I refer here to the author's use of Martin v. Republic of South Africa, 836
F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1987), as an example of a case where "sovereignty" and "self-determination"
rang "hollow" due to the fact that the discriminatory conduct in that case-leaving a black
man at the scene of an accident-was violative of a fundamental norm. Id. at 1302-03.
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of the case arguing for the preservation of their transnational groups' values
and interests-or what we may consider as their biases and prejudices.
I am thinking here of one of the prime examples of conflict between lo-
cal laws and Western liberal values: women's rights and the host of issues
surrounding this contentious subject. In cases such as these, the conflict be-
tween cultural imperialism and respect for sovereignty or self-determination
is not resolved by the use of an alternative discourse. Part III of this paper
will return to this thorny subject, in its discussion of a proposal for dealing
with the theoretical and practical implications of diverse viewpoints in an
increasingly interconnected, interactive, and interdependent world.
C. State Responsibility
This section examines the international legal discourses revolving
around the evolving concept of "state responsibility," and the built-in biases,
prejudgments, and prejudices surrounding this term. As the name itself sug-
gests, there is great emphasis placed upon the "state," along with certain as-
sumptions in the discourse about state power, attribution, and how liability
attaches (or does not attach) to individuals within the state structure. The
International Law Commission's (ILC) recent efforts to articulate and give
substance to the rules surrounding state responsibility through their Draft
Articles will be discussed. Especially important to this inquiry is the impact
and effect of these articles on the future of international law. As some schol-
ars have concluded, the Articles may do more harm than good, and may rep-
resent a counter-productive and even dangerous path, which does a disser-
vice to the deeper and more long-lasting goals of international society.333
One of the first discussions of state responsibility in the modem dis-
course is found in the Corfu Channel case, discussed in Part II.A of this arti-
cle.334 In the International Court of Justice's principal judgment on the mer-
its of April 9, 1949, the first of two issues articulated by the court related to
state responsibility and was as follows: "[I]s Albania responsible under in-
ternational law for the explosions which occurred on the 22nd October 1946
in Albanian waters and for the damage and loss of human life which resulted
from them and is there any duty to pay compensation?,
335
The second issue concerned whether the United Kingdom had breached
Albanian sovereignty by the actions of the Royal Navy.336 In the court's
opinion, "[f]rom all the facts and observations [set forth previously in the
333. See Allott, supra note 19.
334. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
335. Id. at 6.
336. Id.
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opinion] . . . the Court draws the conclusion that the laying of the minefield
which caused the explosions ... could not have been accomplished without
the knowledge of the Albanian Government.
337
What is interesting is that, as the court reported, "[t]he obligations re-
sulting for Albania from this knowledge [were] not disputed between the
Parties., 33' Thus, even at this early date in the development of the state re-
sponsibility discourse, there remained a general consensus and acceptance by
the states themselves of certain principles, which entailed certain responsi-
bilities flowing to states based on "their knowledge" of a particular state of
affairs.339 It is, however, unclear and not directly addressed in the opinion
what it would mean exactly for a "state" to "know" something, in other
words, what level and how many individuals, within the state or "behind" the
state, would satisfy this knowledge requirement. 340 Assuming, as the court
found, this knowledge existed, then the Albanian "state" had a duty to notify
shipping in the area of the minefield.3 4  This duty did not arise from the
Hague Convention of 1907,
which is applicable in time of war, but on certain general and well-
recognized principles, namely: elementary considerations of hu-
manity, even more exacting in peace than in war; the principle of
the freedom of maritime communication; and every State's obliga-
tion not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts con-
trary to the rights of other States.342
The other important outcome for the state in Corfu Channel is that it
may be held liable not just for its acts, but-just as persons in some contexts
under municipal law-also for its omissions, or its failure to act.343 In the
words of the court: "In fact nothing was attempted by the Albanian authori-
ties to prevent the disaster. These grave omissions involve the international
responsibility of Albania."3" Counterbalanced against this finding against
Albania, however, is the court's further determination with respect to the
second issue, regarding Albanian sovereignty, that "the United Kingdom
violated the sovereignty of the People's Republic of Albania, and that this
337. Id. at 22.
338. Id.
339. Corfu Channel, 1949 IC. at 22.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 23 (emphasis added).
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declaration by the Court constitutes in itself appropriate satisfaction." '345
Interestingly, the sovereignty issue gets subsumed or overshadowed to an
extent under the importance of the state responsibility issue.346 This is appar-
ent in light of the court's acknowledgment that money damages are available
in favor of the United Kingdom for the explosions and loss of life, but the
Albanian state gets nothing but a declaration for its loss of sovereignty.347
The explanation for this imbalance, in terms of the disparate remedies
available to each side of the dispute, is illuminated by Judge Alvarez's sepa-
rate concurring opinion.34 s There, he provided a more sophisticated and nu-
anced view of state responsibility.349 For Alvarez, state responsibility may be
claimed with respect to a variety of acts or omissions with different character
and level of severity, consisting of three general categories: "international
delinquencies, prejudicial acts, and unlawful acts."35 One example of an
international delinquency is the very inaction complained of in the instant
case: "acts contrary to the sentiments of humanity committed by a State in
its territory, even with the object of defending its security and its vital inter-
ests; for instance, the laying of submarine mines without notifying the coun-
tries concerned."351 For Alvarez, "[a] prejudicial act is one which causes
prejudice to a State or to its nationals, but which does so by means of acts not
constituting an international delinquency, e.g., as a consequence of an insur-
rection, civil war, etc. 352 Finally, an "unlawful act "-i.e., the one commit-
ted by the United Kingdom in violating Albanian sovereignty-is "one
which disregards or violates the rights of a State, or which is contrary to in-
ternational law .... The responsibility of the State which committed it varies
according to the nature of the act.''353 This sliding scale of responsibility
with respect to unlawful acts explains why the acts of the United Kingdom,
although unlawful, did not rise to the level of condemnation and seriousness
triggered by Albania's omissions.354
Taking a step back from Corfu Channel for a moment, it becomes clear
that both sides were acting-in accordance with their own understanding,
conception, and view of the situation-under the impression that each was
exercising a legitimate and valid right: for Albania, the right to self-
345. Id. at 36.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 22-23.
348. Id. at 43-46.
349. See Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 43-46.
350. Id. at 45.
351. Id. (emphasis added).
352. Id.
353. Id. (emphasis added).
354. See Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 45-46.
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protection, preservation, and territorial integrity; for the United Kingdom, the
right of free passage through an international strait in time of peace.355 For
both sides, however, their actions represented a "misuse of right." '356 This
limitation on the exercise of rights, as articulated by Alvarez, provides an-
other lens from which to view the case and prevents states from gaining im-
munity just because they believed they acted within their rights.357 The prob-
lem, as discussed supra, becomes one of line-drawing, where does the le-
gitimate right end and the "misuse" or "abuse" of the right begin.358
The decision in Corfu Channel359 may be compared with another more
recent one involving a finding of state responsibility, the Case Concerning
United States Diplomatic & Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran)360
("United States Hostages Case ").361 In the United States Hostages Case, the
court characterized the initial facts leading up to the hostage-taking as fol-
lows:
At approximately 10.30 a.m. on 4 November 1979, during the
course of a demonstration of approximately 3,000 persons, the
United States Embassy compound in Tehran was overrun by a
strong armed group of several hundred people. The Iranian secu-
rity personnel are reported to have simply disappeared from the
scene; at all events it is established that they made no apparent ef-
fort to deter or prevent the demonstrators from seizing the Em-
bassy's premises.
362
The facts thus immediately set up a situation, analogous to Corfu Chan-
nel, where at least a state may be liable not just for its positive acts-mine-
laying or hostage-taking-but also for its omissions or failure to act-failure
to notify interested countries of the danger from the mines or failure to pro-
tect the safety of foreign diplomatic personnel.363
It is significant that Iran did not appear before the court in order to fully
present its case and proffer arguments in support of its position. 64 However,
355. See id.
356. Id. at 47-48. See Alvarez's opinion, arguing that "in virtue of the law of social inter-
dependence this condemnation of the misuse of a right should be transported into international
law." Id. at 48.
357. See id.
358. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 47-48.
359. Id.
360. 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
361. Id.
362. See id. 17, at 12.
363. Seeid. 63, at31.
364. Id. 33, at 18.
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the ICJ did examine the initial question of admissibility (or jurisdiction) of
the United States' claim and Iran's objections thereto contained in the letter
of 9 December 1979.365 In the manner of Albania's assertions, the Iranian
position centered around its own somewhat loosely conceived notions of
sovereignty:
The Iranian Government in its letter ... drew attention to what it
referred to as the "deep rootedness and the essential character of
the Islamic Revolution of Iran, a revolution of a whole oppressed
nation against its oppressors and their masters." The examination
of the "numerous repercussions" of the revolution, it added, is "a
matter essentially and directly within the national sovereignty of
Iran." 3
66
In the 9 December 1979 letter, Iran further argued that the ICJ could not
exercise jurisdiction over the matter because:
[the U.S. hostages] question only represents a marginal and secon-
dary aspect of an overall problem, one such that it cannot be stud-
ied separately, and which involves, inter alia, more than 25 years
of continual interference by the United States in the internal affairs
of Iran, the shameless exploitation of our country, and numerous
crimes perpetrated against the Iranian people, contrary to and in
conflict with all international and humanitarian norms. 367
According to Iran, therefore, "the Court cannot examine the American
Application divorced from its proper context, namely the whole political
dossier of the relations between Iran and the United States over the last 25
years. 368 The court rejected Iran's claims of lack of admissibility and found
that the general reliance on such historical circumstances, without further
explanation, was not sufficient to divest the court of jurisdiction.369
365. Iran, 1980 I.C.J. 33-34, at 18.
366. Id. 34, at 18.
367. Id. 35, at 19.
368. Id.
369. Id. 37, at 20. Additionally, in paragraph 81, the court further addressed this argu-
ment based on the "more than 25 years of continual interference by the United States in the
internal affairs of Iran" by again emphasizing that "it was open to Iran to present its own case
regarding those activities to the Court by way of defense to the United States' claims. The
Iranian Government, however, did not appear before the Court." Iran, 1980 I.C.J. 81-82, at
37-38.
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With respect to the merits of the case, the court directly addressed the
responsibility of Iran for the attacks on the embassies and subsequent hos-
tage-taking:
[t]he first phase, here under examination, of the events complained
of also includes the attacks on the United States Consulates at
Tabriz and Shiraz. Like the attack on the Embassy, they appear to
have been executed by militants not having an official character,
and successful because of lack of sufficient protection.370
However, this fact did not absolve Iran of responsibility. 37' Even though
the attacks were not directly imputable to the actions of the state, this "does
not mean that Iran is, in consequence, free of any responsibility in regard to
those attacks; for its own conduct was in conflict with its international obli-
gations. ' '17 As in Corfu Channel, the state was found liable due to its omis-
sions, i.e., the government's failure to act to protect the embassies and dip-
lomatic personnel in contravention of the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and
1963.373
Another important stream of discourse part and parcel of the state re-
sponsibility inquiry in the United States Hostages Case concerned the le-
gitimacy and appropriateness of counter-measures taken by the United States
subsequent to the hostage-taking. 374 The ICJ noted that the United States had
acted unilaterally after instituting its action before the court and after provi-
sional measures had been ordered.3 75 The United States imposed economic
sanctions, began freezing assets of Iranian nationals, and conducted an
aborted military rescue attempt which included invading Iranian territory.
376
The court did not condone these attempts at "self-help," but instead "ex-
pressed its concern" in the following manner:
[b]efore drawing the appropriate conclusions from its findings on
the merits in this case, the Court considers that it cannot let pass
without comment the incursion into the territory of Iran made by
United States military units. ... No doubt the United States Gov-
ernment may have had understandable preoccupations with respect
to the well-being of its nationals held hostage in its Embassy for
370. Id. 60, at 30 (emphasis added).
371. Id. 61, at 30.
372. Id. 61-62, at 30.
373. Id. 61, at 30.
374. Iran, 1980 I.C.J. 30, at 16.
375. Id.
376. Id. 31-32, at 17.
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over five months. No doubt also the United States Government
may have had understandable feelings of frustration at Iran's long-
continued detention of the hostages, notwithstanding two resolu-
tions of the Security Council as well as the Court's own Order of
15 December 1979 calling expressly for their immediate release.
Nevertheless, in the circumstances of the present proceedings, the
Court cannot fail to express its concern in regard to the United
States' incursion into Iran. When, as previously recalled, this case
had become ready for hearing on 19 February 1980, the United
States Agent requested the Court, owing to the delicate stage of
certain negotiations, to defer setting a date for the hearings. Subse-
quently, on 11 March, the Agent informed the Court of the United
States Government's anxiety to obtain an early judgment on the
merits of the case. The hearings were accordingly held on 18, 19
and 20 March, and the Court was in course of preparing the pre-
sent judgment adjudicating upon the claims of the United States
against Iran when the operation of 24 April 1980 took place. The
Court therefore feels bound to observe that an operation under-
taken in those circumstances, from whatever motive, is of a kind
calculated to undermine respect for the judicial process in interna-
tional relations; and to recall that in paragraph 47, 1 B, of its Order
of 15 December 1979 the Court had indicated that no action was to
be taken by either party which might aggravate the tension be-
tween the two countries. 3
The dissenting opinion of Judge Morozov was even more condemnatory
of the United States counter-measures and would have denied reparations to
the United States.
[T]aking into account the extraordinary circumstances which occurred
during the period of judicial deliberation on the case, when the Appli-
cant itself committed many actions which caused enormous damage to
the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Applicant has forfeited the legal right
as well as the moral right to expect the Court to uphold any claim for
reparation.378
The doctrine of state responsibility, as expressed in these two cases, is
interestingly devoid of any real substance, bright-lines, or any clear indica-
tion where exactly the right stops and the abuse of right begins. 379 For the
377. Id. 93, at 43.
378. Id. 5, at 53 (Morozov, J., dissenting).
379. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9); Case Concerning United
States Diplomatic & Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
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majority in United States Hostages Case, the court condemned the American
counter-measures but stops short of holding that such actions will preclude
reparations for Iranian breaches.380 The court makes its condemnation in the
softest voice possible-by expressing its "concern" and recalling that it had
formerly ordered the parties not to "aggravate the tension. '381 Judge Moro-
zov attacked the majority's characterization of these counter-measures as
well as the depiction of the facts themselves by the majority:
[s]ome parts of the reasoning of the Judgment described the cir-
cumstances of the case in what I find to be an incorrect or one-
sided way .... I was unable to accept paragraphs 32, 93, and 94.
The language used by the Court in those paragraphs does not give
a full and correct description of the actions of the United States
which took place on the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran on
24-25 April 1980. Some of the wording used by the Court for its
description of the events follows uncritically the terminology used
in the statement made by the President of the United States on 25
April 1980, in which various attempts were made to justify, from
the point of view of international law, the so-called rescue opera-
tion. But even when the President's statement is quoted, some
parts thereof, which are important for a correct assessment of those
events, are omitted.382
This alternative interpretation of the facts and the different ramifications
for the United States' alleged violations of international law shows that there
is no clear line: no a priori legal (although good political) reasons for the
majority to treat American counter-measures as frowned upon, yet tolerable
and tolerated.383
This inherent lack of bright-line rules in the state responsibility dis-
course brings us to the quest for substance and codification pursued by the
ILC in the form of its Draft Articles.384 These articles have become greatly
influential, not as "hard" but as "soft" law, in spite of the fact that they are
only provisional and have not been ratified by states as parties to any formal
treaty.385 The ICJ has considered "certain aspects of the Draft Articles as
reflecting the customary international law of state responsibility. 386 Other
380. Iran, 1980 I.C.J. T 93, at 43.
381. Id.
382. Id. 7-8, at 55 (Morozov, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
383. Id.
384. See DAMROSCH, supra note 4, at 686.
385. Id.
386. Id. (citing Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slov.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 47-52, at
34-36 (Sept. 25)).
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tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia, "have likewise considered various parts of the Draft Articles and the
ILC's commentary as authoritative expressions of customary law." '387 As
noted in the leading textbook, some aspects of the articles have also been
strenuously objected to by states, especially those articles dealing with inter-
national crimes and counter-measures.388
The Draft Articles begin with the statement that "[e]very internationally
wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that
State. 389 Phillip Allott has written that the notion of "state responsibility" is
a "dangerous fiction" which in effect creates more harm than good.39" His
first point is that "it consecrates the idea that wrongdoing is the behavior of a
general category known as 'states' and is not the behavior of morally respon-
sible human beings. '391' His second point is that:
[i]f responsibility exists as a legal category, it must be given legal
substance ... general conditions of responsibility have to be cre-
ated which are then applicable to all rights and duties. The net re-
sult is that the deterrent effect of imposition of responsibility is se-
riously compromised ... by leaving room for argument in every
conceivable case.39 2
At a basic level, Allott is concerned with the "nefarious effects" of interpos-
ing the concept of responsibility between wrongdoing and liability.393
The first critique is reminiscent of the point made in the context of the
sovereignty and jurisdictional discourses concerning the idiosyncratic and
outmoded conception of the state and state power.394 As discussed, the reifi-
cation of the state can result in certain viewpoints being privileged over oth-
ers, namely those with nationalistic ties and those allied with narrowly-
defined national interests.395 Alternative discourses get discounted or left
387. Id. (citing Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108bis (Judgment of Appeals Chamber,
Oct. 29, 1997), 26, at n.34).
388. Id.
389. ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
International Law Comm., 53rd sess., Supp. No 10, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001),
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/stateresponsibility/responsibilityfra.htm
390. See Philip Allott, State Responsibility and the Unmaking of International Law, 29
HARV. INT'LL.J. 1, 13 (1988).
391. Id. at 13-14.
392. Id. at 14.
393. See generally id. at 15-16.
394. Id. at 14-15.
395. See State Extraterritorially, supra note 244, at 1293.
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out, especially those based on the interests of transnational groups."' A
similar phenomenon occurs in the context of state responsibility.3 97 The re-
sult in this context, as Allott makes clear, "is that those human beings who
implement the law's rights and duties are able to perceive themselves, on the
one hand, as entitled to implement the state's rights and duties and, on the
other hand, as bringing about responsibility in the state if they implement
them unlawfully. 3 98  For Allott, "it is not surprising that states behave
badly" under such circumstances.3 99 In effect, the state acts as a shield (and
sword) for individuals to hide (or fight) behind: "[t]he moral effect of the
law is vastly reduced if the human agents involved are able to separate them-
selves personally both from the duties the law imposes and from the respon-
sibility which it entails."4 °
With respect to the second critique, Allott focuses on those articles con-
cerning "circumstances precluding wrongfulness," which by defining the
limits of responsibility also thereby provide copious arguments to states and
their lawyers to justify otherwise unlawful behavior.4 ' These articles define
six circumstances precluding wrongfulness: "consent, countermeasures in
respect of an internationally wrongful act, force majeure and fortuitous
event, distress, state of necessity, and self-defense. 4 2 As we saw, with re-
spect to the United States Hostages Case, the use of counter-measures by the
United States was not approved by the court, although no negative repercus-
sions were imposed beyond the rather mild language of disapprobation found
in the majority's opinion.43 Allott identifies the self-defense exception and
its close relation-counter-measures-as akin to "self-help". 4°4 Allott takes
a hard stance with respect to self-help, commenting that it is "indistinguish-
able from anarchy in practice if it is regarded by the subjects of the law as
the normal sanction of the law.
' 40 5
Allott's viewpoint and interpretation of the state responsibility concept
is one which sees through the discourse to something deeper, hidden, and
even pernicious lying beneath its surface.40 6 His conception and evaluation
396. Id.
397. See generally Allott, supra note 390.
398. Id. at 14.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 17.
402. Allott, supra note 390, at 17.
403. See Case Concerning United States Diplomatic & Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 93, at 43 (May 24).
404. Allott, supra note 390, at 21.
405. Id.
406. See generally Allott, supra note 390.
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of state responsibility is an important one, which forces us to question the
perceived wisdom and surface structures of the doctrine.4"7 Out of the three
discourses explored in the present paper, state responsibility appears to be-
on its surface level and at first glance-the most beneficial and helpful in
protecting the state and preserving international society.4"8 A doctrine which
professes to "impose responsibility" on rogue nations, could also simultane-
ously and perhaps in a greater number of instances, function to do just the
opposite-to allow states to escape responsibility-is an apparent paradox
and a chimera for international law and the international lawyer.40 9 Allott's
perspective also recognizes the dangers surrounding the bureaucratization of
international law and society, which in a Weberian sense, "involves not only
the dominance of a certain social group but also the dominance of a certain
mentality. 410
From a sociological perspective, bureaucratization "is no longer pre-
cisely the spirit of autocracy or oppression characteristic of old regimes."' "
Rather, it is a spirit, "which seeks to get the job done with the minimum of
spiritual commitment and the maximum of personal security."412 For Allott,
this spirit is especially sympathetic to the state and to state power.413 It is a
system, which supports and sustains the state structure, and is especially det-
rimental to-what for Allott is the proper focus and concern of international
law-the people who exist within the state.41 4 Allott's view has its own par-
ticular perspective (and some may say bias), one that envisions the role of
the international lawyer as serving not just governments, but "international
society" as a whole: "[a]s lawyers they are servants not of power but of jus-
tice. ,
41 5
This utopian view imbues law with special, almost supernatural powers,
as the overseer and restrainer of state power. For Allott, law functions (ide-
ally) as a great mediator-allowing the relationship between the people and
the state to be one of growth, prosperity, and stewardship, not subjugation.1 6
At the same time, law's articulations, especially as manifested in the work of
the ILC, the codifiers and bureaucrats, tend to devalue and erode the very
legitimacy of law itself. The view of law as a great social phenomenon, as
407. See generally id.
408. Id. at 25.
409. Id. at 14.
410. Id. at 9.
411. Allot, supra note 390, at 10.
412. Id.
413. See id.
414. See id. at 14-16.
415. Id. at 24.
416. See Allot, supra note 390, at 24.
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an experiment for the future and a promise for mankind's well-being and
happiness, is life-affirming and positive. As Allott points out, though, this is
a view which is yet to be realized, because international law is trapped-to
varying degrees, as this paper seeks to show-in the pre-revolutionary and
antiquated discourses of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centu-
ries.4 17
III. EXAMINING THE STRUCTURE OF FAIRNESS DISCOURSE AND ITS
NECESSARY PRESUPPOSITIONS
The previous section, Part II, had as its concern the discourses sur-
rounding the various procedural and structural aspects of contemporary in-
ternational law, specifically sovereignty, jurisdiction, and state responsibility.
These discourses were singled out, both for their representative capacity to
highlight certain trends running like threads through the fabric of interna-
tional law, and for their strong similarities, the inter-relationships between
the various discourses, revealing their interconnectedness, and inter-
dependence. In Part III, below, I examine another discourse; the one sur-
rounding fairness. "Fairness" has become, for many, a round-trip ticket on
the "universal express." It may be thought of as a vehicle, which (for its
proponents at least) enables the transplantation of western, liberal values to
other parts of the world. It is also, according to its adherents, able to func-
tion to allow those values to be legitimatized, i.e., to avoid the imperialism
critique, to conquer charges of ethnocentrism, culture-centrism, and-most
important for our purposes-to defeat the challenge of bias launched by
those who reject the universalist stance.
Thomas Franck analyzed the notion of fairness and finds it the most im-
portant basis behind the creation of modem international legal norms." 8 For
Franck, international law has reached a new level of maturity and complex-
ity.4 19 It is now in its post-ontological stage, meaning that the question
"whether international law is law" no longer needs to be asked, proved, de-
fended, or fought over; rather, now the issue turns to the content of the new
international law."' The new questions, which must be asked include those
such as: "is international law effective? Is it enforceable? Is it understood?
And, the most important question: Is international law fair?" 421 Fairness,
417. See id. at 25.
418. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)
[hereinafter FRANCK I].
419. Id. at 4-6.
420. See id. at 3-9.
421. Id. at 6.
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therefore, has become the meta-discourse, which rises above and preserves
the other internal discourses, providing legitimacy, acceptance, and stability
to the system of international law.422
The importance of fairness to international law's self-conscious justifi-
cation of itself cannot be overstated. If it is fair to impose our cultural values
universally throughout the world-on all other societies-then on what basis
do recipient societies have to object? Does fairness solve all our problems?
My answer is that while it may seem like a panacea and a way out of the
paradox of universalism, we need to dig a little deeper to determine on what
fairness is based. At the bottom, if the discourse fails to give us something to
stand on, to provide justifications for the transplantation of legal values, or if
the presuppositions of fairness discourse are unsatisfactory, then we must
look elsewhere for alternative discourses or better ways to resolve the cri-
tique of cultural imperialism.
Franck identifies two presuppositions of modem fairness discourse:
moderate scarcity and community.423 The condition of moderate scarcity, as
Franck says citing Rawls, presents an optimal opportunity for fairness dis-
course to be productive: "[it] is most likely to be productive when the allo-
cation of rights and duties occurs in circumstances which make allocation
both necessary and possible. 424 The implication is that for a discourse to be
productive it must be able to convince others (i.e., the less fortunate) of the
425distributional justness of their assigned allocations. Just as state responsi-
bility discourse was most likely to be productive, effective, or efficient in
situations where the most powerful had been wronged and needed a remedy
against a less powerful adversary, and even in spite of the technical wrongs
committed by the more powerful, as we saw for example in the Corfu Chan-
nel and United States Hostages cases.426 In other words, fairness discourse
would not be "productive" if it failed to pacify and assuage the discontent
felt by those less well-off.427
With respect to the second structural presupposition of fairness, Franck
argues that a community is "based, first, on a common, conscious system of
reciprocity between its constituents. 4 28 The community, Franck emphasizes,
is not just about shared rights and rules, but about "shared moral imperatives
422. Id. at 7.
423. FRANCK I, supra note 418, at 9-10.
424. Id. at 9.
425. Id. at 10.
426. See United States Diplomatic & Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran) 1980 I.C.J. 3
(May 24); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
427. See FRANCK I, supra note 418, at 7-9.
428. Id. at 10.
2005]
144
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss2/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
and values."4 2 9 This point echoes Slaughter's distinction raised in Part II
between liberal and non-liberal states, where the so-called liberal states con-
stitute the community.43 ° If we look at who is defining liberal, and who is
defining the community, it becomes painfully obvious that there is something
deeply tautological and circular here. We define who is able to join the
community and who gets excluded. So it is no wonder that fairness can
thrive in this limited context.
The concern raised above regarding the exclusivity of the community of
states and the apparent bias emanating from its self-defined nature may be
dealt with, as Franck does, by stressing the global nature of contemporary
problems, issues, media, and culture. For example, he says:
[a]s we enter the third millennium, there is much evidence of a
global community, emerging out of a growing awareness of irrefu-
table interdependence, its imperatives and exigencies. It may be
tempting to speak of emerging 'global communities': of trade, of
environmental concerns, of security, of health measures, et cetera.
It would, however, be inaccurate because these regimes are linked.
A state's conformity with environmental policy will have an effect
on its credit-worthiness in borrowing from the World Bank; most
favored nation trade benefits may be linked to a state's human
rights record, and so forth. These multiple linkages, making dif-
ferent regimes interdependent, are evidence of community.431
The trend of globalization certainly points toward a more interactive re-
lationship between states, toward a larger and larger encompassing commu-
nity. But we are not completely there yet. There are many states and people
living within states, which do not share a sense that they belong in any real
sense to the global community.
At this point, there is the urge to ask, "so what?" What does it matter
that a few or minority of rogue nations do not (or do not choose) to partici-
pate in a larger community of states? Let them alone or just inflict measures
to force their compliance if they do not feel the voluntary obligations of the
"liberal" states.432 Indeed, some sort of discord, disarray, and indeterminacy
is a necessary part of the fairness discourse.433 As Franck acknowledges,
regarding the subjectivity of the concept:
429. Id.
430. See Slaughter, supra note 20, at 509-11.
431. FRANCKI, supra note 418, at 12.
432. See FERNANDO R. TEs6N, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998).
433. See FRANCK I, supra note 418, at 14.
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[e]ven if 'everyone' were to agree, at least in theory, that fairness
is a necessary condition of allocational rules, this unfortunately
would not assure that everyone shared the same sense of fairness
or agreed on a fixed meaning. Fairness is not 'out there' waiting
to be discovered, it is a product of social context and history...
What is considered allocationally fair has varied across time, and
still varies across cultures. 4
What this tells us, however, can be easily misrepresented.
It does not tell us that the search for allocational fairness is the pur-
suit of a chimera. What the deep contextuality of all notions of fair-
ness does tell us is that fairness is relative and subjective ... a hu-
man, subjective, contingent quality which merely captures in one
word a process, ... reasoning, and [a] negotiation leading, if suc-
cessful, [on] an agreed formula.435
What this quotation shows is that Franck is, of course, aware of the sub-
jective and viewpoint-laden nature of the fairness discourse.436 Any one con-
ception of fairness may (paradoxically) be biased from someone else's per-
spective.437 To be fair means to be unfair to someone, some of the time.
One person's freedom fighter may be another's terrorist. One person's lib-
eration, is another's subjugation. One person's sacred values, is another's
outlawed taboos.
Given this admittedly subjective nature of fairness, the question still
remains, what to do with rogue or non-compliant nations? One way the fair-
ness discourse deals with this question is by subdividing fairness, so that it
can function on different levels, for different parties, simultaneously. This
subdivision move is encapsulated in what Franck calls his caveat to the fair-
ness discourse. 438 It distinguishes between "legitimacy as process fairness"
and "distributive justice as moral fairness., 439 The important point here is
that these conceptions can (and do) conflict and clash, although there is much
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. See id.
437. See id. at 14-15. I don't say "is" but "may" instead, because I acknowledge the logi-
cal possibility of a universally fair rule, i.e., in theory, there is a possible state of affairs where
a rule could be devised which everyone would be convinced produced a fair result. For ex-
ample, if our entire community consisted of a small group of people, or perhaps a large group
with homogenous interests, and no other people in the universe were in existence, then a rule
could be devised that everyone would consider fair.
438. See FRANCK I, supra note 418, at 22-24.
439. Id. at 22.
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overlap between legitimacy and justice.44 Just as sovereignty had state sov-
ereignty and people's sovereignty, fairness has legitimacy and justice."
Both are viable options in the discourse." 2 Franck says,
[t]he notion of 'fairness' encompasses two different and poten-
tially adversary components: legitimacy and distributive justice.
These components are indicators of law's, and especially fair
law's, primary objective: to achieve a negotiated balance between
the need for order and the need for change .. .What matters is
how this tension is managed discursively through what Kosken-
niemi calls 'the social conception' of the legal system. This 'so-
cial conception' manifests itself in the discursive pursuit of fair-
ness.
443
Thus, for example, there were fairness arguments made on both sides of
the United States's intervention in 1990 against Iraq after it had invaded
Kuwait.'" Supporters of the United States argued legitimacy-as-fairness,
i.e., that concepts such as "uti possidetis" and "territorial integrity" gave
legitimacy to Kuwait's claim of sovereignty and to be free from invasion. "
The other side argued justice-as-fairness, maintaining that there was gross
unjust resource allocation and that the people of Kuwait and Iraq had been
artificially and unjustly divided by colonial intervention." 6
This nuanced view of fairness captures some of the depth and flexibility
of the fairness discourse and goes a long way in meeting the charge that
"fairness" does not take into account alternative views and cultures. But the
charge of ethnocentrism is still not answered, because one could imagine a
situation where both "legitimacy-as-fairness" and "justice-as-fairness" oper-
ated in tandem and synchronously within one community, but not between
different communities. (An example here might be specific family law or
divorce rules operating in different cultures, where in one culture they may
be viewed as completely legitimate and distributionally just, but imagined in
another context (such as in the United States) they would be viewed as sex-
ist, unfair, and degrading to women).
440. Id. at 22-23.
441. Id.
442. See id. at 22-24.
443. FRANCK I, supra note 418, at 23.
444. Id.
445. Id. (emphasis added).
446. Id.
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John Tasioulas has written a paper directly critiquing Franck's discus-
sion of fairness." 7 Tasioulas criticizes Franck for, among other things, his
failure to deal adequately with the problem of ethnocentrism." 8 Tasioulas
acknowledges that Franck does not accept the objectivist basis of fairness,
but instead, as we have seen, embraces an inter-subjective, indeterminate,
and flexible conception."9 In order to highlight the importance of culture
and the imperialist dilemma that is not rectified merely because of one com-
munity's inter-subjective conception of fairness, Tasioulas relies on the work
of Italian political philosopher Daniel Zolo. 450 Zolo attacks the liberal enter-
prise of universalism by first asserting:
[t]he incompatibility of the values expressed in human rights
norms with 'the dominant ethos in countries like China, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, the Sudan or Nigeria.' Second, he insists that the
lack of objective foundations for such norms renders their invoca-
tion 'a perfect continuation of the missionary, colonizing tradition
of the Western powers.' 
451
Tasioulas suggests that "[n]othing in Fairness [in International Law and
Institutions] ... really dispels the threat of ethnocentrism. ' 452 He does, how-
ever, acknowledge that elsewhere Franck argues that "personal freedom is
not a parochial, specifically, Western value and hence not an ethnocentric
imposition on non-Western cultures.""53 As Franck says in that other con-
text:
[t]here is no reason to believe that these underlying emancipatory
forces [e.g., developments in industrialization, urbanization, scien-
tific and technological discoveries, transportation, communication,
information processing and education].. . are indigenous to West-
ern society and cannot affect other societies as they have affected
our own. On the contrary, one must assume them to be independ-
ent variables, which, when they come to the fore anywhere under
447. John Tasioulas, International Law and the Limits of Fairness, 13 EuR. J. INT'L L. 993
(2002), WL 13 EURJIL 993.
448. Id. at *995.
449. See, e.g., id. at *996.
450. Id. at *996.
451. Id. (quoting Donilo Zolo, COSMOPOLIS: PROSPECTS FOR WORLD GOVERNMENT 118-19
(1997)).
452. Tasioulas, supra note 447, at 1000.
453. Id. (referring to THOMAS FRANCK, Is Personal Freedom a Western Value? 91 AM. J.
INT'L L. 593 (1997) [hereinafter FRANCK II] substantially reprinted as chapter 6 of THOMAS
FRANCK, THE EMPOWERED SELF: LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF INDIVIDUALISM (1999)).
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the right conjunction of circumstances, can tilt the balance in favor
of more personal autonomy.
454
In addition, Franck presents another argument which speaks to the non-
parochial character of liberal values and ideas.455 This occurs in his discus-
sion of democracy, as Tasioulas correctly notes:
[t]his almost complete triumph of ... notions of democracy (in
Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe, and to a lesser extent Asia)
may well prove to be the most profound event of the twentieth
century, and will in all likelihood create the fulcrum on which fu-
ture development of global society will turn. It is the unanswer-
able response to claims that free, open, multiparty, electoral par-
liamentary democracy is neither desired nor desirable outside a
small enclave of Western industrial states.456
For Tasioulas, these arguments are a "valuable corrective to the tendency to
reify cultures and ascribe to them an historically invariant essence. 457
Despite the attractiveness of the "independent variable" argument and
the "empirical democracy" claim, this still does not adequately answer why
certain states are left out of the community of states, why some cultures are
privileged over others, nor does it provide a prescriptive, normative explana-
tion for the universal nature of liberal values.458 As Tasioulas notes, "it is
unlikely that such empirical considerations, pertaining to modernity ... can
blunt the real force of the ethnocentric challenge." 45 Indeed, while it pro-
vides a sociological or descriptive explanation for the fact of the permeation
and instantiation of liberal values throughout the world, it does little to ex-
plain why these values should be predominant, preemptive, and prevailing.46 °
I reside with Tasioulas in my skepticism of Franck's utopian vision of
the fairness discourse as really having all the justificatory and explanatory
power, which it is advertised to have.4 6 But, at the same time, I am in agree-
ment with Franck that there is no objective fairness, no fairness "out there"
which we can tap into in order to assuage the rumblings of "the natives" and
the malcontents. 46' Fairness discourse suffers from the kind of blind adher-
454. Id. at 1001. (quoting FRANCK II, supra note 453, at 608) (alterations in original).
455. Id.
456. Id. (quoting FRANCK I, supra note 418, at 88) (alterations in original).
457. Tasioulas, supra note 447, at 1001.
458. See id. at 1002.
459. Id.
460. See id.
461. Id.
462. FRANCK I, supra note 418, at 17.
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ence, which Wittgenstein discussed in On Certainty, and Tasioulas aptly
cites: "'Men have judged that a king can make rain; we say this contradicts
all experience. Today they judge that aeroplanes and the radio etc. are means
for the closer contact of peoples and the spread of culture.' 463 This state-
ment is made in connection with Wittgenstein's general discussion of how
we come to know (and believe) things about the world 6. 4' A brief discussion
of Wittgenstein's philosophical ruminations on the nature of experience and
judging will follow and will then be applied to help analyze the fairness dis-
courses at the heart of contemporary international law.
One of Wittgenstein's main points in On Certainty is that it is a fallacy
to think that incremental experience in individual cases teaches us how to
judge the world.465 For Wittgenstein, "experience is not the ground for our
game of judging. Nor is it its outstanding success." 466 This should not be
confused with an objectivist stance. Wittgenstein is not saying, like Kant,
that judging is dependent on a priori structures common to all mankind
through reason.467 Instead, Wittgenstein has in mind an inter-subjectivist
idea, an organically arising structure of propositions mutually dependent and
mutually reinforcing. 468 This is elucidated by Wittgenstein's further insight
that "[w]hen we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a sin-
gle proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually
over the whole.), 469  "We do not learn the practice of making empirical
judgments by learning rules: we are taught judgments and their [connection]
with other judgments. A totality of judgments is made plausible to us." 470
For Wittgenstein, "[i]t is not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a
system in which consequences and premises give one another mutual sup-
port.
471
These insights help to understand both the limitations and the power of
fairness discourse. 4 72 Fairness is a "language-game" which we all speak in
the Western liberal world. It has been learned and has come to be seen as the
primary mode upon which we judge ther propositions, arrangements, and
463. Tasioulas, supra note 447, at 1003 (quoting LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY
132, at 19e (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von Wright eds., 1969)).
464. See id.
465. LUDWIG WIrTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 13 1, at 19e (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von
Wright eds., 1969) [hereinafter WITTGENSTEIN Il].
466. Id.
467. See id. 143, at 2 1e.
468. See id. 140-42, at 21e.
469. Id. 141, at 21e.
470. WITTGENSTEIN II, supra note 465, 140, at 21e.
471. Id. 142, at 21e.
472. See id. TT 140-142, at 21e.
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institutions, as well as the extraterritorial application and transplantation of
our laws on other nations and peoples.473 But Wittgenstein reminds us that
"fairness"-like any other judgment-is only one facet in a web of intercon-
necting concepts which all hang together in a certain conceptual structure.474
The strength of the fairness discourse derives not from its individual "right-
ness" or "wrongness," but rather from its co-existence and co-dependence
with other concepts in the Western liberal vocabulary: for example, legiti-
macy, equity, freedom, and justice. Each of these terms gains credibility,
and is defined by, and with reference to, fairness and vice-a-versa.
This point may be seen more clearly in an example Wittgenstein pro-
vides regarding how we know that the earth existed before our birth.475 In
Wittgenstein's parlance, "everything speaks for... and nothing against" this
proposition.476 The following discussion in On Certainty shows the progres-
sion of Wittgenstein's thoughts toward this conclusion:
"[i]t is certain that we didn't arrive on this planet from another one
a hundred years ago." Well, it's as certain as such things are.
It would strike me as ridiculous to want to doubt the existence of
Napoleon; but if someone doubted the existence of the earth 150
years ago, perhaps I should be more willing to listen, for now he is
doubting our whole system of evidence. It does not strike me as if
this system were more certain than a certainty within it. 477
"I might suppose that Napoleon never existed and is a fable, but
not that the earth did not exist 150 years ago."
"Do you know that the earth existed then?".-"Of course I know
that. I have it from someone who certainly knows all about it." [I
think Wittgenstein is being humorous here].
It strikes me as if someone who doubts the existence of the earth at
that time is impugning the nature of all historical evidence. And I
cannot say of this latter that it is definitely correct.
At some point one has to pass from explanation to mere descrip-
tion.
473. Think of the reasonableness balancing conducted under Restatement Section 403.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403 (1987).
474. WrTI'GENSTEIN II, supra note 465, 140-42, at 21e.
475. Id. 190, at 26e.
476. Id. 191, at 27e.
477. Id. 184-85, at 26e (emphasis added).
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What we call historical evidence points to the existence of the
earth a long time before my birth;-the opposite hypothesis has
nothing on its side.
Well, if everything speaks for an hypothesis and nothing against
it-is it then certainly true? One may designate it as such-But
does it certainly agree with reality, with the facts?-With this
question you are already going around in a circle.
To be sure there is justification; but justification comes to an
end.478
These thoughts regarding the empirical certainty of such bedrock prin-
ciples as the earth's existence can be applied to the question of our moral
"certainty" of applying such bedrock principles as "fairness" (and other lib-
eral values) across cultures.479
In keeping with Wittgenstein's thinking on the certainty of "bedrock
principles," it is apparent that we might have the same reaction to someone
who doubted the moral certainty of fairness or the use of justice as one of the
aspirational goals for a society. as We might look at such a person in a new
light, as crazy or confused. Perhaps we would think that they must not un-
derstand what we mean by "fairness," "justice," or that they were not able to
speak our language correctly. Wittgenstein makes this point in reverse when
he says, "Even if I came to a country where they believed that people were
taken to the moon in dreams, I couldn't say to them: 'I have never been to
the moon--Of course I may be mistaken.' 4 81 What Wittgenstein teaches us
is that at some level our certainty-moral, empirical, philosophical-is de-
pendent on a certain set of foundational assumptions about the world, how it
operates, and what objects, institutions, and structures reside within it.482
In Culture and Value, another collection of writings published posthu-
mously collecting the late Wittgenstein's thoughts, he remarks that:
[n]othing we do can be defended absolutely and finally. But only by ref-
erence to something else that is not questioned[,] [i.]e. no reason can be
given why you should act (or should have acted) like this, except that by
478. Id. 186-192, at 26-7e.
479. See W1TrGENSTEIN II, supra note 465, 184-192, at 26-27e.
480. See id. 184-92, at 26e-27e.
481. Id. 667, at 88e.
482. See id. 184-192, at 26e-27e; 667, at 88e.
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doing so you bring about such and such a situation, which again has to be
an aim that you accept.
483
This thought is really another way of making the point that at a certain level
justification and explanation must stop; at bottom, at some fixed point there
is no further reason for our actions which can be given or articulated outside
the confines of our language-game; i.e., from outside our way of seeing the
world. The second Gulf War comes to mind. Just as Franck commented,
with regard to the first Gulf War, there was no absolute and final justification
for American intervention just as there was no absolute and final justification
for Iraq's position.484 At the end of the day, each side had to rely on the bed-
rock principles which were justified ultimately not by further concepts, but
instead by the bringing about of "such and such a situation," a new reality,
the legitimacy of which the majority of the rest of the world by consensus
would either accept or reject.485
In one sense, Wittgenstein's insight regarding certainty does not resolve
the charge of ethnocentrism raised against fairness discourse.486 In a very
real sense, it actually strengthens this charge by acknowledging that our con-
cepts derive their meaning and their commitment from the socially accepted
complex structure of interconnecting principles, which we have learned as
part of our own language, culture, upbringing, and development as members
in a particular society.487 But, in another (and I propose more important and)
wider sense, Wittgenstein's philosophy provides a solution to the charge by
acknowledging that the notion of certainty is a function of an inter-subjective
commitment reached by persons operating within and as part of a functioning
community. 488 Because each system (or each culture) operates within its
own conceptual structures and language, it is true that no one system has any
a priori claim of primacy or priority. But, it is also true that under the real-
world state of affairs as they exist presently and increasingly in the future, a
new community is emerging and its values will gain primacy and priority
because of globalization, modernization, and the sheer number of its partici-
pants.
483. WITTGENSTE1N I, supra note 3, at 16e.
484. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97
AM. J. INT'L L. 607 (2003).
485. See WITTGENSTEIN I, supra note 3, at 16e.
486. See id.
487. See id.
488. WITTGENSTEIN II, supra note 465, 194, at 27e.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This is the case in the world today: because we are faced with the prob-
lems (and blessings) of globalization, we must operate as a society of states,
transnational groups, peoples, individuals, and other entities. We have no
choice if we are to survive, as a planet, as a species. I find myself in agree-
ment and in sympathy with Phillip Allott's view: that "[1]aw forms part of
the self-constituting of a society," and that "[l]aw is a universalizing system,
reconceiving the infinite particularity of human willing and acting, in the
light of the common interest of society.' 89 From the abstract heights of Al-
lot's almost Hegelian project of law realizing itself, I am drawn to the recog-
nition that there may not be any ethical justification for cultural imperialism
which can be articulated outside the language of our own idiosyncratic cul-
tural context.4 90 However, that fact, although it may be hard to accept, does
not require abandonment of the project of international society, international
law, and liberal values. Instead, it requires that we accept a commitment to
take a hard look at our biases and assumptions. Once that is accomplished,
only then can we begin the process of constituting an international society
for all humankind, only then can we honestly forge a new and better reality
for the future.
489. Philip Allott, The Concept of International Law, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
3.1, 3.4, at 69 (Michael Byers ed. 2000).
490. See id. at 69-89.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1502, when Christopher Columbus landed in Cuba, he called it "the
most beautiful land human eyes have ever seen."1 Since then, this phrase has
been repeated many times by exiled Cubans, tourists, and writers in describ-
ing Cuba's scenery.2 With thousands of miles of coastline, Cuba is home to
beautiful beaches, towering mountains, rolling hills, and colorful coral reefs.'
Approximately 11,308,764 people currently reside in Cuba.4 However,
unlike other islands in the Caribbean, Cuba is currently the only communist
nation in the Americas.'
Due to its communist state, the United States government severely re-
stricts travel to the island of Cuba.6 The Trading with the Enemy Act7 pro-
hibits travel to Cuba unless the individual is licensed.8 A violation of this
restriction involves criminal sanctions, including up to ten years in prison
and civil penalties of up to $50,000 per person.9 Despite the impending pos-
sibility of criminal prosecution, it is estimated that 200,000 Americans suc-
cessfully visited Cuba in 2003.'0 Americans are able to circumvent the law,
which is less than copiously enforced by United States officials, by first trav-
eling to Canada or Mexico and then flying into Cuba."
Part II of this article provides a brief background on the history of Cuba
by focusing on Fidel Castro's takeover of Cuba and its effect on tourism.
Part III discusses restrictions President Kennedy imposed on travel to Cuba
and the Cuban Democracy Act. 12 Part IV briefly discusses the Office of For-
1. Daniel J. Whittle et al., International Tourism and Protection of Cuba's Coastal and
Marine Environments, 16 TuL. ENvTL. L.J. 533, 537 (2003).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 537-38.
4. K. Lynn Stoner, Cuba, in MICROSOFT ENCARTA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA 1 (2004), at
http://encarta.msn.com/encylcopedia_761569844/Cuba.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2005).
5. See id.
6. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, CUBA:
WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE U.S. EMBARGO 1, available at http://www.treas.gov/
offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/+l lcuba.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2005) [hereinafter OFAC
CUBA].
7. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1) (2000).
8. OFAC CUBA, supra note 6, at 2.
9. 50 U.S.C. app. § 16 (2000).
10. Bruce Schimmel, Closing Cuba, Philadelphiacitypaper.net, Oct. 16-22, 2003, at
http://citypaper.net/articles/2003-10-16/canon.shtml (last visited Jan. 8, 2005).
11. International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, Enforcement of U.S.
Travel Restrictions to Cuba to be Enhanced, at http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2003/Oct/
15-270865.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2005) [hereinafter International Informational Programs].
12. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-10 (2000).
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eign Assets Control's role in the American government's effort to restrict
travel to Cuba. Part V details travel restrictions to Cuba as they existed be-
fore June 30, 2004. Part VI analyzes two major United States Supreme
Court cases which upheld the validity of restricting travel to Cuba. Part VII
details the new regulations that took effect on June 30, 2004, which further
restrict travel to Cuba. Part VIII discusses a recent case as an example of
how serious the United States government is about the new restrictions. Part
IX stresses the importance of continuing to restrict travel to Cuba in an effort
to oppress Fidel Castro's government and prevent American dollars from
further fueling his economy. Finally, Part X concludes by explaining how
enforcing the stringent travel restrictions is instrumental in eliminating Fidel
Castro's communist regime.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ISLAND OF CUBA
A. Fidel Castro Takes Power
For over 400 years, Cuba was under the control of Spain.13 In 1898,
with the assistance of the United States, Cuba successfully fought for its in-
dependence from Spain and was declared an independent nation under the
protection of the United States.' 4 Around 1902, Cuba began to lessen the
United States' influence and began to function under its own government for
the first half of the twentieth century.' 5 In 1934, Fulgencio Batista took over
the country as president and military dictator. 6 Under Batista, the Cuban
government became corrupt, its citizens revolted against Batista, and the
infamous "Cuban Revolution" began. 7
On January 1, 1959, the Cuban revolution successfully brought down
Batista's government.' 8 One month later, in February of 1959, Fidel Castro
proclaimed himself "el commandante" ("the commander") of Cuba's new
revolutionary government.' 9 In his first year as Cuba's new leader, Castro
passed over 1500 new laws supposedly aimed at distributing wealth to the
citizens of Cuba and securing investments from foreign non-capitalist coun-
tries.2° Castro gained the support of the Cuban people by riding in tanks
13. Stoner, supra note 4, at 1.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Stoner, supra note 4, at 1.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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through the streets preaching how he had liberated the citizens from the Ba-
tista government and profoundly promising to uphold Cuba's constitution.2'
To ensure he had the support of his people, Castro refused to lay down all
arms until all other revolutionary groups accepted him as Cuba's new
leader.22 Finally, in 1961, the revolutionary Cuban Communist Party was
formed and still remains in power today. 3
B. Tourism in Cuba
For more than 150 years, Cuba has been a particularly favorite vacation
spot for many Americans. 24  Even today, Cuba's charm and picturesque
scenery continues to be a beloved location for United States travelers.25 De-
spite the country's government turmoil over the last forty-five years, Ameri-
can interest in the island has yet to be curtailed.26 This interest is evidenced
by the continued growth of American tourism in Cuba.27 Tourism signifi-
cantly contributes to the Cuban economy and has been the only sector with
continued growth in the Castro era.28 It is estimated that in 1990, $243 mil-
lion were injected into the Cuban economy from tourism.29 That figure has
increased by 500%, and travel to Cuba contributed more than $1.6 billion in
the year 2002.30
The Castro government continuously assures the people of Cuba they
will have a share in the country's national goods.31 Despite these promises,
Cubans are strictly banned from all tourist areas, including the beautiful
beaches and hotels.32 For example, shopping in luxury stores and eating in
fine restaurants is reserved only for foreigners.33 Castro does so to prevent
Cuban citizens from gaining access to valuable foreign currency.34 These
restrictions are forcing Cubans to resort to desperate measures in an effort to
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Stoner, supra note 4, at 4. Interestingly, despite the reigning power, to date, the
Cuban Constitution has yet to be upheld. Id.
24. Whittle et al., supra note 1, at 553.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. In fact, the regulations appear to make people want to visit it all the more. Id.
28. Stoner, supra note 4, at 3.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Stoner, supra note 4, at 3.
34. Id.
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gain access to United States dollars on the island.35 Highly educated males
and females are abandoning their traditional jobs, opting for other extreme
career paths.36 For example, males are beginning to drive cabs and females
have resorted to prostitution (now at an all time high) just to make ends
meet.37
III. TRAVEL TO CUBA BECOMES HIGHLY RESTRICTED
A. President Kennedy Restricts Travel to Cuba
On February 3, 1962, through Presidential Proclamation No. 3447,
President John F. Kennedy imposed an embargo on all transactions with
Cuba.38 President Kennedy cited to section 2370 of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, which granted him the authority to impose such restrictions.4°
Section 2370(a)(1)-(2) provides that:
(1) No assistance shall be furnished under this chapter to the pre-
sent government of Cuba. As an additional means of implement-
ing and carrying into effect the policy of the preceding sentence,
the President is authorized to establish and maintain a total em-
bargo upon all trade between the United States and Cuba.
(2) Except as may be deemed necessary by the President in the in-
terest of the United States, no assistance shall be furnished under
this chapter to any government of Cuba, nor shall Cuba be entitled
to receive any quota authorizing the importation.., or to receive
any other benefit under any law of the United States, until the
President determines that such government has taken appropriate
steps according to international law standards to return to United
States citizens . . . or to provide equitable compensation to such
citizens and entities for property taken from such citizens and enti-
ties on or after January 1, 1959, by the Government of Cuba.
4 1
Because section 2370(a)(2) makes returning property taken from United
States citizens a condition precedent to receiving a "benefit," any attempt to
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Maria L. Pagan, U.S. Legal Requirements Affecting Trade with Cuba, 7 PACE INT'L L.
REv. 485, 488 (1995).
39. 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (2000).
40. Pagan, supra note 38, at 487.
41. § 2370(a)(1)-(2).
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ease the restrictions against Cuba would have to essentially repeal this law,
unless, of course, the Cuban government chooses to return all property.42
Further, there is no statutory language indicating specific time restrictions on
the expiration of the embargo or guidance on when, or how, it may end.43
Although the current President could always terminate the embargo by exer-
cising his foreign powers, the regulations would still exist in the texts.
44
B. The Cuban Democracy Act
In 1992, thirty years after President Kennedy implemented the Cuban
embargo, Congress passed the Cuban Democracy Act ("CDA") . 5  "The
CDA contains a Congressional finding that the [Cuban] government contin-
ues to disregard human rights, continues to support subversive activities
around the world, has decreased the well-being of the Cuban people, and
shows no signs of change despite the collapse of Communism around the
world." 6 The purpose of the CDA is to provide for a smooth transition for
the communist government of Cuba to become a democratic one . 7 Addi-
tionally, it punishes the Cuban government while assisting the people of
Cuba.48
In order to persuade other countries to support the United States' posi-
tion, the CDA contains provisions encouraging other countries to adopt the
Cuban Embargo while punishing those who do not.49 Sanctions include de-
nying countries eligibility for assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 or sales under the Arms Export Control Act. 0 Additionally, countries
that do not follow the United States' policy towards Cuba are not eligible for
a reduction of any debt owed to the American government." Under the
CDA, the President of the United States has the power to waive the restric-
tions if he determines that Cuba has: 1) held democratic elections; 2) al-
lowed other parties to campaign for such elections and allowed the media
full access to the candidates; 3) shown respect to the citizens of Cuba by
42. Pagan, supra note 38, at 487.
43. Id. at 488.
44. Id.
45. Christine Zack, Comment, Globalization's Unlikely Opportunist: Castro's Cuba
Shapes the Paradigm for Economic and Political Stability in Latin America, 11 TUL. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 355, 360 (2003).
46. Pagan, supra note 38, at 499.
47. 22 U.S.C. § 6002(1) (2000).
48. Pagan, supra, note 38, at 499.
49. See 22 U.S.C. § 6003 (2000).
50. Id.
51. § 6003(b)(1)(B).
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respecting their "civil liberties and human rights;" and 4) has committed it-
self to Cuba's constitutional change. 2 Although a delineated power, the
above conditions appear very subjective and their interpretation will most
likely depend on the political affiliation of the President of the United States
at the time.
Finally, the CDA provides relief to the Cuban community in a number
of ways. 3 First, it allows exportation of food and medicine to Cuba within
certain restrictions.5 4 For example, there is a prohibition on exporting medi-
cine if the likelihood exists that the medicine's purpose is for torture or other
forms of human rights abuse. 55 Secondly, the CDA permits telecommunica-
tion services between the United States and Cuba, but only to the extent nec-
essary to provide "efficient and adequate telecommunications. 56 Further,
the CDA allows these transactions with Cuba only if they benefit the Cuban
people and not the Cuban government.57
IV. THE OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
The Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") operates under the
United States Treasury Department.58 In an effort to preserve United States'
foreign policy, OFAC's principal task is enforcing embargoes and economic
sanctions against foreign countries. 9 OFAC is the successor of the former
Office of Foreign Funds Control ("OFFC"), which was established at the
commencement of World War 11.60 OFFC's principle purpose was to act
under the Trading with the Enemy Act ("TWEA") and to prevent dealings
with the Nazis. 6' As the years progressed, OFFC expanded and began regu-
lating more countries. 62 In December, 1950, President Truman formally cre-
ated OFAC, and declared a national emergency under TWEA after blocking
assets, subject to United States jurisdiction, from China and North Korea.63
52. 22 U.S.C. § 6007(a) (2000).
53. 22 U.S.C. § 6004 (2000).
54. § 6004(b)-(c).
55. § 6004(c)(2)-(3).
56. § 6004(e)(l)-(2).
57. 22 U.S.C. § 6009(a) (2000).
58. R. Richard Newcomb, Office of Foreign Assets Control, 705 PRAC. L. INST. 397, 401
(1994).
59. Id.
60. United States Dep't of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control: Frequently
Asked Questions, at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/faq/index.html (last visited
Jan. 8, 2005) [hereinafter OFAC FAQ].
61. Id.
62. Newcomb, supra note 58, at 401.
63. Id. at 444.
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Currently, OFAC is the lead agency enforcing restrictions against Cuba,
including travel restrictions.' The International Emergency Economic Pow-
ers Act 65 ("IEEPA") grants OFAC the authority to oversee restrictions on
Cuba.66 OFAC, combined with the President's wartime and national emer-
gency powers, is the means by which the American government regulates
transactions with foreign countries.67
V. TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS TO CUBA BEFORE JUNE 30, 2004
A. Fully Hosted Travelers
One of the most popular methods for American travel to Cuba was un-
der the "fully hosted travel" provision.68 The "fully hosted travel" provision
meant that an American could legally travel to Cuba if the trip, and all asso-
ciated costs, were paid by a person outside of the United States, and United
States' jurisdiction.69 All travel which fell into this category was deemed
"authorized" travel. 70
B. Returning Goods to the United States
While in Cuba, Americans were permitted to purchase merchandise and
take it home to the United States.7 The only limitations were that the mer-
chandise must cost under $100 in value and the item must be for the trav-
eler's personal use. 2 Alternatively, visitors were free to return an unlimited
amount of informational materials, such as books and magazines, back to the
United States.73
64. Id. at 401.
65. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000).
66. Newcomb, supra note 58, at 401-02.
67. Id.
68. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 33,768 (June 16, 2004) (to be codi-
fied at 31 C.F.R. pt. 515).
69. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.420 (2003).
70. Id.
71. § 515.560(c)(3).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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C. Visiting Family
Travel restrictions to Cuba were lenient for those who had family mem-
bers on the island.74 A person with a "close relative," including second cous-
ins, could visit their family once every twelve months, provided they ob-
tained a general license from OFAC.75 The traveler could stay indefinitely,
since there was no limitation placed on the length of stay. 76 Additional visits
within the same twelve-month period were also permitted." Further, while
visiting their family, the traveler was allowed to spend up to the State De-
partment's then $167 per diem allowance.78
D. Educational Activities
A large part of travel to Cuba is comprised of college students and fac-
ulty engaged in educational programs.79 OFAC issues specific licenses to
academic institutions that are accredited by a national or regional accredita-
tion association that permits travel to Cuba.80 However, these licenses must
be renewed every two years.8' Once the institution has applied and is granted
a license, its students and faculty may travel to Cuba without further inter-
vention by OFAC, provided that they fall into one of the following five cate-
gories.s2 The first category encompasses undergraduate or graduate students
participating in a "structured educational program . . . as part of a course
offered at [their] accredited U.S. college or university. 83 Students traveling
"must carry a letter" from their school confirming: the student's enrollment
at all times, the institution's license number, and that the travel is part of
their educational program. 84 The second category involves individuals en-
gaging in "[n]on-commercial academic research" for the purpose of securing
74. See § 515.561.
75. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 33,769 (June 16, 2004) (to be codi-
fied at 31 C.F.R. pt. 515).
76. Id.
77. Id. A specific license, usually granted, was also needed for an additional visit occur-
ring within the same twelve month period. Id.
78. Id. However, a visitor could spend more than the per diem on unexpected expenses
that arose while in Cuba. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 33,769.
79. DeWayne Wickham, Powell Prescribes Cuba Travel Waiver for U.S. Medical Stu-
dents, USA TODAY, July 7, 2004, at A11.
80. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.565(a)(1) (2003).
81. § 515.565(a)(1).
82. § 515.565(a)(2).
83. § 515.565(a)(2)(i).
84. Id.
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a professional degree.85 Persons who travel under this category must also
have a letter from their institution confirming that the travel is not only part
of the researcher's educational program, but also that the course work will be
accepted for credit in the United States. 86 The third category is for students
who are enrolled in an accredited undergraduate/graduate course of study at a
"Cuban academic institution." 87 Fourth, a person regularly employed at an
accredited learning institution who is planning to teach at a "Cuban academic
institution" may also travel to Cuba.88 Finally, full-time employees of a li-
censed institution who are coordinating the above named activities may also
travel.89 As all other categories of education-based visitors, these individuals
must also carry a letter stating they are employed activities coordinators and
include their employer's OFAC license number.9"
E. Remittances
American citizens were permitted to send Cuban nationals $300 once
every four months.91 When traveling to Cuba, the authorized amount of
money a traveler could carry was $3000.92 Banks, or other forms of deposi-
tory institutions within the United States jurisdiction, could act as forwarders
for remittances from Americans to Cuban nationals.93 These forwarders
were not required to obtain any kind of license from OFAC before engaging
in such activities.94
VI. CHALLENGES TO THE VALIDITY OF TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS TO CUBA
A. Zemel v. Rusk
Prior to the United States breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba in
1961, passports were not required for travel within the Western Hemi-
85. § 515.565(a)(2)(ii).
86. Id.
87. § 515.565(a)(2)(iii). This category of students may also travel, provided they meet
the same three requirements as the students in the "structured educational program" category.
See id.
88. § 515.565(a)(2)(iv). Once again, these individuals must carry a letter at all times
stating that they are employees of an American institution and the appropriate license number.
Id.
89. § 515.565(a)(2)(vii).
90. Id.
91. § 515.570(a).
92. § 515.560(c)(4)(i).
93. § 515.572(a)(3).
94. Id.
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sphere.95 On January 16, 1961, the United States Department of State re-
moved Cuba from the list of countries in which a passport was not required
for travel.96 In a landmark case, Zemel v. Rusk,97 Zemel applied to have his
passport validated for travel to Cuba "to satisfy [his] curiosity . . . and to
make [him] a better informed citizen.' '98 Because of the change in law, Ze-
mel's application was rejected and he subsequently filed suit in federal dis-
trict court based on three counts: 1) "that he was entitled [to travel] under
the [United States] Constitution ... and to have his passport validated;" 2)
"that the Secretary's restrictions upon travel to Cuba were invalid;" and 3)
"that the Passport Act of 1926 and [section] 215 of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952 were unconstitutional." 99 In addition, Zemel prayed
that Rusk, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General "be enjoined
from interfering with such travel."' 00 The United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut "granted the Secretary of State's motion for summary
judgment and dismissed the action against the Attorney General."'0 l Follow-
ing dismissal, Zemel made a direct appeal to the United States Supreme
Court pursuant to federal statute.1
0 2
The Supreme Court found that the Passport Act granted the Executive
Branch the authority to refuse validation of passports for travel to Cuba.'
0 3
The Court reasoned that the continuous interpretation that the Department of
State possesses authority to impose restrictions to certain countries must be
considered in construing the Passport Act."° Chief Justice Warren noted that
in 1952, Congress enacted legislation relating to passports, but despite the
many executive impositions of area restrictions, it left "untouched the broad
rule-making authority granted in the earlier [Passport] Act."'01 5 Unlike the
applicant in Kent v. Dulles,10 6 where Mr. Kent was denied a passport based
95. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 3 (1965).
96. Id.
97. 1d. at 1.
98. Id. at 4.
99. Id.
100. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 4.
101. Id. at 5.
102. Id at 4-5. A direct appeal to the Supreme Court from a district court can be made
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253. Id. at 5.
103. Id. at 7.
104. Zemel,381U.S.at8-11.
105. Id. at 12.
106. 357 U.S. 116 (1958). The two plaintiffs in Kent were denied validation of their pass-
ports because of their refusal to file an affidavit concerning their membership in the Commu-
nist Party. Id.
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on his political beliefs or associations, the restrictions in Zemel applied to
everyone regardless of beliefs and were therefore constitutionally upheld. 10 7
Travel restrictions to specific countries are nothing new, and in fact they
have become quite common since World War 11.108 For example, in the late
1940's, "[t]ravel to Yugoslavia was restricted ... [due to] a series of incidents
involving American citizens" within Yugoslavia.'0 9  Like Yugoslavia,
"[t]ravel to Hungary was [also] restricted between December 1949 and May
1951," and once again after 1951.110 In an action similar to the new travel
restrictions to Cuba, the Department of State began to stamp passports to
Czechoslovakia "not valid for travel" and "declared that all passports out-
standing" were also "not valid for such travel.""' Using these past restric-
tions as a basis, the Supreme Court found Zemel's constitutional rights were
not being abridged by area restrictions prohibiting travel to Cuba." 2 Addi-
tionally, the Court noted that a liberty cannot be inhibited without due proc-
ess of law does not mean that it can under no circumstances be inhibited and
found these restrictions to be justified by the "weightiest considerations of
national security."' 13 The failure to validate Zemel's passport resulted in a
certain action being prevented and is not a violation of an individual's First
Amendment right. 14 "The right to speak and publish does not carry with it
the unrestrained right to gather information" in order to make one a more
informed citizen. 15 Finally, the Passport Act does not grant Congress com-
plete unfettered freedom to act as they wish and the only restrictions author-
ized are those that are proper in light of Congress's prior administrative prac-
tices.'16
B. Regan v. Wald
In 1977, regulation 560"17 was added to the Cuban Assets Control Regu-
lations."' This added provision permitted almost all travel-related transac-
107. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 13.
108. Id. at 10.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing 22 Dept. State Bull. 399).
111. Id.
112. See generally 381 U.S. at 13-18.
113. Id. at 14-16.
114. Id. at 16-17.
115. Id. at 17.
116. Id. at 17-18.
117. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (2003).
118. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 223 (1984).
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tions to Cuba, thus creating an exception to regulation 201(b)'s" 9 prohibition
on such transactions. 12 Simultaneous to the amendment of regulation 560,
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act was enacted in order to
allow the President to exercise his emergency economic powers. 12 ' At first
glance, it appeared the President had been given authority which he already
had under section 5(b) of TWEA, but there was one significant difference. 122
Instead of the President having to declare a new national emergency to con-
tinue the Cuban embargo, Congress included a "grandfather clause."'' 23 Un-
der the grandfather clause, despite the changes to the TWEA, "'authorities
conferred upon the President by section 5(b)... which were being exercised
with respect to a country on July 1, 1977, as a result of a national emergency
declared by the President before such date, may continue to be exercised."
24
In 1982, regulation 560 was amended to include a restriction on the
various types of American travel related activities in Cuba. 15 These restric-
tions eliminated travel to Cuba for tourist and non-governmental business
purposes. 126 The new regulation 560 permitted travel only for visiting "close
relatives," gathering news, and other "official" visits. 127 However, not all
Americans were satisfied with the new regulation. 128 In Wald, the plaintiffs
challenged the United States imposed travel restrictions to Cuba pursuant to
an amendment under the grandfather clause of section 5(b) of the TWEA.
129
According to these authorities, the President may regulate transactions in-
volving any property in which any foreign country or any national thereof
has an interest. 30 This was the precise restriction Wald challenged on the
basis that the grandfather clause required the President to declare a national
emergency in order to continue the same economic hardships that previously
existed under TWEA.'3 The Supreme Court overruled the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit in a 5-4 decision, and found that the grandfather clause,
together with the language in section 5(b), granted the authority to regulate
all travel-related transactions with Cuba since they were being exercised on
119. § 515.201(b).
120. Wald, 468 U.S. at 222.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 228.
123. Id. at 228-29.
124. Id. at 228-29 (quoting 91 Stat. 1625 (1977)).
125. Wald, 468 U.S. at 229.
126. Id. at 229-30.
127. Id. at 229.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 229.
130. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1) (2000).
131. Wald, 468 U.S. at 228.
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July 1, 1977.132 The Court further reasoned that "[it] follow[ed] from a natu-
ral reading of the grandfather clause." '133 Additionally, the Court explained
that nothing in the legislative history of the grandfather clause supported the
contention that Congress meant only to apply grandfather restrictions "in
place on July 1, 1977.' ' 4 Further, if the Court was to eliminate the Presi-
dent's authority to alter travel restrictions, it would have created the situation
which the grandfather clause was intended to avoid.1 35 Finally, the Court
relied on the strong deference to executive decisions in matters of foreign
policy and found restricting travel to Cuba in order to prevent the flow of
"hard currency" into Cuba was an adequate means to achieve that goal. 36
VII. TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS TO CUBA AFTER JUNE 30,2004
A. Generally
On October 10, 2003, President George W. Bush "announced the estab-
lishment of The Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba ("the Commis-
sion"). 137 The Commission's primary function is to assist Cuba in the tran-
sition from a communist country to a free and democratic society 38 The
Commission provided a report to the President on May 1, 2004, proposing a
number of changes to the current United States policy towards Cuba. 3 9 Fol-
lowing the Commission's suggestions, the President implemented the new
policy considerations, effective June 30, 2004.140 Since the outset of his
presidency, President Bush has vigorously upheld restrictions on Cuba, while
preserving the rights of Cuban citizens. 14' In a speech given on Cuba's Inde-
pendence Day, President Bush stated:
[T]he sanctions the United States enforces against the Castro re-
gime are not just a policy tool, but a moral statement. It is wrong
to prop up a regime that routinely stifles all the freedoms that
make us human. The United States stands opposed to such tyr-
132. Id. at 223, 232.
133. Id. at 235.
134. Id. at 238.
135. Id. at 258.
136. Wald, 486 U.S. at 243.
137. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 33,768 (June 16, 2004) (to be codi-
fied at 31 C.F.R. pt. 515).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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anny and will oppose any attempt to weaken sanctions against the
Castro regime until it respects the basic human rights of its citi-
zens, frees political prisoners, holds democratic free elections, and
allows free speech. 
14 2
B. Fully Hosted Travelers
The new rules eliminate the "fully hosted travel[er]" provision, and li-
censes will no longer be extended under this provision.1 43 Unfortunately,
from the time of the provision's original inception in 1999, travelers who
claimed their travel was "fully hosted" took advantage of the program by
engaging in prohibited monetary transactions in Cuba. 44 For example, these
transactions included payments to Cuban authorities for docking fees in and
out of Cuba. 4 5 Further, Americans in Cuba were receiving complimentary
goods and services as a way to circumvent the law.' 4 6 By eliminating this
provision, OFAC is ensuring that Americans are not dealing in property in
which Cubans or Cuban nationals might have an interest. 4 7 The amended
rule now states that property received in Cuba, regardless of who it comes
from and whether it is provided free of charge, is unauthorized unless it
comes under a specific OFAC license.'48
C. Mode of Travel and Returning Goods to the United States
Changes have not only been made to define who can travel to Cuba and
when a person may do so, but changes have also been made to the mode of
travel.'49 Payment for air travel to Cuba via a carrier from a third country
involving property in which Cuba has an interest, is now prohibited since the
carrier is likely to pass on a portion of the payment to a Cuban entity. 5 Pur-
chasing merchandise and returning it to the United States is now prohibited,
regardless of value or how it came into the possession of the traveler.15" '
142. Bush Announces Strengthening of Measures Dealing with Cuba, International Infor-
mation Programs, July 13, 2001, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/us-
cuba/bush13.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2005).
143. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 33,768 (June 16, 2004) (to be codi-
fied at 31 C.F.R. pt. 515).
144. id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 33,771.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 33,769.
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However, the exception for informational materials remains unchanged, and
licensed travelers are welcome to bring back an unlimited amount of such
material.' Additionally, regulations which governed the carrying of cur-
rency to Cuba have been repealed since it is now forbidden to spend Ameri-
can dollars in Cuba.15 In its place is a new regulation restricting the amount
of luggage that may be taken pursuant to licensed travel.'54 More specifi-
cally, the total amount of luggage Americans may take with them may not
exceed forty-four pounds. 55
D. Visiting Family
The rules regulating who may visit and how often a person may be vis-
ited in Cuba have also been amended and made stricter. 56 The definition of
"close relative" has been modified and now only includes a "'member of the
person's immediate family." ' 57 "Immediate family" consists of the trav-
eler's spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent or sibling.'58 Addition-
ally, provisions which previously allowed members of the traveler's house-
hold to visit have been modified. 159' Now, the traveler's co-habitants are only
allowed to accompany the traveler if they too are related to the person being
visited in Cuba. 6 ° Additionally, the provision providing that a person may
visit a relative once every twelve months for an unlimited time period has
been eliminated. 1' Now, the traveler can only visit family once every three
years and for no longer than fourteen days at a time. 62 The three year period
in which they may return will be calculated from the day they arrived in the
United States. 163 For everyone else, the day of departure from the United
States on their last trip to Cuba will serve as the basis for calculation. 6" Ad-
ditional visits on request to OFAC before the three year waiting period has
lapsed also will not be allowed.1
65
152. Id. at 33,771.
153. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 33,769.
154. Id. at 33,771.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 33,769.
157. Id.
158. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 33,772.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 33,769.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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E. Visiting Non-Cuban Nationals
Regulations dealing with visits to family members who are not Cuban
nationals, but are instead in Cuba for different reasons, such as an American
studying in Cuba, have also been modified. 66 In order to visit a non-Cuban
national in Cuba, "exigent circumstances" must exist.1 67 The individual in
Cuba will now have to demonstrate the exigency of the situation to the
United States Interests Section in Havana in order to secure a license from
OFAC. 168 For example, a license may be issued if the individual in Cuba is
severely ill combined with an inability to travel.
69
While in Cuba, Americans may now only spend a total of fifty dollars
per day and an additional fifty dollars per trip to pay for transportation ex-
penses. 70 For example, a traveler who is on a seven day trip may spend an
additional fifty dollars on bus or train fare to travel from city A to city B, if
the travel requires transportation between the two cities.' 7' However, the
additional fifty dollars may only be spent on transportation costs.
72
F. Educational Activities
The regulations concerning American students in Cuba have also
changed.'73 For example, institutional licenses are now only valid for one
year instead of two. 74 Additionally, students who travel to Cuba under a
learning institution's license must be enrolled for credit at that specific insti-
tution's undergraduate or graduate program. 75 Students will no longer be
able to travel under the educational licenses of institutions other than their
own, even if the licensed institution program offers them credit towards their
degree at their own institution. 76 Furthermore, employees of the licensed
institution must now be full-time employees in order to travel to Cuba. 177
Part-time staff and contractors no longer qualify for travel under an institu-
166. Id. at 33,772.
167. Id. at 33,769.
168. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 33,769.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 33,772.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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tion's license. 7  Also, certain educational activities must last a minimum of
ten weeks. 179 Activities which must adhere to this requirement are "struc-
tured educational program[s] ... as part of a course offered at a licensed insti-
tution;"'80 "formal course[s] of study at a Cuban academic institution;' 8' and
"[t]eaching at a Cuban academic institution.' ' 82
G. Remittances
Regulations regarding quarterly remittances which were allowed to any
household of a national in Cuba have been amended. 8 3 Now, quarterly re-
mittances can only be sent to members of the sender's "immediate family."'84
"Immediate family" member is defined to include only a "spouse, child,
grandchild, parent, grandparent, . . . as well as any spouse [or] widow," of
the aforementioned.8 5 Additionally, a specific notation has been included to
indicate that these remittances are excluded if they are for the benefit of gov-
ernmental officials or members of the "Cuban Communist Party.' 86 Banks
and other depository institutions are now required to receive a specific li-
cense from OFAC before engaging in forwarding services.'87
VIII. ENFORCING REGULATIONS
A. Generally
The Department of State has already warned that "Cuban-Americans
who have been visiting relatives in Cuba" are no longer able to rely on poor
enforcement of restrictions by United States officials. 88 Since the Presi-
dent's initiative to strengthen enforcement over Cuba on October 10, 2003,
OFAC has significantly increased enforcement of travel restrictions to
178. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 33,772.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 33,773.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Cuba Travel Restrictions to be Enforced, WASH. TIMES (UPI), June 7, 2004, available
at http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20040607-100419-5455r.htm.
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Cuba.189 In a speech to a group of Cuban-Americans in Miami, Florida,
Treasury Secretary John Snow stated: "[w]e're cracking down. We mean
business."' 90 OFAC has increased inspections of travelers and shipments to
and from Cuba and is specifically targeting Americans who attempt to cir-
cumvent the law by traveling through third countries on private vessels.' 9'
With the assistance of the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"),
OFAC has already implemented specific programs and increased staff at the
three airports where the most activity to and from Cuba takes place: Miami
International Airport, New York's John F. Kennedy Airport, and Los Ange-
les International Airport.'92 DHS plans to use "intelligence and investigative
resources" in order to identify individuals who are traveling via third coun-
tries to circumvent the travel restrictions. 3 From October 10, 2003 to Feb-
ruary 9, 2004, the OFAC has posted staggering numbers proving how serious
it is about enforcing travel restrictions." 4 In that four month period,
569 aircraft with passengers destined for Cuba, mostly direct char-
ter flights, were targeted for outbound inspection. Over 44,000
passengers were screened as they departed the United States for
Cuba and over 50,915 passengers were screened on their return to
the United States on charter flights.
275 travelers were denied travel on charter flights after examina-
tion revealed they did not qualify under any OFAC license cate-
gory.
1007 aircraft with passengers returning to the United States from
Cuba were targeted for inbound inspections. This number includes
returning charter flights and other flights arriving in the United
States from third countries. Over 50,915 passengers and crew
were subjected to extensive examination.
376 OFAC-related seizures were accomplished, most of which re-
lated to the unlicensed importation of Cuban cigars and alcohol.
189. Press Release, Office of Public Affairs, Office of Foreign Assets Control Status Re-
port on Implementation of Enhanced Cuba Travel Enforcement (Feb. 9, 2004), at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1161.htm [hereinafter Press Release].
190. Tom Carter, U.S. Bans Cuba-linked Firms; Crackdown on 10 Foreign Companies,
WASH. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 2004, at A 15 (internal quotations omitted).
191. Press Release, supra note 189.
192. Id.
193. International Informational Programs, supra note 11.
194. See Press Release, supra note 189.
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* 264 cases have been opened to date by OFAC's Enforcement Di-
vision for investigation of alleged post October 10, 2003 travel to
Cuba
* 3 cases have been referred for criminal investigation by OFAC
Enforcement directly to federal law enforcement agencies, pri-
marily the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
OFAC is working with special agents and Assistant U.S. Attor-
neys on a number of potential criminal cases. 195
B. Uritsky v. Newcomb
Readiness to enforce the President's initiative in further restricting
travel to Cuba is exemplified in the threshold case Uritsky v. Newcomb. 196 In
Uritsky, Mr. Uritsky departed from Montreal, Canada aboard a Cuban na-
tional airliner for a one-week vacation in Cuba.197 "[H]e re-entered the
United States through Highgate Springs, Vermont carrying a bottle of rum
purchased in Cuba, and was questioned by U.S. Customs officials."'98 Urit-
sky admitted that he did not travel to Cuba under a valid OFAC license and
stated that he paid a Canadian travel agency $822.81 for the trip using his
credit card.199
More than one year later, OFAC sent a pre-penalty notice to Uritsky,
notifying him that the director of OFAC had reason to believe that Uritsky
engaged in "unlicensed travel-related transactions by vacationing in Cuba
and that OFAC intended to impose a ... fine ... of $7,5 lO. '2°° The fine in-
cluded $7,500 for the unlicensed travel and ten dollars for importing the bot-
tle of rum.2 °' On March 28, 2003, Uritsky filed suit seeking review of the
final agency action imposing the monetary fine.20 2 Uritsky's defense was
that he qualified as a "fully-hosted traveler., 20 3 Uritsky claimed that his fa-
ther, a Russian citizen, paid for all of Uritsky's travel-related transactions to
Cuba and provided an affidavit in support thereof.2°4 Since Uritsky's father
195. Id.
196. No. CIV.A.03-10569-PBS, 2004 WL 1125203, at *1 (D. Mass. May 19, 2004).
197. Id. This case was decided just one month before the notice was published in the
Federal Register stating that travel restrictions to Cuba will become stricter and enforcement
of these regulations will become a top priority. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Uritsky, 2004 WL 1125203, at *1.
201. Id.
202. Id. at *2.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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was not under the jurisdiction of the United States, this could have made
Uritsky's travel lawful.205
Upon investigation by OFAC, it was learned that Uritsky himself had
actually paid for the trip and that his father had later refunded him the
money.2"6 The District Court upheld OFAC's decision and found that be-
cause Uritsky charged the cost on his credit card, these actions constituted
payment by him for the travel expense to Cuba.0 7 Even if Uritsky's father
refunded him the money, the transaction was still paid for by Uritsky and did
not qualify as a "fully-hosted travel," regardless of "after-the-fact reim-
bursement."20 8
IX. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL TO
CUBA
The embargo against Cuba has been in place for more than forty years,
and now, more than ever, the United States must continue its enforcement.
One of the primary reasons travel restrictions have become stricter is to fur-
ther curtail the entry of American dollars into the Cuban economy under
Castro. It now appears that the Castro regime is out of money mostly due to
the collapse of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the end of generous fund-
ing to the communist government.2 9 Moreover, Cuba currently owes Russia
over twenty billion dollars.210
What the United States is asking of Cuba in order to allow travel and lift
the embargo as a whole is extremely feasible and can be achieved through
pressure from the United States and other countries.21' These prerequisites
include liberating all political prisoners, allowing other political parties to
form, and allowing free democratic elections. 212 These are the same types of
conditions that influenced democratic change over the last four decades in
Portugal, Chile, and the Dominican Republic-just to name a few.213 In con-
205. Uritsky, 2004 WL 1125203, at *2.
206. See id.
207. Id. at *3-*4.
208. Id. at *3.
209. See Maya Bell, Bridging the Gulf, Younger Cuban-Americans Challenge Hard-
Liners' Approach, Reach Out to Island, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 13, 2004, at Al, 2004 WL
82425353.
210. Cuban GDP Grew 3 PCT in 2001, Recovery Slows, REUTERS NEWS SERV. (Havana),
July 6, 2002, http://www.futurodecuba.org/notic-02-7-602eng.htm [hereinafter GDP].
211. See Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Cuba is not China, USA TODAY, June 6, 2000, at 14A,
LEXIS, News Library, USA Today File.
212. Id.
213. 145 CONG. REc. H2351, H2352 (1999).
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trast, where there has been no external pressure and trade has been allowed,
there has been no change to communist regimes.21 4
In upholding restrictions, the United States will also be taking a step
toward preserving human rights. In Cuba, individuals are incarcerated for
expressing their thoughts on a regular basis. 215 The Castro government does
not disclose figures relating to how many individuals are currently in jail as
political prisoners,2 16 but the figure is estimated to be between 2000 and 5000
prisoners.2 7 The political prisoners can be left in jail anywhere from a cou-
ple of days to over thirty years.21 Since the judicial system is controlled by
the communist party and the right to legal representation is not guaranteed,
political prisoners are commonly detained for years without being charged or
much less tried.219
Political prisoners are generally treated the worst of all prisoners.220
They have unsanitary facilities, are not provided with blankets, and are af-
forded no legal protection.22 Additionally, medical care is refused to politi-
cal prisoners on a regular basis.2 22 For example, Jorge Antunez, a thirty-three
year old male, was incarcerated for eighteen years as a political prisoner.223
While in jail, Antunez was beaten unconscious by prison guards.224 When
his sister questioned the beating, she was told that prison officials were au-
thorized to beat inmates at their discretion.225 At the time of the beating,
Antunez was suffering kidney failure and hypoglycemia, and was denied
medication. 226 Another example of a human rights violation was the Cuban
government's attack on a tugboat carrying more than forty people (twenty
were children) during which all of the passengers were killed for attempting
to flee the island.227
214. Diaz-Balart, supra note 211. An example of such a regime is China. Id.
215. 145 CONG. REc. H2351, 2352 (1999).
216. See Win. Garth Snider, Banishment: The History of Its Use and a Proposal for Its
Abolition Under the First Amendment, 24 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 455,
501 n.241 (1998). Political prisoners are individuals incarcerated simply for expressing any
kind of disagreement for anything the government has done or might do in the future. Id.
217. 145 CONG. REc. H2351, H2353 (1999).
218. Id. at H2352.
219. Id.
22u. Id. at H2353.
221. Id.
222. 145 CONG. REc. H235 1, H2353 (1999).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. 145 CONG. REC. H2351, H2352 (1999).
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Recently, individuals opposing the restrictions on Cuba have compared
such restrictions to the situation in China where private investment is being
made; thus the question arises, why China and not Cuba?28 The answer is
simple; the situation in Cuba is completely different from that in China. Al-
though it appears that investing in China is helping create a flourishing de-
mocracy, in reality it is not.229 For example, the Chinese government is still
trying to control all activity in its country.23 ° Currently, the Chinese govern-
ment has placed stringent controls on the use of the internet and has declared
that "party cells" will be imposed on all private organizations doing business
in China.23'
Additionally, unlike China, Cuba has not taken any steps towards re-
form.232 For example, in Cuba there is neither private property, nor any per-
sons available to do business with except for the government itself. Clearly,
this policy is attributable to Castro's control over all aspects of life in
Cuba.233 Under Castro's government, it is illegal for anyone to do business
except for the government.23 ' This means that even if the United States al-
lowed businesses to establish themselves in Cuba, the business owners would
not be able to independently run the business or hire employees. 235 The Cu-
ban government would control the company and assign the workers they feel
should be employed by the company.236 For example, the largest foreign
investor in Cuba is Sheritt International of Canada ("Sheritt"). 23 7 Sheritt op-
erates a mine in Cuba that employs about 1500 individuals and pays Castro
about $10,000 a year per worker.238 Castro, in turn, pays the workers eight-
228. Jesse Helms, On Trade, Cuba is not China, N.Y. TiMES, June 24, 2000, at A15,
LEXIS, News Library, NY Times File [hereinafter Helms].
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. Party cells refer to individuals assigned by the government to oversee the private
company's affairs to make sure that they are operating to the liking of the communist govern-
ment. Id.
232. Helms, supra note 226.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Susan Candiotti, Chretien Shakes Hands with Castro: Canadian Leader Begins
Whirlwind Cuban Visit, CNN.com, Apr. 26, 1998, at http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/americas/
9804/26/cuba.chretien.update [hereinafter Candiotti]. Sheritt executives are forbidden from
traveling to the United States under the Helms Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6021-081 (1994),
because the company uses a mine that was taken from an American company by Fidel Castro
when he took power. Id.
238. Helms, supra note 226.
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een dollars a month and retains the difference for himself.239 This is the type
of money that the United States needs to prevent the Cuban government from
acquiring. One way of accomplishing this goal is through the embargo and,
more specifically, through travel restrictions that prevent the flow of Ameri-
can dollars into Cuba.
Looking back, the past forty-four years of the embargo have cost the
Castro government more than seventy-two billion dollars.240 However, it is
estimated that one billion dollars annually is contributed to communist Cuba
via travel to the island or Americans sending money to their family mem-
bers. 41 This constant influx of American dollars is what currently drives the
Cuban government and consequentially, is precisely what must stop.
X. CONCLUSION
Castro continues to restrict access to food, education, health care, and
work. 42 "This permits Castro to stifle any and all dissent. Any Cuban dar-
ing to say the wrong thing, by Castro's standards, loses his or her job. Any-
one refusing to spy on a neighbor is denied a university education. Anyone
daring to organize an opposition group goes to jail." 43 The American gov-
ernment is trying to prevent these exact actions by restricting travel to Cuba
and by not allowing American dollars to further help fuel the fire of the com-
munist government. Travel restrictions are by no means going to shut down
Castro's government, but it will significantly contribute to the overall effort
and is more than a step in the right direction.
If the United States preserves the current sanctions against Cuba, it will
be more difficult for Castro's successors to mimic the same form of govern-
ment.2' Because of lack of money, his successors will have no choice but to
comply with United States' mandate, thereby, freeing political prisoners,
allowing opposing political activity, permitting free press, encouraging the
formation of labor unions, and most importantly, permitting democratic elec-
tions.245 If the United States backs out now, oppression and a communist
dictatorship for the Cuban people will be effervescent in decades to come
even after Fidel Castro is long gone.246
239. Id.
240. Argentina Determined to Have Cuba in Mercosur, CUBANET, Nov. 5, 2003, at
http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y03/nov03/05e4.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2005).
241. Id.
242. See Hehs, supra note 226.
243. Id.
244. Diaz-Balart, supra note 211.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The intended purpose of the Medicare system is to provide the elderly
and disabled with adequate health care in order to create a healthier, more
financially secure society.1 As a Commonwealth of the United States, Puerto
Rico is privy to the benefits of the Medicare program and is also subject to
the regulations set out under the program.2 As such, Puerto Rico contributes
to the Medicare fund based on the same rates as all other Medicare partici-
pants, but Puerto Rico only gets reimbursed a portion of the benefits that the
* J.D. Candidate 2005, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center;
B.S., Nova Southeastern University, Farquhar College of Arts and Sciences, 2001. The author
wishes to give a special thanks to his family and friends for all the love and support during the
course of his educational career. The author would also like to acknowledge the entire Nova
Law Review staff for their much appreciated assistance in the editing of this Note. Lastly, the
author would like to dedicate this Note to his late "Papa", Antonio Olivo, "con todo mi amor y
carrifio."
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2000); PETER A. CORNING, THE EVOLUTION OF MEDICARE...
FROM IDEA TO LAW 30-32 (1969).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(9) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat
2066 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(9)(E)); Hosp. San Rafael, Inc. v. Sullivan, 784
F. Supp. 927, 930 (D.P.R. 1991); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, 42 C.F.R. §§
412.200-.220 (2003).
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states receive. Since 1987, Puerto Rico's hospitals have been subject to a
special Medicare reimbursement rate based on just a portion of the national
rate utilized by all other hospitals in the states.4 The special rate results in
lower payment levels for the participating hospitals on the island, which in
turn makes it more difficult for the elderly and disabled on the island to re-
ceive the medical care they need.5 Since the incorporation of the unequal
rates, significant improvements have been developed; however, there is still
much ground to make before Puerto Rico reaches the parity it seeks to ob-
tain.6 This article will discuss the purpose and effect of the Medicare pro-
gram and how the program is unequally applied to Puerto Rico.
Part II of this article will track the history and reasons behind the crea-
tion of the Medicare program. Part III will discuss the reforms that the sys-
tem has undergone since its creation in 1965, and the social and economical
impact it has had on the citizens of the United States. Part IV will discuss
the Medicare program as applied to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, with
a focus on the special reimbursement rate imposed on Puerto Rico. Part V
will conclude with a brief analysis of the facts and how they support elimi-
nating the unequal reimbursement rate.
II. THE LONG JOURNEY OF MEDICARE
In the United States, the concept that the government should contribute
to the health care of its citizens started long before Lyndon B. Johnson
signed Medicare into law.7 Early in the twentieth century, with the begin-
ning of the Industrial Revolution, labor practices heightened the focus on
welfare matters.8 Organizations such as the American Association for Labor
Legislation ("AALL") began making a push toward health care legislation
that protected workers.9 However, in the early 1900s health care issues were
3. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.200-.220; § 1395ww(d)(9); Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 930.
4. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 930.
5. See Congressional Committees Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare - Why..
New Territories Staffers in Committees, P.R. HERALD, June 13, 2003, at
http://www.puertorico-herald.org/issues/2003/vo17n24/WashUpdateO724-en.shtml [hereinaf-
ter Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare]; Noticias, Anibal Acevedo Vili, Presidente Bush
Convierte en Ley Reforma al Medicare: Significativo el Impacto Sobre Puerto Rico (Dec. 7,
2003) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Significativo el Impacto].
6. See § 1395ww(d)(9); Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 930; Move to Increase Puerto Rico
Medicare, supra note 5.
7. CORNING, supra note 1, at 120.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 6-7. The organization led a campaign requiring employers to insure their
workers against industrial accidents and they created a Social Insurance Committee in order to
spot issues and come up with solutions. Id. By 1915, the AALL managed to influence thirty
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mainly handled within the states; this made it particularly difficult to imple-
ment any national welfare proposal since implementation had to be done on a
state-by-state basis.'" In the early part of the twentieth century, Americans
had the attitude that less government intervention was best for state issues
such as health care." Despite the majority philosophy, Theodore Roosevelt
based his 1912 campaign on the "New Nationalism," which contained ideas
for a number of social welfare programs, including government health insur-
ance. 12 Not surprisingly, Roosevelt was heavily criticized. 3  The obvious
lack of support brought the idea of government health insurance to an early
halt and foreshadowed the difficulties to come."
The United States was fond of private enterprise and independence,
which acted as a large blockade to mandatory nation-wide health insurance. I"
Furthermore, states were reluctant in adopting mandatory social welfare leg-
islation fearing that such legislation would place them at a disadvantage on
the national economic level.' 6 Despite the unfavorable positions presented
on both the state and national level, implementation of a broad social welfare
system would best be achieved on the federal level. 17 The Great Depression
of the 1930s created a vast sense of vulnerability amongst the United States
citizens and provided an opportune moment to push for a nation-wide health
care program. 18
In 1932, Franklin Roosevelt, the newly elected president, came into of-
fice with change in mind.'9 Roosevelt, through his "Fireside Chats" and pro-
posed "New Deal," provided great comfort to Americans during a time of
economic struggle.2" At this time, his inter-dependence ideas were widely
accepted. 2' The birth of the Social Security Act sprouted out of the many
federal organizations and administrations established under the Roosevelt
administration. 2 In 1934, Roosevelt assembled the Committee on Economic
states to implement laws mandating employers to insure their workers against industrial acci-
dents. Id.
10. CORNING, supra note 1, at 120.
11. Id. at 11-12.
12. Id.
13. Id. at9, 11.
14. See id.
15. CORNING, supra note 1, at 11-12.
16. Id. at 12-13.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 29.
19. Id.
20. CORNING, supra note 1, at 29.
21. Id. at 30.
22. Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89
CAL. L. REv. 569, 585 (2001); CORNING, supra note 1, at 30. Among the many agencies
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Security to investigate what issues were creating the most problems for eco-
nomic security of individuals, to investigate all forms of social insurances,
and to formulate possible solutions to the problem.23 The results of the com-
mittee study were not definitive; however, health insurance and unemploy-
ment insurance were the leading concerns.24 Roosevelt's strong push for
nation-wide health care slowly died down as opposition grew from conserva-
tives in Congress25 and as pressure grew from the American Medical Asso-
ciation ("AMA").26 The AMA represented the voice of American physicians
who strongly opposed the idea of any national health care system because of
fear that it would open the door to excessive government intrusion.27 In spite
of the AMA's strong opposition and Roosevelt's passiveness, the Social Se-
curity Act survived heavy scrutiny and was signed on August 14, 1935.28
The signing of the Social Security Act was a tremendous accomplishment
and paved the road for Medicare.29
The outlook of the national health care system was particularly incon-
sistent throughout the 1930s and 1940s.30 In the late 1930s a strong wave of
pro-national health insurance arose, only to be dissolved by the preoccupa-
tion of the start of World War II and the death of President Roosevelt.3 In
established by the Roosevelt administration in an attempt to remedy the country's economic
struggle were the: Civil Works Administration (CWA); Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC);
Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA); National Recovery Administration
(NRA); and Public Works Administration (PWA). CORNING, supra note 1, at 30.
23. William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 207
(2001); CORNING, supra note 1, at 30-31. The report was given a deadline of December 1,
1934, and the list of possible programs that would assist the economic state of the country
ranged from accident insurance and unemployment insurance to retirement annuities and
health insurance. CORNING, supra note 1, at 30-31.
24. CORNING, supra note 1, at 30-31.
25. Theodore R. Marmor & Gary J. McKissick, Medicare's Future: Fact, Fiction and
Folly, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 227 (2000); CORNING, supra note 1, at 41.
26. Emily Friedman, The Compromise and the Afterthought: Medicare and Medicaid
After 30 Years, 274 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 278, 279 (1995).
27. See CORNING, supra note 1, at 16.
28. Id. at41.
29. See id. After the signing of the Social Security Act, the Social Security Board was
created under section 702 of the Social Security Act. Id.
30. See id.
31. CORNING, supra note 1, at 51-52. The National Health Conference, held in July of
1938, created a lot of great publicity for a national health plan and placed pressure on the
leading opposition (AMA) to take a public stance as to the health care issue in the country. Id.
In February of 1939, the "Wagner Bill," featuring improvements to the Social Security pro-
gram, was proposed. Id. The bill was unsuccessful due to the combination of AMA's strong
campaigning against the bill and the President's inability to support the bill due to his preoc-
cupation with the start of WWII. Id. Roosevelt's death in 1945 also posed as another gloomy
[Vol. 29:2:311
182
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss2/1
A NOT SO SPECIAL RATE
the 1940s Harry S. Truman was another pro-national health insurance presi-
dent.32 He also made a push for health insurance but was interrupted with the
rise of domestic anti-communism and an economic plummet.33 By 1949, the
polls indicated that favoritism toward government health plummeted to 51
percent and that private insurance coverage amongst the population more
than doubled since 1946. 3"
In an attempt to place a more appealing spin on an openly dissatisfying
proposal, Merril G. Murray, an official of the Social Security Administration,
introduced an idea that originated during the Truman administration.
5
Murray suggested that "[g]overnment health insurance be limited (at least at
first) to social security beneficiaries., 36 Limiting government health insur-
ance was appealing to the Social Security Administration. 37 The idea was
particularly appealing because limiting the beneficiary class to the elderly
citizens addressed an already existing objective, namely, to "protect against
the greatest single cause of economic dependency in old age-the high cost
of medical care., 38 A 1950 census showed that the population of elderly
people was growing rapidly and that two-thirds of them made less than
$1000 per year.39 The numbers clearly exemplified the necessity elderly
people had for health insurance.4" Murray's suggestion of limiting medical
care to the elderly provided an attractive twist to an old issue.41
event for a national health care system. Friedman, supra note 26, at 279. However, Truman
picked up where Roosevelt left off with the introduction of the "Fair Deal." Id.
32. Daniel R. Berg, M.D., A History of Health Care for the Indigent in St. Louis: 1904-
2001, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 191, 203 (2003).
33. CORNING, supra note 1, at 58.
34. Id. at 67; see also Amy E. RADICH, M.S. IV, A BRIEF HIsTORY OF THE HEALTHCARE
INDUSTRY IN AMERICA http://www.ooanet.org/pdf/OUCOMManagedcare.pdf (last visited Feb.
2, 2005). By 1950, about 60 percent of the population had at least hospitalization coverage
through private insurance, which was more than double the amount in 1946, when only about
25 percent of the population had private coverage of any kind. CORNING, supra note 1, at 67.
35. CORNING, supra note 1, at 71. The idea of limiting government health insurance to
social security beneficiaries was first suggested by Dr. Thomas Parran of the Public Health
Service, in 1937. Id. The idea was never pursued and was forgotten until Murray suggested it
again in 1944. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 72.
38. CORNING, supra, note 1, at 72.
39. Id. Coming mentioned that "[t]he 1950 census showed that the aged population had
grown from 3 million in 1900 to 12 million in 1950, or from 4 to 8 percent of the total popula-
tion. Two-thirds of these people had income of less than $1,000 annually, and only 1 in 8 had
health insurance." Id.
40. Id. at 72-73. Despite the necessity that the elderly had for health insurance, private
insurance coverage was not always the answer. See id. The older generation presented a
higher risk for the private insurance companies; thus, the private insurance companies would
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The initial step of implementing universal medical care for the elderly
began in 1950, when the federal government enacted a program that pro-
vided "direct payments to 'medical vendors' for the treatment of welfare
clients, including the elderly. 42 The "medical vendors" program was a pre-
cursor to national health insurance; however, support for the highly debated
topic declined in the early to mid-1950s. 43 The decline in popularity of na-
tional health insurance during the mid-1950s was mainly attributed to Presi-
dent Eisenhower's administration and its support for private insurance cover-
age.44
The national health insurance issue did not quiet down for long.45 The
activities in Congress soon rallied talks again. 6 By 1957, the government
health insurance proposal received much needed support when the Labor
Federations and the American Hospital Association ("AHA") got involved.47
Ironically, hospitals, unlike physicians, favored nationwide health insur-
ance.48 Because hospitals, much like the elderly, faced economic difficulties
concerning health care expenses, it was no wonder that hospitals favored a
government insurance system.4 ' As usual, the AMA did not miss a beat in
the government health insurance system debate, but this time the AMA was
willing to compromise." In an effort to address the obvious economic prob-
increase their premiums or choose not to cover them at all. CORNING, supra note 1, at 72-73;
see also RADICH, supra note 34.
41. See CORNING, supra note 1, at 72-73.
42. Id. at 73.
43. See id. at 74-75.
44. Friedman, supra note 26, at 279.
45. See CORNING, supra note 1, at 74-76.
46. Id. Four events during the 1956 session of Congress helped rally the issue of gov-
ernment health insurance: 1) the enactment of a Military Medicare Program, which gave
government health protection to dependents of servicemen; 2) an expansion of payments to
medical vendors in order to provide more medical care for welfare clients; 3) the approval, by
Congress, of a $30,000 study focusing on problems of the aged (the study resulted in a Senate
sub-committee that ultimately became a forum for national health care talks); and 4) the
struggle to add totally and permanently disabled persons aged fifty and older to the list of
social security cash beneficiaries. Id. Many physicians opposed this last measure because of
fear that the government would be able to manipulate medical practice, even though the bill
specifically required that physicians make the determinations themselves. Id.
47. Id. at 78.
48. Friedman, supra note 26, at 278-79.
49. CORNING, supra note 1, at 78. The burden on the hospitals was so heavy that
"[m]any hospital officials viewed this growing problem as a threat to the very existence of the
private hospital system." Id.
50. Id. at 80.
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lems faced by the elderly, the AMA advocated for doctors to cut medical
fees for elderly people. 1
Once again things settled down for a while in the late 1950s.2 There
were a number of proposed bills and suggestions that were mostly unsuccess-
ful. 5' Then came the "Mills Bill" of 1960, which provided the largest break
in universal health care since the creation of the "medical vendors" payment
plan in 1950.51 With the cooperation of the AMA, Chairman Mills devised a
plan that intended to expand the state run medical vendor program.55 The
expansion involved the creation of a new assistance category called "medical
indigency," which was intended for elderly citizens who needed assistance
with their medical expenses but did not qualify for welfare benefits. 6 The
"Mills Bill" presented a number of features that were appealing to both na-
tional health partisans and non-partisans. 7 In summary,
[The Bill] was more modest in cost and scope than either the
Forand bill or the Republican "subsidy" plan; from a technical
standpoint it was a logical first step; it was a "Democratic bill" in a
Democratic Congress and was sponsored by the respected Ways
and Means Committee chairman; and, not least, it had the backing
of the AMA."
The Mills proposal (H.R. 12580) received immediate approval and
swept right through the Ways and Means Committee, House Rules Commit-
tee, and the House of Representatives.5 9 The proposal was modified and
amended once it reached the Senate, but the "Mills Bill," later re-named the
"Kerr-Mills Bill," was finally signed into law (Public Law 86-778) on Sep-
51. Id. The AMA preferred that physicians and hospitals address the issue on their own,
rather than promoting government intervention. Id.
52. Friedman, supra note 26, at 279.
53. Will Mallon, What is Medicare?, CTR. FOR HISTORY GEO. MASON, July 21, 2003, at
http://www.historynewsnetwork.com/articles/1583.html; see also CORNING, supra note 1, at
83-85. The "Flemming Bill," which was proposed to assist states in subsidizing private
health insurance premiums for low income elderly by providing federal grants, was just one
proposal that arose and was quietly put to rest during the Eisenhower administration.
CORNING, supra note 1, at 83. The "Forand Bill" was yet another casualty of the times. Id. at
83-85.
54. CORNING, supra note 1, at 83-85.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 85.
57. CORNING, supra note 1, at 85.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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tember 13, 1960.60 The "Kerr-Mills Bill" marked the first time that a pro-
spective health insurance proposal obtained a floor vote in the United States
Senate and was approved. 6' Although government health insurance advo-
cates were not fully satisfied with the bill, it served as a significant building
block.62
Despite the now newly enacted Kerr-Mills Act, the pressure for national
health insurance for the elderly persisted.63 Senator John F. Kennedy based
his campaign for presidency on a pro-Medicare stance and won the elec-
tion.64 The beginning of President Kennedy's term was preoccupied with a
mild recession, but nonetheless, Kennedy eventually brought the focus back
to his proposed Medicare plan.65 The push for Medicare was propelled by
the inadequacy of the Kerr-Mills Act.66 Through the first eighteen months of
the Act's implementation, reports showed that only 88,000 elderly citizens,
spread mainly throughout only four states, benefited from the Act.67  The
inability for the elderly to cover medical expenses began to weigh heavily on
private insurance companies because medical treating facilities began to off-
set their losses by increasing costs of medical services across the board.68
Furthermore, the elderly population continued to grow while the average cost
for hospital care increased at a rate of 6.7 percent per year.69
As a result of the disappointing numbers for the Kerr-Mills Act, the
predominant number of Democrats both in the House and in the Senate, and
Kennedy as President, the stage was set for Medicare to prevail. 70 However,
the moment was cut short when President Kennedy was assassinated in
60. Id. at 85-86. The Democrats favored the government health insurance embodied in
the bill, while the Republicans modified the bill with a "subsidy" plan. Id. at 86. Both sug-
gestions were defeated and the differences between the parties were resolved in a Senate-
House conference, which eventually led to the signing of the bill into law. CORNING, supra
note 1, at 86.
61. Id. at 86-87.
62. See Donald R. Wolfensberger, Federal Involvment in Healthcare: An Historic Per-
spective, An Introductory Essay for the Congress Project Seminar on Congress and Health-
care Policy, Sept. 13, 2004, http://wwics.si.edu/events/docs/hlthcare-essay.pdf.
63. See CORNING, supra note 1, at 87.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 88-89.
66. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY, MEDICARE, at http://college.hmco.com/history/reader
comp/rcah/html/ah_058600_medicare.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2005) [hereinafter MEDICARE].
67. CORNING, supra note 1, at 93-98.
68. Id. at 102-03. Only fifty percent of the elderly population was privately covered in
1963. Id.
69. Id. at 101-02. The elderly population grew from 12 million, or 8.1 percent of the
total population, in 1950 to 17.5 million, or 9.4 percent of the total population, by 1963. Id.
70. See CORNING, supra note 1, at 104.
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1963.71 Lyndon B. Johnson became President and immediately picked up
where Kennedy left off.72 President Johnson managed to utilize the public
sentiment to get many Kennedy endorsed bills to be passed, but the Medicare
bill was not one of the successfully passed bills.73
It was not until the introduction of the King-Anderson bill that Medi-
care made its final break-through.74 Initially, the King-Anderson bill was
denied by the Ways and Means Committee, but the bill managed to linger
around long enough to obtain Senate approval. 75 The bill underwent a num-
ber of revisions and by spring of 1965, it was introduced on the House floor
as the "Mills Bill" (H.R. 6675). 76 On April 8, 1965, the Mills Bill was ap-
proved by the House of Representatives.77 It took four additional months of
revisions, debates, and amendments before the final version of the bill was
completed and approved by the House and the Senate.78 On July 30, 1965, in
Independence, Missouri, President Johnson signed Medicare into law and the
United States finally had a national health care plan for its elderly.79
III. THE MODERN MEDICARE PROGRAM IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Evolving Medicare Program
The concept of Medicare began as a national health plan, which was to
subsidize medical coverage for the elderly. By 1972, the program expanded
to include coverage for disabled people and those patients with end-stage
renal disease.8° Medicare was an optimistic program, providing health care
71. THE WI-TE HOUSE: LYNDON B. JOHNSON, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/pres-
idents/lj36.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2005).
72. CORNING, supra note 1, at 106.
73. Id. at 106-07.
74. See id. at 107-09.
75. Wolfensberger, supra note 62, at 5-7. The King-Anderson bill actually failed twice.
CORNING, supra note 1, at 108. However, on its second turn around, there were enough votes
on the floor for the bill to attach to H.R. 11865 as an amendment, even without committee
approval. Id.
76. CORNING, supra note 1, at 113. Chairman Mills finally sided with Medicare and took
it upon himself to revise the King-Anderson bill into its final form, which was then renamed
as the "Mills Bill" (not to be confused with the bill Chairman Mills introduced in 1960). Id.
By the time the bill was approved by the Senate and the House in July of 1965, the bill un-
derwent a total of 513 revisions or amendments. Id.
77. Wolfensberger, supra note 62, at 7.
78. CORNING, supra note 1, at 113-15.
79. Id. at 120.
80. Friedman, supra note 26, at 280,
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security to those in need of assistance.81 However, it did not take long before
the negative effects of the program started to shine through.82 Within the
first couple months after the program began, there were significant increases
in medical expenses across the nation. 3 The increase was attributable to the
following: increased spending on services provided to beneficiaries, an un-
expected increase in the number of Medicare beneficiaries," and the hike in
medical services charges.8 Hospitals and physicians began to take advan-
tage of the favorable payment system in place.86 "Between the years of 1967
and 1971, the daily charges of American hospitals 'increased at' an average
of thirteen percent per year.
87
Creating reforms to impede the inflation of Medicare expenditure be-
came a huge focus during the 1970s.8 Congress attempted to freeze the rise
in spending by developing a number of reform measures, such as: generating
different reimbursement techniques, creating professional review organiza-
tions (to implement national cost controls over hospitals), 9 and creating a
new administration called the Health Care Financing Administration (sepa-
rating Medicare from Social Security).9" One of the reimbursement tech-
niques that temporarily froze the climbing increase in medical expenses dur-
ing the 1970s was the concept of basing the reimbursement rates on a Medi-
care Economic Index ("MEI"). 9' Despite the implementation of the MEI and
other techniques, the national health expenditure continued to increase at a
steadfast pace.92
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395a (2000).
82. See Friedman, supra note 26, at 280-81.
83. Physician Payments: Hearing on H.L. 12 Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Dan L. Crippen, Director, Congressional Budget
Office) http://www.waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/health/ 107Cong/2-28-02/2-28crip.htm
[hereinafter Physician Payments].
84. Friedman, supra note 26, at 280.
85. Physician Payments, supra note 83.
86. Theodore R. Marmor & Gary J. McKissick, Medicare's Future: Fact, Fiction, and
Folly, 26 Am. J.L. & MED. 225, 230 (2000). When hospitals were reimbursed their "reason-
able costs" and physicians were reimbursed their "customary charge," hospitals and physi-
cians began to exploit the system. Id.
87. Id. at 231. The total expenditure for Medicare went up to $7.9 billion in 1971 from
$4.6 billion in 1967. Id. During the spending increase, the total number of Medicare benefi-
ciaries only rose by six percent. Id.
88. Physician Payments, supra note 83.
89. Friedman, supra note 26, at 280.
90. Marmor & McKissick, supra note 86, at 231-32.
91. Physician Payments, supra note 83.
92. Marmor & McKissick, supra note 86, at 232.
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In the 1980s Congress decided to take a more aggressive stance by cre-
ating a completely new reimbursement rate.93 The new plan was to incorpo-
rate a Prospective Payment System ("PPS"), which established a method of
reimbursing hospitals on a fixed rate for each patient discharged no matter
the costs incurred by the hospitals. 94 The PPS reimbursement rate continues
to be utilized today.95 The main incentive behind PPS was to promote cost
efficiency by discouraging hospitals from spending unnecessary time and
resources.96 The reimbursement formula is composed of a three-pronged
system. 97 First, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (the "Secretary") must establish a predetermined national rate for all
patient discharge costs,98 which is done as follows:
PPS is based on a standardized amount that is multiplied by a
weighing factor. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(2)(G), (3)(D). The stan-
dardized amount is a base amount that equals the average Medi-
care allowable costs per discharge for all hospitals participating in
the Medicare program in a base year, which is adjusted according
to regional wage variations, indirect medical education costs, and
hospital case mix. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(2). The weighing fac-
tor is a multiplier based on the diagnosis related group ("DRG") in
which the discharged patient's illness falls. The Secretary has cre-
ated 470 DRGs, each with a weight derived from the relative cost
to treat a patient in that DRG. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(4). 99
Once the predetermined national rate for all patient discharges is deter-
mined, the next step is to determine the amount of reimbursement per Medi-
care patient discharge. °0 At this point, the Secretary must place each par-
ticipating hospital in one of three geographical areas, which are categorized
as "large urban," "other urban," or "rural."'0' The area in which a hospital is
categorized will "determine the hospital's 'average standardized amount per
discharge' payment and the applicable area wage index, and are the organ-
93. Id. at 233.
94. Alvarado Cmty. Hosp. v. Shalala, 155 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(1)).
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (Supp. 2000).
96. Alvarado Cmty. Hosp., 155 F.3d at 1119.
97. See Coalition For Reclassification v. Sullivan, No. 1:92CV242-B-O, 1992 WL
443455, at *1-2 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 25, 1992); Alvarado Cmty. Hosp., 155 F.3d at 1119.
98. Alvarado Cmity. Hosp., 155 F.3d at 1119.
99. Id.
100. Coalition For Reclassification, 1992 WL 443455, at * 1.
101. Id.
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izational basis for reimbursement under the [PPS].' 10 2  Lastly, the system
accounts for "outlier" cases, which are those cases that result in longer and
more expensive treatments than are usually the case for the designated
DRG.1
0 3
The PPS reimbursement rate was first put into practice on October 1,
1983, and it took over four years before the system was applied to all hospi-
tals.' 4 The implementation of PPS considerably slowed down medical ex-
penditures, but it did not provide for a permanent fix. °5 There have been
some payment adjustment programs added to PPS since its inception. °6 One
of the added programs was the Medicare Disproportionate Share ("DSH")
Payments. 0 7 It provides extra financial assistance to hospitals that treat a
larger number of low-income patients.108  Although there have been some
102. Id.
103. Alvarado Cmty. Hosp., 155 F.3d at 1119. The outliers were calculated as follows:
"Day outliers" occur when a patient's length of stay ("LOS"), measured in days,
exceeds the mean LOS for a particular DRG by a fixed number of days or standard
deviations. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(i). "Cost outliers" occur when the cost
exceeds a fixed multiple of a particular DRG's payment rate or when it exceeds the
rate by a fixed dollar amount. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(ii). The amount for
additional payments for these cases "shall be determined by the Secretary and shall
approximate the marginal cost of care" beyond the applicable cut-off point. 42
U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(iii). Finally, the statute provides that [t]he total amount
of the additional payments made under this subparagraph for discharges in a fiscal
year may not be less than 5 percent nor more than 6 percent of the total payments
projected or estimated to be made based on DRG prospective payment rates for
discharge in that year. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(iv) ("Clause (iv)") (emphasis
added).
Id.
104. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395(d)(1)(A)(i)). During the years that the PPS was being
incorporated nationwide, the Secretary performed a two-portion reimbursement method that
consisted of a "hospital specific portion" and a "federal rate." Id. The court in Alvarado
Community Hospital explained it as follows:
The "hospital specific portion" was calculated under the prior system, based on the
hospital's actual costs. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(1)(A), (C). The other portion, the
"federal rate," was determined under PPS. The hospital specific portion of the re-
imbursements was 75% in FY 1984, 50% in FY 1985, 45% in 1986, and 25% in
1987, while the federal rate increased correspondingly. 42 U.S.C. §
1395ww(d)(l)(C). Thereafter, all reimbursements were calculated under PPS.
Id. (citation omitted).
105. Marmor & McKissick, supra note 86, at 233.
106. See Association of American Medical Colleges, Medicare Disproportionate Share
(DSH) Payments, at http://www.aamc.org/advocacy/library/teachhosp/hosp0003.htm (last
visited Feb. 2, 2005) [hereinafter DSH Payments].
107. Id.
108. Id. "Low income Medicare patients tend to be sicker and more costly to treat than
other Medicare patients with the same diagnosis." Id.
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additions and proposed reforms to PPS, it has gone largely untouched and
continues to be the reimbursement rate used today."°9
B. The Social and Economical Effects of Medicare in the United States
The citizens of the United States have had, and continue to have, serious
concerns about their medical health care coverage because having health care
coverage means having a bit of economic security."' The poor and the eld-
erly have historically been, and continue to be, the groups that would benefit
the most from a national health coverage plan. Hence, the creation of pro-
grams that assist the neediest people first would be the most logical ap-
proach."' Medicare was one of those programs. 12 The program has pro-
vided, and continues to provide, millions of beneficiaries with the medical
coverage they need and a taste of the economic security they seek." 3
According to the statistics provided by the Health Care Financing Ad-
ministration ("HCFA"), Medicare has helped keep millions out of poverty
"[b]y [simply] reducing the amount of money the elderly had to pay for
health care."".4  The statistics showed that before Medicare was imple-
mented, an average of one in every three senior citizens was living at or be-
low poverty level." 5 Senior citizens who were living off of social security
were forced to pay for over fifty-three percent of their health care costs out
of pocket, which generally consumed about twenty-four percent of their so-
cial security checks per month.' 16 In 1997, HCFA statistics showed that on
average, the elderly were paying for only eighteen percent of their medical
expenses out of pocket and that the amount of senior citizens living at or
below poverty level dropped to one in every ten. 17
In addition to the financial assistance provided to the elderly, Medicare
has also improved the quality of life and life expectancy amongst Americans
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww.
110. See CORNING, supra note 1; International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, Social Security/Medicare, at http://www.iamaw.org/politics.asp?n=2&c=857 (last
visited Feb. 2, 2005) [hereinafter IAMAW].
111. See CORNING, supra note 1; Friedman, supra note 26, at 280. Statistically, the poor
get sicker more often and stay sicker longer than the rich. See DSH Payments, supra note
106.
112. See Friedman, supra note 26, at 280.
113. See id.
114. Id.; see HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, MEDICARE: A PROFILE 33 (2000)
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/35chartbk.pdf [hereinafter PROFILE OF MEDICARE BENEFICI-
ARIES].
115. PROFILE OF MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES, supra note 114, at 33.
116. Id.at33-34.
117. Id.at33.
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in general." 8 The survey conducted by HCFA in 1999 showed that there has
been a dramatic increase in access to medical care and medical coverage
amongst Americans since the inception of Medicare in 1965." 9 The im-
proved health care system has led to a twenty percent increase in the life
expectancy of the average sixty-five year old American. 120 Lastly, Medicare
has improved access to medical care for minority and disabled Americans. 121
In order for hospitals and physicians to participate in the program, the gov-
ernment implemented a non-discrimination policy as a condition to obtain
the federal funds provided from Medicare.
22
Despite all the positive contributions Medicare has imparted thus far,
there continues to be serious issues about the inadequate funding given to
health care.'23 The cost of medical health care continually rises on a yearly
basis due to the constant improvements in medical technology and its infra-
structure, which also results in an increase in Medicare expenditures. 124 Even
with estimated benefit payments that exceed $234,970,769,877, as reported
in the fiscal year of 2001,125 there continues to be a need for more funding
because too many Americans are still going without adequate health care
services. 121
118. Id.
119. Id. The numbers provided by HCFA, in their 2000 profile, were as follows:
"[h]ospital discharges averaged 190 per 1,000 elderly in 1964 and 350 per 1,000 by 1973; the
proportion of elderly using physician services jumped from 68 to 76 percent between 1963
and 1970. [In 1999], more than 94 percent of elderly beneficiaries receive a health care ser-
vice paid for by Medicare." PROFILE OF MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES, supra note 114, at 33.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 34.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 608(d) (2000); see also PROFILE OF MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES, supra note
114, at 34.
123. See Friedman, supra note 26, at 280; JAMAW, supra note 110; Reed Abelson, Hos-
pitals Say They're Penalized by Medicare for Improving Care, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2003, at
Al.
124. RANDALL HAUGHT ET AL., FINANCIAL IMPACT OF IMPROVED MEDICARE
REIMBURSEMENT FOR RURAL HOSPITALS 1-2 (2003), http://www.nrharural.org/blasts/Lewin-
Reach.pdf.
125. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE ESTIMATED BENEFIT
PAYMENTS BY STATE FISCAL YEAR 2001 http://www.cms.hhs.gov/researchers/pubs/datacomp-
endium/2003/03pg7 1.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
126. See David Demko, Empty Wallet New Cause of Elder Death, SENIOR WORLD
ONLINE, at http://www.seniorworld.com/articles/a20000330192223.html (last modified Mar.
30, 2000); Patricia Barry, Chasing Drugs: Many Readers Take Drastic Steps to Get Prescrip-
tion Medicine, AARP BULLETIN ONLINE, Oct. 2003, at http://www.aarp.org/bulletin/prescript-
ion/Articles/a2003-09-29-chasingdrugs.html.
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There are hospitals that are taking significant financial losses each year
simply because they do not receive adequate reimbursements from the Medi-
care program.127 Low reimbursement rates impact more than just hospitals;
they also affect the social and economic status of the United States.128 Gen-
erally, the elderly and the poor are most affected by reductions in govern-
ment programs because they are in the most need for such assistance.121
However, low Medicare reimbursement rates also affect the middle and up-
per classes due to medical providers' "balance billing" techniques, also
known as "cost shifting.""13 "Cost shifting" is the method in which hospitals
make up for their financial losses.11  The costs that hospitals incur from
treating the poor who are not adequately covered by Medicare reimburse-
ments or other such programs are passed onto the rest of the nation through
cost increases. 32  Furthermore, the financial dilemmas that many elderly
Americans are facing today, create the very same nationwide insecurities that
were suppose to be overcome with the creation of Medicare.' 33 Clearly, the
Medicare program has provided some financial relief to an extremely needy
health care system, but the system is still in terrible need of more financial
support.
IV. MEDICARE AS APPLIED TO PUERTO RICO
A. Puerto Rico and Its Integration into the Program
Puerto Rico was originally a Spanish colony from the year 1493 until
1898, the year the Spanish-American War ended and Spain was forced to
surrender the island by virtue of defeat. 134 The island was officially ceded to
127. See Abelson, supra note 123; Press Release, Schumer Unveils Plan to Reverse Im-
pact of Medicare Cuts that Began on October 1 (Oct. 22, 2002), at http://schumer.senate.
gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/press releases/PRO1264.html [hereinafter Schumer Unveils
Plan].
128. See HAUGHT, supra note 124, at 1-2; Abelson, supra note 123; CORNING, supra note
1, at 78, 102; Friedman, supra note 26, at 280; Marmor & McKissick, supra note 86, at 231.
129. See IAMAW, supra note 110.
130. Physicians Payments, supra note 83. See also CORNING, supra note 1, at 78, 102;
FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 280.
131. FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 280.
132. Id.
133. See IAMAW, supra note 110; CORNING, supra note 1, at 28-33; Demko, supra note
126; Barry, supra note 126.
134. Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
The Commonwealth Relationship, at http://www.pridco.com/english/overview/2.2prover-
viewcommonwealth.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2005) [hereinafter The Commonwealth Rela-
tionship].
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the United States in the Treaty of Paris in 1898.' By 1900, the United
States Congress passed the Foraker Act, which set up a United States gov-
ernment system in Puerto Rico with a United States governor, an upper legis-
lative chamber, an elected house of delegates, and "Congress was given the
right to review all legislation.'
' 36
The island slowly obtained more and more autonomy as the years
passed. 37 For instance, the people of Puerto Rico were granted United States
citizenship in 1917 under the Jones Act, and by 1948, the governor of Puerto
Rico was no longer appointed by the United States President; the Puerto Ri-
can people were given the right to have a popular election in order to elect
their own governor.'38 Finally, the island was proclaimed a Commonwealth
in 1952 through operation of Law 600 of 1952, which continues to be its
status today. 139 As a Commonwealth of the United States, the island operates
under both its own laws and Constitution and the laws and Constitution of
the United States.1 40 The Commonwealth is not allowed to vote in the gen-
eral elections,'4 ' nor does it have a vote in Congress. 42 However, its people
are allowed to vote in the presidential primaries, have a non-voting seat in
the United States House of Representatives, and are represented in Congress
by an elected Resident Commissioner.143
The residents of Puerto Rico are subject to many United States laws.'44
As participants in the United States Medicare System, the residents of Puerto
Rico are particularly subject to the Medicare legislation set out by Con-
gress. 45 The residents of Puerto Rico contribute to the Medicare fund and in
return, they are entitled to benefits. 4 6 Prior to 1983, Medicare reimburse-
135. COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, ENCYCLOPEDIA .COM, PUERTO RICO, at http://www.ency-
clopedia.com/htmlI/section/puertori-history.asp (last visited Feb. 4, 2005).
136. Id.
137. The Commonwealth Relationship, supra note 134; COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra
note 135.
138. COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 135.
139. Commonwealth Relationship, supra note 134.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Jamin Raskin, A Right-to- Vote Amendment for the U.S. Constitution: Confronting
America s Structural Democracy Deficit, 3 ELECTION L.J. 559, 565 (2004).
143. Commonwealth Relationship, supra note 134.
144. Id.
145. See Hosp. San Rafael, Inc. v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 927, 930 (D.P.R. 1991).
146. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TEMA 903 - IMPUESTOS PATRONALES (FEDERALES) EN
PUERTO RICO, at http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc903.html [hereinafter TEMA 903]. Puerto
Rico and the rest of the United States are taxed 6.2% of their first eighty-seven thousand dol-
lars earned in a year in order to fund social security and 1.45% of their entire yearly wages in
order to fund Medicare. Id.
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ments to all qualified participants were based on the same cost-based system,
where the health care providers were reimbursed based on their actual
costs. 14 7 However, since the implementation of PPS in 1983, the reimburse-
ment rates for Puerto Rico qualified Medicare providers has been much
lower than the rates given to the providers located in the states. 48
The integration of PPS, among the mainland states, began in 1983 and it
took four years before the system was fully implemented across all Medicare
participating hospitals. 49 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986
("OBRA") initiated PPS in Puerto Rico, but it was not actually implemented
until September of 1987.150 PPS was made applicable to Puerto Rico in a
different manner than it was applied in the mainland states.' 5 ' OBRA pre-
sented a seven-step process that was to be applied in order to determine the
PPS rate for Puerto Rican Medicare providers.'52 The system was adequately
summarized in Hospital San Rafael v. Sullivan15 3 as follows:
(1) Determination of Target Amounts
The Secretary first determines the "target amount" for each
participating Puerto Rico Hospital. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(A).
The target amount represents the actual costs home by each hospi-
tal in a base year. The use of these target amounts as the basis for
determining PPS rates is meant to insure that payment under PPS
will closely approximate the actual economic experiences of
Puerto Rico hospitals.
(2) Updating the Target Amounts
The target amounts are then updated for inflation to mid-
fiscal year 1988 levels by prorating the applicable percentage in-
crease for fiscal year 1988. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(B).
(3) Standardizing the Target Amounts
After arriving at updated target amounts.., the Secretary [is]
to remove distorting effects stemming from several sources, in-
147. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 929 (D.P.R. 1991) (referencing Title XVIII of the Social
Security Act, 79 Stat. 291, amended by, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 etseq.).
148. See id. at 929-32.
149. Id. at 930.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 930-32.
153. Id. at 927.
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cluding variations in area wage levels. 42 U.S.C. §§
1395ww(d)(2)(C)(ii), 1395ww(d)(9)(B)(ii); See generally 52 Fed.
Reg. 33,034, 33,066 (Sept. 1, 1987)...
(4) Determination of the Discharge- Weighted Average
Following the standardizing of the target amounts, the Secre-
tary determines the average standardized amount per discharge in
urban and rural settings for Puerto Rico. 42 U.S.C. §
1395ww(d)(9)(B)(iii). These amounts are arrived at by first de-
termining the total labor-related and nonlabor-related standardized
costs for urban and rural areas of Puerto Rico. This is reached by
adding the target amounts for each hospital in each area. The four
total costs are divided by the total number of discharges in urban
and rural areas, respectively. This process yields four standardized
average amounts per discharge: two for labor and nonlabor costs in
Puerto Rico's urban areas; and two for labor and nonlabor costs in
Puerto Rico's rural areas. See 52 Fed. Reg. at 33,062, 33,070, Ta-
ble Ic.
(5) Adjustment for Outlier Payments
The Secretary is . . . to adjust the average standardized
amounts to account for [outlier] payments by estimating the degree
to which outlier payments will be made in each urban and rural
area. The average standardized amounts are then reduced propor-
tionally.
(6) Adjustment for Differences in Area Wage Levels
The Secretary reemploys the wage index to adjust the aver-
age urban and rural standardized amounts, arrived at in steps one
through five, to account for variations in area wage levels. 42
U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(9)(B)(vi). This is done by multiplying the
labor-related portion of the average standardized amounts by the
"appropriate wage index for the area in which the hospital is lo-
cated." 52 Fed. Reg. at 33,065. The use of the wage index here
differs from the use of the wage index to adjust for variations in
area wages discussed in the context of step three .... Here, the
discharge-weighted average standardized amounts are multiplied
by the appropriate wage index.
(7) Determination of Payment Rates Per DRG
The final step in determining PPS rates for Puerto Rico hos-
pitals involves the addition of the average adjusted standardized
[Vol. 29:2:311
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labor-related amount for urban areas, arrived at in step six, to the
nonlabor-related average standardized amount for urban areas.
The average standardized amounts for rural areas are similarly
added. The total adjusted average standardized urban amount per
discharge is then multiplied by the predetermined weighting factor
corresponding to a particular DRG. This product determines the
payment rate for that ailment rendered at a hospital in either an ur-
ban or rural area. Since Congress has specified that the overall
PPS payment rate for Puerto Rico providers is to consist of a blend
of seventy-five percent of a Puerto Rico adjusted rate and twenty-
five percent of the national rate, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ww(d)(9)(A);
42 C.F.R. section 412.204, seventy-five percent of this figure is
added to twenty-five percent of the national rate for the same DRG
to reach the overall amount to be paid to the Puerto Rico hospi-
tai. 15
4
Since Sullivan, the reimbursement rate has undergone some reform in
regards to how it applies to Puerto Rico. 155 Originally, the PPS payment rate
for Puerto Rico consisted of a blend of seventy-five percent based on the
Puerto Rico adjusted rate and twenty-five percent based on the national ad-
justed rate.156 From the inception of PPS, the people of Puerto Rico would
have preferred a reimbursement rate solely based on national rates, just like
the one applied to the mainland states, but unfortunately, that was not the
case.' 57 The special PPS rate resulted in lower federal funds being supplied
to Puerto Rico, which was appealing to many because it helped keep Medi-
care costs down. 58 The Commonwealth also had to contend with the fact
that it did not have any voting representation in Congress, which made it
154. Id. (internal footnotes omitted). The court went on to explain how wages were also
taken into consideration in order to better standardize the target amounts:
To effect this standardization for the cost variation at issue in this action-
differences in area wage levels-the Secretary first divides the target amounts into
labor and nonlabor components derived from the national hospital market basket.
This division is necessary since wages correspond only to the labor-related costs of
a hospital. The labor component is 74.39% of each hospital's updated target
amount. 52 Fed. Reg. at 33,044. In order to remove the effect of disparate wages,
this labor component is divided by a wage index for the geographic area in which
each hospital is located. This yields a standardized target amount taking into ac-
count variations in area wage levels.
Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 930-31. The hospital market basket is a price index compiled from
prices of various categories of goods and services purchased by hospitals across the nation,
including Puerto Rico. Id. at 930 n.4.
155. See Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare, supra note 5.
156. See Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 932; Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare, supra
note 5.
157. Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare, supra note 5.
158. Id.
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virtually impossible for the Commonwealth to obtain the reimbursement rate
its people wanted. 159 Ultimately, the implementation of the special formula
was justified at the time by the fact that costs in Puerto Rico were drastically
lower than the rest of the nation; thus, this resulted in the need to provide the
island with more financial backing was not pressing."
By 1997, due to a strong lobbying effort from the Resident Commis-
sioner of Puerto Rico, assistance from democratic representatives in Con-
gress, and a strong push from the Clinton Administration, the Puerto Rico
reimbursement rate was amended. 1 ' The newly amended rate was now
based on fifty percent of the Puerto Rico adjusted rate and fifty percent of the
national rate. 6 2 The rate change made an immediate and apparent contribu-
tion within the first year of its implementation, when it provided the island
hospitals an additional $44 million in health care assistance.'63 The Clinton
Administration attempted to achieve another amendment to the reimburse-
ment rate in 2000 by proposing that the rate be based on seventy-five percent
of the national adjustment rate and only twenty-five percent on the Puerto
Rico rate1 64 This proposal was heavily opposed in Congress and was ulti-
mately denied. 16
5
The "fifty-fifty" reimbursement rate remained in place until its amend-
ment under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modemiza-
tion Act of 2003 ("Modernization Act"). 6 Initially presented under the
Medicare Puerto Rico Hospital Payment Parity Act of 2003 ("the Parity
Act"), the proposed amendment presented itself as a second chance at chang-
ing the Puerto Rico rate from "fifty-fifty" to seventy-five percent national
adjustment rates and twenty-five percent Puerto Rico rates.167 On December
8, 2003, the amendment was included within the newly approved Moderniza-
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. Leading the lobby for equality in the reimbursement rates was then-Resident
Commissioner of Puerto Rico, Carlos Romero-Barcelo and then-Governor of Puerto Rico,
Pedro Rossello. Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare, supra note 5. Other politicians and
organizations that provided much needed support was then-House Hispanic Caucus Chair
Xavier Becerra (D-CA), Senator Bob Graham (D-FL), the Puerto Rican Hospital Association,
the New York Hospital Association, and Puerto Rico's Association's Lobbyists. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. The additional funding range estimated at the time anticipated an increase in
funds from $50 million to $75 million a year. Id.
164. Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare, supra note 5.
165. Id.
166. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, § 504, 117 Stat. 2066, 2292-93 (2003).
167. Medicare Puerto Rico Hospital Payment Parity Act of 2003, S. 653, 108th Cong. § 2
(2003).
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tion Act signed by President George W. Bush.168 Although the amendment
went against President Bush's objective of luring "people away from a reli-
ance on Medicare to private insurance plans to reduce costs," a compromise
was reached and the amendment went forward. 1
69
The amendment to the Modernization Act proposes a gradual change
toward the new percentages. Starting April 1, 2004, through October 1,
2004, "the applicable Puerto Rico percentage [will be] 37.5 percent and the
applicable federal percentage [will be] 62.5 percent."' 170 The percentages will
then take final form starting and continuing on from October 1, 2004, at the
rate of twenty-five percent based on the applicable Puerto Rico percentage,
and seventy-five percent based on the federal percentage.' 7' The Resident
Commissioner of Puerto Rico, Anibal Acevedo Vila, anticipates that the
amended rates will provide the health care system in Puerto Rico with an
average of $300 million per year over the next decade.172 Vila also claims
that the amendment will provide prescription drug coverage for an additional
250,000 Medicare enrollees on the island that were presently not receiving
any such coverage. 73 The amendment has significantly advanced Puerto
Rico's pursuit toward equalizing the reimbursement rates, but there is still
much room for progress. 7
4
B. A Closer Look at the Special Reimbursement Rate
Currently, and in years prior, Puerto Ricans have been subject to the
same Social Security and Medicare taxes as any other U.S. citizen. 175 In or-
der to fund Social Security, the first $87,000 made each year, by all employ-
168. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 §
504; Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare, supra note 5.
169. Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare, supra note 5. President Bush attempted to
lure people away from Medicare by creating outpatient prescription drug benefits that would
provide incentives for people to move toward more of a private insurance plan basis. Id.
Ultimately, the compromise was that the new "legislation would provide equal prescription
drug subsidies under both Medicare and private insurance plans." Id.
170. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, § 504, 117 Stat. 2066, 2292-93 (2003).
171. Id.
172. Significativo el Impacto, supra note 5.
173. Id.
174. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 §
504; Significativo el Impacto, supra note 5.
175. TEMA 903, supra note 146; see also SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, SOCIAL SECURITY &
MEDICARE TAX RATES, at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/taxRates.html (last visited
Feb. 3, 2005).
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ees in the United States and in Puerto Rico, are subject to a 6.2 percent tax. 176
Likewise, Medicare is funded by imposing a 1.45 percent tax on all income
made by employees in a year. 177 Despite being subject to the same Medicare
and Social Security taxes, participating hospitals on the island are subject to
special reimbursement rates, which result in lesser payment levels. 78 Ac-
cording to Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 560,725 Puerto Ri-
cans were enrolled in the Medicare program in 2002,179 and the Medicare
participating hospitals on the island received an average reimbursement of
$2842 per patient, while the participating hospitals within the fifty states
received an average reimbursement of $3780 per patient. 180
Providing adequate medical care is already an extremely difficult task
without the added disadvantage of smaller reimbursement rates.'18  For in-
stance, United States hospitals continue to face serious funding issues despite
the fact that they receive reimbursements based on the more favorable na-
tional rate. 182 As previously discussed, state hospitals claim that the threat of
the slightest reduction in reimbursement rates would cause a loss of millions
of dollars in funding and would lead to hospitals taking even more losses
each time they treat a patient. 83 There are also numerous stories about eld-
erly people in the United States dying more frequently from the inability to
afford adequate health care than from old age itself. 84 All these events are
taking place in the richest country in the world, where according to the
United States Census Bureau calculations of 2000, the median family income
in the United States was $50,046.'85 Puerto Rico, on the other hand, had a
176. TEMA 903, supra note 146.
177. Id.
178. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, § 504, § 1886(d)(9), 117 Stat. 2066, 2292-93 (2003); Hosp. San Rafael, Inc.
v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 927, 930-32 (D.P.R. 1991); Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare,
supra note 5.
179. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE ENROLLMENT BY STATE
2002, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/researchers/pubs/datacompendium/2003/03pg74.pdf (Nov.
2003).
180. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE HOME HEALTH AGENCY
UTILIZATION BY STATE CALENDAR YEAR 2002, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/feeforserv-
ice/HHAUtil02.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2005).
181. See generally Barry, supra note 126; Schumer Unveils Plan, supra note 127; Demko,
supra note 126.
182. See generally Schumer Unveils Plan, supra note 127; Demko, supra note 126.
183. See Schumer Unveils Plan, supra note 127; Barry, supra note 126.
184. Demko, supra note 126.
185. Id.; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2003 826,
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/03statab/outlying.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2005) [here-
inafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
[Vol. 29:2:311
200
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss2/1
A NOT SO SPECIAL RATE
median family income of $16,543 in 2000,186 which means that in addition to
coping with the constant increases in medical technology and costs, the is-
land's hospitals also deal with the added financial pressures of treating low-
income patients. 87 Despite all these factors, Puerto Rico is still reimbursed
at a lower rate than the fifty states.'88
The reimbursement rates given to Puerto Rico have been judicially chal-
lenged in the past.189 In Sullivan, a number of Puerto Rican hospitals raised a
direct challenge to the implementation of PPS for Medicare rates for hospi-
tals in Puerto Rico.' 90 In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the wage
index was determined arbitrarily, the reliance on the national hospital market
basket to calculate the wage index was contrary to law because the data is
not exclusively based on Puerto Rico numbers, and that the "Puerto Rico
PPS statute violates the Equal Protection clause of the United States Consti-
tution because it results in a lower level of payment to Puerto Rico hospitals,
which are owned, operated, and staffed predominately by Hispanic per-
sons."'9 1 The court rejected each of the plaintiffs' challenges. 92 Under the
wage index claim, the plaintiffs argued that the Commonwealth hospitals,
which are not subject to minimum wage regulations, and federal hospitals,
whose pay scales are higher than the national norm, equally distort wage
indices; hence, both should be excluded from the wage index calculation.' 93
According to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services (the "Secretary"), the federal hospitals were excluded from the cal-
culations because they did not participate in the Medicare program, while the
Commonwealth hospitals were included because they generally did partici-
pate in the program. 94 The court stated that their job was not to determine
the reasonableness of the calculations, but rather they were to look at the
explanation of the methodology to determine if the calculations were arbi-
trary or capricious."' They then concluded that the calculations were not
arbitrary or capricious because the methodology used was logically related to
186. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 185, at 827.
187. See DSH Payments, supra note 106.
188. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, § 504, 117 Stat. 2006, 2292-93 (2003).
189. See Hosp. San Rafael, Inc. v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 927 (D.P.R. 1991); Harris v.
Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980).
190. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 929.
191. Id. at 932-33.
192. Id. at 940.
193. Id. at 934-35.
194. Id. at 935.
195. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 936.
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the means used and the purpose achieved.'96 Next, the court rejected the
argument that the use of the national market basket was contrary to law.'
97
The plaintiffs argued that the statute requires that "a Puerto Rico adjusted
DRG prospective payment rate" be established in order to determine the ap-
plicable wage index; thus, the use of separate labor and non-labor rates spe-
cific to Puerto Rico must be used.'9 8 It was conceded that the Puerto Rico
labor costs were lower than the national labor costs and that such a factor
does alter the results. 199 However, the court held that incorporating the per-
centage difference would be so trifling that it did not warrant interfering with
the methodology currently in place. °°
Lastly, the plaintiffs argued that Congress violated the Equal Protection
clause of the United States Constitution when it created a method to deter-
mine Puerto Rico's PPS rates that was different than that utilized by the rest
of the nation.20' In denying the equal protection claim, the court first rea-
soned that entitlement to Medicare reimbursements is not a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution.2 2 However, creating a burden on a
suspect class, such as Hispanics, deserves strict scrutiny. 203 The court ulti-
mately decided that the statute did not appear to be racially based and that
the plaintiffs' claim that the different methodology result in less reimburse-
ment payments to Puerto Rico, lacked factual support.2 °4 The court further
supported their denial of the equal protection claim by holding that the Terri-
tory Clause of the Constitution gave Congress "the power to treat Puerto
Rico differently from States if there is a rational basis for doing so.' '205 The
Court, making reference to the Supreme Court decision of Harris v.
Rosario,2 °6 then laid out the rational basis factors that justified Congress'
actions in treating Puerto Rico differently when allotting funds:
(1) Puerto Ricans do not contribute to the federal treasury; (2) high
costs of treating Puerto Rico as a state for purposes of the statute;
(3) the possibility that greater benefits might disrupt the economy
of Puerto Rico. Rosario, 446 U.S. at 652, 100 S.Ct. at 1930. These
196. Id.
197. Id. at 937.
198. Id. at 936 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(9)(B) (2004)).
199. Id. at 937.
200. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 937.
201. Id. at 939.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 939-40.
205. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 940.
206. 446 U.S. 651 (1980).
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factors, as well as the unique economic circumstances attributable
to Puerto Rico, support Congress' decision to prescribe a separate
PPS rate for Puerto Rico.2 °7
The arguments made by the Secretary, and the reasons provided by the
Sullivan court for its ruling, were contradictory to the facts and lacked ade-
quate support.208 In Sullivan, the Secretary made it a point to account for all
Medicare participants equally, which is why all participating Commonwealth
hospitals, even those without minimum wage regulations, were included in
the national market basket to calculate applicable wage indices.29 Appar-
ently, the parity that exists when calculating overall PPS rates does not apply
when it comes time to make actual PPS payments. 210 At the beginning of the
PPS process, Puerto Rico is treated like any other Medicare participant.
21
'
"Puerto Ricans are expected to pay" the same tax rate to fund the Medicare
program, and no special treatments are rendered while the majority of the
PPS rate is being determined; that is, until it is time to actually distribute
212payments. 2 At the point of distribution, a Puerto Rico specific rate is
blended in with the national rate in order to determine the Puerto Rico pay-
ment, which ultimately results in lower levels of payments for Puerto Rico
hospitals.213
In justifying the special treatment, the court in Sullivan, citing to the
Constitution and Rosario, stated that Congress has the power to treat Puerto
Rico differently from the states, under the Territory Clause, so long as there
is a rational basis for doing so. 21 4 The exact wording under the Territory
Clause is as follows: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution
shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of
any particular State."2 5 On its face the clause does not contain any wording
that allows Congress to "treat Puerto Rico differently from States if there is a
207. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 940.
208. See id.
209. Id. at 935.
210. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, § 504, 117 Stat. 2066, 2292-93 (2003); see also Hosp. San Rafael, Inc. v. Sulli-
van, 784 F. Supp. 927, 935 (D.P.R. 1991).
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (2000); TEMA 903, supra note 146.
212. See TEMA 903, supra note 146.
213. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(9)(E) (2000 & Supp. 2004).
214. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 940 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3; Harris v. Rosario, 446
U.S. 651, 651-52 (1980) (Marshal, J. dissenting), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 912 (1980)).
215. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
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rational basis for doing so., '216 Furthermore, the dissenting opinion in
Rosario accurately pointed out that the majority did not cite any authority for
the proposition, and that the statement made by the majority was overbroad
and unsupported. 2 7 The dissenting opinion went on to say that the United
States must be careful as to how differently it treats Puerto Rico because
Puerto Ricans are United States citizens who are entitled to many constitu-
tional rights, such as the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." 8
The rational basis factors provided by the Sullivan court, in support of
the statute enacted by Congress, also lacked support.219 First, the rationale
that Puerto Rico does not contribute to the Federal Treasury was not applica-
ble with regards to the Medicare program in Puerto Rico, because Puerto
Rico contributes to the Medicare fund in the same manner as all other Medi-
care participants.12 0 Likewise, treating Puerto Rico as a state when it comes
to the PPS payments is no more costly than when it is treated as a state for
Medicare taxing purposes.221 Puerto Rico contributes to the Medicare pro-
gram at the same tax rate as all other states;222 hence, it should be reimbursed
in the same manner as all other states. Next, the rationale that greater bene-
fits might disrupt the Puerto Rican economy was viewed as having "trou-
bling overtones" by the dissent in Rosario, and it appears to have the same
defect in Sullivan.223 The dissent in Rosario stated that the rationale suggests
that programs designed to help the poor should be scarcely applied in areas
where the need is greater because such aid will disrupt the poverty levels in
those areas.224 Moreover, the dissenting opinion stated that the theory sug-
gests that those areas of the country that are the most economically sound
would receive the most funding because that is where the aid will cause the
least amount of disruption.25 The anticipated economic effects and so called
"unique economic circumstances attributable to Puerto Rico," that suppos-
edly justify the special Puerto Rico PPS rate, are irrational and lack any evi-
dence to support said rationales.226
216. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 940.
217. Rosario, 446 U.S. at 653.
218. Id.
219. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 940.
220. TEMA 903, supra note 146.
215. Id.
222. Id.
223. Rosario, 446 U.S. at 655; see also Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 940.
224. Rosario, 446 U.S. at 655-56.
225. Id. at 656.
226. See id. at 652-56; Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 940.
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V. CONCLUSION
Puerto Rico is not a state, thus treating it with full statehood privileges
may not be justified.227 Yet, there are compelling reasons for providing
equality in the administration of a government program such as Medicare.
Puerto Rico, as well as the United States, will benefit from a healthier Puerto
Rico. 228 Puerto Ricans are United States citizens, therefore, the well-being of
Puerto Rico residents would improve the well-being and economic status of
United States citizens overall. 229 Furthermore, Puerto Ricans should also be
entitled to the full benefits of the program, since they are subject to the same
contribution rates that all other participants are mandated to pay. 3° Anything
less than equal treatment under such circumstances is unjustifiable.
In the Emily Friedman article, The Compromise and the Afterthought:
Medicare and Medicaid After 30 Years, she quotes, "It is both a flaw and a
strength of human nature that one tends to forget the circumstances that sur-
rounded the need for and that shaped certain decisions and actions., 231 In the
instant case, it is flaw for the United States to forget the circumstances that
led us to the formation of Medicare.232 The program was designed to provide
the needy, predominantly the elderly, with adequate health care so as to
avoid the economic insecurities that loom over an unhealthy society. 3  To-
day, in a time where the improvements in medical technology and medica-
tions are increasingly costly, the need for medical funding assistance contin-
227. See Rosario, 446 U.S. at 652; Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. at 940; The Commonwealth
Relationship, supra note 134.
228. See Rosario, 446 U.S. at 653; THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS EASTERN
REGIONAL CONFERENCE, PROMOTING FEDERAL ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR PUERTO RICO
(2002), at http://www.csgeast.org/page.asp?id=2002puertoricores [hereinafter PROMOTING
FEDERAL ECONOMIC INCENTIVES]. The United States benefits from a prosperous Puerto Rico
because Puerto Rico is the tenth largest trading partner of the United States. Id. Puerto Rico
purchases over $16 billion worth of goods from the United States every year, which results in
over 180,000 jobs. Id. Furthermore, a prosperous Puerto Rico also creates more jobs on the
island, thus resulting in "less welfare in Puerto Rico, which leads to more Social Security,
Medicare and federal payroll taxes for the United States." Id. For instance, in 2001 Puerto
Rico contributed $20.90 billion in Medicare taxable earnings and $19.14 billion in Social
Security taxable earnings. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, STATE STATISTICS, DECEMBER
2002-PUERTO RICO (2002), at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/state_ stats/pr.html
[hereinafter STATE STATISTICS].
229. See Rosario, 446 U.S. at 653.
230. TEMA 903, supra note 146.
231. Friedman, supra note 26, at 280.
232. See generally CORNING, supra note 1.
233. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2000); CORNING, supra note 1.
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ues to grow. 2 34 Puerto Rico is no exception to the trend.235 As an island with
approximately half of its population living below the poverty line, Puerto
Ricans are prime candidates for a national health care program such as
Medicare and all the benefits it has to offer.236 Currently Puerto Rico is re-
ceiving assistance, and its situation has gotten progressively better.231 This
does not necessarily mean that the system currently in place is adequate.238
In order for Puerto Rico to achieve the parity it deserves, the Medicare pro-
gram will need to undergo further reform with a focus on achieving equality
on the issue of reimbursement once and for all.
234. HAUGHT ET AL., supra note 124, at 1-2. See also Demko, supra note 126; Barry,
supra note 126.
235. See Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare, supra note 5; Significativo el Impacto,
supra note 5.
236. PROMOTING FEDERAL ECONOMIC INCENTIVES, supra note 228.
237. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(9) (2000 & Supp. 2004); Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 504, 117 Stat. 2066,
2292-93 (2003).
238. See Move to Increase Puerto Rico Medicare, supra note 5; Significativo el Impacto,
supra note 5.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE
The purpose of this article is to compare the regulation of several pro-
fessions within the state of Florida. In Florida, attorneys are self-regulated
through The Florida Bar. As a branch of the Supreme Court of Florida, The
Florida Bar serves as the licensing agency of attorneys within the state.1
Two other professions-real estate professionals and certified public ac-
countants-in which the public also places fiscal trust and responsibility, are
regulated through a different agency, the Department of Business and Profes-
sional Regulation (DBPR).2 This article seeks to examine and explain the
different methods of licensing and regulation between these professional
groups and looks at empirical data regarding the discipline of such members.
The idea for this statistical review arose in 2004 following an analysis,
done by this author in conjunction with another legal professional, on the
public's view of Florida attorney discipline That article dealt with the dis-
cipline of Florida attorneys and featured statistics gathered from public
sources. After publication of that article original information was received
from The Florida Bar regarding the specifics of attorney discipline during a
certain time period. At that time we came across data comparing attorneys
with other professions, prompting a more detailed comparison of the differ-
ences in these state professional systems.
II. FISCAL PROFESSIONALS: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
ATTORNEYS, CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, AND REAL ESTATE
PROFESSIONALS IN FLORIDA
The mission of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation
(DBPR) is to ensure that professionals provide quality services to the public.4
In addition, The Florida Bar lists as its ultimate goal "to provide more effec-
tive delivery of legal services."5 Both of these professional membership and
1. See FLA. BAR ADMISS. R. 1-12(2004).
2. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Home Page, at http://www.my
florida.com/dbpr/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter DBPR Home Page].
3. Debra Moss Curtis & Billie Jo Kaufman, A Public View of Attorney Discipline in
Florida: Statistics, Commentary, and Analysis of Disciplinary Actions Against Licensed
Attorneys in the State of Florida from 1988-2002, 28 NOVA L. REv. 669 (2004).
4. DPBR Home Page, supra note 2.
5. The Florida Bar, Member Services, at http://www.flabar.org/tfb/TFBMember.nsf/
ED6E4BCB92A8FE 1B852567090069F3C2/75 1 BOD34A09978C685256B2F006CD8 1E?Ope
nDocument (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
[Vol. 29:2:339
208
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss2/1
2005] LICENSING AND DISCIPLINE OF FISCAL PROFESSIONALS 341
regulation organizations deal with various occupations. However, the three
occupations that overlap frequently either in licensing or in their fiscal re-
sponsibilities to the public are attorneys, certified public accountants, and
real estate professionals.
In reality, many of these three professional groups are cross-trained; in
other words, an attorney also may be a certified public accountant or a real
estate broker.6 A New York State Bar Ethics opinion was issued to assist
New York attorneys in sorting out the conflicts of interest in acting as part of
a law firm engaged in real estate matters.7 In that opinion, the State Bar Eth-
ics Committee reiterated that it was not improper for lawyers to engage in
other businesses such as dually working as either real estate brokers or certi-
fied public accountants. 8 Lawyers, however, must overcome the presump-
tion in many rules of professional conduct that their work in any non-legal
field is subject to the rules of professional conduct of lawyering.9 They also
must make it clear to clients that simply being qualified in more than one
field is not directly related to the work to be done.'" Attorneys also must be
aware of conflicts of interest in their roles in any dual transaction.ll
Attorneys have also become acutely aware of the interaction between
professions, as well as the cross-purpose in the examination of whether legal
6. See Arash Mostafavipour, Law Firms: Should They Mind Their Own Business?, 11
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCs 435, 453 (1998). In fact, real estate licensing rules for sales associates
are tailored to allow already licensed attorneys to waive several requirements. FLA. ADMIN.
CODE R. 61J2-3.008(8) (2004). In Texas, for example, when a Texas Civil Statute regulated
who may perform property tax consulting services without registering with the Department of
Licensing, attorneys, certified public accountants, and certain real estate brokers were specifi-
cally grouped together and exempt from the requirement. Cynthia M. Ohlenforst & Jeff W.
Dorrill, Annual Survey of Texas Law Part II, Taxation, 45 Sw. L.J. 2093, 2122 (1992). How-
ever, demand for dual-licensed attorney-accountants may even be greater than the current
supply. See Corby Brooks, A Double-Edged Sword Cuts Both Ways: How Clients of Dual
Capacity Legal Practitioners Often Lose Their Evidentiary Privileges, 35 TEX. TECH. L. REv.
1069, 1079 (2004). The American Association of Attorney-Certified Public Accountants
(AAA-CPA) professional organization website claims that of the approximately one million
lawyers and approximately 450,000 CPAs in the United States, only about three percent are
dually qualified. American Association of Attorney-Certified Public Accountants, An Un-
common Organization for Uncommon Professionals, at http://www.attorney-cpa.com/
i4a/pages/index.cfm?page id=3295 (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Uncommon Organi-
zation]. A chapter of the AAA-CPA has been established in Florida. Id.
7. N.Y. St. Bar Assn. Comm. on Prof. Ethics Op. 595 (1989).
8. Id.
9. Mostafavipour, supra note 6, at 453.
10. Id. In addition, an attorney who is dual-licensed may alter the evidentiary privilege
rule of communication with attorneys due to his or her dual-status. See Brooks, supra note 6,
at 1071.
11. Ethics Op. 595, supra note 7.
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services should be permitted in the structure of organizations other than tra-
ditional law firms.' 2 The American Bar Association has been considering the
thorny issue of whether lawyers should be allowed to join with other profes-
sionals to offer services under one single practice, and how that new struc-
ture may affect attorneys' abilities to serve the public and financial out-
come. 13 The Florida Bar Ethics hotline reported in 2002 that it had received
inquiries about attorneys regarding combining their businesses with others,
among them accountants. " And clients are increasingly more interested in
engaging attorney professionals that may provide the benefits of expertise in
accounting matters as well. 5
These three groups of professions occasionally have overlapping re-
sponsibilities. Real estate brokers often are authorized by state law to draft
or complete specific legal documents or to conduct closing and settlement
proceedings in certain real estate transactions. 6 Some states also allow certi-
fied public accountants to perform some activities otherwise considered "le-
gal services," such as appearances before certain tax adjudicatory bodies. 7
Ultimately, citizens of Florida rely upon members of these three profes-
sions to responsibly handle their money and property. While other service
professions regulated by the DBPR deal in property and money, those pro-
fessions are not based on fiscal responsibility. 8 You may pay a contractor,
and trust that person with important property, but you are seeking a tangible,
physical service from the contractor. The same goes for architects, electrical
contractors, barbers, and funeral directors-all occupations regulated by the
DBPR.' 9 However, accountants and real estate professionals provide basic
services that involve holding, accounting for, and transferring money.
Other professions in Florida also have high levels of trust and are not
regulated by the DBPR. A key example is physicians, who are regulated by
the Florida Board of Medicine.20 However, while doctors certainly are paid
12. Burnele Powell, Flight from the Center: Is It Just or Just About Money?, 84 MINN.
L. REv. 1439, 1443 (2000).
13. See Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 820 So. 2d 210, 213 (Fla. 2002).
14. Id.
15. See Brooks, supra note 6, at 1071. Brooks asserts that "dual capacity practitioners"
benefit consumers by providing a "higher quality product at a lower cost." Id. at 1076.
16. Quintin Johnstone, Connecticut Unauthorized Practice Laws and Some Options for
Their Reform, 36 CONN. L. REV. 303, 337 (2004).
17. Id. at 338.
18. See DBPR Home Page, supra note 2.
19. See id.
20. See Florida Board of Medicine, Board Overview, at http://www.doh.state.fl.us/mqa/
medical/mehome.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005). There are several divisions by medical
specialty. Id.
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for their services, their basic purpose is not related to any fiduciary duty, but
rather to the patient's health. Attorneys assist clients through the legal sys-
tem. All attorneys are required under self-regulation rules to be fiscally re-
sponsible to their clients when dealing with their money. However, many
fields of law have built into them the primary task of fiscal responsibility,
such as estate planning and guardianships. Because this fiscal responsibility,
like that of accountants and real estate professionals, often takes center stage
in the service to clients, these three professions were chosen for compari-
son.
21
III. LICENSING OF PROFESSIONALS
A. Attorney Licensing
Most consumers in the public are familiar with the concept that an at-
torney must "pass the bar" in order to become licensed in a particular state.
What many consumers do not understand is that the "Bar Exam," and in fact,
the entire regulation of attorneys in the state of Florida, is handled solely
through the judicial system of the state; the same system in which attorneys
ultimately conduct most of their business.22 The Supreme Court of Florida,
which is the highest court in the state, handles bar admissions through its
administrative arm, the Florida Board of Bar Examiners.23
A task of the Florida Board of Bar Examiners is to be gatekeeper for
admission to the professional organization known as The Florida Bar,24 and it
is known to be a powerful force. For many years, there has been a growing
movement to deregulate the legal profession and allow lay practitioners to
practice law. 5 However, the requirements for admission to the bar remain
21. See Robert B. Hale, Comment, Auditor Liability Under the DTPA: Can It Get Any
Worsefor Accountants?, 44 BAYLOR L. REv. 313, 320 (1992) (noting that services of a profes-
sional are similar in that they require application of professional judgment and rendering of an
opinion, and specifically lists real estate agents, attorneys, and accountants as examples in this
category).
22. FLA. BARADMIss. R. 1-11 (2004).
23. FLA. BAR ADMIss. R. 1-12. "The Florida Board of Bar Examiners consists of twelve
members of The Florida Bar and three members of the general public who are not lawyers."
FLA. BAR ADMIss. R. 1-2 1.
24. See Florida Board of Bar Examiners, Home Page, at http://www.floridabarexam.org
(last visited Feb. 7, 2005). The fee for filing an application to the Bar and sitting for the exam
can be as high as $2500. Florida Board of Bar Examiners, Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://floridabarexam.org/public/main.nsf/faq.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter
FBBE FAQs]. No one may gain "reciprocity" through admittance from another state. Id.
25. Meredith Ann Munro, Note, Deregulation of the Practice of Law: Panacea or Pla-
cebo?, 42 HAsTiNGs L.J. 203 (1990).
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stringent. Admission to the bar exam begins with an application. 26 The ap-
plication itself has a three-page checklist that is so detailed that the first step
of the "Checklist to File a Bar Application" is instructions to the reader to
"[p]rint this [c]hecklist" and "[c]heck each item when completed" in order to
ensure all parts of the application are completed. 27 The second step, which
requires gathering informational materials, contains fifteen individual items
that may be needed depending on responses to some inquiries, including
employment information for the past ten years (or since the applicant's six-
teenth birthday, whichever is shorter), as well as financial information, in-
formation regarding arrests, charges or accusations, and specifics on traffic
violations. 28 The third part lists thirteen steps to properly complete the appli-
cation. 21 Part four contains information on "packaging" the application com-
plete with fingerprint card, photograph, and other supporting documents.3°
Applicants who wish to sit for the bar exam must have graduated from a
law school accredited by the American Bar Association. 31 The costs for a
typical six-semester curriculum to complete law school can exceed $100,000
including living expenses. 3 2 Only after satisfactory completion of law school
requirements can students be "certified" by their deans to proceed with The
Florida Bar Examination.33
Actual admission to The Florida Bar is divided into two general catego-
ries. The first requirement is the taking and passing of The Florida Bar
Exam, which is administered on the last Tuesday and Wednesday of Febru-
ary and July each year in one central location in the state.34 In addition, the
admissions process also requires the passing of the Multistate Professional
Responsibility Exam (MPRE), given three times yearly, and administered by
26. FBBE FAQs, supra note 24.
27. Florida Board of Bar Examiners, Checklist to File a Bar Application, at http://www.
floridabarexam.org/public/main.nsf/checklistnoreg.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Jennifer Kucklick Watson, Protecting the Public Through the Legal Licensing Sys-
tem, 1 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 547, 549 (2000).
32. Id. at 550.
33. NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY SHEPARD BROAD LAW CENTER, LAW STUDENT
HANDBOOK, available at http://www.nsulaw.nova.edu/students/documents/studenthandbook.
pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter STUDENT HANDBOOK].
34. FBBE FAQs, supra note 24. The past several years, this sole location has been in
Tampa, Florida, at that city's convention center. Florida Board of Bar Examiners, Florida Bar
Examination and Filing Deadlines, at http://www.floridabarexam.org/public/main.
nsf/FLABarExamdates.PDF/$file/FLABarExamDates.PDF (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [herein-
after Bar Schedule].
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the National Conference of Bar Examiners, rather than the state itself.35 Al-
though applicants must be present in the state of Florida (although not a resi-
dent) to sit for the two-day Florida Bar Exam in February or July, applicants
to Bar admission in Florida may physically be present in any state adminis-
tering the MPRE and then have those scores forwarded to the Florida Board
of Bar Examiners.36
The two-day Florida Bar examination contains two portions. Part A is
the "Florida-prepared" portion, generally containing three hours of essays
followed by three hours of multiple-choice questions, and including subjects
chosen from: Florida Constitutional Law, Florida Rules of Civil and Crimi-
nal Procedure, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, Federal Constitu-
tional Law, Chapters 4 and 5 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, Cor-
porations, Partnerships, Wills, Administration of Estates, Contracts, Criminal
Law, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, Family Law, Real Property, Torts, and
Trusts.3 7 Part B of the two-day exam is titled "Multistate Bar Examination,"
and it is created by the National Conference of Bar Examiners.38 This por-
tion of the exam is six hours, two hundred questions, and deals exclusively
with the non-state specific subjects of Contracts, Torts, Constitutional Law,
Criminal Law, Real Property, and Evidence.39 The exam is given primarily
in paper format, although examinees are permitted to take the essay portion
of the exam using laptop computers under certain conditions.4"
The separate MPRE is a fifty question, two hour, multiple-choice ex-
amination, exclusively testing a lawyer's professional conduct as governed
by the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, and other evidentiary and substantive laws
35. FLA. BAR ADMISS. R. 4-30, at http://www.floridabarexam.org/public/main.nsf/rules.
html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005). Rule 4 of the Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to Bar
Admissions details the requirements of the examinations and standards for passing. Id.
36. Bar Schedule, supra note 34, at 2.
37. Id. at 1. Most, if not all, of these subjects are available in a typical law school cur-
riculum. See STUDENT HANDBOOK, supra note 33, at 3-4.
38. National Conference of Bar Examiners, Multistate Tests, at http://www.ncbex.
org/tests.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Tests].
39. Id These courses, with the exception of evidence, which at some schools is a re-
quired upper-level course, are generally mandatory courses given in the first year of law
school. STUDENT HANDBOOK, supra note 33, at 3-4.
40. Florida Board of Bar Examiners, Laptop Program, at http://www.floridabarexam.org
/public/main.nsf/laptop.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005). Examinees must load a particular
software program onto the laptop and be prepared to continue with the exam in paper-based
format in the event of malfunction. Id.
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to emerge from those bodies.4' However, despite its universal-sounding
name, the "American Bar Association" (ABA) is a voluntary organization for
attorneys, not a licensing agency.42 Each state individually creates and ap-
proves its own ethical codes and rules for attorneys to follow, to which they
are individually bound.4 3 Although many states base their own rules on the
ABA rules, attorneys required to sit for this exam, and be tested on these
rules, ultimately are not bound by those exact rules, particularly if their state
has made substantive changes."
The MPRE is graded with both a raw score, calculated from the number
of test questions answered correctly, and a scaled score, calculated with a
statistical process adjusting for variations in the difficultly of the test from
year to year.45 Raw scores run from zero to fifty, while scaled scores run
from fifty to one hundred fifty.46 The Supreme Court of Florida fixed the
passing rate for bar admittance at a scaled score of eighty or better, which
must be attained within twenty-five months of passing other parts of The
Florida Bar Exam.47
The second requirement for admittance to The Florida Bar, apart from
passing these two examinations, is the passing of a character and fitness
screening.48 The Supreme Court of Florida holds a "good moral character"
requirement emphasizing an inquiry into the applicant's "honesty, fairness,
and respect for the rights of others. 49 In considering the character and con-
duct of an applicant, the court recognized that the character and conduct
"must have a rational connection to the applicant's fitness to practice law.""0
41. Tests, supra note 38. Most Florida law schools require such a course entitled Profes-
sional Responsibility covering the material tested on this exam. STUDENT HANDBOOK, supra
note 33, at 3-4.
42. American Bar Association, About the ABA, at http://www.abanet.org/about/home.
html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
43. American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibility, Lawyer Regulation
for a New Century: Report of the Commission on the Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement,
at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mckayreport.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
44. Id. Several of Florida's professional responsibility rules are different from ABA
rules, and in fact, portions of them are among the subjects included in Part A of the twoday
Florida Bar Exam. Id.
45. National Conference of Bar Examiners, MPRE Score Reports, at http://www.
ncbex.org/tests/mpre/report.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
46. Id.
47. FLA. BAR ADMIss. R. 4-18, 4-33.2 (2004).
48. FLA. BAR ADMISS. R. 2-12. The Bar requires applicants to possess "good moral char-
acter." Id. Rule 2-12 of the Rules of the Florida Supreme Court Relating to Admission of the
Bar requires that all applicants seeking admission to the Bar shall "produce satisfactory evi-
dence of good moral character." Id.
49. Florida Bd. of Bar Exam'rs v. G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454, 458 (Fla. 1978).
50. Id.
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To determine this character and conduct, Supreme Court of Florida
rules allow for intensive background investigations into the applicant.5 The
rule seeks to ensure that attorneys have a record showing core knowledge;
"ability to reason;" likelihood of complying with deadlines; ability to
"[c]ommunicate candidly and civilly with clients, attorneys, courts and oth-
ers;" ability to "[c]onduct financial dealings in a responsible, honest, and
trustworthy manner;" capability to "[a]void acts that are illegal, dishonest,
fraudulent, or deceitful; and ability to [c]onduct oneself in accordance with
the ... laws ... and the Rules of Professional Conduct. 5 2 The rules also
delineate "disqualifying conduct" of attorneys, which includes "[a] record
manifesting a deficiency in the honesty, trustworthiness, diligence, or reli-
ability."53
Ultimately, an applicant who has complied with the rules for admission,
passed the requisite examinations, and met character and fitness standards,
will be recommended for admission to The Florida Bar by the Board of Bar
Examiners. 4 The Supreme Court of Florida, upon satisfaction of this rec-
ommendation, will enter an order of admission. 5  Once an attorney swears
the requisite Oath of Attorney, the applicants then become subject to the ad-
ministration of The Florida Bar and thus the discipline system of The Florida
Bar.56
Florida attorneys are required to continue their legal education by com-
pleting thirty hours of further education over a period of three years, includ-
ing five hours in the area of ethics.5 7 Members must report hours earned in a
three-year cycle, although they are required to renew their bar memberships
annually, which includes an annual membership fee starting from $265.58
51. FLA. BAR ADMISS. R. 3.
52. FLA. BAR ADMIss. R. 3-10.
53. FLA. BAR ADMISS. R. 3-11.
54. FLA. BAR ADMIss. R. 5-10.
55. FLA. BAADMISS. R. 5-11.
56. FLA. BAR ADMIss. R. 5-15.
57. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 6-10.3(b).
58. Id; see also Florida Board of Bar Examiners, Bar Application, at http://www.florida
barexam.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2005). Should attorneys wish to participate in voluntary
"sections" of The Florida Bar, there are organizations arranged by area of practice for net-
working and education purposes. The Florida Bar, Organization, at http://www.flabar.org/tfb/
TFBOgan.nsf/2FC80981 iCO 105238525671100692F 1C/95FD890BE127C05E85256B2F006C
D832?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 11, 2005). An additional fee applies for each section
joined, which varies per section. See generally The Florida Bar, Sections and Divisions, at
http://www.flabar.org/names.nsf/Sections?OpenForm (last visited Feb. 11, 2005) (linking to
each section's website).
215
: Nova Law Review 29, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2005
NOVA LA W REVIEW
The Florida Bar has no reciprocity with licensed attorneys from other
jurisdictions.59 Any candidate wishing to obtain a Florida Bar license must
submit to The Florida Bar Examination.6 °
B. Real Estate Professionals
In every state, as well as in the District of Columbia, real estate brokers
and sales agents must be licensed to conduct real property business deal-
ings.6' Real estate professionals may be divided into two categories: real
estate agents (also called sales associates) and real estate brokers.62
The real estate profession in Florida is governed by the DBPR, specifi-
cally, the Florida Real Estate Commission.63  The DBPR is a Florida state
agency that issues licenses and ensures the quality of services provided by its
licensees.' It regulates some two hundred classes of licensed professions
and occupations and is required under the Florida Statutes to submit an an-
nual report on the professions that it regulates.65
The Division of Real Estate regulates real estate licenses through educa-
tion, regulation, and compliance.66 It provides administrative support to the
Florida Real Estate Commission, which consists of seven members ap-
pointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate.6 7
59. FBBE FAQs, supra note 24.
60. Id.
61. Career Webschool, Florida Real Estate School-Career, at http://www.careerweb
school.com/Florida-Real-Estate/florida-real-estate-education-career-info.html (last visited
Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Career].
62. Career Webschool, Florida Real Estate School-State Requirements, at http://www.
careerwebschool.com/Florida-Real-Estate/florida-real-estate-state-requirements.html (last
visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Real Estate Requirements]. Real Estate Appraisers are also
considered professionals under the DBPR and Florida Statutes; however, their roles in rela-
tion to the public are dissimilar to attorneys and CPAs and thus have been excluded for pur-
poses of this article. FLA. STAT. § 475.610 (2003); Division of Real Estate, Florida Real Es-
tate Appraisal Board, at http://www.state.fl.us/dbpr/re/freab welcome.shtml (last visited Feb.
7, 2005) [hereinafter Real Estate Appraisal].
63. § 475.02(1).
64. DBPR Home Page, supra note 2.
65. Id.
66. Division of Real Estate, Home Page, at http://www.myflorida.com/dbpr/re/index.
shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
67. § 475.02(1). Four members must be brokers having held active licenses for a five-
year period. Id. One member is a licensed broker or sales associate for two years, and two
members are members of the public who have never been licensed real estate professionals.
Id. Members hold their positions for four year terms, may be removed for cause, and one
member of the commission must be at least sixty years of age. § 475.02(l)-(2).
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In Florida, real estate sales associates generally are independent sales-
people who work for licensed real estate brokers in exchange for a portion of
a commission earned from the sale of a property.68 Real estate brokers, by
contrast, generally own their independent businesses and supervise the work
of associates in their employ.69 These two categories have different licensing
requirements.70
An applicant for a real estate associate license must be at least eighteen
years old and have a high school diploma or its equivalent.71 In addition, an
applicant must be "honest, truthful, trustworthy, and of good character" as
well as "have a good reputation for fair dealing., 72 An applicant must be
"competent and qualified to make real estate transactions," and if a previous
license has been denied or revoked, the applicant will not be licensed unless
they have rehabilitated themselves through subsequent behavior.73 Real es-
tate associates must complete a pre-licensing course, approved by the real
estate commission, of sixty-three classroom hours, which is valid for two
years after completion.74 The course covers a wide range of important topics
for real estate sales associates, from real estate brokerage, including property
management, appraising, financing, and counseling, to development and
construction, the roles of different levels of government, and professional
associations. 75 There are also additional sessions specifically on real estate
license law, federal and state laws pertaining to real estate, titles, deeds, legal
descriptions, real estate financing, taxes, and zoning.76
In addition, applicants must complete an application, fingerprint card,
submit an initial fee of $152, and then sit for the Florida Real Estate Sales
68. Career, supra note 61.
69. Id. A broker is defined under Florida Statutes as a person who "appraises, auctions,
sells, exchanges, buys, rents, or offers, attempts or agrees to appraise, auction, or negotiate the
sale, exchange, purchase, or rental of business enterprises or business opportunities or any real
property." § 475.01(1)(a).
70. Real Estate Requirements, supra note 62.
71. § 475.17(1)(a). Florida Licensing Requirements for Real Estate are readily accessible
on the "myflorida.com" webpage, listed under the DBPR. Division of Real Estate, Florida
Licensing Requirements for Real Estate, at http://www.myflorida.com/dbpr/re/frec licens-
ingrequirements.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Licensing Requirements for
Real Estate]. In addition, further detailed information clarifying these statutes appears in the
Florida Administrative Code. See generally FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61 J2 (2004).
72. § 475.17(1)(a).
73. Id.
74. Real Estate Requirements, supra note 62.
75. The Florida Real Estate Commission, SALESPERSON COURSE SYLLABUS (2001), at
http://www.state.fl.us/dbpr/re/publications/frec/frec-syllabus.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2005)
[hereinafter SALESPERSON COURSE SYLLABUS].
76. Id.
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Associate Exam.77 Finally, applicants must complete the administrative step
of activating their licenses and completing forty-five classroom hours of
post-licensing instruction before biennial license expiration.7" Currently,
neither licensed Florida attorneys nor applicants with a four-year-degree are
required to submit to these real estate requirements.79
By contrast, those seeking to become real estate brokers must already
hold an active real estate sales associate license and then complete twelve
months of real estate experience during a period of five years before seeking
to become a broker.80 A broker must take an additional pre-licensing course,
approved by the Florida Real Estate Commission, consisting of seventy-two
classroom hours, which also is valid for two years after the course comple-
tion date.8 This course focuses more specifically on advanced skills for this
higher level of licensing, such as opening, owning, managing, and supervis-
ing a real estate office, including escrow management, valuing real property,
listing and selling real property, and several specialty areas including envi-
ronmental issues that affect real estate transactions. 2 Such information in-
cludes understanding policies and law relating to leasing real property and
employing sales associates.83
All other requirements for brokers are similar to sales associates, such
as the application, fingerprinting, paying a fee, and the successful passing of
the real estate broker examination. Real estate brokers also must complete
administrative requirements in order to activate their licenses and complete
at least sixty hours of post-licensing course work prior to license expiration. 5
77. Licensing Requirements for Real Estate, supra note 71. A passing grade on this
exam is a seventy-five. Id. In addition, applicants may sit for the Florida Real Estate Law
Examination, of which a passing score of at least thirty is required. Id. In addition, Florida
has "mutual recognition" of licensing with ten states. SALESPERSON COURSE SYLLABUS, supra
note 75.
78. Real Estate Requirements, supra note 62. Real estate applications may be submitted
partially online. Id.
79. IFREC Real Estate Schools, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.ifrec.com/
faq.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter IFREC FAQs].
80. Real Estate Requirements, supra note 62.
81. Id.
82. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, BROKER COURSE SYLLABUS (1999), at http://
www.state.fl.us/dbpr/re/publications/frec/frec2_syllabus.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
83. Id.
84. Real Estate Requirements, supra note 62.
85. Id. Fees for Real Estate Brokers are initially $162 with a renewal fee of $72.50 per
license; licensees must complete fourteen hours of continuing education every two years. Id.;
Division of Real Estate, Fees, at http://www.myflorida.com/dbpr/re/fees.shtml (last visited
Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Fees].
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The real estate exam is given by a private vendor at various testing cen-
ters throughout Florida. It is a multiple-choice exam that is administered
electronically through a touch-screen format, with instant notification of suc-
cess or failure at the test site. 6 The examination is graded on a basis of one
hundred points, and successful completion is a grade of seventy-five points
or higher."7 The sales associate examination is based on "real estate princi-
ples and practices, real estate law, and real estate mathematics.' '8 s Generally,
forty-five points are based on law, forty-five points on principles and prac-
tices, and ten points on real estate mathematics.8 9 The broker exam is also
based on real estate law principles and practices, including appraising, fi-
nance, investment and brokerage management, and real estate mathematics.9°
This exam is generally broken down by forty-five points on law, forty points
on principles and practices, and fifteen points on mathematics.9'
Applicants without Florida residency may become licensed, non-
resident real estate professionals in Florida. However, those licenses are
specially governed and have additional rules that are particular to them. A
written exam consisting of forty questions is administered to all non-resident
applicants, who must answer thirty or more questions correctly to pass the
test.92 In addition, the code specifically defines residency for real estate li-
censing purposes and details post-license and continuing education require-
ments for non-resident licensees.93
Real estate schools are heavily regulated by the Florida Administrative
Code, and a list of approved real estate schools is available on the DBPR
website.94  Although many schools are listed as branches with different
physical locations, the list contains 1131 schools, some of which have out-of-
state addresses. 95 Minimum standards for pre-licensing study, including use
of guest lecturers, instructor requirements, and renewal are all state-
regulated.96
86. IFREC FAQs, supra note 79. Applicants who fail must wait at least thirty days to
take the exam again. Id.
87. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61J2-2.029 (2004).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. FLA. ADMiN. CODER. 61J2-26.001 (2004).
93. FLA. ADMN. CODER. 61HJ2-26.
94. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Real Estate Schools, at
http://www.myflorida.com/dbpr/re/publications/re_schools.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
95. Id. The list appears to contain a few repetitions of schools and addresses. See id.
96. See FLA. ADmTN. CODER. 61J2-3.008.
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The initial and continuing education courses necessary for real estate
professionals are regulated by the DBPR.97 All of the details of the specific
classroom requirements within each school, including the requirements for
successful course completion, as well as regulations on advertising, are
specified.98
All active licensees must also complete a minimum of fourteen hours of
continuing education during each biannual license renewal period, except for
the first license period.99 During the first licensing period, all brokers and
sales associates must complete a specified post-licensing course prior to the
first renewal.1"' For sales associates, this course requirement is not more
than forty-five hours (including exam) in subjects including "property man-
agement, appraisal, real estate finance, the economics of real estate manage-
ment, marketing, technology, sales and listing of properties, business office
management... practical real estate application skills, development of busi-
ness plans, marketing of property, and time management."'' 1  By contrast,
the post-licensing course for brokers includes instruction in the same subjects
for up to sixty hours prior to the first license period.0 2 Sales associates must
pay a $65 renewal fee, while brokers pay a renewal fee of $72.50.03
The Florida Division of Real Estate has "mutual recognition" with ten
states, in which both brokers and sales associates can qualify for an equiva-
lent-type license in Florida if they are eighteen years of age, hold a high
school diploma or equivalent, and are not a resident of Florida at the time of
application.0 4
97. Law schools may be accredited by states for graduates to sit for only that state's bar
exam; however, the American Bar Association also nationally accredits law schools, permit-
ting ABA-accredited school graduates to apply for the bar examination in any state. American
Bar Association, The ABA Role in General, at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/accreditation
/abarole.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
98. See FLA. ADMrN. CODE R. 61J2-3.008.
99. FLA. STAT. § 475.182(1) (2004).
100. FLA. ADMlN. CODE. R. 61J2-3.020.
101. § 475.17(3)(a). These courses must be given by an accredited college, registered real
estate school, or other approved center. Id.
102. FLA. ADMIN. CODER. 61J2-3.020(l)(b).
103. Fees, supra note 85.
104. SALESPERSON COURSE SYLLABUS, supra note 75. The ten states are Alabama, Arkan-
sas, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.
Id. There are other requirements for certain states, and if applicants have received their li-
censes in these ten states by reciprocity, they may not claim mutual recognition in Florida. Id.
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C. Certified Public Accountants
A certified public accountant (CPA) is defined as a person who holds a
license from the State of Florida to practice public accounting."0 5 A person
practicing public accountancy performs various services for the public in-
volving financial statements, presentations of financial information, and
various types of services using accounting skills."0 6 Any person who wishes
to be licensed as a certified public accountant in Florida must apply for such
a license to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation Board
of Accountancy.
10 7
To sit for the examination to become a licensed CPA, an applicant must
be a graduate of a four-year baccalaureate degree program, with a major in
accounting, as well as other credit hours concentrating in the field of ac-
counting.' °8 In addition, the applicant must be considered of "good moral
character."10 9 Good moral character is defined as a "personal history of hon-
esty, fairness, and respect" both for the rights of others and for the law.11 0 A
finding of lack of such character must be supported by competent substantial
evidence.' There is neither a requirement of residence or employment in
the state of Florida for applicants, nor of any experience in the field.1
Potential licensees must pass the CPA exam, a national exam given un-
der the approval of the Florida Board of Accountancy." 3 The Board is a
division of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, focus-
ing on the regulation of CPAs.1 4 The board determines the passing grade for
105. § 473.302(4).
106. § 473.302(7)(a)-(c). A detailed list of public accounting duties is included in this
statute. Id.
107. Division of Certified Public Accounting, Florida Board of Accountancy, at
http://www.myflorida.com/dbpr/cpa/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Board
of Accountancy]. The Florida Board of Accountancy is located in Gainesville, Florida. Id.
108. § 473.306(2)(b); FLA. ADmiN. CODE R. § 61H1-27.002 (2003). The other hours must
equal at least thirty semester hours or forty-five quarter hours in excess of those required for
the baccalaureate degree, including a program concentrating on accounting as defined in the
administrative code. § 473.306(2)(b).
109. § 473.306(2)(a).
110. § 473.306(4)(a).
111. § 473.306(4)(b). In addition, an applicant who is rejected for a license based on
character must be furnished with a complete record of such evidence upon which the determi-
nation was based. FLA. STAT. § 473.306(4)(c) (2004).
112. Division of Certified Public Accounting, Licensure and Examination, at http://www.
myflorida.com/dbpr/cpa/business/licensingLpages/licensure-examination.shtml (last visited
Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter CPA Licensure].
113. See id.
114. Board ofAccountancy, supra note 107.
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each subject of the exam for Florida applicants, but does not administer a
Florida-specific examination." 5 The exam is actually prepared by the Board
of Examiners of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA)."16 The Board of Examiners of the AICPA is responsible for both
preparing and grading the Uniform CPA exam.117 All fifty states-as well as
the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands-
use this exam.118 The National Association of State Boards of Accountancy
(NASBA) assists the boards of accountancy in processing the exam grades
and providing statistical information arising from the exam.'19
In 2003, the DBPR approved the final administration of a paper-based
CPA examination for Florida test-takers.120 Beginning on April 5, 2004, all
of the testing for the CPA examination in Florida is only computer-based. 121
The Board offers four testing "windows" for examinees to take the exam., 22
An exam "window" is a three-month period, during which the exam is actu-
ally available for testing for only two of the months; for one month the exam
is not offered for "routine maintenance" of the system. 123
The newer computer-based examination consists of the same number of
parts as the previous paper-based examination, although they have been re-
named. 124 The four sections of the exam are: 1) Auditing and Attestation; 2)
115. § 473.306(3)(a); see also American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, THE
UNIFORM CPA EXAMINATION CANDIDATE BULLETIN (2004), http://www.cpa-examorg/
cpa/bulletin.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter CPA CANDIDATE BULLETIN]. The
Board of Examiners makes recommendations to each individual board of accountancy regard-
ing standards. Id.
116. CPA CANDIDATE BULLETIN, supra note 115, at 1. The AICPA is the largest national
professional organization for CPAs, and its mission is to serve its members in a way to enable
them to provide valuable services. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id. at l, 4.
119. Id. at 1.
120. Division of Certified Public Accounting, Computer-Based CPA Exam Information,
http://www.myflorida.com/dbpr/cpa/CBT for web_page.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
121. CPA Licensure, supra note 112.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. CPA Ready, Computerized CPA Exam Information, at http://www.cpaexam.conrl
content/examinfo.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter CPA Exam Info]. These sections
correspond in order to the old paper-based examination sections of 1) Auditing; 2) Financial
Accounting and Reporting; 3) Accounting and Reporting; and 4) Business Law and Profes-
sional Responsibilities. Id. Applicants who are currently in their eighteen-month period of
accumulating credits may use old paper-based section credits combined with newer, com-
puter-based passed sections during the transition period of the computer-based testing. Id.
The specific descriptions of each section are available in the Uniform CPA Examination Can-
didate Bulletin, June 1, 2004. CPA CANDIDATES BULLETIN, supra note 115.
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Financial Accounting & Reporting; 3) Regulation; and 4) Business Environ-
ment and Concepts.125 The cost for taking each of these sections, which does
not include the $50 application fee and is paid directly to the Division of
CPA, ranges from $100.50 to $134.50 for each section. 26 The estimated
total cost for first-time exam candidates may be up to $800.127
Candidates for licensing may take different sections of the exam indi-
vidually and in any order.2 8 Once taken, the examinee earns credit for each
section of the exam passed for a period of eighteen months. 9 Candidates
must pass all four sections within that eighteen-month period and may not
retake a failed section within the same examination window. 30
Information about the CPA exam, including access to sample exams, is
available on a national website.' 31 In Florida, applicants contact the national
examination services directly to set up exam testing. 32 There is generally no
application deadline; rather, the new computer-based examination is intended
to allow candidates to apply on a rolling basis for an examination window.'
33
Once a test appointment is scheduled, candidates may reschedule an ap-
pointment if there is a conflict. 134 Applicants do not have to be physically
located within their respective jurisdictions to take the exam, but may take it
at any site approved by the company administering the exam.35  There are
125. Id.
126. CPA Licensure, supra note 112. Florida Administrative Code Rule 61H1-31.001,
subsection one, lists the costs for taking the paper-based portion of the exam. FLA. ADMiN.
CODE R. 61H1-031.001(1) (2003).
127. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, CPA Computer-Based Examina-
tion FAQs, at http://www.cpa-exam.org/cpa/computer-faqs.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005)
[hereinafter CPA FAQs]. Each section of the exam carries a different cost. CPA Licensure,
supra note 112. The total cost may include other fees associated with the testing. Id.
128. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, The CPA Exam: An Update, at
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/cpaltr/may2002/supps/edul.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
129. CPA Exam Info, supra note 124.
130. Id.
131. CPA FAQs, supra note 127.
132. CPA CANDIDATE BULLETIN, supra note 115. The telephone number is 1-800-CPA-
EXAM (1-800-272-3926). American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Steps to Be-
come a CPA, http://www.cpa-exam.org/get-started/steps.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005). In
other states, applicants may have to contact their Board of Accountancy directly or another
service. Id.
133. See id. at 8.
134. Applicants may reschedule at no charge if they are rescheduling more than thirty days
in advance. Id. at 12. Rescheduling between five and twenty-nine days results in a charge of
approximately $35; however, rescheduling within five days requires full forfeiture of the fee
for the section that was scheduled. CPA CANDIDATE BULLETIN, supra note 115; CPA FA Qs,
supra note 127.
135. CPA CANDIDATE BULLETIN, supra note 115; CPA FAQs, supra note 127.
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test centers throughout the United States, but applicants may not sit for the
exam outside of the United States.136 As of this writing, there were twelve
testing centers in Florida, located in Coral Springs, Ft. Myers, Gainesville,
Jacksonville, Miami, Davie, Orlando, Sarasota, Tallahassee, and Tampa.1
37
The substance of each exam consists of both simulation tests and multi-
ple-choice questions. 38 The length of each section ranges from two hours
and thirty minutes to four hours and thirty minutes, and the test is a total of
fourteen hours in four separately tested sections.139 Each section consists of
"testlets" which contain either multiple-choice questions or a case study
(simulation). 40
There is no immediate feedback of results. A minimum of two to four
weeks is generally required to process all scores, and an additional delay is
likely as the transition to computer-based examinations is completed. 41 A
passing grade is eighty.
1 42
Licensed CPAs are required to complete continuing professional educa-
tion programs prior to biennial license renewal. 43 The DBPR brings all li-
censees into a concurrent reporting system by ending at the end of the DBPR
reporting year, which is June 30th. CPA's must complete at least eighty total
hours of continuing education during a two-year period, including at least
twenty hours in accounting and auditing subjects, and no more than twenty
hours in behavioral subjects. 144 The hours must be taken during the period of
the current license, and while hours do not carry over, extensions are avail-
136. Id. Applicants must bring a document entitled "Notice to Schedule" to the center,
and without it, will not be allowed to sit for the exam. CPA CANDIDATE BULLETIN, supra note
115, at 14. Applicants must also bring photo identification, on which the name must exactly
match the notice. Id. at 7.
137. Thompson Prometric, TCL Test Centers, at http://www.2test.com/registrationgate
way?ccode=USA&st=FL&cid=CPA (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter TCL Centers]. In
the past, when paper-based exams were administered, more than 55,000 applicants took the
exam as given twice a year. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, The New
CPA Exam Meeting Today's Challenges, at http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/cpaltr/may2002/supps/
edul.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2005). These exams were administered in large rooms to ac-
commodate hundreds or more applicants simultaneously. Id. The new computer-based for-
mat allows more examination windows, more flexibility to applicants on which section to take
at what time, and more options in scheduling and location, as well as private exam carrels. Id;
CPA CANDIDATE BULLETIN, supra note 115, at 8-11, 15-16.
138. CPA CANDIDATE BULLETIN, supra note 115, at 22.
139. CPA Exam Info, supra note 124.
140. CPA CANDIDATE BULLETIN, supra note 115.
141. CPA FAQs, supra note 127.
142. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61H1-33.001(1) (2004).
143. Id.
144. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61H1-33.003.
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able subject to additional hours taken.'4 5 License renewal may be adminis-
tratively accomplished through the "myflorida.com" secure website and must
be renewed every two years. 46  In addition to the continuing education
courses, current licensees must also pass an exam on Florida Accountancy
Law and Rules. 147 This open-book exam is administered either via the Inter-
net or via hard copy upon request. 48 The total biennial cost to renew the
CPA license is $95.149
The accountancy system provides that applicants who have passed the
CPA examination in another state may become licensed in Florida. First, if
the applicant has passed all parts of the nationally administered exam, in
conformance with Florida's rules for sitting for the exam, but not yet applied
to be licensed in another state, the examinee may apply to transfer credit of
the uniform exam to Florida. 50 In contrast, if the applicant has already been
licensed or applied for licensing in another jurisdiction, a process known as
endorsement must be undergone, requiring a ten-page application with a fee,
five years of governmental accounting after licensure, and compliance with
specific rules regarding educational experiences and accreditation.'
D. Comparing and Contrasting Fiscal Professional Licensing
The first difference between the fiscal professionals examined in the
state of Florida is their educational requirements. Real estate professionals
are not required to hold any particular traditional degree, 5 2 while CPAs are
required to complete a baccalaureate degree, 153 and attorneys are required to
complete a post-graduate degree. 4 However, real estate professionals must
take a certain number of credit hours of training specifically in that field;'55
145. Id.
146. Division of Certified Public Accounting, Laws and Rules Exam Reminder, at
http://www.myflorida.com/dbpr/cpa/lawsrules reminder notice 2004.pdf (last visited Feb.
7, 2005) [hereinafter CPA Exam Reminder].
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Division of Certified Public Accountants, Instructions For Completing Application
For Licensure by Endorsement Transferring Examination Grades DBPR CPA 5002-1, at
http://www.myflorida.com/dbpr/cpa/forms/endorsementapplicationpackage.pdf (last visited
Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Instructions].
151. FLA. STAT. § 473.308(4) (2004); FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61H1-29.003; Instructions,
supra note 150.
152. FLA. STAT. § 475.17(l)(a).
153. FLA. STAT. § 473.306(2)(b)(1).
154. FLA. BAR ADMISS. 4-13.1(a) (2004).
155. § 475.17(3)(a).
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similarly, CPAs must have majored specifically in accounting and then taken
additional specific accounting courses. 156 In contrast, the attorney, who has
completed a minimum of seven years of post-high school education, is not
required to take course training specific to the vocation.'57 Law school
courses often are said to teach students to think like lawyers and to teach the
law, but they do not necessarily cover the specific every day business re-
quirements of being an attorney.'58 One of the results of these requirements
is a discrepancy in ages of the fiscal professionals. A real estate professional
could be as young as eighteen (as per licensing requirements),'59 while the
requirement of a bachelor's degree makes an accounting licensee unlikely to
be that young (although no age requirement is specified in the licensing), 61
and certainly attorneys are expected to be even older, with the necessity of
three additional years of education over accountant licensees. 6 '
A second level of comparison is the examination process. Real estate
professionals are required to take an exam that is crafted and administered by
the State of Florida. 162 The real estate exam is given by private testing cen-
ters and is in computer format with immediate feedback. 163 The accountancy
exam, by contrast, is administered by a national organization and has re-
cently switched to an internet format at an approved testing site. Addition-
ally, feedback is not immediate, as the written portion of the exams requires
careful evaluation. Attorney examinations differ from both real estate and
accounting exams. Attorney examinations are a combination of Florida law
and national law, and the Florida Board of Bar Examiners works to adminis-
ter this combination test with the National Conference of Bar Examiners." 6
While the Bar has recently begun allowing examinees to use laptop com-
puters in the writing of the exam, it is a paper-based exam given only on two
specific dates a year in one central location. 16  Feedback as to a passing
score generally comes after a delay of several months. Such a difference in
examination methods certainly sets a different tone and level of accessibility
to the future professionals. This difference regulates the rate at which the
stream of professionals is increased in each profession, requiring careful
planning by employers and future licensees alike.
156. § 473.306(2)(b)(1), (2).
157. FLA. BARADMISS. R. 14-13.1(a).
158. See generally, STuDENT HANDBOOK, supra note 33.
159. § 475.17(1)(a).
160. FLA. ADMIN. CODER. 61H 1-27.002.
161. FLA. BARADMISS. R. 4-13.1(a).
162. FLA. ADMrN. CODER. 61J2-3.008 (2004).
163. Id.; IFREC FAQs, supra note 79.
164. FLA. BARADMIss. R. 4-11.
165. FLA. BAR ADMISS. R. 4-14, 4-15.
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The third level of difference between the licensure systems is the man-
ner in which they treat potential licensees who are licensed in other jurisdic-
tions. On one end of the spectrum is the attorney system in Florida, forbid-
ding any reciprocity of other licensed attorneys. On the other end, for our
purposes, is the real estate system, which has set up a mutual recognition
system with twenty percent of the licensing states, once additional minimum
standards are met.166 A far more complicated system is the accountant en-
dorsement system, which designates minimum requirements, work experi-
ence, and the potential of additional continuing education. 67
The final level of comparison between the professions is in the adminis-
trative requirements. All three fiscal professional categories require some
type of post-licensing continuing credit. Real estate professionals are re-
quired to carry a heavy load during the first renewal period, followed by a
comparatively lighter educational requirement-half of an attorney's re-
quirements in two-thirds the time period.'68 By contrast, accountants are
required to complete more than twice the number of hours in a period one-
third shorter in length than attorneys. All three fiscal professional categories
are also required to renew their licenses and pay a fee. Both real estate pro-
fessionals and accountants have two-year renewal periods,'6 9 brought into
time concurrence according to the DBPR annual report year, with a fee of
less than $100; meanwhile, attorneys have a three-year renewal period,170
staggered as to actual admittance date to the Florida Bar, with a maximum
fee of $265 annually.' 71
IV. THE DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS
A. Attorneys
The Supreme Court of Florida establishes the responsibilities of its
member attorneys through the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.172 The Su-
166. Division of Real Estate, Mutual Recognition Information, at http://www.myflorida.
com/dbpr/re/mutrec.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
167. FLA. ADMIN. CODER. 61H1-29.003.
168. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61J2-3.020.
169. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 6141-031.001 (1); see CPA Exam Reminder, supra note 146.
170. R. REGULATING. FLA. BAR 6-10.3(b) (2004).
171. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 1-7.3. Although The Florida Bar Exam is administered
only twice per year, the actual admittance date of the applicant may depend on the completion
of the full processing of any individual application. FLA. BAR. ADMISS. R. 2.
172. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 1-4.2. The Supreme Court of Florida has the power under
the Florida Constitution to regulate the admission of the members of the Bar with the right to
practice law, and thus set the ethical standards for those members. See id. The current Rules
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preme Court of Florida sets the standards of actions for attomeys and deter-
mines what constitutes discipline. 73 The Supreme Court of Florida also is
ultimately responsible for disciplining Florida attorneys. 74 The professional
regulation of lawyers in Florida is not the same as a civil lawsuit for mal-
practice."'
The grievance process against an attorney generally begins with a com-
plaint from a client. 76 Clients are encouraged, before the filing of a com-
plaint, to first contact the Attorney Consumer Assistance Program (ACAP),
launched by The Florida Bar in March 2001. A client who contacts ACAP
before filing a grievance will first discuss the behavior of the subject attorney
with non-lawyer personnel and then with ACAP attorney personnel, who will
by then have reviewed the information.178 The ACAP attorney's role is to
help determine if a potentially actionable grievance exists against an attorney
and to guide the client through the filing of such a complaint.' 79
of Professional Conduct were adopted in the late 1980s and are based on the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. See Timothy P. Chinaris, A Brief Overview of Lawyer Regula-
tion in Florida, at http://www.sunethics.comlawregoverview.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
173. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-1.2.
174. Id.
175. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-1.1. A civil lawsuit for malpractice occurs when attor-
neys are sued in the civil court system of the judicial circuit having jurisdiction over that at-
torney's actions, proceeding according to the court and substantive rules and laws of the juris-
diction. FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (2003). Such malpractice lawsuits are subject to a statute of limi-
tations, as set by section 95.11, Florida Statutes. Id. In a lawsuit for malpractice, the court
usually is asked to award monetary compensation to the plaintiff. Id. In professional regula-
tion grievance matters, only the status of the attorney's license is at stake. R. REGULATING
FLA. BAR 3-5.1. There is no monetary compensation ordered. Id.
176. See The Florida Bar, Complaint Against a Florida Lawyer, at http://www.flabar.
org/tfb/TFBConsum.nsf/48e76203493b82ad852567090070c9b9/c5b7d247a0c9c45a85256b2f
006c6186?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
177. The Attorney Consumer Assistance Program (ACAP) was created by The Florida Bar
to investigate charges of unethical conduct against lawyers practicing in Florida and assist
clients in resolving problems prior to filing a complaint. Jan Pudlow, Disciplinary Details,
FLA. B. NEWS, Mar. 15, 2001, available at http://www.flabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNNews
01 .nsf/cb53c80c8fabd49d85256b5900678f6c/5cb1a95d473c0a5585256b0a007269c0?OpenDo
cument (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
178. Complaint Against a Florida Lawyer, supra note 176. One reason that this program
was created was to reduce the number of complaints filed on matters not under the jurisdiction
of The Florida Bar for which to give discipline. Pudlow, supra note 177. Generally, The
Florida Bar has the authority to investigate lawyers' behavior regarding fiscal responsibilities,
conflicts of interests, lying, and failure to follow through with matters. See generally R.
REGULATING FLA. BAR 5-1.1, 4-1.1, 4-1.7,4-8.4.
179. New Bar Program to Assist Lawyers and Their Clients, 28 FLA. BAR NEWS 1, Apr.
15, 2001, available at http://www.flabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNNews0l.nsf/cb53c80c8fabd49
d85256b5900678f6c/faaf2e8e8a622b1685256aea0062f7ffl?OpenDocument (last visited Feb.
7, 2005) [hereinafter New Bar Program]. The ACAP program is apparently successful in
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A complaint filed against an attorney must always be in writing and
signed under oath. 8' The official one-page complaint form is available on
The Florida Bar website, and additional information may be attached.'8 '
Complainants must be aware that the name, address, and telephone number
of the person making the complaint (technically called an "inquiry" at this
stage),'82 not only becomes public record, but also is affirmatively disclosed
to the attorney who is the subject of the complaint.'83
The Florida Bar creates a file on each grievance received, which is as-
signed to a Florida Bar disciplinary staff attorney in order to determine
whether The Florida Bar has jurisdiction to investigate the inquiry. 84 If the
Bar determines that it does not have jurisdiction over either the attorney or
the actions, the file is closed.'85
If the Bar does have jurisdiction, the matter then becomes technically
known as a "complaint," and the Bar begins the formal investigative process
by writing a letter to the lawyer who is the subject of the complaint. 8 6 The
accused lawyer is required to answer this request in writing, generally within
twenty days.87 The individual who filed the complaint may then respond to
rebut information provided in the attorney's response.18
The Florida Bar disciplinary counsel then conducts a review to deter-
mine whether the case should move on to the next stage of the disciplinary
process.'89 If counsel makes a determination of complaint substance, the
case is taken to the next step and heard by a Florida Bar grievance commit-
tee. 90 A grievance committee is comprised of panels of volunteers, at least
reducing the number of grievances filed against attorneys and satisfying clients as well. Id.
Complaints to the grievance system of The Florida Bar have dropped eight percent since 2001,
when ACAP was instituted. Id.
180. R. REGULATING. FLA. BAR 3-7.3(c).
181. The Florida Bar Inquiry, Complaint Form, available at http://www.flabar.org/
TFBfTFBResources.nsf/Attachments/AB230E7DCCC3B75385256B29004BD6DC/$FILE/ac
ap-form-web04.pdfOpenElement (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
182. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-7.3(a).
183. Complaint Against a Florida Lawyer, supra note 176.
184. Id.
185. Id. At this point, the complaint is initially labeled as an "inquiry." Id. One reason,
for example, that the Bar may not be able to handle a complaint is if the attorney is not li-
censed in the state of Florida by The Florida Bar. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 1-3.1.
186. Complaint Against a Florida Lawyer, supra note 176. Attorneys may not know if
their behavior was discussed with ACAP when no complaint was filed. Id.
187. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-7.6(h)(2). Extensions are generally liberally granted for
attorneys engaged in the active practice of law. Curtis & Kaufman, supra note 3, at 679.
188. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-7.6(h)(2).
189. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-7.3(a).
190. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-7.3(0.
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one-third of whom may not be lawyers. 91 The committee serves to hear
cases within its jurisdiction to determine if there is "probable cause" in the
matter, determined by a majority vote of those committee members pre-
sent. 92 Grievance committees may only hear complaints if a quorum, con-
sisting of a minimum of three members, two of whom must be lawyers, is
present. 93
If a grievance committee finds probable cause in a matter, bar counsel
files a formal complaint against the accused attorney with the Supreme Court
of Florida.1 94 If that complaint is contested by the subject attorney, the mat-
ter is sent to a circuit or county court judge appointed for that purpose for a
trial. 95 The judge, known in this contest as a "referee," hears evidence,
makes a finding of fact, and recommends discipline to the Supreme Court of
Florida, which has the final authority to decide the discipline of any Florida
attomey.' 96
The Rules Regulating the Florida Bar enumerate the disciplines which
the Supreme Court of Florida may impose. 97 First are specific rules for what
is considered "minor misconduct."'98 Although defined in the rules only as
what is not minor misconduct, rather than an affirmative statement of what is
minor misconduct, generally, the appropriate discipline for such action is
"admonishment" of the attorney.' 99 Admonishment of an attorney declares
191. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-7.4(g)(2).
192. Complaint Against A Florida Lawyer, supra note 176. The Florida grievance com-
mittees are assigned by judicial circuit. Id. Florida's courts are divided into twenty numbered
judicial circuits divided by geography. Florida State Courts, Circuit Courts, at
http://www.flcourts.org/courts/circuit/circuit.shtml (last visited Feb. 11, 2005). Some counties
comprise an entire judicial circuit, while other small counties may combine to form one single
judicial circuit. Id. All members of the grievance committee are appointed by The Florida
Bar Board of Governors. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR. 1-4.3.
193. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-7.4(g)(1).
194. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-7.4(p); see CONSUMER PAMPHLET "ATTORNEY CONSUMER
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM," http://www.flabar.org/tfb/TFBConsum.nsf/48e76203493b82ad85256
7090070c9b 9/90dad2cf7a8f877b85256b2fD06c6lbd?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 7,
2005).
195. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-7.6(a). Cases may also be settled without a trial. Id.
196. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-7.7.
197. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1. In addition, the Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions, Part B describes the levels of discipline and reasons why each may be assessed.
FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANcS. 2.1-10 (2004).
198. R. REGULATING FLA. BARR. 3-5.1(b).
199. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR R. 3-5.1(b)(1). This rule enumerates six conditions in
which misconduct will not be regarded as minor: misappropriation of a client's funds or
property; behavior likely to result in actual prejudice to a client; improper behavior by an
attorney who has been publicly disciplined in the past three years; misconduct of the same
nature for which the subject attorney has been disciplined in the past five years; misconduct
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that the conduct of the attorney was not proper, but it does not limit that at-
torney's right to practice law within the state of Florida.20 0
Attorneys also may have their minor misconduct declared improper in a
more public fashion, but still without limiting their right to practice law. 0 '
This may be appropriate where injury or potential injury is caused by the
attorney's actions, but where the behavior is generally categorized as negli-
gent rather than knowing or intentional.02 Such a judgment of a "public
reprimand" is published in the law reporters for Florida cases. 3
If an attorney's misbehavior is not considered "minor" under the Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar, there are three levels of discipline potentially
available to the court.204 The discipline is public, and in some way, restricts
or alters the attorney's right to practice law. 5
The least intrusive discipline which alters an attorney's right to practice
is being placed on probation.20 6 Attorneys may be placed on probation for a
time period generally between six months and three years. They also may be
required to complete continuing education programs or to be supervised by
licensed attorneys.20 7
Alternatively, attorneys may be suspended from practice either after a
hearing or on an emergency basis.20 8 Suspensions are generally imposed for
either ninety days or less, which do not require proof of rehabilitation or pas-
sage of the bar examination, or between ninety days and three years, which
do require rehabilitation and may also require passage of all or part of the bar
exam. 20 9 An attorney's license may be suspended for violations regarding
which includes dishonesty, misrepresentation, deceit, or fraud by the subject attorney; and
behavior constituting a felony. Id.
200. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 2.6. An admonishment generally consists of a
memorandum documenting the behavior and directing the attorney to appear before either the
grievance committee or The Florida Bar Board of Governors for a discussion of the behavior.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR R. 3-5.1 (a).
201. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 2.5.
202. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 4.13, 4.23, 4.43, 4.63, 5.13, 5.23, 6.13, 6.23, 6.33,
7.3, 8.3; see also Fla. Bar v. Kelner, 670 So. 2d 62, 63 (Fla. 1996); Fla. Bar v. Lumley, 517
So. 2d 13, 14 (Fla. 1987).
203. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(d) (2004). Florida cases are published solely in the
Southern Reporter, Second Series. Id.
204. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(d)-(f).
205. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(c). The referee's recommendation is not binding on
the Supreme Court of Florida, however it is given weight. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-7.7(2).
206. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(c).
207. Id.
208. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(e); see also FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANcS. 2.3,
2.4(2004).
209. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(e).
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improper dealing with client property causing injury, revealing confidential
information of a client, knowing of conflicts of interest without disclosing
them to clients, knowingly failing to perform services for a client, knowingly
lacking competence causing injury, or knowingly deceiving a client, causing
injury or potential injury.21 °
The court also may order an emergency suspension of the license of an
attorney without the full grievance proceeding when an attorney has been
convicted of a serious crime, or if an attorney's conduct will, or is likely to,
cause immediate or serious injury to a client or the public. 1
The most severe of the disciplines against attorneys is disbarment.2 2
Attorneys who are disbarred lose both the privilege of practicing law and
their status as members of the Bar.21 3 Attorneys may be permanently dis-
barred or disbarred with leave to apply for readmission.2 4
There is no explicit list of violations published for attorneys that will re-
sult in disbarment. However, disbarment may be recognized as an appropri-
ate punishment in a variety of grave injuries or potential injuries to a client,
or being convicted of a felony, engaging in the sale of drugs, fraud, or for
deceitful behavior.215
210. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANcS. 4.12, 4.22, 4.32, 4.42, 4.52, 4.62. In addition, a
license suspension may be the appropriate sanction for an attorney who engages in certain
kinds of criminal conduct or other activities, including causing intentional injury or potential
injury to a client, the public, or the legal system. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANcS. 8.2. The
Supreme Court of Florida may also find it appropriate to suspend an attorney's license to
practice law if the attorney already has been publicly reprimanded for the same or similar
conduct, and subsequently has another violation of a similar type. Id.
211. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 2.4. The Florida Bar is required to file a formal
complaint of discipline within sixty days of an order of emergency suspension. R.
REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.2(d) (2004). Such a case then proceeds directly to trial, skipping
the need for a probable cause hearing before a grievance committee. Id. Attorneys may move
to have the emergency order dissolved. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.2(e)(1).
212. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(f).
213. Id.
214. Id; see In re Hipsh, 586 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1991); see also Fla. Bar v. Ryder, 540 So. 2d
121 (Fla. 1989). The disbarred attorney must show, in a petition supported by clear and con-
vincing evidence, that he or she both has completed the bar examination and is rehabilitated,
once again fit to practice law. FLA. STDs. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 2.2 (2004). The disbarred
attorney must also wait a minimum of five years before reapplying. Id.
215. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANcs. 4.11, 4.21, 4.31, 4.41, 4.51, 5.21, 6.31, 7.1. This
rule also applies when an attorney intentionally reveals information regarding a client's mat-
ter, with the intent to benefit a third person, and the disclosure, which would not otherwise be
permitted, causes potential or real injury to the client. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCs. 4.61.
If an attorney knowingly or intentionally deceives a client, disbarment may be appropriate
regardless of injury. Id. When an attorney is found guilty of theft from monies held by that
lawyer in a fiduciary relationship, The Florida Bar rules provide for a rebuttable presumption
of disbarment. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANcs. 4.11; see also Fla. Bar v. Mart, 550 So. 2d
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The Florida Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions states that a court
should consider the following factors in imposing a discipline order on an
attorney: the duty violated by the attorney, the mental state of the attorney,
the potential or actual injury caused by the misconduct, and whether any
mitigating or aggravating factors existed in the matter.2 16 Aggravating fac-
tors may justify an increase in the discipline level imposed on an attorney,
and by contrast, mitigating factors may justify a reduction in the discipline
imposed.2 17
The public has some access to this discipline information, although not
in a single format with both an organized report and detailed information.
The Florida Bar publishes a summary chart for its past fiscal year overview-
ing the years 1996-97 to the present, regarding bar population and final or-
ders by category and the total number of files opened.2' 8 Also, the public
may access specific information about attorney conduct and discipline in a
number of ways. The first is through a listing of orders by the Supreme
Court of Florida (detailing the attorney's name, city, specific conduct, and
discipline received) dating back approximately a year.219 In addition, these
paragraphs are published in the Florida attorney trade newspaper, The Flor-
ida Bar News, on a biweekly basis. It is available at law libraries open to the
public, although many non-lawyers may not be aware of this publication or
its availability. Last, an individual concerned about a specific attorney may
contact The Florida Bar directly to inquire about his/her discipline history.2
464 (Fla. 1989). Standard 5.1 called it failure to maintain personal integrity. FLA. STDS.
IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 5.1. Other reasons for the disbarment sanction may include intention-
ally deceiving the court, abusing the legal process, or intentionally violating the terms of a
prior disciplinary order. E.g., FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 6.11, 6.21, 8.1.
216. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 3.0.
217. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 9.21, 9.31. Facts which may be considered aggra-
vating include prior disciplinary offenses, experience level, patterns of misconduct or vulner-
ability of the victim of the offense. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANcs. 9.22. Mitigating fac-
tors may include absence of prior records or dishonest motive, personal problems or situa-
tions, good faith efforts to rectify consequences, impairments, and overall character. FLA.
STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 9.32.
218. The Florida Bar, Regulation of Lawyer Conduct: The Florida Bar Disciplinary Sta-
tistics, at http://www.flabar.org/tfb/TFBLawReg.nsf/basicview/F4AB3FF7CB9A5AFA85256
B2F00 6C9F09?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Bar Disciplinary Sta-
tistics].
219. The Florida Bar, News Releases, at http://www.flabar.org/tfb/TFBPublic.nsf/wNews
Releases?OpenView (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Fla. Bar News Releases].
220. Id.
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B. Real Estate Professionals
The Department of Business and Professional Regulation provides a
centralized electronic format for both licensees and the public to gather in-
formation about the regulation of many professions.22  The site may be
searched according to occupation.2 22
Complaints against real estate associates, brokers, or unlicensed persons
practicing in the field must be in writing and signed.223 A complaint form is
available on the DBPR website for consumers, or the complainant may write
a letter including details of the complaint along with copies of all pertinent
documents.224
The Division of Real Estate's "Complaint Section" will forward a com-
plaint to a complaint analyst when received for a determination of legal suf-
ficiency.225 If sufficient information does not exist to support a violation, a
letter will be sent to the complainant explaining that a case will not be
opened.226
A probable cause panel, consisting of two members of the Florida Real
Estate Commission, determines if probable cause exists that a licensee or
subject of an investigation violated the Florida Statutes pertaining to real
estate. 227 The main office of the Real Estate Commission is in Orlando, Flor-
ida.228 Members, including those serving on probable cause panels, may be
compensated $50 per day for attendance at meetings or the conducting of
"official" business of the Commission, as defined in the code. 29
221. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Regulation, at
http://www.myflorida.com/dbpr/reg/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
222. Id.
223. Division of Real Estate, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.myflorida.com/
dbpr/re/faq_enfnew.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Real Estate FAQs]. The
complaint form itself asks the complainant to properly categorize the problem as either unli-
censed activity, escrow deposit, property management, appraisal, or other. Department of
Business and Professional Regulation, Uniform Complaint Form, at http://www.myflorida.
com/dbpr/dbpr/leportal/dbpr-0070-l.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Uniform
Complaint Form]. It also asks to list private attorney information if available. Id.
224. Real Estate FAQs, supra note 223.
225. Id.
226. Id. The confidential complaint is retained by the Division of Real Estate. Id.
227. FLA. ADMrN. CODE R. 61J2-20.009 (2004). The members of the panel are appointed
by the chairperson of the Commission, and one panel member may be a former member,
rather than a current member, of the Commission. Id. If a former member, that person must
hold an active real estate license. Id.
228. FLA. ADMrN. CODER. 61J2-20.048.
229. FLA. ADMIN. Code R. 61J2-20.049.
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When an investigation of a complaint is undertaken, the DBPR is re-
quired to furnish to the subject a copy of that complaint, and the subject has
twenty days in which to submit a written response to that complaint.2 30 The
panel must consider the response by the subject, but regardless of it, may still
have the power to issue an emergency order if warranted in order to protect
the public. 3 ' The complaint will be further investigated by the DBPR and its
report submitted to the probable cause panel, including findings and recom-
mendations as to the existence of probable cause.232 The department may
also dismiss a case at any point in the proceedings for insufficient evi-
dence. 3
As an alternative to the complaint being heard by the probable cause
panel, the DBPR may give a licensee, who is the subject of a complaint, a
"notice of noncompliance for an initial offense of a minor violation., 234 A
minor violation is defined as one that "does not demonstrate a serious inabil-
ity to practice the profession, result in economic or physical harm to a per-
son, or adversely affect the public health, safety, or welfare or create a sig-
nificant threat of such harm.,
235
There are twenty such behaviors listed which carry no other penalty, in-
cluding improper use of a guest lecturer in a course or failure to maintain an
office entrance sign.236 The notice identifies the statute and rule violated, and
provides information on how to comply.2 37 The subject is given fifteen days
from the time of receipt of notice in order to be in compliance; failure to
comply may result in a citation. 38 The law requires the DBPR to keep the
complainant updated as to probable cause and any other proceedings or ap-
peals.239
If there are violations which the Division will hear, and the documenta-
tion supports these violations, a case is opened and forwarded to a local In-
vestigative Field Office. 4 ° Complaints are confidential until the subject of
230. FLA. STAT. § 455.225(1)(b) (2003). These guidelines are not specific to the real estate
profession only, rather this applies to the entire Department of Business and Professional
Regulation. See id. Compare with section 454.021 of the Florida Statutes, which delegates
the regulation of attorneys to the Supreme Court of Florida. § 454.021.
231. § 455.225(l)(b).
232. § 455.225(2).
233. Id. A dismissal may come even after a finding of legal sufficiency. Id.
234. § 455.225(3)(a).
235. Id.
236. FLA. ADMDN. CODE R. 61J2-24.003(1) (2003).
237. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 6 1J2-24.003(2).
238. Id.
239. § 455.225(9).
240. Real Estate FAQs, supra note 223.
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the investigation waives the privilege of confidentiality or ten days after a
disciplinary action finding of probable cause.241
In cases going to the probable cause panel, a determination as to the ex-
istence of probable cause is made by a majority vote. 242 Generally, a panel
that requests additional investigative information must make that request
within fifteen days of the receipt of the initial report and make its determina-
tion within thirty days of that date.243
In a situation of a disputed issue of material fact, a formal hearing on
the complaint may be heard by an administrative law judge, who issues a
recommended order.2 " In addition, the DBPR may have such a judge review
any final order by the Board.245 Mediation may be used to assist the process-
ing of a complaint.2 46 Such judicial reviews have recently included appeals
from decisions of the Florida Real Estate Commission by brokers having
licenses revoked or having been found guilty.24 7
A person operating as a broker or sales associate without a valid active
license commits a third degree felony under Florida law, and the Division of
Real Estate may refer such situations to the State Attorney.248 The Florida
Real Estate Commission, as a licensing body, may impose various disci-
plines against its licensees for wrongdoing.249 It may choose to fine, sus-
pend, revoke licenses, place on probation, or simply reprimand its licen-
sees.2 50 The Florida Statutes and the Florida Administrative Code detail a
range of disciplinary guidelines for violations under chapter 475 of the Flor-
241. Id. The outcome of any action taken against a licensee may be discovered by con-
tacting the DBPR with the correct spelling of the licensee's name. Id.
242. § 455.225(4). The Florida Administrative Code specifically stated there were two
members (not at least two) of a probable cause panel for real estate hearings, which then ap-
pears to require a unanimous vote. FLA. ADMIN. CODE. R. 61J2-20.009.
243. § 455.225(4). However, extensions may be granted. Id.
244. § 455.225(5).
245. § 455.225(7).
246. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61 J2-24.004.
247. Jones v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 873 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2004) (holding that there was no "dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device" and reversing
in part); Djokic v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof 1 Regulation, Div. of Real Estate, 875 So. 2d 693, 695
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the Florida Real Estate Commission could not
reverse an administrative law judge's finding of not guilty and no violation of statute, revers-
ing the previous finding).
248. § 475.42(l)(a).
249. See Real Estate FAQs, supra note 223.
250. Id. Restitution to the complainant is not within the power of the board. Id. Licen-
sees operating outside of their licensing or employing those who do so may also be punish-
able. Id.
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ida Statutes. 251 Violations are specifically listed with a recommended range
of penalty for each behavior.252
The purpose of the specific list of violations, along with their penalties,
is to give notice to licensees regarding potential violations. 3 The general
"order of penalties, ranging from lowest to highest: is reprimand, fine, pro-
bation, suspension, and revocation or denial. 254 In addition to other penal-
ties (combinations are permitted), the commission may place a licensee on
probation. Such conditions may include attending or completing a pre-
licensure course, attending or completing post-licensure courses, attending
continuing education courses, and re-taking the state-issued exam. 55 Other
conditions may include periodic inspections, interviews, filing reports, or the
changing of a license from broker to broker-salesperson status.
256
There are thirty-nine separate violations and corresponding penalties
listed with their statutory authority, ranging from: failing to properly main-
tain an office and sign; to have false, deceptive, or misleading advertising; or
to be convicted or found guilty of a crime related to real estate. 57 Disci-
plines may include: 1) suspensions (generally either up to ninety days,
ninety days to two years, three to five years, or five years); 2) revocation;
and 3) fines of either $500 or $1000.258
There are additional violations which the Commission can discharge
with only a citation, generally consisting of a fine between $100 to $500, and
possibly including education requirements 9. 2  There are forty-one such sepa-
rate citation violations, including: failure to maintain a proper office sign;
failure to timely deposit trust funds (if not more than three days late); failure
to properly report education to the DBPR; and improper handling of financial
matters for clients, such as failing to secure permission of parties before plac-
ing trust funds in an interest-bearing account.
26 °
Aggravating or mitigating circumstances may change the discipline
given, and may include factors such as "[t]he degree of harm to the consumer
or public," "[t]he disciplinary history of the [subject]," and the degree of
hardship a penalty may have on the subject, among others.2 6'
251. § 475.42; FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61 J2-24.001.
252. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61J2-24.001(3).
253. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61J2-24.001(1).
254. Id.
255. FLA. ADMIN. CODER. 61J2-24.001(2).
256. Id.
257. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61J2-24.001(1)(a), (d), (g) (2003).
258. FLA. ADMIN. CODE1R 61J2-24.001(3).
259. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61J2-24.002(2).
260. Id.
261. FLA. ADMIN. CODER. 61J2-24.001(4)(b).
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262The harshest penalty imposed on a licensee is revocation. Revocation
of a licensee is generally permanent, except in certain unusual circum-
stances.263
The disciplines themselves are reported on the DBPR public access
websites. 2' By following a link entitled "Disciplinary Action," members of
the public may access fully compiled reports by year-dating back to the
DBPR year 2000-of discipline information sorted by city, including "name
of disciplined professional and a full description of the behavior involved. 2 65
In addition, the DBPR produces an annual report summarizing the licensee
numbers, complaints received, and dispositions of various professions, in-
cluding real estate. 2' Last, the public may search individual licensees on-
line by name and learn the status of their licenses-including whether they
have had their license revoked, or had other discipline imposed on them.267
C. Certified Public Accountants
The discipline process of certified public accountants (CPA) generally
begins with a complaint against a Florida CPA. A uniform complaint form is
available on line at www.myfloridalicense.com, and contains a contact num-
ber at the DBPR Customer Contact Center for assistance in completing the
form.268 The form itself, found through the general licensing pages, rather
than at the specific Division of Accountancy page, asks complainants for
personal information such as name, company, address, contact information,
and a specific question regarding whether this is a complaint regarding unli-
262. See id.
263. FLA. ADM1N. CODER. 61J2-24.005(1).
264. DBPR Home Page, supra note 2. Certain aspects of the DBPR website are password
protected. See id. They are generally specific sites related to license maintenance, renewal
and personal information. Id.
265. Division of Real Estate, Florida Real Estate Commission: Disciplinary Activity Re-
ports, at http://www.myflorida.com/dbpr/re/freab-dar.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [here-
inafter FREC Disc.].
266. Real Estate Appraisal, supra note 62.
267. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Licensing Portal-Licensee
Search by Name, at https://www.myfloridalicense.com/licensing/wll 1.jsp?SID= (last visited
Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Search by Name].
268. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Complaint Filing, at https://
www.myfloridalicense.com/entercomplaint.asp?SID= (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
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censed activity. 269 Last, the form allows for the inclusion of a 5000 character
complaint description. 70 It may be mailed or submitted online. 71
The Florida Board of Accountancy is responsible for appointing a prob-
able cause panel to determine whether probable cause exists for a violation
of the Florida Statutes regarding rules of accountancy. The Florida Ac-
countancy Board consists of nine members, seven of whom are CPAs and
two of whom are consumer members. 73
The Board-appointed probable cause panel is composed of at least three
members.274 One member must be a current Board member and another must
be a present or former Board member who must hold an active and valid
CPA license. 275 The panel also must contain a former or present consumer
member, if available.2 76 Any determination of probable cause must be made
by a majority vote of the probable cause panel.2 77 The Chairman of the
Board selects the probable cause panel, and one panelist is selected as presid-
ing officer, who determines the meeting times of the panel.17' The process of
finding probable cause is similar to that of the process for real estate profes-
sionals, described above, as they are both under the jurisdiction of the
DBPR.279
The Board of Accountancy has set forth specific penalty ranges that
correspond with specific behavior violating the Florida Statutes.28 ° Rule
61H1-36.004(2) of the Florida Administrative Code lists multiple categories
269. Uniform Complaint Form, supra note 223. Compare to attorney regulation, which
has a different department of the Bar that handles unlicensed practice of law matters. R.
REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-5.5 (2004).
270. Uniform Complaint Form, supra note 223.
271. Id.
272. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61H1-19.007 (2003). To be a member of the Florida Board of
Accountancy, board members must attend all regularly scheduled meetings (approximately ten
per year) and may not be absent without excuse from three consecutive meetings. FLA. ADMIN.
CODE R. 61H1-19.006. Excused absences are specifically defined as "illness of the Board
member or member of the Board member's family, death of a member of the Board member's
immediate family, or natural disaster." FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61H1-19.006(l). The terms
"family" and "immediate family" are also defined. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61H I-19.006(3)-(4).
273. FLA. STAT. § 473.303(1) (2003).
274. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61H1-19.007(2).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61H1-19.007(1).
278. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61H1-19.007(3).
279. § 455.225(4).
280. §§ 473.322,.323.
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of violations.28 ' The following table summarizes the Code's information
regarding violations:282
Table 1: Disciplining Accountants
Violation Source Minimum Maximum
(FLA. STAT. or Penalty Penalty
FLA. ADMIN. CODE)
Attempting to § 473.323(1)(b); Revocation and Not applicable
procure license FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. $5000 fine if li-
by bribery or 61H1-36.004(2)(a). censed; denial of
fraudulent license and refer
misrepresenta- to State Attorney
tion if not licensed
CPA License § 473.323(l)(c); Same penalty as Not applicable
disciplined FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. imposed in other
by another 61Hi-36.004(2)(b). jurisdiction or
jurisdiction same range of
penalties for same
violation
Misdemeanor § 473.323(1)(d); Reprimand Reprimand;
criminal con- FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. $5000 fine;
viction relating 61H1-36.004(2)(c). one (1) year sus-
to accountancy pension and two
(2) years probation
Felony § 473.323(1)(d); One (1) year sus- Revocation and
criminal con- FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. pension; $5000 fine
viction relating 61H1-36.004(2)(c). two (2) years
to accountancy probation;
1 1_ $5000 fine
281. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61H1-36.004(2) (1999). Two recent cases in which the Board
of Accountancy was a party were either affirmed without decision or declined to be heard by
the Florida appellate courts, and no further information is available on these matters. Jarkow
v. State, 847 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (unpublished table decision); Buchman
v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof 1 Regulation, 819 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (unpub-
lished table decision). In previous years, particularly in 1993 and 1994, most published cases
regarding the Board of Accountancy dealt with accountant's ability to advertise. See Ibanez v.
State, 621 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd by Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Prof'l
Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994); see also Dep't of Bus. & Prof'I Regulation v. Rampell, 621
So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1993).
282. FLA. ADMIN. CODER. 61H1-36.004(2).
[Vol. 29:2:339
240
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss2/1
2005] LICENSING AND DISCIPLINE OF FISCAL PROFESSIONALS 373
Violation Source Minimum Maximum
(FLA. STAT. or Penalty Penalty
FLA. ADMIN. CODE)
Knowingly § 473.323(1)(e); Reprimand; Revocation;
making or FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. one (1) year pro- $5000 fine
filing false 61H1-36.004(2)(d). bation
report
Fraudulent, § 473.323(1)(f); Letter of guidance Reprimand;
false, decep- FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. one (1) year proba-
tive or mis- 61H1-36.004(2)(e). tion and $5000 fine
leading adver-
tising
Incompetence § 473.323(1)(g); Suspension until Not applicable
(impairment) FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. ability to practice
61Hi-36.004(2)(f). proved followed
by probation
Fraud or deceit § 473.323 (1)(g), (k); Reprimand; $5000 fine and
FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. one (1) year sus- revocation
61Hi -36.004(2)(g). pension;
two (2) year pro-
bation and $5000
fine
Negligence or § 473.315; Letter of Guid- Reprimand;
misconduct: FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. ance one (1) year proba-
technical stan- 61 Hi-36.004(2)(h)(1). tion, continuing
dards education, and
review of practice
at licensee's ex-
pense and limited
area of practice
Negligence or § 473.315; Reprimand; Reprimand;
misconduct: FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. one (1) year pro- one (1) year sus-
lack of inde- 61H1-36.004(2)(h)(2). bation with review pension;
pendence of practice and two (2) year proba-
continuing educa- tion and review of
tion practice and con-
tinuing education
Negligence or FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. Reprimand One (1) year sus-
misconduct: 61H1-21.003, .005; pension;
commissions FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. two (2) years pro-
and contingent 61H1-36.004(2)(h)(3). bation; $5000 fine
fees I I I
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Violation Source Minimum Maximum
(FLA. STAT. or Penalty Penalty
FLA. ADMIN. CODE)
Negligence or FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. Letter of guidance Suspension until
misconduct: 61H1 -23.002; records are re-
client records FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. turned
disposition 61HI -36.004(2)(h)(4).
Solicitation § 473.323(1)(i); Letter of guidance Reprimand; one
FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. (1) year probation;
61H1-36.004(2)(1). $5000 fine; and
one (1) year sus-
pension
Practicing on § 473.323(l)(1); Revoke if previ- Not applicable
suspended or FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. ously suspended,
revoked li- 61H1-36.004(2)(j). refer to State At-
cense torney if previ-
ously revoked
Practicing on § 473.323(l)(1); Reprimand and Not applicable
inactive license FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. fine based on
61H1-36.004(2)(k). length of time in
practice while
inactive; $100 per
month or $5000
maximum (will
require licensure
or cease practice)
Licensees § 473.309; Reprimand and Not applicable
practicing in § 473.3101; $100 per month
an unlicensed § 473.323(1)(g); fine to maximum
firm FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. of $5000 and
61H1-36.004(2)(1). suspension of
right to practice
until corrected
Suspension of § 473.323(1)0); Same penalty as Not applicable
right to prac- FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. imposed by
tice in front of 61H1-36.004(2)(m). agency or imposi-
any state or tion of same range
federal agency as those set forth
in those rules for
type of violation
Lack of good § 473.323(1)(1); Reprimand and Revocation
moral charac- FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. one (1) year pro-
ter 61H1-36.004(2)(n). bation
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Violation Source Minimum Maximum
(FLA. STAT. or Penalty Penalty
FLA. ADMIN. CODE)
Failure to pay § 473.323(l)(1), (in); $100 per month Revocation
fines or admin- FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. late fee for every
istrative costs 61H1-36.004(2)(o). month licensee is
imposed by late to max of
final order or $5000
citations
Once these penalties have been assessed by the Board, the public is able
to access information about them. One way is through the exact same annual
report, which summarizes the real estate profession, created by the DBPR
annually in accordance with its fiscal year ending June 30.283 A second way
is to search individually for a particular licensee by name to determine that
person's discipline status and history.284
D. Comparing and Contrasting Fiscal Professional Discipline
The first major difference in the discipline of these fiscal professionals
in Florida is in the certainty of discipline for a particular action. The rules
governing attorney behavior include broad categories of actions, with room
for interpretation for particular circumstances. In contrast, both real estate
professionals and certified public accountants are pre-noticed with a specific
list of behaviors and specific penalties imposed for those behaviors. 285 The
difference is two-fold-first in the notice to a potential violator and second
in the amount of discretion given to a particular body imposing discipline.
All three systems involve initial boards, made up of diverse members and
non-members of the profession initially reviewing a behavior for discipline,
and do allow for mitigating circumstances that may ultimately affect the final
disposition. 86
283. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Annual Reports & Long Range
Program Plan, at http://www.myflorida.com/dbpr/os/ospubs/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 7,
2005) (linking to individual reports) [hereinafter Long Range Program Plan].
284. Search by Name, supra note 267.
285. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61J2-24.001(1) (2000); FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61H1-36.004(l)
(2003).
286. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR. 3-3.4(c) (2004); FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 9.31
(2004).
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A second difference in evaluating these three systems of discipline is
the ultimate manner in which the discipline is finalized. In professions regu-
lated by the DBPR, disciplines are generally decided by a board, with an
administrative law judge either recommending an order or reviewing a final
order. By contrast, judges in attorney cases serve as initial "referees" rec-
ommending discipline,287 with ultimate discipline being ordered by the high-
est court of the state, and thus becoming part of the legal system in which the
attorney operates.288
A third difference is a program that attorneys have put into place to
"pre-handle" potential attorney grievances.289 In an effort to reduce the
number of improper grievances brought before the Bar, a consumer assis-
tance program was put into place three years ago to assist consumers with
complaints.29 ° While the real estate and certified public accountant profes-
sions are under the umbrella of the already consumer-friendly DBPR, with
help lines available, no such specific program has been deemed necessary to
assist the consumer in properly resolving problems with these professions.
Statistics discussed in Part IV of this article may illuminate the Bar's need
for such a program.
A fourth difference is the manner in which unauthorized practice claims
are handled. The same disciplinary body which deals with license violations
also handles complaints of unlicensed activity for DBPR, treating unlicensed
activity as a consumer fraud issue.291' The real estate complaint form even
specifically provides for a place to indicate that complaint subject. 292 The
public on-line information for DBPR even allows for searches of complaints
against persons or organizations that were not DBPR-licensed. 293 By con-
trast, the information about the "unlicensed practice of law" appears in the
"regulation" section of The Florida Bar website, rather than the consumer
services information, and has a separate complaint sent to a department cre-
ated to monitor this problem specifically.294
287. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-7.6.
288. See R. REGULATNG FLA. BAR 3-7.7.
289. New Bar Program supra note 179.
290. Id.
291. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Don't Be a Victim of Unli-
censed Activity, at http://www.state.fl.us/dbpr/os/communications-office/unlicensedactivity/
dont be a victim.doc (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Don't Be a Victim].
292. Uniform Complaint Form, supra note 223.
293. Don't Be a Victim, supra note 291.
294. The Florida Bar, Law Practice Regulation, at http://www.flabar.org/tfb/TFBLawReg.
nsf/e0f40af2c23904c785256709006a3713/12e6c80e88ba08fd85256b2f006c9dI 5?OpenDocu
ment (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
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A fifth comparison may be made in the diversion from the probable
cause panel provided for in the real estate complaint system. Certain viola-
tions by real estate professionals are considered so technical that an adminis-
trative notice and order to comply may be directly issued rather than the vio-
lation being heard for substance. In contrast, the attorney system provides
for a minor misconduct result but not process,295 while the accountant system
focuses on more major penalties. 6
One sharp difference between the professions regulated by the DBPR
and the self-regulated attorney system is the ability to fine the licensed pro-
fessional for violations. Both the real estate and accountant professions pro-
vide specifically for fines, in some cases up to $5000 for some accountancy
violations to be paid by the disciplined professional as part of the discipline
imposed.297 By contrast, fines are not regularly part of the attorney discipline
process.298
A final distinction among the professions is the public's access to in-
formation. The real estate profession, through the DBPR, has been most
forthcoming with information, including both an annual detailed report as
well as a searchable index for licensed professionals. To learn about disci-
pline regarding a certified public accountant, only general information re-
garding totals may be gleaned from the annual report, but an individual may
be searched, showing the DBPR does not require the same information
among different regulated professions. Those interested in attorney disci-
pline also may search individual names or look at a numerical report, but
also may peruse individual information about attorneys and their disciplines,
although sorted by date and not by name or location.
V. STATISTICS REGARDING LICENSING, COMPLAINTS, AND DISCIPLINE IN
THE ACCOUNTANCY, ATTORNEY, AND REAL ESTATE PROFESSIONS
The following information is gathered from two different kinds of
sources. 299 The first source is the official reports released by the governing
295. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(b).
296. FLA. ADMIN. CODER. 61H1-36.004 (2003).
297. See generally FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61J2-24.001(1); FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61H1-
36.004(1).
298. Complaint Against a Florida Lawyer, supra note 176. There are some instances
where attorneys may be required to pay restitution for specific misdeeds, and a client recovery
fund is available under The Florida Bar to assist in certain client compensation situations. d.
See also FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANcs. 2.1-.8 (2004).
299. The author is not a trained statistician; all information was hand-tabulated and per-
centages rounded on a traditional +/- .5 basis.
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body, either the DBPR 30 or The Florida Bar.30' Each regulatory body has
produced certain kinds of office information available to the public for the
past several years; however, the information type has not been consistent
through the years, even from the same organization. This information is
presented in accord with the agency's fiscal year, which is a July 1 to June
30 year for both the DBPR and The Florida Bar.3°2 The second type of in-
formation used is compiled from general public records published regarding
the discipline of each professional where available.3 3 The information gath-
ered from these sources does not come from an official report of the agency,
but rather was tabulated from various reports listing, and/or describing, dis-
ciplines throughout a year. 31 Information about the nature of those disci-
plines was extrapolated from the published reports. 305 Each table or set of
tables will indicate from which source the information was procured.
A. Licensees in Florida
The published annual reports of both the Department of Business and
Professional Regulation and The Florida Bar list the total number of licen-
sees being regulated in Florida. 306
Table 2: Total Licensees
Profession 1996-1 1997- 1998-11999- 000- 2001-12002-
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Accoun- 25,392 25,872 32,119 33,024 31,471 32,336 35,016
tancy 308 309 310 311 312 313 314
(includes
firms)
3 0 7
300. See Long Range Program Plan, supra note 283.
301. Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218.
302. Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218. See Long Range Program Plan, supra
note 283.
303. Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218. See Long Range Program Plan, supra
note 283.
304. Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218. See Long Range Program Plan, supra
note 283.
305. Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218. See Long Range Program Plan, supra
note 283.
306. Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218. See Long Range Program Plan, supra
note 283.
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307. See Long Range Program Plan, supra note 283. The DBPR annual report included
all accountant licensees through 1996-97; starting in 1997-98 active licensees were desig-
nated.
308. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, 1996-1997
ANNUAL REPORT 60, http://www.myflorida.com/dbpr/os/ospubs/ar9697.pdf (last visited Feb.
7, 2005) [hereinafter 1996-1997 REPORT]. This number shown represents the number of active
licenses.
309. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, 1997-1998
ANNUAL REPORT 60, http://www.myflorida.com/dbpr/os/ospubs/ar9798.pdf (last visited Feb.
7, 2005) [hereinafter 1997-1998 REPORT]. This number shown represents licenses.
310. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, INSIDE DBPR
FISCAL YEAR 1998-1999 22, http://www.myflorida.com/dbpr/os/ospubs/ar9899.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter 1998-1999 REPORT]. This number shown represents total ac-
countancy.
311. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, 1999-2000
ANNUAL REPORT 22, http://www.myflorida.com/dbpr/os/ospubs/ar9900.pdf (last visited Feb.
7, 2005) [hereinafter 1999-2000 REPORT].
312. DIvISION OF PROFESSIONS, REAL ESTATE AND CERTIFIED ACCOUNTANCY, 2000-2001
ANNUAL REPORT 7, http://www.myflorida.com/dbpr/os/ospubs/arOOOl.pdf (last visited Feb. 7,
2005) [hereinafter 2000-2001 REPORT]. This number shown represents total accountancy.
313. DIvISION OF PROFESSIONS, REAL ESTATE AND CERTIFIED ACCOUNTANCY, 2001-2002
ANNUAL REPORT 7, http://www.myflorida.com/dbpr/os/ospubs/arOl02.pdf (last visited Feb. 7,
2005) [hereinafter 2001-2002 REPORT].
314. DIvISION OF PROFESSIONS, REAL ESTATE AND CERTIFIED ACCOUNTANCY, 2002-2003
ANNUAL REPORT 7, http://www.myflorida.com/dbpr/os/ospubs/ar 0203.pdf (last visited Feb.
7, 2005) [hereinafter 2002-2003 REPORT].
315. Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218. The Florida Bar information indicates
that the membership figure for The Florida Bar began including inactive status beginning in
2002-2003.
316. The Florida Bar information indicates that the membership figure now includes total
migs (members in good standing) and inactive status.
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Profession 1996- 11997- 1998- 1999- 2000 2001-12002-
1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Real B: B: 267,006 266,382 215,28 227,015 249,871
Estate 49,135 56,023 320 321 7322 323 324
Comnis- 318 319
sion
(includes
corpora- : :tions, S: :
schools) 317  100,65 141,02
1325 2326
First, the numbers of those being regulated under the Real Estate Com-
mission is far greater than those of accountancy or attorneys, as all corpora-
tions, organizations, and schools involved in the real estate profession are
reported together under one figure in the DBPR annual report.327 It is not
possible to extrapolate only the number of sales associates and/or broker
licensees, and thus it is difficult to examine the comparative effect that these
licensing agencies have on individuals.
Second, the manner in which licensees are reported has shifted through
the years.328 A consumer of these professional services, keeping a watch on
317. See Long Range Program Plan, supra note 283. The DBPR included all real estate
licensees regardless of status but distinguished between brokers (B) and sales associates (S) in
its annual report through the 1997-98 year. After that, only active real estate licensees were
designated without distinction of the category.
318. 1996-1997 REPORT, supra note 308, at 62. This number shown represents the num-
ber of active licenses.
319. 1997-1998 REPORT, supra note 309, at 62. This number shown represents licenses.
320. 1998-1999 REPORT, supra note 3 10, at 22. This number shown represents total real
estate commission.
321. 1999-2000 REPORT, supra note 311, at 22. This number shown represents total real
estate commission.
322. 2000-2001 REPORT, supra note 312, at 7. This number shown represents total real
estate commission.
323. 2001-2002 REPORT, supra note 313, at 8. This number shown represents total real
estate commission.
324. 2002-2003 REPORT, supra note 314, at 6. This number shown represents total real
estate commission.
325. 1996-1997 REPORT, supra note 308, at 62. This number shown represents the num-
ber of active licenses.
326. 1997-1998 REPORT, supra note 309, at 62. This number shown represents licenses.
327. Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218. See Long Range Program Plan, supra
note 283.
328. Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218. See Long Range Program Plan, supra
note 283.
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licensees, would have to carefully note the differences in what was reported
-active licensees only or all licensees, individuals or individuals and com-
panies. No explanations are given in any of the reports as to why the report-
ing methods have changed.329
B. Complaints Against Licensees Received/Probable Cause Found
Each agency has produced an annual report detailing the number of
complaints received (from The Florida Bar, files opened) by that regulatory
body.33 In addition, the DBPR also includes within its annual report the
number of these complaints in which probable cause was found through its
regulation system.33 '
Table 3: Total Complaints Received Against Licensed Professionals
(Files Opened for Attorneys/Probable Cause Found)
(not available for Attorneys)33
Profession 1996- 1997- 1998- 1999- 2000- 2001- 2002-
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Accountancy 249'13/ 299... 290~/ 216 27914'/ 23411/ 24941
19934 298336 I 56338 /53 340 108342 92 3 4 4  9346
329. Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218. See Long Range Program Plan, supra
note 283.
330. Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218. See Long Range Program Plan, supra
note 283.
331. See Long Range Program Plan, supra note 283.
332. The data for Accountancy and Real Estate Commission from 1996 to 1998 references
total complaints received and legally sufficient complaints. After 1998 data for Accountancy
and Real Estate Commission references total complaints received and complaints for which
probable cause was found. The data for Attorneys references complaint files opened.
333. 1996-1997 REPORT, supra note 308, at 64.
334. Id.
335. 1997-1998 REPORT, supra note 309, at 64.
336. Id.
337. 1998-1999 REPORT, supra note 310, at 13.
338. Id. at 14.
339. 1999-2000 REPORT, supra note 311, at 22.
340. Id.
341. 2000-2001 REPORT, supra note 312, at 8.
342. Id. at 9.
343. 2001-2002 REPORT, supra note 313, at 9.
344. Id. at 10.
345. 2002-2003 REPORT, supra note 314, at 7.
346. Id. at 8.
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Profession 1996- 11997- 1998- 1999- 2000- 2001- 2002-
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Attorneys 347  9,436 9,317 9,101 9,491 9,280 8,691 8,671
Real Estate- B: B: 7,611 4,918 5,123 4,246 4,826
Commission 348  5,403 6,358 313/469 355/593 357/ 359/ 361/
(includes 349/ 351/ 354 356 490358 316360 360362
corporations, 4,226 5,117
schools) 350 352
The first notable figure is the number of accountancy complaints versus
the number of complaints against attorneys. Approximately twice the num-
ber of attorney licenses have been issued, yet more than thirty times the
number of complaints have been filed. 363 Although the overall number of
complaints against attorneys is decreasing, the number is still far greater than
in either of the other fields.36"
A second figure to look at is the number of files in which probable
cause was found compared to the total number filed. In accountancy, the
number of files with probable cause have been steadily decreasing from ap-
proximately a little more than one-third of the grievances filed down to one-
fourth.365 In some years, only one complaint was not found to have probable
cause, while by comparison, the real estate complaints with probable cause
are a small fraction of the total number of complaints filed. The reasons for
347. Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218.
348. See Long Range Program Plan, supra note 283. The DBPR distinguished between
brokers and sales associates in their annual report through the 1997-98 report. Id.
349. 1996-1997 REPORT, supra note 308, at 66.
350. Id.
351. 1997-1998 REPORT, supra note 309, at 66.
352. Id.
353. 1998-1999 REPORT, supra note 310, at 13.
354. Id. at 14.
355. 1999-2000 REPORT, supra note 311, at 20.
356. Id.
357. 2000-2001 REPORT, supra note 312, at 8.
358. Id. at 9.
359. 2001-2002 REPORT, supra note 313, at 9.
360. Id. at 10.
361. 2002-2003 REPORT, supra note 314, at 7.
362. Id. at 8.
363. Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218. See Long Range Program Plan, supra
note 283.
364. Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218.
365. See Long Range Program Plan, supra note 283.
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this discrepancy are unknown. It is possible this gap is due to the actual
number of clients these respective professions typically handle. Accountants
tend to work with fewer large projects or with fewer individual clients with
sophisticated fiscal needs. In contrast, real estate professionals often deal
with numerous individuals in many transactions.366
C. Dispositions of Disciplinary Files
Beginning in 1998, the DBPR began reporting the numbers of disposi-
tions that each board accomplished in that fiscal year.367 In the DBPR re-
ports, a disposition only means that a file was closed, not that a particular
discipline, if any, was imposed.368 Attorney final orders connote a discipline
ordered. 69
Table 4: Dispositions of Disciplinary Files
(Final Orders of Discipline for Attorneys)
Profession 1998- 1999- 2000- 2001- 2002-
1 1999370 2000371 2001372 2002373 2003374
Accountancy 38 17 40 35 65
Attorneys 403 391 472 414 384
Real Estate Commission 1229 687 297 384 416
(includes corporations,
schools)
D. Gender and Disciplines Ordered
On the public websites for both the DBPR and The Florida Bar, the
public may read individual descriptions of disciplines meted out by the re-
366. Career Web School, Significant Points, at http://www.careerwebschool.com/Florida-
real-estate/florida-real-estate-education-career-info.html (last visited Feb.7, 2005) [hereinafter
Significant Points].
367. See id.
368. See id.
369. Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218.
370. 1998-1999 REPORT, supra note 310, at 13; Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note
218.
371. 1999-2000 REPORT, supra note 311, at 20; Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note
218.
372. 2000-2001 REPORT, supra note 312, at 8; Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218.
373. 2001-2002 REPORT, supra note 313, at 9; Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218.
374. 2002-2003 REPORT, supra note 314, at 7; Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218.
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spective disciplinary bodies.375 The Florida Bar publishes a paragraph-long
narrative about each final order of discipline from the Supreme Court of
Florida.3 76 The Division of Real Estate has a direct link to a calendar year-
long compilation of descriptive narratives regarding discipline, sorted by city
of the licensee, licensee name, and a full description of the discipline or-
dered.377 Through reading these individual narratives, Table 5 was compiled
for the three years available in full to the public.
Table 5: Total Disciplines Designated by Gender/Percentage of
Disciplined Licensees by Gender for Years 2000-2002. 378
Year: 2000
Professions Disciplines in Male/Female 379  Percentage
I Report Male/Female
I Attorneys 1250 1221/29 188%/12%
Real Estate 271 170/85 63%/31%
Year: 2001
Professions Disciplines in Male/Female Percentage
I Report I Male/Female
IAttorneys 1281 1242/39 186%/14%
Real Estate 221 145/60 66%/27%
Year: 2002
Professions Disciplines in Male/Female Percentage
Report Male/Female
Attorneys 217 188/24 187%/11%
375. FREC Disc., supra note 265; Fla. Bar News Releases, supra note 219.
376. Fla. Bar News Releases, supra note 219.
377. FREC Disc., supra note 265.
378. Florida Real Estate Commission, 2002 Disciplinary Activity Reports, available at
http://www.state.fl.us/dbpr/re/publications/frec/DARs/20O2/frec dar 2002.pdf (last visited
Feb. 7, 2005); Florida Real Estate Commission, 2001 Disciplinary Activity Reports, available
at http://www.state.fl.us/dbpr/re/publications/frec/DARs/ 2001/frec dar 2001.pdf (last visited
Feb. 7, 2005); Florida Real Estate Commission, 2000 Disciplinary Activity Reports, available
at http://www.state.fl.us/dbpr/re/publications/frec/DARs/2O00/frec dar-2000.pdf (last visited
Feb. 7, 2005). There are no published reports available to the public to read individual ac-
countancy disciplines by name.
379. For Table 5, years 2000 through 2002, any discrepancy in gender split against total
results from the inability to determine a certain person's gender.
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Professions Disciplines in Male/Female Percentage
I Report I Male/Female
Real Estate 235 157/56 67%/24%
There is a clear difference in the numbers of men and women being dis-
ciplined in these two professions. It is clear that in the legal field in Florida,
men are being disciplined at a far greater rate than women.8 0 It was posited
previously in regard to this data that the source of this discrepancy can be
linked to data indicating that more disciplines also are ordered on attorneys
with more than ten or even twenty years of experience.38 ' In addition, with
women having entered the legal profession in small numbers over many
years, a critical mass of women has not yet reached the level of responsibility
in which most attorneys are at risk for discipline.38 2
By contrast, due to different levels of education required for licensing,
combined with the lifestyle flexibility available to those in the real estate
profession, it is likely that large numbers of women have been a part of the
real estate business for many years, thus increasing the overall likelihood that
women will be involved in business.383 Second, the real estate business is not
structured in terms of levels of responsibility in the same manner as law
firms.384 While a new attorney in certain legal structures may work under the
guidance and supervision of more senior attorneys for many years without
dealing directly with clients (and thus unlikely to be the subject of a com-
plaint),385 real estate sales associates, due to the nature of their work, deal
directly with individual clients right away.3 6 Although they work under the
structure of real estate brokers, different responsibilities fall to each licensed
group, and each licensed group is subject to complaints related to the work
associated with that licensee's responsibility. 387 Therefore, due to the nature
of this work, no person working in the real estate profession is immune from
complaints.
380. Curtis & Kaufman, supra note 3, at 691-95.
381. Id.
382. Id. In this article, it was clear from a longer range view of the data that the percent-
age of women being disciplined is rising in Florida. Id.
383. See Significant Points, supra note 366.
384. Id.
385. Curtis & Kaufman, supra note 3, at 693 n. 151.
386. Id.
387. Id.
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E. Categories of Discipline Ordered
In examining which types of discipline were ordered within each pro-
fessional regulatory organization, the quirk of information being presented
for some period of time and then no longer being presented in the annual
report was particularly noticeable.388 Table 6 looks in detail at some of the
different kinds of discipline ordered by each regulatory body from official
annual reports, from 1997 through 2000. 389 Once that format changed and
the information was no longer presented in summary form, the information
in Table 7 became available: a composition of extrapolated data from the
individual descriptions of the disciplines ordered on the same subject.3 90 It
also is important to note that from reviewing individual reports of real estate
licensee discipline, those under the real estate system may be given more
than one category of discipline at a time, so that one behavior can generate
numbers in multiple categories.391 By contrast, the categories of discipline
are generally exclusive in the attorney system, which results in a total count
in each category of discipline equaling, but not exceeding, the total number
of disciplines in real estate.392
388. See Long Range Program Plan, supra note 283.
389. Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218. See Long Range Program Plan, supra
note 283.
390. Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218. See Long Range Program Plan, supra
note 283.
391. See Long Range Program Plan, supra note 283.
392. Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218.
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Table 6: Annual Report Summaries of Selected Disciplines
Ordered 1997-2000
Year: 1997-1998
Profession Total Disbar/ Suspend Probation Voluntary
Disciplines Revoke Surrender
Given 3 93  /Resign
3 94
Accountant 40 6 6 14 N/a
Attorney395  417 32 150 73 38
Real Estate 977 105 36 54 N/a
Year: 1998-1999
Profession Total Disbar/ Suspend Probation Voluntary
Disciplines Revoke Surrender
Given /Resign
Accountant 29 0 6 3 3
Attorney 403 129 144 71 44
Real Estate 1024 1109 37 68 55
Year: 1999-2000
Profession Total Disbar/ Suspend Probation Voluntary
Disciplines Revoke Surrender
Given /Resign
Accountant 16 2 2 5 0
Attorney 391 35 132 93 30
Real Estate 521 52 45 89 18
393. Even when the format of the report remained constant, certain information was not
presented in certain years. Some figures were not explicit within the annual report, but calcu-
lated from other information within it.
394. The DBPR titles this category as "Voluntary Relinquishment" while The Florida Bar
titles them "Disciplinary Resignations."
395. The Florida Bar presents this information through the present in official report form.
However, for comparison purposes with the other professions, extrapolated data is used post-
2000.
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Table 7: Data Assembled from Individual Reports Regarding Selected
Disciplines Ordered 2000-2002
Year: 2000
Profession 396  Total Disbar/ Suspend Probation Voluntary
Disciplines Revoke Surrender
Given /Resign
Attomey 250 38 129 11 125
I Real Estate 1271 141 154 195 37
Year: 2001
Profession Total Disbar/ Suspend Probation Voluntary
Disciplines Revoke Surrender
Given /Resign
Attorney 281 129 1148 110 131
,Real Estate 1221 121 168 156 1381
Year: 2002
Profession Total Disbar/ Suspend Probation Voluntary
Disciplines Revoke Surrender
Given /Resign
IAttorney 1217 131 1101 14 129
Real Estate 284  138 157 1119 125
396. There are two sources of information on attorney discipline available from The Flor-
ida Bar. The first source is a statistical chart based on fiscal year totals of the numbers of
disciplines, totaled by year and category and cost of discipline, available at
www.floridabar.org. However, The Florida Bar also publishes individual reports, in para-
graph form, on each discipline, which are available either on the same website, or in print
through The Florida Bar News. Information about the discipline of real estate professionals is
also available through an organized statistical chart published by the Department of Business
and Professional Regulation, as well as through a report compiling the individual reports, in
paragraph form, on each discipline in this profession. As the statistical charts created by each
licensing agency do not provide clear correlating information, Table 7 was created by re-
searching the individual paragraphs on attorney discipline for these calendar years (not pub-
lished in compilation by The Florida Bar), and comparing those figures with the individual
paragraphs as published in compilation form by the Department of Business and Professional
Regulation. The individual attorney reports, however, do not explicitly match the statistical
chart published on The Florida Bar website (due to time period differences and gaps between
the total disciplines from that statistical chart) with those actually published in detailed form.
Therefore, the figures for attorney discipline represent what a member of the public would
extrapolate from reading only individual reports of attorneys, as well as reading individual
reports about Real Estate professionals, but not necessarily the exact figures as published by
The Florida Bar.
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While the low total number of accountancy disciplines yields no un-
usual breakdown as among disciplines, an interesting contrast is seen be-
tween the attorney system and real estate system. Despite the higher number
of total disciplines given in the real estate system, the number of those with
certain categories of disciplines is not always higher, or in proportion to the
greater number of total disciplines.397 In the years examined, attorneys who
were disciplined were far more likely to be suspended than real estate licen-
sees.39 8 In all years, the total numbers of licensees in each group who were
disbarred or had their license(s) revoked were in closer proportion to the total
disciplines given.39 9 The number of licensees who received probation is very
close between professions, despite the discrepancies in total disciplines for
the first three years, with the numbers of attorneys on probation decreasing
and the number of real estate professionals on probation increasing.4° Al-
though disciplines are given similar names and effect among these profes-
sions, the discipline systems order them in different quantities.
The difference between the end results of discipline may be related to
the structure of how disciplines may be ordered. The real estate system,
working from the DBPR, provides a specific list of violations with penalties
-so within a factual interpretation of the situation, the discipline category
has been predetermined. 0' By contrast, the attorney rules are written more
open-ended, allowing discipline categories to be determined in each specific
factual situation. °2 Second, the real estate system allows more than one dis-
cipline to be imposed, the most common example being probation and sus-
pension being ordered together, along with a fine.40 3 By contrast, the judge
acting as referee in examining a lawyer's factual circumstances must choose
to recommend only one discipline category.
The number of professionals on probation presented the most striking
changes through the years examined. 5 One explanation for the rising num-
ber of real estate professionals on probation simultaneous to the sinking
number of attorneys on probation is the real world consequence of the disci-
pline ordered. When a real estate professional is put on probation, a proba-
tion may be ordered to follow a suspension, and is usually accompanied by a
397. See Tables 6 & 7.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. FLA. STAT. § 475.25 (2003).
402. See FLA. STns. IMPosING LAW. SANCS. 3.0 (2004).
403. § 475.25(1).
404. See FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. preface.
405. See id.; Table 7.
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fine as well as an additional educational requirement.4 °6 By contrast, attor-
neys put on probation are subject to no other levels of discipline, other than
potentially being ordered to complete additional educational requirements. 4
7
In short, because of the "one discipline" nature of the system, an attorney on
probation suffers little professional consequence, and thus the "punishment"
may be falling out of favor within the disciplinary body.
F. Discipline by Geographic Location
Table 8 examines certain selected counties within Florida for the total
number of disciplines ordered. This geographic information was extrapo-
lated from the individual listing, which the DBPR emphasizes, as it sorts the
individual discipline listings first by year and then by city.40 8 The counties
examined were selected as some of the major population centers, though
certainly not all of them, within Florida.
Table 8: Disciplines Ordered by Florida County (Selected)
Year: 2000
Profession Broward Hills- Leon Miami- Orange Palm Pinellas
IIIboro- Dade IBeachII
IAttorney 127 113 16 164 113 119 122
Real Estate 21 10 1 53 28 21 8
Year: 2001
Pfession
IAttorey
I Real Estate
Broward
40
132
Hills- Leon Miami- Orange Palm Pinellas
boro I I Dad I I Beach
21 15 172 110 11 121
111 11 1 31 1 14 126 113
Hills- Leon
boro19 7
Miami-
Dade
52
45
406. See § 475.25(1).
407. FLA. STDS. IMPOSING LAW. SANCS. 2.7.
408. See FREC Disc., supra note 265.
Year: 2002
Prfession
atateyIReal Estate
Broward
24
39
Orange PalmI Pinellas
I Beh 1
11 23 9
115 126 12
1 1 I I
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In counties with a high population, there are higher numbers of disci-
plines in both the attorney and real estate professions.40 9 The South Florida
tri-county area of Broward County, Miami-Dade County and Palm Beach
County contain high levels of the general population and is likely to employ
high numbers of service professionals as well.4 " However, the other coun-
ties examined show no pattern of connecting disciplined professionals with
geographic location. For example, Hillsborough County, in which Tampa is
located, in one year examined has slightly more attorneys disciplined than
real estate professionals.41' In a second year examined, the number of attor-
neys disciplined was approximately two times that of real estate profession-
als.412 In the third year, the numbers were nearly equal. 3
G. Overall Licensees Disciplined
One last look at the accountant, attorney, and real estate professions is
an evaluation of the overall profession and how many disciplines are being
ordered in each. Table 9 examines the total licensees and total disciplines in
each year as reported in the agency's annual reports, and calculated the per-
centage of disciplines as to licensees. There are two important notes to these
figures. The first is that while throughout this entire table, the total licensees
of the two DBPR professions is calculated on the total licensees, active and
inactive. 14 However, The Florida Bar, as noted in Table 2, only reported
active licensees up until the 2002-2003 year.4 '5 As a result, comparison per-
centages are affected. The second point of data is that in the real estate pro-
fession, more than one discipline may be ordered to one licensee-thus, the
column reflecting the total disciplines is actually the number of disciplines,
not exactly the number of licensees.
409. Curtis & Kaufman, supra note 3, at 694.
410. See id. at 699-701.
411. Curtis & Kaufman, supra note 3, at 697; see FREC Disc., supra note 265.
412. Id.; see FREC Disc., supra note 265.
413. Id.; see FREC Disc., supra note 265.
414. See Long Range Program Plan, supra note 283.
415. Bar Disciplinary Statistics, supra note 218.
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Table 9: Total Licensees, Disciplines and Percentages of Discipline
Year: 1997-1998
Professions Total Licensees Total Disciplines 416  Percentage of
I I IDisciplines
Accountancy 25,392 40 .16%
Attorneys 58,108 417 .72%
Real Estate 197,045 977 .50%
Year: 1998-1999
Professions Total Licensees Total Disciplines Percentage of
I _I I I Disciplines
Accountancy 28,687 29 .10%
Attorneys 59,741 403 .67%
Real Estate 165,585 1024 .62%
Year: 1999-2000
Professions Total Licensees Total Disciplines Percentage of
I IIDiscilie
Accountancy 28,607 16 1.06%
Attorneys 61,014 391 .64%
Real Estate 168,244 521 1.31%
Year: 2000-2001
Professions Total Licensees Total Disciplines 417  Percentage of
I I_ I I Disciplines
Accountancy 31,471 40 1.13%
Attorneys 62,722 472 .75%
Real Estate 215,287 297 1.14%
416. The 1997-1998 annual report by the DBPR does not explicitly state the total disci-
plines, however this number was extrapolated from other information given.
417. The annual report format of the DBPR changed beginning in 2000. Rather than
reporting the "total disciplines," the report states "Disposition of Disciplinary Actions" and
compares with "Disposition of Non-Disciplinary Actions." See Long Range Program Plan,
supra note 283. This number appears to reflect the total disciplines ordered in that year. This
category appears in all annual reports forward from this date.
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Year: 2001-2002
Professions Total Licensees Total Disciplines 418 ]Percentage of
______________________ 
I Disciplines
Accountancy 32,336 35 .11%
Attorneys 62,999 414 .66%
Real Estate 227,015 384 .17%
Year: 2002-2003
Professions Total Licensees Total Disciplines4 19 Percentage ofIDisciplines
Accountancy 35,016 65 .19%
Attomeys 42  72,933 384 .53%
Real Estate 249,871 416 .17%
Year: 2003-2004 (DBPR information not yet available)
Professions Total Licensees Total Disciplines 421  Percentage of
I I I Disciplines
Attorneys 74,874 331 .44%
The first notable conclusion from Table 9 is that despite the time and
money that each profession dedicates to the discipline system, in each pro-
fession in each year, less than one percent of licensees receive final orders of
discipline, when total disciplines given is compared to total licensees. From
a consumer standpoint, this result may be viewed in either of two ways: (1)
consumers of professional services in Florida can be confident that the pro-
fessional that they have hired will not act in a way commensurate with disci-
pline within that profession, as more than ninety-nine percent of profession-
als are not subject to a discipline order in any given year, or (2) the extraor-
dinary low percentages of disciplines could also make some consumers sus-
pect of professions that are either self-regulated (such as attorneys), or regu-
lated using fellow professionals. Some consumers may see the low number
and percentage of disciplines not as a triumph of the ethics of these profes-
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. This year marks the first that attorney license numbers included both active and inac-
tive licensees.
421. See Long Range Program Plan, supra note 283.
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sionals, but as a weakness in the system that potentially does not catch
enough licensees.
The accounting profession has the second lowest ratio of the three pro-
fessions examined, and as discussed above in conjunction with Table 3, may
be attributed to the profession's clients, and the overall low number of com-
plaints.422
The attorney profession has clearly been working to reduce the number
of licensees disciplined. As discussed earlier, the ACAP program by the
Florida Bar has clearly produced results.423 In the years since the ACAP
program was introduced, the ratio of disciplines to licensees has decreased
by a full one-third.424
The real estate profession demonstrates the greatest reduction in total
disciplines compared with total licensees; from a high of .62% in 1998_99,42s
down to the most recent figure of .17% in 2002-03.426 The total number of
licensees is growing tremendously in recent years, while the total number of
disciplines is shrinking. 7 The reasons for these dramatic changes may be
many. First, the real estate profession may simply be experiencing fewer
disciplinary problems within its system, due to education, licensing require-
ments or ethical qualities of professionals, or any combination of factors.
Alternatively, fewer disciplines may have been ordered due to changes in the
way the system is being administered-individual probable cause panels may
be viewing behaviors differently, or more citations warning real estate pro-
fessionals of potential violations may be doing the job of diverting poten-
tially problematic behavior before it reaches the complaint stage. Finally, the
changes in the annual report (not clearly labeling the total disciplines in a
year) may be altering the appearance of the statistics, resulting in altered
data.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the public may place the same fiscal trust in attorneys, real es-
tate professionals, and certified public accountants within Florida, these pro-
fessions are not treated the same by their licensing bodies. With different
educational requirements, testing, and renewal requirements, each of these
fiscal professionals are presented to the consumer with different back-
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. 1998-1999 REPORT, supra note 310.
426. See Long Range Program Plan, supra note 283.
427. Id.
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grounds. With different discipline systems, each consumer also may encoun-
ter a different process or result in case of a problem with that professional.
While any professional clearly operating under more than one license
will be subject to the licensing and discipline of the profession under which
they are specifically acting, the lines are not always clear as to what fiscal
activity falls under which profession. When realtors complete legal forms,
attorneys escrow money, accountants give financial advice with legal conse-
quences, and realtors counsel individuals, the lines are blurred in the every-
day, proper activities of these professionals in Florida. Consumers must be
aware of which fiscal professionals they are dealing with and learn as much
as possible about each system of licensing and discipline before engaging a
professional in which the consumer will place his or her fiscal trust.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Florida was active this year, ruling on two very
important cases in the child welfare field. In the area of termination of pa-
rental rights, it held that Florida's termination statute, providing that parental
rights of a child may be terminated when the rights to a sibling have already
been terminated,' does not create a rebuttable presumption that the parent
must overcome to avoid transmission.2 In other words, the burden of proof is
not shifted to the parent. The State must prove a substantial risk of signifi-
cant harm to the current child and do so by clear and convincing evidence.3
In a second case, S.B. v. Department of Children and Families,4 the Supreme
Court of Florida ruled that where a parent's right to counsel in a dependency
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. This article covers cases through June 30, 2004, with one exception.
The author thanks Michele Forte, Jennifer Pearl, and Christopher Sprague for their assistance
in the preparation of this article.
1. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(i) (2004).
2. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 609 (Fla. 2004).
3. Id. at 609-10.
4. 851 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 2003).
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proceeding arises solely from statute,5 the parent may not raise ineffective
assistance of counsel in a collateral proceeding by writ of habeas corpus.6
At the intermediate appellate court level, the courts spent a substantial
period of time dealing with a number of child welfare issues involving both
dependency and termination of parental rights. The appellate courts applied
the so-called "nexus" test, holding that in finding for termination, the trial
court must tie harmful behavior by the parent to the particular child who is
the subject of the proceeding.7 The appellate courts also dealt with cases
involving incarcerated parents 8 and the obligations of the trial court to prop-
erly handle situations where a parent fails to appear.9
Florida's intermediate appellate courts were less active in the delin-
quency area, with one major exception: Tate v. State.10 Tate is the highly
publicized ruling from the Fourth District Court of Appeal on the court's role
in determining competency of a juvenile to stand trial.11 In addition, the ap-
pellate courts ruled on several cases involving delinquency issues arising in
the school setting. 2
II. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
A. Adjudicatory Issues
Tate, the competency case which drew national attention, involved the
death of a six-year old playmate at the hands of a twelve-year old boy.13 The
case initially resulted in a conviction in adult court and a life sentence for the
5. See § 39.013(1). The court previously held that a parent has a constitutional, as op-
posed to statutory, right to counsel in a dependency proceeding only when the proceeding
could result in termination of parental rights or if a parent could potentially be charged with
child abuse. In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
6. S.B., 851 So. 2d at 691.
7. J.F. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 866 So. 2d 81, 87 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004);
N.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 857 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
8. In re A.D.C., 854 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); C.B. v. Dep't of Children
& Families, 874 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
9. R.P. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 835 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003);
R.H. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 860 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); In re
I.A., 857 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); In re B.B., 858 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2003); In re C.D., 867 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); A.M. v. Dep't of
Children & Families, 853 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
10. 864 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
11. Id. at 47.
12. State v. J.T.D., 851 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); M.H. v. State, 851 So.
2d 233 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
13. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 47.
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defendant, Lionel Tate. 14 The appellate opinion established a procedural
approach to the evaluation of competency for the young defendant in Flor-
ida's juvenile and adult criminal justice systems. 5 The Tate case was also
the impetus for a special issue of the NOVA LAW REVIEW entitled The After-
math of the Lionel Tate Case.'6
Competence recently came up again in Department of Children and
Families v. C.R.C.,17 involving the issue of proper placement of a child who
was previously determined incompetent to stand trial due to mental illness.
Florida law provides that when a child is found incompetent based on mental
illness or retardation, the child may be committed to the Department of Chil-
dren and Families (DCF) for restoration of competency, treatment, and train-
ing.'8 If a child is adjudicated incompetent to proceed solely because of age
or immaturity, the child must not be committed to DCF. 19 In C.R.C., the trial
court received two reports from examining psychologists concluding that the
child was not competent to stand trial on the basis of the child's age and un-
derstanding. 20 Neither expert found incompetency on mental illness or retar-
dation grounds.2' However, the court made such a finding and ordered the
child placed with DCF.22 The appellate court reversed, holding quite simply
that the trial court's order departed from the requirements of Chapter 985,23
because its findings were not supported by the written reports of the examin-
ers. 
24
Delinquency charges based upon school-related activities often come
before the Florida courts. In these cases, a common issue is the legality of a
search conducted in the school. The leading case is the 1985 United States
Supreme Court opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,25 in which the high Court
ruled that school officials must have reasonable grounds to suspect that the
search would produce evidence that the student violated either school rules
or the law.26 T.L.O. related cases have been the subject of analysis in this
14. Id. at 46.
15. Id. at48.
16. See generally 28 NOVA L. REv. p. 467-603 (2004).
17. 867 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
18. FLA. STAT. § 985.223(2) (2004).
19. Id.
20. C.R.C., 867 So. 2d at 593.
21. Id. at 593-94.
22. Id. at 594.
23. FLA. STAT. ch. 985 (2004).
24. Id.
25. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
26. Id. at 341.
2005]
266
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss2/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
review in the past.27 In State v. J. T.D.,28 the Second District Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court's suppression of a child's confession in a delinquency
case arising out of a petition charging a middle schooler with lewd and las-
civious molestation of another student.29  The school investigation of the
child involved both a St. Petersburg police officer and the school's resource
officer.30 The court held that the school official was not acting as an en-
forcement agent, and therefore, the necessity for Miranda warnings did not
exist.3' The court found that the police officer was merely present during the
interview, although in and out of the room, and asked no questions. 32 The
opinion also states that the officer heard the admission, and that after the
admission, the school official turned the questioning over to the police offi-
cial.33 The officer started to read the child Miranda warnings but, because
another problem arose, he left and never completed them.34 The appellate
court held that under the facts, Miranda warnings were not necessary as the
police officer's mere presence did not transform the school official's inter-
view of the child into a custodial interrogation.35 The court did not view the
setting as traditional custody as understood under Miranda.36 While the
child could not leave the principal's room, the court held that it was not de-
terminative of whether it was a custodial interrogation that had to be pre-
ceded by Miranda warnings.37 The court came to this conclusion based upon
the principle that children's liberty interests are lessened in the school set-
ting.38 As the appellate court put it, "[e]stablishing a blanket rule that ex-
cludes the presence of a police officer whenever a school administrator ques-
tions a student unless Miranda warnings are given turns a blind eye to the
threatening world surrounding our schools."39
A second school suspension delinquency case is MH. v. State.4° In this
case the child moved to suppress statements made to a school official in the
presence of a law enforcement officer who was employed as a school re-
27. See Michael J. Dale, 2003 Survey of Juvenile Law, 28 NOVA L. REV. 543, 567 (2004)
[hereinafter Dale 2003].
28. 851 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
29. Id. at 794, 797.
30. Id. at 794.
31. Id. at 797.
32. Id. at 795-96.
33. JT.D., 851 So. 2d at 795.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 797.
36. Id. at 796.
37. Id.
38. J.T.D.,851 So. 2d at 797.
39. Id.
40. 851 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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source officer.4 Charges arose out of an altercation with another student in
the middle school.42 The school official questioned the child in the presence
of the resource officer 3.4  The court noted that "[a]ll questioning was done by
the school official except that the resource officer asked one question at the
end."44 Without any analysis, the court held that "[t]he mere presence of a
law enforcement officer, when a student is being questioned by a school offi-
cial, does not amount to a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warn-
ings. 45
As in the school setting, the issue of proper Miranda warning cases are
reported in the appellate court case literature in Florida. Frances v. State
46
involved a challenge to the voluntariness of a juvenile confession. 47  The
child, who was sixteen at the time of the confession, claimed on appeal that
the confession was involuntary because he was not afforded an opportunity
to speak with his mother prior to the questioning.48 Florida courts have held
that there is no constitutional requirement that police notify a juvenile's par-
ents prior to questioning.49 Although section 985.207(2) of the Florida Stat-
utes5" requires police officers to attempt to notify a juvenile's parents when
taking the child into custody, failure to do so does not per se make a confes-
sion involuntary." Other states do provide by statute for such protection in
the form of required notification of parents. In Frances, the court did note
that had the child said he did not wish to talk to police until he had an oppor-
tunity to speak with his parents, the questioning would have ceased.53 Ap-
plying a totality of the circumstances test,54 the court held there was no basis
to conclude that the confession was in any way coerced or involuntary.5 '
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. MH., 851 So. 2d at 233-34.
46. 857 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
47. Id. at 1003.
48. Id.
49. Id. See Brancaccio v. State, 773 So. 2d 582, 583-84 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
50. FLA. STAT. § 985.207(2) (2004).
51. Frances, 857 So. 2d at 1004 (citing Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1999)).
52. See Michael J. Dale, Representing the Child Client, 5.03[7] (Matthew Bender & Co.
2004) (summarizing the case law around the country showing different approaches).
53. Frances, 857 So. 2d at 1004. See B.P. v. State, 815 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2002).
54. See Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 568 (describing the totality of the circumstances test).
55. Frances, 857 So. 2d at 1004.
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In Florida delinquency cases, pretrial practice and discovery issues do
not appear often in appellate case law. However, in F.R. v. State,56 a child
appealed from an adjudication of delinquency on a charge of trespass on the
grounds that the trial court, as a sanction for untimely disclosure of that wit-
ness, excluded a defense witness and denied a motion for continuance.
57
Two days prior to the trial the defense filed a witness list, which the state
claimed was untimely. The state asked the court to exclude the witness on
prejudice grounds, because it could not depose the witness.5 The defense
position was that counsel only became aware of the witness ten days before
the trial and did not disclose the witness until after he had the ability to inter-
view the individual.60 The question on appeal was whether the trial court
abused its discretion in excluding the witness as a sanction for the untimely
disclosure.6' The appellate court found that the testimony of the excluded
witness was highly relevant, juvenile proceedings operated under an expe-
dited time frame, and the sanction of exclusion is severe and a last resort
only to be used in extreme or compelling circumstances. 6' The court con-
cluded that this was an uncomplicated case, the defense gave a reasonable
explanation, and other less severe methods existed to overcome the preju-
dice. 63 The appellate court found an abuse of discretion and remanded for a
new trial.64
The Florida rules governing speedy trial in juvenile delinquency cases
provide that a child shall have an adjudicatory hearing within ninety days,
without demand, following the earlier of either the date the child was taken
into custody or the date the petition was filed.65 The Florida appellate courts
regularly review cases concerning affirmation of this rule.66 In Alvarez v.
State,67 a juvenile petitioned for issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
trial court to dismiss an information charging him as an adult.68 The child
56. 860 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 502.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. F.R., 860 So. 2d at 502.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 503.
64. Id.
65. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.90(a).
66. See Michael J. Dale, 2002 Survey of Florida Juvenile Law, 28 NOVA. L. REV. 1, 5
(2003) [hereinafter Dale 2002]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law Issues in Florida in 1998, 23
NOVA L. REV. 819, 834-35 (1999) [hereinafter Dale 1998].
67. 849 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
68. Id. at 1090.
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was initially charged in a delinquency petition with one count of battery.69
The state entered a nolle prosequi because it was considering direct filing
against the child in the adult criminal division.7 ° The defendant argued that
the ninety-day juvenile speedy trial rule was triggered by the delinquency
petition, applied to the adult charges, and had run.7 The appeals court de-
nied the petition finding that the juvenile rules did not apply to the adult
charges filed, because by virtue of the nolle prosequi, nothing was pending
against the child in the juvenile court at the time the information was filed in
the adult court.72 The court relied on the Supreme Court of Florida opinion
in State v. Olivo,73 which held that while juvenile speedy trial rights are trig-
gered upon filing of delinquency petitions, the rules apply only while some-
thing is pending in the juvenile court.74 As nothing was pending in the case
at bar, the juvenile speedy trial rule did not apply.75
Under Florida law, parents or guardians of a child who is detained dur-
ing delinquency proceedings may be required to pay fees to the state for the
cost of the child's subsistence.76 In B.S. v. State,77 the child was taken into
police custody, subsequently ordered to home detention, and released to her
parents.7" While the matter was pending, the court ordered the parents to pay
twenty dollars a day for the cost of the child's care.79 The State subsequently
filed a nolle prosequi petition in the case, and the child then filed a pro se
motion to rescind the cost order."0 The child argued that the parents should
not be required to pay, because the State decided not to prosecute, and the
defendant was at home.8' Based upon the mandatory language of the stat-
ute ' 2 the juvenile court denied the motion.83 The child then brought a consti-
tutional challenge on both equal protection and substantive due process
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Alvarez, 849 So. 2d at 1091.
73. 759 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 2000).
74. Id. at 649.
75. Alvarez, 849 So. 2d at 1091.
76. FLA. STAT. § 985.215(b) (2004).
77. 862 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
78. Id. at 17.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. FLA. STAT. § 985.215(6) (2004). This statute provides "[w]hen any child is placed
into secure or home detention care ... the court shall order the parents ... to pay to the De-
partment of Juvenile Justice fees as provided under s. 985.2311." Id.
83. B. S., 862 So. 2d at 17.
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grounds.84  The child argued that the statute violated equal protection by
treating exonerated juveniles differently than exonerated adults.85 In addi-
tion, the child argued that the statute violated substantive due process by
requiring "payment of subsistence costs for a child's detention at home."86
The appellate court accepted both of the child's arguments.87 Applying an
ordinary scrutiny equal protection standard under Florida law,88 the court
could find no legitimate state objective to justify discriminating between
adults and juveniles in this context.89 The court also applied ordinary scru-
tiny to the due process question, concluding that requiring payment for home
detention bore no rational relationship to the permissible legislative objective
of alleviating the state's financial burden. 90 The court further held that re-
quiring a parent to pay both to support her child at home and to reimburse the
state for unexpended costs was arbitrary and oppressive.9
B. Dispositional Issues
Florida statutes provide the juvenile court with a variety of dispositional
powers, including probation, restitution, community service, curfew, revoca-
tion or suspension of driver's license, placement in a consequence unit,
placement in home detention, commitment to a licensed child care agency,
and commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) at a residential
commitment level (a level of security provided by programs that supervise
and care for the child).92 The issue in B.A.B. v. State93 was whether a juve-
nile disposition order "should be reversed because the trial court failed to
order and consider a predisposition report, ('PDR'), before making its final
disposition." 94 Under Florida law, "a predisposition report shall be ordered
for any child for whom a residential commitment disposition is anticipated or
recommended by an officer of the court or by the [D]epartment [of Juvenile
Justice]." 95 In denying the child's motion to correct the order, the trial court
84. Id. at 16.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 16-17.
87. Id. at 20.
88. B.S., 862 So. 2d at 18 (citing D.P. v. State, 705 So. 2d 593, 597 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1997)).
89. Id. at 19.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 19-20.
92. See §§ FLA. STAT. 985.231, .03 (2004).
93. 853 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
94. Id. at 554-55.
95. § 985.229(1).
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stated it did not order a PDR because the court had previously seen the child
on multiple occasions for prior offenses and commitment.9 6 The trial court
held that redundant investigations were unnecessary where the court already
had knowledge of the relevant information. 97 The appellate court held that
the statute's requirements are mandatory. 98 A predisposition report is re-
quired, the court shall consider it, and it shall be made available to the child
and counsel among others.99 It then concluded that there was no authority to
support the proposition that the court could, if it had knowledge of the
child's prior record, forego the statutory requirements.'00 It added that the
trial court effectively "created an exception to the applicable statutes and
rules that does not exist."'' More importantly and significantly, the trial
court deprived the child of an opportunity to review a PDR prior to his dis-
positional hearing as required by state law by relying upon its knowledge of
the child.12 Therefore, the court reversed and remanded.' 3
Issues concerning proper application of the restitution provisions of the
dispositional law in delinquency cases come regularly before the appellate
courts.' 04 J.D. v. State0 5 involved a restitution jurisdictional issue where the
trial court terminated probation without reserving jurisdiction for purposes of
restitution. 10 6 In failing to reserve jurisdiction, the trial court relied upon a
DJJ recommendation that probation be terminated, but DJJ overlooked the
fact that restitution had not been completed.0 7 When it became known that
restitution had not been completed, the court accepted the State's reliance on
the ground of a "scrivener's error," and vacated its order to reinstitute juris-
diction. 08 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the decision. 0 9 It
found that the mistake was not a "scrivener's error," but concluded that the
court had authority to vacate its order on grounds of mistake under the Flor-
ida Rules of Juvenile Procedure."' However, despite the ability to vacate an
96. B.A.B., 853 So. 2d at 555.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 556.
101. B.A.B., 853 So. 2d at 556.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Dale 2003, supra note 27, at 569; Dale 2002, supra note 66, at 8; Dale 1998, supra
note 66, at 839.
105. 849 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
106. Id. at 459.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 461.
110. J.D., 849 So. 2d at 459 (citing FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.140).
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order on the grounds of mistake, the court had to "have jurisdiction over a
juvenile to enter an order." '' In the case at bar, the court lacked jurisdiction
because it failed to enter a restitution order before the child's nineteenth
birthday, the time jurisdiction would otherwise end.11 2 Instead, the new order
"merely reserved jurisdiction for restitution purposes."' 3 There being no
proper restitution order in effect prior to the respondent's nineteenth birth-
day, the court lacked jurisdiction to subsequently enter the order setting the
restitution amount. 1
14
C. Appellate Issues
The First District Court of Appeal dealt with a very important issue re-
garding application of what is commonly known as an Anders appeal in
A.F.E. v. State."5  In Anders v. California,"6 the United States Supreme
Court held that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel
in criminal cases is not satisfied when an appointed appellate lawyer merely
reports by letter that there is no meritorious issue presented on appeal." 7
Pursuant to its ruling implementing Anders, the Supreme Court of Florida
held that the appellate court must then undertake "a full and independent
review of the record to discover any arguable issues apparent on the face of
the record."".8 The problem that arose in A.F.E. involved a legitimate catch-
22 situation.' 1' The defendant and several other juveniles were charged after
a note containing a bomb threat was found in their high school, and the ap-
pellant didn't contest the charge. 2 ° At the dispositional stage, DJJ recom-
mended probation with the alternative of commitment at a moderate risk
facility.' 2' The trial court rejected these alternatives and committed the child
to a high risk residential commitment facility.12 However, in its independent
review of the record, the appellate court found that the trial court's departure
did "not appear to be supported by competent substantial evidence in the
111. Id. at 460.
112. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 985.201(4)(a) (2004).
113. JD., 849 So. 2d at 460.
114. Id.
115. 853 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
116. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
117. Id. at744.
118. In re Anders Briefs, 581 So. 2d 149, 151 (Fla. 1991).
119. See A.F.E., 853 So. 2d at 1091.
120. Id. at 1092.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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record" as required by state law,'23 but the child's counsel failed to preserve
the issue for appeal. 12 4 Because the child's lawyer neither objected at the
time the trial court entered its disposition nor filed a motion to correct the
disposition order pursuant rule 8.135(b)(2) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile
Procedure, the appellate court could not act. I2 5 All that remained was a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 26 However, as the appellate court
pointed out, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel "is of little practical
assistance in juvenile cases, where the sentence imposed may be completed
before any relief is granted."'127 Describing the problem as a dilemma, the
appellate court affirmed, but certified as a question of public importance
whether an appellate court can correct a sentencing error in an Anders case
that was not preserved pursuant to the applicable rules of procedure, and if
not, what steps should the appellate court follow to carry out the mandate of
Anders?
128
III. DEPENDENCY
Dependency court jurisdictional issues do not come up regularly in
Florida. An exception is J.M v. Department of Children and Family Ser-
vices.2 9 The case involved adjudication of an infant as dependent where the
child was absent from the State of Florida and where DCF had claimed that
there was a risk of harm to the child being "with his mother, who herself was
a minor and had been adjudicated dependent, but was on runaway status."' 130
The facts are significant. The trial court issued an ex parte order to take the
mother and the child into custody.' At no time had the infant been declared
dependent prior to the filing of the petition.32 The court held an arraignment
hearing, and ultimately entered a consent on behalf of the parent by default
after the court determined that there had been a diligent search to find her. 33
An attorney ad litem was present for the mother and objected to the adjudica-
123. Id. at 1093.
124. A.F.E., 853 So. 2d at 1093.
125. Id. at 1093, 1095.
126. Id. at 1094.
127. Id. at 1093.
128. Id. at 1095. See also The Honorable Martha C. Warner, Anders in the Fifty States:
Some Appellants' Equal Protection Is More Equal than Others', 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625
(1996).
129. 851 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
130. Id. at 304.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 305.
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tion. 134 The court took hearsay evidence presented by DCF regarding the
mother's circumstances and adjudicated the infant child dependent.1 35 There-
after, the court held a dispositional hearing and established a reunification
case plan, which the mother ultimately signed when her whereabouts became
known. 36 The appellate court reversed the trial court order, finding that the
court lacked jurisdiction over the infant because DCF never had custody of
the infant child, and the mother was never given notice or the opportunity to
be heard. 37 Furthermore, the court order adjudicating the infant dependent,
where both mother and child were outside the jurisdiction, constituted a dep-
rivation of the mother's due process rights.
3 1
A more troubling jurisdictional case involving dependency is In re
D.N. 39 The case concerned two children as to whom a Hawaii court entered
an order of protection giving the father both legal and physical custody with
supervised visitations for the mother. 4° While proceedings were pending in
Hawaii, the mother took the children out of the state and was subsequently
arrested in Florida.' As a result, DCF filed a petition for dependency of the
two children against the mother only, never filing against the father.'42 Rely-
ing upon the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), which was
in effect in Florida, 4 3 the father quickly filed a motion to have the children
returned to him in Hawaii based upon the Hawaii custody order.'" Despite
the existence of the Hawaii order and the relevant statutory mandate, the trial
court denied the motion to have the two children returned. 45 DCF filed a
case plan defining tasks to the father for reunification, but never sought to
have the children adjudicated dependent as to the father. 46 Despite no find-
ing of dependency as to the father, the court approved the case plan. "4' For a
year and a half the father continued to seek to have the Hawaii custody order
enforced. 48 The trial court held an evidentiary hearing concerning return of
the children to the father, and DCF never raised issues of compliance with
134. J.M, 851 So. 2d at 305.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 858 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
140. Id. at 1088.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. FLA. STAT. §§ 61.501-.542 (2004).
144. D.N., 858 So. 2d at 1088.
145. Id. at 1089.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC).'49 At the end
of the hearing, the trial court ordered the children returned to the father, and
despite that order, DCF refused to transfer the children to Hawaii. 50 The
father sought to enforce the court order, and at this late stage, DCF argued
that the Hawaii ICPC administrator had not approved the placement.' 5' The
court ordered the children placed with their father, and then DCF appealed,
even seeking a stay. 152 In the absence of a stay, the children were reunited
with their father while the case was pending on appeal. 53 In a detailed opin-
ion, the appellate court laid out what would have been obvious to any lawyer
in the field-the application of the UCCJA and the Parental Kidnapping Pre-
vention Act (PKPA).'54 In what could only be described as a significant un-
derstatement, the court concluded as follows:
Finally, we note that the Department has come under increased public scru-
tiny during the past year concerning the way it has handled, or mishandled,
certain cases. Given that scrutiny, we fail to understand why the Depart-
ment chose to focus its efforts in this case on keeping the two children
from a father who clearly wants them and who has a valid court order
awarding him custody. Further, we fail to understand why the Department
chose not to bring the controlling provisions of the UCCJA and the PKPA
to either the trial court's or this court's attention. In making these choices,
the Department strayed from its legislatively mandated objectives, and its
attorneys strayed from their duty to bring controlling authority to the
court's attention.' 55
The initial court proceeding in a dependency case is often the hearing
on a shelter petition. 156 This hearing takes place when "a child has been or is
to be removed from the home and maintained in an out-of-home placement
for a period longer than 24 hours."' 57 The issue In re j.P.'158 was whether the
father was "denied the statutorily afforded opportunity to be heard and to
present evidence at the shelter hearing. ' 59 The Pasco County Sheriffs Of-
fice filed a petition for placement in shelter of three children based upon fac-
149. D.N., 858 So. 2d at 1089; FLA. STAT. § 409.401 (2004).
150. D.N., 858 So. 2d at 1089.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1094.
153. Id.
154. 20 U.S.C. § 1738(A) (2003).
155. D.N, 858 So. 2d at 1094.
156. See FLA. STAT. § 39.402 (2004).
157. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.305(a).
158. 875 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
159. Id. at 716.
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tual allegations of domestic violence, the father's prior drug conviction, and
his current drug use. 6' At the shelter hearing, where both parents were rep-
resented by counsel, the mother's lawyer sought an opportunity to present
evidence. 61  The trial court decided that the hearing sought was discretion-
ary, and since the court never did "three-hour shelter hearings," 162 it refused
to start conducting them.163 It ruled that probable cause could be found on
the four corners of the affidavit. 16' The Second District Court of Appeal re-
versed, holding that Florida law provides parents with due process rights in
judicial proceedings involving temporary removal from the home. 65 Spe-
cifically, section 39.402 of the Florida Statutes provides that parents shall be
given "an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence at shelter hear-
ings.' 66 Further, the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide that per-
sons shall be given an opportunity to be heard and present evidence on the
criteria for placement under the law. 167 The appellate court concluded that
the judge below incorrectly held that the written submissions alone consti-
tuted probable cause despite the fact that the clear statutory and rule author-
ity afforded the parents the right to be heard and to present evidence at the
shelter hearing.168
The interplay of child custody issues in dependency proceedings and
domestic relations proceedings comes up often in Florida appellate case
law. 169 In King v. Jordan,7 ° the trial court initially entered an order granting
custody of the parties' daughter to the father during the course of a depend-
ency proceeding under Chapter 39"171 In exercising its continuing jurisdic-
tion as provided by statute, 172 the court subsequently reopened the depend-
ency proceeding, restored all of the mother's rights and obligations, and
granted her liberal visitation, while continuing the father's primary residen-
tial responsibility for the child. 173 At the close of the proceeding, the court
ruled that custodial and visitation rights were granted without prejudice to
160. Id. at 716-17.
161. Id. at 717.
162. Id.
163. J.P., 875 So. 2d at 717.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 718-19.
166. Id.
167. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.305(b)(4).
168. J.P., 875 So. 2d at 718.
169. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000 Survey of Florida Law, 25 NOVA L. REv.
91, 100 (2000) [hereinafter Dale 2000].
170. 850 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
171. Id.; FLA. STAT. ch. 39 (2004).
172. § 39.013(2).
173. King, 850 So. 2d at 646.
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the right of either parent to seek further relief under Chapter 61,174 Florida's
domestic relations child custody statute." 5 Thereafter, the mother petitioned
for primary residential custody pursuant to the dependency court's prior or-
der preserving her right to seek relief under Chapter 61. The court rejected
her claim, 7 6 citing Gibbs v. Gibbs, "' a case from the Second District Court
of Appeal, holding "that a party seeking to modify a custody decree must
establish a substantial change in circumstances since the final judgment and
that such a change justifies imposing a change in custody."'78 The appellate
court reversed, holding that the domestic relations standard applied in Gibbs,
relating to a modification of a custody decree after an initial Chapter 61 de-
termination, does not apply here, where the custody determination was made
in a Chapter 39 dependency proceeding. 79 The appellate court held that
when a custody arrangement is ordered in a dependency case, all the court is
doing is making a decision to place the child with a responsible adult, pref-
erably a parent. 80 Such a decision does not consider all of the elements of
the dissolution statute "concerning a determination of the primary residential
parent based on the best interests of the child." 8 ' The court concluded that
the extraordinary circumstances test applied to modification under Chapter
61 is not applicable when the initial custody determination was made in a
dependency case as opposed to a dissolution proceeding. 8 Unlike a dissolu-
tion or paternity custody order arising under Chapter 61, a custody order
arising from a Chapter 39 dependency proceeding is not a determination of
the best interest of the child for purposes of determining primary residential
custody."3
A second case involving custodial placement in the dependency context
is S.L. v. Department of Children and Families.'84 During the course of a
dependency proceeding against both parents arising out of severe violence
between the mother and the father in the presence of the children, the court
initially placed the children with their maternal uncle. 5 Thereafter, the
court placed the children jointly with the mother and the maternal grandpar-
174. Id.
175. FLA. STAT. ch. 61 (2004).
176. King, 850 So. 2d at 645.
177. 686 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
178. King, 850 So. 2d at 646 (citing Gibbs, 686 So. 2d at 639).
179. Id. at 647.
180. Id.
181. Id. (citing § 61.13).
182. Id.
183. King, 850 So. 2d at 647.
184. 852 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
185. Id. at 373.
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ent with unsupervised visitations for the father.'86 The father appealed,
claiming he was entitled to custody of the children because a parent is pre-
ferred over more distant relatives. 87 He relied upon Hammond v. Howard,88
a case arising out of the Fifth District. The appellate court rejected the appli-
cation of Hammond to a dependency proceeding because Hammond was a
domestic relations custody case arising under Chapter 61, which is unrelated
to dependency. 89 In a dependency case, the issue is whether the child should
be reunited with the parent.' 90 Furthermore, the court must determine
whether the parents substantially complied with the terms of the case plan as
well as considering the well-being and safety of the child.' 9' Finally, the S.L.
court opined that the court below had substantial flexibility in the depend-
ency proceeding because of the statutory obligation to include protective
supervision by DCF at the home of either or both parents.'9 2 The appellate
court thus affirmed.' 93
The question of application of speedy trial rules in a dependency case
was before the Fourth District in D.D. v. Department of Children and Fami-
lies.94 The father appealed the denial of a motion to dismiss because the
state failed to hold a dependency trial within thirty days as provided by Flor-
ida law.195 The father argued that the Supreme Court of Florida case, which
held the thirty-day time frame applicable to involuntary commitment proce-
dures, should apply to dependency cases. 96 The appellate court rejected this
argument. 97 It found that the juvenile rule governing speedy trials applies
only in delinquency cases. 198 According to the Fourth District, while the
Florida dependency statute does speak of a thirty-day period, it is not manda-
tory.' 99 Rather, it concluded that the thirty-day rule is discretionary, given
the nature of the proceedings and the state's interest in protecting a child's
welfare, which is paramount to the parents' interests.2 °°
186. Id.
187. Id. at 373-74.
188. 828 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
189. S.L., 852 So. 2d at 374.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.52 1(1)(b)(3) (2004)).
193. Id.
194. 849 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
195. § 39.507(1)(a).
196. D.D., 849 So. 2d at 475, (citing § 39.507(1)(a)); State v. Goode, 830 So. 2d 817,
825-26 (Fla. 2002)).
197. D.D., 849 So. 2d at 476.
198. Id. at475.
199. Id. at 476; see § 39.507(1)(a).
200. D.D., 849 So. 2d at 476.
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A case involving "default" or, more appropriately, "consent" to adjudi-
cation in the dependency in context" is R.P. v. Department of Children and
Families.2 °2 The consent occurred when a father, through counsel, advised
the court that due to the fault of the lawyer's office, the father was not told
until 5:45 p.m. the previous day that it was necessary for him to be at the
hearing.203 The father lived two hundred miles away and did not have a ve-
hicle.2° The father's counsel then asked for a brief continuance.2 5 When
the father did not appear in the afternoon, the attorney requested another con-
tinuance until the father's arrival, which the court denied and entered a de-
fault.2°6 On appeal, the Fourth District reversed, stressing the importance of
the parent-child relationship and warning the lower courts not to disrupt this
relationship on procedural grounds unless harm will befall the child.20 7
IV. PROSPECTIVE ABUSE AND NEGLECT
On July 8, 2004, just beyond the usual annual survey period for this ar-
ticle, the Supreme Court of Florida decided Department of Children and
Families v. F.L.205 This important opinion clarifies the application of pro-
spective abuse and neglect in both dependency and termination of parental
rights (TPR) cases, which was first addressed by the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida in 1991 in Padgett v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Ser-
vices.20 9 Prospective abuse or neglect was the subject of a lengthy discussion
of the intermediate appellate cases in last year's survey article.210 In that
case, the court ruled that permanent termination of parental rights to one
child on the basis of abuse and neglect may be sufficient grounds for termi-
nation of the parental rights to another child.21' However, the court held that
constitutional liberty interests required that the state "show by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the reunification with the parent poses a substantial
risk of significant harm to the child., 212 In addition, the court held that the
201. See infra pp. 413-19 for a discussion of consent in the termination of parental rights
context.
202. 835 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
203. Id. at 1213.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. R.P., 835 So. 2d at 1213-14.
208. 880 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2004).
209. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
210. Dale 2003, supra note 27, at 559-64.
211. Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571.
212. Id.
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State must prove that termination is the least restrictive means of protecting
the child from harm by the parent.1 3
F.L. specifically dealt with the issue of which party has the burden of
proof to show substantial risk of harm, or lack thereof, to a current child
based upon harm perpetrated upon another child.1 4 Since Padgett, a sub-
stantial number of appellate cases have interpreted it, both in the dependency
and termination of parental rights contexts.1 5 The courts were in disagree-
ment as to the proper interpretation of section 39.806(1)(i) of the Florida
Statutes, dealing with the test for terminating parental rights when the paren-
tal rights to a sibling have been involuntarily terminated.1 6 A quartet of ap-
pellate cases in the intermediate appellate courts were at odds as to the ap-
propriate burden of proof."' In A.B. v. Department of Children and Fami-
lies,2 18 T.P. v. Dep't of Children and Families,21 9 and In re TS.220 the courts
held that the statute validly created a rebuttable presumption of termination
of parental rights, which the parent could rebut.2  On the other hand, in
C. W. v. Department of Children and Families,2 Judge Erwin wrote a con-
curring opinion taking the view that the statute could not be used to terminate
parental rights solely on the basis of the parents' conduct.2 3 Likewise in
F.L., at the appellate court level, the court held that the section "unconstitu-
tionally shifts the burden to the parent to prove reunification would not be
harmful to the child. 224 The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed this opin-
ion.22 5 Applying Padgett, the court held that the statute may not constitu-
tionally be viewed to permit a termination of parental rights without proof of
substantial risk to the child. 226 A rebuttable presumption would relieve DCF
213. Id.
214. F.L., 880 So. 2d at 606-07.
215. Dale 2003, supra note 27, at 546-48, 559-64; Dale 2002, supra note 66, at 13-14,
18-19.
216. Dale 2003, supra note 27, at 546-48, 559-64; Dale 2002, supra note 66, at 13-14,
18-19.
217. Dale 2003, supra note 27, at 546-48, 559-64; Dale 2002, supra note 66, at 13-14,
18-19.
218. 816 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002); see contra Dale 2003, supra note 27, at
560.
219. 860 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
220. 855 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
221. A.B., 816 So. 2d at 684; TP., 819 So. 2d at 271; T.S., 855 So. 2d at 680.
222. 814 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
223. Id. at 493-98 (Erwin, J., concurring).
224. F.L. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 849 So. 2d 1114, 1116 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2003).
225. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 609 (Fla. 2004).
226. Id.
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of its burden of proof and would, according to the high court, violate the
constitutional requirements articulated in Padgett.227 The court held explic-
itly that the state must prove both the prior involuntary termination of paren-
tal rights to a sibling and a substantial risk of significant harm to the child
who is before the court.228 In addition, DCF must prove that termination of
parental rights is the least restrictive alternative for protecting the child from
harm. 229 The court gave the trial courts guidance on how to apply the sec-
tion, explaining that the circumstances leading to the prior termination are
highly relevant to the issue before the court concerning risk to the other
child.230 The parents' conduct which led to the involuntary termination may
tend to indicate a greater risk of harm to the current child. 3' The courts
should take into account the amount of time that passes between the two
events, and evidence of a change of circumstances since the prior involuntary
termination will be significant to the determination of risk. 32 Finally, the
court explained that past conduct has some predictive value as to likely fu-
ture conduct, which can be changed by positive life changes. 33 The court
emphasized that the parent is not obligated to show evidence of changed
circumstances to avoid the termination of parental rights.234 The court held
that DCF must prove by clear and convincing evidence2 35 that the rights of
the prior child were terminated involuntarily, that the child now before the
court is at a substantial risk of significant harm, and that termination of pa-
rental rights is the least restrictive alternative for the protection of the
child.236 The court then concluded that, so interpreted, the statute would be
constitutional.237
In two concurring opinions, Justices Pariente and Cantero were at odds
over an additional question-whether a manifest best interest determination
is the equivalent of an obligation of the State to prove substantial risk of
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 610.
230. FL., 880 So. 2d at 610.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See generally, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding the standard of
proof in termination of parental rights cases must be at least clear and convincing evidence to
comport with due process rights).
236. F.L., 880 So. 2d at 611.
237. Id.
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harm to the child under one of the statutory grounds for termination.2 38 Jus-
tice Pariente said no,23 9 and Justice Cantero said yes.24°
A separate ground for termination of parental rights involving prospec-
tive abuse or neglect is the situation where the parent has committed murder
or voluntary manslaughter of another child or a felony assault that results in
serious bodily injury to another child.241 A number of courts have held that a
nexus must be shown between the acts described in the subsection and the
potential for future abuse.242 The issue of nexus arose in J.F. v. Department
of Children and Families43 where the mother's stepchild was physically
abused and died while in her care as a result of blunt trauma to the stom-
ach.24 She was ultimately convicted of manslaughter and child abuse.245 On
appeal, the Fourth District reversed the trial court's termination of parental
rights, inter alia, rejecting DCF's position that no nexus need be shown.246
In so doing, the court noted that "[f]ailure to give the statutory scheme a nar-
row construction requiring the State to prove a nexus between the past con-
duct and the continuing substantial risk of harm to the current child could
render the statute constitutionally infirm. 247 DCF argued that the mother's
failure to take responsibility for the first child's death constituted the nexus
of danger necessary to the second child.248 The court held this argument in-
sufficient to support a finding that the mother posed a threat to her other
children.249
A second nexus case, this one occurring at the dependency stage, is N.S.
v. Department of Children and Families.25° In N.S., DCF commenced a de-
pendency proceeding alleging that the neglect of an older child was grounds
to find abuse and neglect of the younger children. The dependency proceed-
ing was commenced despite the fact that there were no allegations in the
petition that the parents had in fact abused and neglected any of the younger
children or that the children might be abused in the future. 251 There was nei-
238. See id. at 611-13 (Pariente, J., concurring); id. at 613-615 (Cantero, J., concurring).
239. F.L., 880 So. 2d at 611.
240. Id. at 615.
241. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(h) (2004).
242. See Dale 2003, supra note 27, at 562-63.
243. 866 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
244. Id. at 82.
245. Id. at 83.
246. Id. at 88-89.
247. id. at 88.
248. J.F., 866 So. 2d at 88.
249. Id.
250. 857 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
251. Id. at 1000-01.
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ther testimony that the younger children were abused nor any evidence pre-
sented to support a conclusion that the younger children were at risk.252 Cit-
ing earlier case law, the appellate court reversed,253 concluding that the trial
court made no findings to draw a connection between the treatment of the
older child and the probable treatment of the younger children in the fu-
ture.
2 5 4
V. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Adjudicatory Issues
Appellate opinions continue to appear relating to "defaults", or as noted
earlier, "consents" to terminations of parental rights or dependency based
upon non-appearance of the parent as often occurs in the dependency set-
ting. 5 In R.H. v. Department of Children and Family Services,256 the father
failed to appear on the trial date, and the court entered a default against
him.25 7 The father was advised of the trial date at the advisory hearing and
also through a letter from counsel. 8 However, the trial date was changed.2 59
The court sent written notice to the father's counsel who then sent a second
letter to the father "mimick[ing]" the first, but with the new trial date.2 60 The
father argued that he did not appear on the continued date, which in fact was
earlier in time, because he thought the second letter was simply a duplicate
of the first.261' The father filed a timely motion to vacate the default, attach-
ing the letters from counsel as well as a letter demonstrating completion of
an outpatient substance abuse program.2 62 The father claimed excusable ne-
glect and a meritorious defense.263 The trial court held a hearing and denied
the motion based upon the best interests of the child, finding no excusable
neglect. 2' The appellate court held that the failure of the trial court to accept
252. Id. at 1001-02.
253. Id. See also M.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 765 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2000); M.N. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 826 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2002).
254. N.S., 857 So. 2d at 1001.
255. See FLA. STAT. § 39.506(3) (2004).
256. 860 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
257. Id. at 987.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. R.H., 860 So. 2d at 987.
262. Id.
263. Id. See also FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)(1).
264. R.H., 860 So. 2d at 987-88.
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the father's uncontroverted confusion was an abuse of discretion. 26" The
appellate court also found that the second element of the grounds for release
from judgment is not the best interest of the child, but rather whether there is
a meritorious defense.266 Finally, the court reversed because the trial court
terminated the father's parental rights without taking any evidence in support
of the termination, even assuming there was a default.267 Referring to the
United States Supreme Court case, Santosky v. Kramer,268 as well as other
Florida intermediate appellate court cases,269 the court held that even in a
default situation, evidence must be taken to determine the need for termina-
tion of parental rights. 7°
The issue of default also arose in a group of Second District cases, in-
volving both termination of parental rights and dependency. In In re L.A. 2 7' a
dependency case, the parent was in the restroom when the case was called.2 72
When the parent entered the courtroom, the trial court stated the following:
"Well, that's too late. You can just appeal if you need to. The record re-
flects it's 20 minutes to 10:00. This thing was set for 9:00.,,273 The appellate
court held that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the parent
consented to the adjudication of dependency. 274 The court held there was no
showing that a short continuance would have had adverse consequences to
the child.275 Relying on an earlier opinion from the Fourth District,276 the
appellate court found that there was no single valid reason to refuse the con-
tinuance, but rather good ones to grant it.2 77
In In re B.B. ,278 at a dependency arraignment hearing, the parent was un-
represented by counsel and not present when the case was called, but had
used his cell phone to contact the DCF employee in the courtroom directly.279
265. Id. at 988.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 988-89.
268. 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (recognizing the need for due process protections and the sig-
nificance of the parental interest at stake).
269. See M.A. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 760 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2000); M.E. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 728 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1999).
270. R.H., 860 So. 2d at 988-90.
271. 857 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
272. Id. at 311.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 312.
275. Id.
276. R.P. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 835 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
277. L.A., 857 So. 2d at 312-13.
278. 858 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
279. Id. at 1185.
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The court apparently learned this information, confirmed that the parent had
been served, and requested that DCF move for a default, which they did.28°
The court did not appoint a lawyer for another five months, whereupon the
lawyer filed a motion to set aside the default.28 When the lawyer attempted
to argue the default should be set aside, the court cut off counsel's argument
and summarily denied the motion even though the parent was anxious to
testify and explain why he had arrived five minutes late for the hearing.282
The appellate court recognized that the trial court has lengthy dockets and
needs to manage them. 283 However, as the appellate court said, "dependency
arraignment hearings where many parties are unrepresented and all parties
have already demonstrated that they have difficulty coping with life's normal
burdens are an especially questionable place to rigidly impose 'defaults' as a
method of case management. "284 Furthermore, the appellate court held that
the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide that when a consent is en-
tered to dependency, there must be a disposition hearing within fifteen
days. 85 The trial court did none of these things in B.B.286 In addition, under
the rules, a party has a right to seek to withdraw a consent for good cause
prior to the beginning of the disposition hearing.287
In re C.D.288 was a termination of parental rights case in which the fa-
ther was "three minutes late for the initial advisory hearing., 289 According to
appellate court, he waited outside the courtroom in the waiting area for forty-
five minutes until he was told where the proper courtroom was located. 90
Because he wasn't in the courtroom when the case was called, the father was
"defaulted. '29' In addition, he was unrepresented by counsel at the termina-
tion hearing.292 Within ten days of the entry of the default, the father sent a
letter to the trial court explaining why he was late. 293 The appellate court
concluded that although the trial court should have regarded the letter as a
motion for rehearing, it made no ruling and instead terminated the father's
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. B.B., 858 So. 2d at 1185-86.
284. Id. at 1186.
285. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 39.506(5) (2004); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.315(a).
286. B.B., 858 So. 2d at 1186.
287. Id. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.315(b).
288. 867 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 405-06.
291. Id. at 406.
292. Id.
293. CD., 867 So. 2d at 406.
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parental rights.294 One month after the termination, counsel was appointed to
represent the father.295 After reversing and remanding, the appellate court, in
a dramatic understatement, said that the trial court "must review these issues
and make a lawful decision as soon as possible following issuance of our
mandate. '296
The same problem occurred in the Fourth District. In A.M v. Depart-
ment of Children and Families,297 a termination of parental rights case, the
trial court entered a default against parents who were late for a hearing.298
According to the appellate court, the parents were mistaken about the public
transportation schedule, arriving one hour after the hearing was to begin.299
A consent to the termination of parental rights was thus entered.3°° The trial
court subsequently held a hearing on the parents' motion to set aside default
and denied it.3°1 Citing its prior holdings interpreting section 39.801(3)(d) of
the Florida Statutes,3 °2 the Fourth District vacated the default as an abuse of
discretion, holding that the trial court should ordinarily refrain from deciding
termination of parental rights cases by default where there was a reasonable
effort to be present by the parents. °3
The trial court also has an obligation to carefully weigh a parent's mo-
tion for continuance in a termination of parental rights case. In re D.S.304
arose out of a dispute between a mother and DCF about an alleged agreement
that DCF would not seek to terminate the parental rights as to her oldest
child so long as she relinquished parental rights as to her three other chil-
dren.305 The oldest child was in the custody of the father in Puerto Rico.30 6
The existence of the agreement came into dispute when a lawyer merely as-
sociated with the parent's counsel appeared on the day of trial to deliver con-
sents regarding the other children.3 7 The associated lawyer was under the
impression that there had been an agreement as to the consents, although
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. 853 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
298. Id. at 1084-85.
299. Id. at 1084.
300. Id. at 1085.
301. Id.
302. FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(d) (2004).
303. A.M, 853 So. 2d at 1085 (citing AJ. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 845 So. 2d 973
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003) and R.P. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 835 So. 2d 1212 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
304. 849 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
305. Id. at 412.
306. Id.
307. Id.
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DCF strenuously denied that there was one.3" 8 When the lawyer requested a
continuance of the trial on the ground that he had understood there was an
agreement and was not prepared to try the case, the trial court denied the
request and proceeded with the trial.309 Despite the fact that trial courts have
broad discretion in granting or denying continuances, the appellate court held
that the trial court abused its discretion, and that the denial of a continuance
created an injustice to the mother based upon the fundamental liberty inter-
ests recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Santosky.3 1°
Discovery issues occasionally are the subject of reported opinions in
termination of parental rights cases. In A.A. v. Department of Children and
Families,31 the court held that the parent's lawyer did not have a right to the
release of the names and addresses of the two younger children's foster par-
ents.3"' In a pretrial motion, the father's counsel argued that DCF's wit-
nesses would testify that the children were in good homes with good foster
parents and the only way to challenge that testimony was by means of dis-
covery as to the foster parents. 3 3 The appellate court affirmed the trial court
ruling that DCF did not have to reveal the names and addresses of the foster
parents for several reasons.314 First, it found that the termination statute did
not allow the court, in considering the manifest best interests of the child, to
compare the attributes of the parents to those providing present or future
placement for the child.3"5 Thus, an evaluation of a foster parent's quality
was not material to the termination proceedings.3"6 Furthermore, as a matter
of public policy, the court held that there is a need to protect caretakers
against intimidation and harassment.317
Under Florida law, there are nine separate grounds for termination of
parental rights,318 one of which is incarceration of the parent.3 9 Two cases
dealt with this standard during the past survey period. In In re A.D. C.,320 a
parent appealed from an order terminating his parental rights to a child who
was one and a half years old at the time of the termination, inter alia, on the
308. Id. at412-13.
309. D.S., 849 So. 2d at 413.
310. Id.; 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
311. 852 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
312. Id. at 320.
313. Id. at 319.
314. Id. at 320.
315. Id. at 320-21 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.810 (2004)).
316. A.A., 852 So. 2d at 321.
317. Id.
318. § 39.806(1)(A)-(I).
319. § 39.806(1)(D).
320. 854 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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ground that the parent's incarceration in a correctional institution would be
for a substantial portion of the time before the child obtained the age of
eighteen as required by statute.32' Under the facts of the case, the child
would be five years old at the time of the parent's release. 22 The appellate
court held, simply, that the time period in the case could not be described as
substantial, citing to other cases of limited incarceration time.323
In C.B. v. Department of Children and Families,324 the issue was
whether incarceration alone was enough to constitute grounds for termination
of parental rights when the specific ground for termination was abandon-
ment.325 The appellate court held that incarceration is a factor in considering
termination based upon abandonment, but incarceration alone is not suffi-
cient.326 In the case at bar, the court found that the mother kept in touch with
family members and constantly asked her sister, the child's aunt, about the
child.327 In turn, the aunt kept in communication with DCF.328 The child's
aunt also sent the mother pictures and kept the mother informed about the
child.329 The court reversed on the ground that the incarceration alone was
insufficient to justify termination.330 The court relied upon other cases re-
versing trial court decisions to terminate parental rights when an incarcerated
parent had not demonstrated a failure to make efforts to provide for the child
or carry out a case plan.33' Furthermore, the court made special mention that
DCF failed to provide the mother with the services necessary to complete a
case plan while incarcerated.332
In C.B., the court also dealt with egregious conduct as grounds for ter-
mination of parental rights.33 As defined by Florida statute, egregious con-
duct involves behavior that is "'outrageous by normal standards of con-
321. Id.at721.
322. Id.
323. Id. (citing W.W. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 811 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2002) (holding that fifty-four months is not a substantial period)); see also In re A.W.,
816 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
324. 874 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
325. Id. at 1248 (citing § 39.01 (defining abandonment)).
326. Id. at 1249 (citing In re T.B., 819 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. C.B., 874 So. 2d at 1249-50.
330. Id. at 1250.
331. Id. at 1249 (citing TB., 819 So. 2d at 270; C.A.H. v. Dep't. of Children & Families,
830 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002); In re T.C.S., 647 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994)).
332. Id. at 1252.
333. Id. at 1253-55. See FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f)(2004).
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duct'. 334 In C.B., the trial court found that while the mother was incarcer-
ated her first child was adjudicated dependent.335 Thereafter, she was medi-
cally furloughed from prison and got pregnant with another child who was
the subject of the instant proceeding.336 The trial court found it was outra-
geous for the mother to get pregnant while furloughed with a child she could
not care for.337 The appeals court held that there must be a nexus between
the behavior and the abuse, neglect, or other specific harm to the child in
order to serve as grounds for termination based upon egregious conduct.33 8
In addition, the court pointed out that in the context of prospective abuse,
DCF must also prove a nexus between the prior act of abuse or neglect and
any prospective abuse or neglect, a topic discussed elsewhere in this sur-
vey.339
B. Appellate Issues
In one of its two major decisions involving children and families, the
Supreme Court of Florida, in S.B. v. Department of Children and Families,34 °
held that there is no right to pursue a collateral proceeding challenging the
competency of court-appointed counsel34 1-the commonly-understood inef-
fective assistance of counsel argument-in civil dependency proceedings not
involving the possibility of criminal charges against the parent or permanent
termination of parental rights.342 The court agreed to hear S.B. because of a
conflict in lower court opinions.343 The Supreme Court of Florida first found
that in dependency proceedings, which are civil in nature, parents must be
informed of the right to counsel at all stages and, if indigent, to have counsel
334. C.B., 874 So. 2d at 1254 (quoting § 39.806(0(2)).
335. Id. at 1248.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 1254.
338. Id.; see also P.S. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 863 So. 2d 392, 394 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that there must be a connection between the activity or conduct
involved and abuse or neglect or specific harm to the child).
339. Id. at 1254 (citing J.F. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 866 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2004)).
340. 851 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 2003). For a detailed critical discussion of the case, see Michele
Forte, Note, Making the Case for Effective Assistance of Counsel in Termination of Parental
Rights Proceedings, 28 NOVA L. REv. 196 (2003).
341. S.B., 851 So. 2d at 690.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 691 (citing S.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 825 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2002); L.W. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 812 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2002)).
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appointed because state law so requires.344 The court then referred to In re
D.B.,3 a case in which the court previously held that a constitutional right to
counsel existed in dependency proceedings only in two cases: first, if the
proceedings would result in permanent termination of parental rights, and
second, when a parent might be charged with criminal child abuse.3 46 Be-
cause the parents in S.B. were not criminally charged, and there was nothing
to indicate that DCF was intending to bring a termination of parental rights
proceeding, there was no constitutional right to counsel in the case. 347 There
being no constitutional right to counsel, but only a statutory right, the court
held that there is no right to collaterally challenge the effectiveness of coun-
sel.34
8
VI. CHILD WELFARE CASES AND ADOPTION
The role of foster parents and grandparents in child welfare cases that
move to the adoption stage, as well as the extent of the trial court's authority
at the adoption stage, have been the subject of a number of reported cases in
Florida including two that are illustrative of problems in this area. In LB. v.
Department of Children and Families,349 foster parents appealed from an
order dismissing a petition to adopt a child, removing the child from their
home, and placing the child with a relative in Tennessee.35 The foster par-
ents, among other things, "moved to reappoint a guardian ad litem, intervene
in the dependency action, consolidate the dependency action with their adop-
tion case and place the case on the trial docket.""35 As to the guardian ad
litem program which had been very active in the case earlier on, the appellate
court stated, "[u]nfortunately, the Program responded they had no available
guardians and so were discharged from the appointment. 35 2 Ultimately, the
344. Id. at 691.
345. 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
346. S.B., 851 So. 2d at 692 (citing D.B., 385 So. 2d at 87, 90).
347. Id. at 693.
348. Id. at 693-94.
349. 876 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
350. Id. at 582.
351. Id. at 583.
352. 1d. For a detailed discussion on the subject of adequate representation of children in
child welfare proceedings, including issues related to the voluntary nature of the program and
the state court's attitudes toward it, see Michael J. Dale, Providing Counsel for Children in
Dependency Proceedings in Florida, 25 NOVA L. REv. 769 (2000). See also Guardian Ad
Litem: The Voice For Florida's Abused and Neglected Children, 2004 Progress Report (stat-
ing that approximately half of the 42,565 children in the system had a guardian ad litem on
June 30, 2004).
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court held a hearing, but took no evidence.353 Instead, it ruled that as a mat-
ter of law the decision to select the appropriate adoptive parents was one for
DCF and not for the judiciary, and that the foster parents lacked standing to
challenge DCF's decision.354 The appellate court reversed and remanded.355
First, it found, as had other courts, that foster parents have standing to inter-
vene 356 and are proper participants under the Florida Rules of Juvenile Pro-
cedure, even if not proper intervenors. 57 The appellate court then concluded
that the trial court erred "by refusing to consider the child's best interests
before changing placement from the foster parents to the relatives., 358 Under
the relevant provisions of both the dependency and adoption statutes, 359 the
appeals court held that the authority and discretion of DCF regarding adop-
tive placement is not absolute. 360 The appellate court also held that the trial
court had "inherent and continuing jurisdiction to entertain matters pertaining
to child custody and to enter any order appropriate to a child's welfare. 361
The foster parents attempted to challenge the Chapter 39 proceedings as
facially violative of equal protection because, while Chapter 63 refers to a
best interest test governing adoption of a child, according to the foster par-
ents, DCF had unfettered discretion in adoption under Chapter 39.362 The
appellate court held that the best interest standard applies in both instances.363
In B.B. v. Department of Children and Families,3" a grandmother ap-
pealed from a final order denying her motion to intervene in a dependency
proceeding related to twin grandchildren as well as the denial of her petition
for adoption.3 65 The trial court refused to address the adoption petition on the
merits.366 During the course of the dependency proceedings, the two children
were transferred to the appellant as the children's relative custodian where
they resided for a period of time. 367 After the appellant's son, whom DCF
353. LB., 876 So. 2d at 583.
354. Id. at 584.
355. Id. at 588.
356. Id. at 584 (citing Sullivan v. Sapp, 866 So. 2d 28, 33 (Fla. 2004); FLA. R. Civ. P.
1.230).
357. I.B., 876 So. 2d at 584 (citing FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.210(b)).
358. Id. at 586.
359. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.812(4), (5), 63.022(2).
360. Id.
361. Id.; see also Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. J.C., 847 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 2002).
362. LB., 876 So. 2d at 586.
363. Id.
364. 854 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
365. Id. at 823.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 824.
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advised could no longer reside in the appellant's home if the children were to
remain, failed to move out within twenty-four hours, DCF removed the chil-
dren from her home. 368 However, DCF did leave five of appellant's minor
nieces and nephews in her home.3 69 At the termination of parental rights
trial, DCF was considering a cousin as a suitable adoptive home.37 ° The
cousin ultimately was unable or unwilling to adopt, and DCF took no steps to
assist the appellant to obtain custody, and in fact reduced her visitation
rights.371 The grandmother then filed a motion to intervene in the ongoing
dependency proceeding and to enforce an earlier court order that she be con-
sidered for adoption in the event the cousin could not adopt.37 The trial
court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction until an adoption petition was filed un-
der Chapter 63. The grandmother filed a petition, and the trial court de-
nied it.3 74 The trial court held that it: "lacked jurisdiction, because the de-
pendency court [under Chapter 39] has ongoing reviews and jurisdiction
until the children are adopted; that DCF had identified another adoptive
home for the twins; that DCF did not consent to Appellant's adoption of the
twins and, absent DCF's consent, an adoption petition must be denied., 375
The appellant was also denied intervener status.376
The appellate court held, first, that the trial court was in error in stating
that it lacked jurisdiction.377 It held that the dependency court has jurisdic-
tion after a TPR trial despite the fact that there may be a subsequent adoption
proceeding under Chapter 63.378 In fact, according to the appellate court, the
statutes prescribe jurisdiction. 379 As in .B., 38° DCF argued that the court
must give "unqualified deference to [their] placement decision., 38' The ap-
pellate court disagreed, finding that the agency's "authority and discretion
are not absolute. 382 The court gave examples such as the court's ability to
place conditions on the exercise of DCF discretion concerning the children
and the court's ability to refuse to grant the adoption petition of a non-
368. Id.
369. B.B., 854 So. 2d at 824.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 825.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. B.B., 854 So. 2d at 825.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. B.B., 854 So. 2d at 825 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 39.812(4), -.813 (2003)).
380. 876 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
381. B.B., 854 So. 2d at 826.
382. Id.
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relative.383 Relying on an earlier opinion from the Fourth District Court of
Appeal in Florida Department of Children and Families v. Adoption of
B.G.J. ,384 the court held that non-interference by the court would exist so
long as the selection was appropriate and in compliance with policies made
in an expeditious manner.385 Thus, the appellate court concluded that the
trial court has an obligation to "ensure that DCF's selection is appropriate
and consonant with DCF's policy. 38 6 Given the statutory and case law pref-
erence for grandparents in the adoption process, the grandparent had priority,
and failure to consider the individual with such priority was neither appropri-
ate under the facts of the case nor consistent with DCF policies and Florida
law governing relative placement.387
VII. STATUTORY CHANGES
The Florida Legislature made a number of statutory changes in the past
year in the delinquency area, including a change regarding the obligation of
families to pay for the cost of supervision of children in delinquency care.3 88
The new law requires the court to order a parent of a child who is in home
detention, on probation, or other supervised status or placement, secure de-
tention or committed to DJJ to pay a daily fee for costs of supervision and
care.3 89 Under certain circumstances, the court can reduce the fees.39 °
On the dependency side, the legislature passed a statute governing edu-
cation of abused, neglected, and abandoned children.3 91 As is typical in Flor-
ida, the legislation fails to provide any rights or a cause of action.392 Fur-
thermore, the legislation does not require an expenditure of funds.393 How-
ever, it does obligate DCF to enter into an agreement with the Department of
Education concerning the education and related services of children known
to them. 394 It also requires DCF to enter into agreements with school boards
and other entities regarding children known to them,395 including enrollment
383. Id.
384. 819 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
385. B.B., 854 So. 2d at 826 (citing Adoption of B.G.J., 819 So. 2d at 986).
386. Id. at 827.
387. Id.
388. FLA. STAT. § 985.2311 (2004).
389. § 985.2311(1)(a)-(b).
390. § 985.2311(3)-(4).
391. § 39.0016.
392. See § 39.0016.
393. Id.
394. § 39.0016(3).
395. § 39.0016(4).
2005]
294
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss2/1
NOVA LA WREVIEW
in school, notification of the name and phone number of the child, establish-
ing a protocol to share information, and notification of DCF's case plan-
ning.396 In return, the school district will provide DCF with a listing of its
services, identify services which are needed for children known to DCF, de-
termine whether transportation is available, continue enrollment in the same
school throughout the time the child is known to DCF, provide individual-
ized student intervention when necessary, cooperate in assessment of ser-
vices and support needed for the children, and appoint a surrogate parent
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
397
The legislature also passed a statute setting up a procedure for release of
confidential information contained in the records of DCF pertaining to "in-
vestigations of alleged abuse, abandonment, or neglect of the child."'3 98 The
statute provides a test for release based upon good cause for public access
found to be in the best interest of the child who is the focus of the proceed-
ing. 3
99
The legislature passed a judicial review procedure for children aging out
of the dependency system.4" It provides for a mandatory judicial review
hearing within ninety days after a child's seventeenth birthday and hearings
thereafter to review the status of the child concerning a series of matters re-
lated to the child's movement toward independent living." 1 Included is the
power of the court, when it concludes that DCF has not complied with its
obligation as articulated in the written case plan for the child or the provision
for independent living services as otherwise provided by Florida law, to issue
an order to show cause, give DCF thirty days to comply, and ultimately to
hold DCF in contempt. 40 2 The same statute also requires DCF to continue to
include independent living and life skills information in its report to courts
on the status of thirteen to eighteen year olds.4 °3
The legislature also made a very specific change to the post disposition
provisions of Chapter 39 regarding petitions for adoption and the involve-
ment of licensed foster parents or court-ordered custodians. 4 4 It changed
Chapter 39 to provide that when a foster parent or custodian is not granted an
application to adopt, DCF cannot move the child from the foster home absent
396. § 39.0016(4)(a)(1)-(4).
397. § 39.0016(4)(b)(1)-(4), (c)(5); 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (2000).
398. FLA. STAT. § 39.2021(1) (2004).
399. Id.
400. § 39.701.
401. § 39.701(6).
402. § 39.701(6)(a)-(c).
403. § 39.701(7)(a)(10).
404. See § 39.812.
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a prior court order." 5 The exceptions to this section are if there is danger of
abuse and neglect, the foster parent agrees, or most significantly, thirty days
have expired following a written notice to the foster parent, and there has
been no formal challenge to the agency decision.4"6
Finally, the legislature allowed DCF to enter into agreements "with a
private provider to finance, design, and construct a [mental health] treatment
facility... of at least 200 beds and to operate all aspects" of that facility.40 7
The agreements cannot exceed twenty years.40 8
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida decided two significant cases in this past
reporting year. They deal with the question of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel in dependency cases4" and the burden of proof in a termination case
where the parental rights to another child in the family have already been
terminated.4" ° At the appellate level, the intermediate appellate courts have
been very active in both the dependency and the termination of parental
rights areas, ruling on a number of issues including how the courts should
handle proceedings where the parents miss their appearance4 ' and in delin-
quency cases involving school settings.4"2
405. § 39.812(4).
406. § 39.812(4)(a)-(c).
407. § 287.057(14)(b).
408. Id.
409. See S.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 851 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 2003).
410. See Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2004).
411. See R.H. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 860 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2003); In re I.A., 857 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); In re B.B., 858 So. 2d
1184 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); In re C.D., 867 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003);
A.M. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 853 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
412. See State v. J.T.D., 851 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); M.H. v. State, 851
So. 2d 233 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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